Somebody home?

I wonder if anyone is aware of the chasm ahead. From what I can see it would seem like no, nobody is taking notice. But then again I may be wrong. Hopefully.

Chavo-madurismo in overdrive

I write "chavo-madurismo" because including all of chavismo is not accurate at this time. There are enough voices inside chavismo that have decided to speak up and who think that genuinely and strategically it is better to acknowledge the electoral defeat and rebuild first chavismo before attempting to counter the opposition. Note: these are not democratic voices, these are people that are aware that they have lost a majority and who are simply surprised by the result and think that it is a mere historical accident and that a little bit of polish will be enough to return to full power for el pueblo.

The chavo-madurismo is as such a faction inside chavismo that has no time nor intention to change anything. Thus they are in an overdrive to conserve their power, privileges and legal immunity. The last one, legal immunity is the motor of that group (by the way, General Reverol may be officially indicted in US courts this week). Too compromised in corruption human rights violations and drug trafficking they know very well that their future will flounder fast with a mere cursory audit of their tenure in office. Thus for them it is out of question to allow that a new assembly can audit them. Period.

All what chavo-madurismo is trying to do to avoid its fate (rigging of high court, creating para legal structures and what not in the three weeks before January 5) will not stand legal review and will lead to an inevitable confrontation that will play in international arena. See, if the gained control at the National Assembly is voided by force, then it is enough for the new chair of the Assembly to demand to the OAS to apply its Democracy Chart. This time around, with heavy weights on board like Argentina, the Venezuela crisis will be made a world crisis. Add the humanitarian side and there you go.

Because while castro-chavo-madurismo fights recklessly for its survival, at all costs, this happens:

Tras la muerte de niños con Cancer este titular enajena: "Quimioterapias que trajo el gobierno son ineficaces" pic.twitter.com/qVZg9rIEJo

— Nelson Bocaranda S. (@NelsonBocaranda) December 16, 2015

The chimio treatments imported for children ARE NOT working. Anyone home to answer for that?

The opposition seems preoccupied elsewhere

While chavo-madurismo is in overdrive the opposition does not  seem in a hurry to take charge.

On one side we have a Capriles who thinks his strategy was the one that allowed the opposition to win a majority, namely that the Assembly was elected solely to solve material problems for the people. Thus he places himself squarely as the rightful spokesperson for the new majority. A strategy equally wrong since 1) the new assembly cannot be the direct actor in improving the fate of el pueblo,  the gouvernement is still in charge of that no matter what as even the new laws application will depend on the good will of the regime, 2) that even if it could do so, the solutions to be written down are not of easy or fast application, 3) not all agree in the priorities that Capriles demands and 4) his demands are possibly unrealistic in the actual context where the regime is applying brute force.

The fact of the matter is that the opposition victory is born on many parameter that include the unrest of early 2014, the discredit of the regime since the 2014 repression, the economic crisis and the protest vote as a reaction, and also the offering of Capriles. But by far not alone by the non confrontational offering of Capriles, the more so that the regime is getting into open confrontation mode.

This explain why the newly elected representatives are more worried about deciding who will chair the coming assembly, and who will hold such and such commission rather than mounting an effective platform to reply to the regime recent attacks. Never mind starting to explain to the country that there is no money for anything when there are people inside chavismo that blithely state the the new assembly will refuse to vote the constant special credits that the executive demands for its social programs.

One is also allowed to wonder whether there is somebody home in charge. Some are noticing this early absence of leadership in the opposition.

And yet the opposition immediate priorities are simple. Considering that a confrontation is inevitable the opposition must from now announce that all measures current mesures taken by the regime will be voided on day first, that the CNE renewal will be conducted immediately and that the amnesty law will be the first law voted. If the regime seeks confrontation, we will give it in our terms, in an area where the opposition is unimpeachable, at least overseas.

In short, the opposition must take a grip of the only defensive tools it can get: fair elections (if needed soon), political leaders free on the streets from jail or exile, partial recuperation of freedom of information and press. Or is it that the political agenda of people like, say, Capriles is more important than the national agenda at a time where we need to find a side that will be able to negotiate the import of food and medicine that are required in 2016 for us not suffer more than necessary?

The last days of Maduro. Or is it of Cabello?

I will try to be short. The actions that Maduro and Cabello are taking are playing against them. One could almost call them suicidal.


Summary: after a begrudging acceptation of results in the wee hours of Monday 7, Maduro and then Cabello have started to push the ante by taking all sorts of measure to neutralize the reach of the newly elected assembly. Accompanying this, of course, we hear a fiery speech to defend the revolution and go above institutions as needed, if we can call the racketeering system that the regime has put in place "institutions". In no particular importance:
- Promotion of the judge that put Leopoldo Lopez in jail
- Swearing o 12 new high court judges without respecting the delays and rules specified in the constitution and laws (written by the regime, by the way).
- Depriving the National Assembly of its own TV network, thus maintaining the country real news black out.
- More promises of the sort such as ruling through "asambleas del pueblo" as if the pueblo had not just voted in 112 seats...
- Sending red shirted thugs to break down press conferences of dissident chavistas (and directing a full blown scale verbal attack on those inside chavismo that want to point out the high levels of the regime as the ones responsible for the defeat).
- Refusing to accept any guilt for the defeat; all is the fault of the economical warfare, of the empire, of the opposition hold on media, etc. Without bothering to present a single shred of evidence: it is my word and that is enough.

Interpretation.

First there was the shock. The regime never expected such a stunning defeat. Like this blogger, it expected that in the end, facing the voting machine, a lot of disgruntled chavista would vote conservative, that is, the 17 year old regime. Except that this blogger knew the polls were too overwhelmingly against the regime and that the vote spread would be 16%, 10% less than what polls were saying.

See, the inner workings of the fraudulent electoral system is that it is not too difficult to apply some make up to bad electoral results. The regime can pad its vote at the last minute if the results are close ("late" voters, voting tables where opposition witness have been banned and which suddenly have 100% participation, and more). But this time around the results were so dramatic that the last minute forcing out of people to go and vote may have resulted in actually more votes for the opposition...

In short the regime was prepared for a narrow victory, at worst. They truly believed it. We cannot conclude otherwise. How come they made such a crass mistake is for the books.

There were two immediate consequences when the results were announced.

The first one was that the repressed dissidence within chavismo was going to cash in, the "I told you so" campaign that the regime had all the trouble in the world to contain would not be contained anymore. And that will be a direct challenge to Maduro and Cabello.

The second one was that the new assembly would sooner or later start investigating the actions of Cabello and his allies (Maduro as the president must be removed from office first before being fully investigated). For Cabello, already under international investigation, it was a sure thing that Venezuela was his safe haven. But not anymore. For him to avoid investigation at home would be at the price of leaving the political scene and, possibly, return part of what he stole or gained illegally. That is, the opposition could only forgive him once it made sure that Cabello could not be a nuisance anymore. Maduro's own unpopularity does not make such process necessary but that his family can now be thoroughly investigated has the same effect on his future.

It is true that the opposition for the sake of political stability and because of the dire economic crisis ahead may chose not to remove Maduro or to investigate Cabello for the time being. But it will happen and there is no way for Maduro and Cabello to recover politically fast enough to block these attempts. A 15% vote defeat cannot be regained in a few month, not even through some form of referendum. By the time chavismo can regain competitiveness it would be too late for both of them.

Hence the sudden and desperate offensive this past week, and the ones to come until January 5. What Maduro and Cabello are doing are desperate measures. Even if they were to be met with some success the economic crisis aggravation as of now would sweep them.

In short, what they are doing right now is counterproductive for their political survival. We are witnessing the last weeks, maybe months at best for them, of Cabello and Maduro. Which is not to say that their replacement would be any better, but that is another story.

Note: since Chavez left for his last trip to Cuba, Maduro and Cabello have been fighting out for his "legacy". Their never ending battle which seemed to go Cabello for a while had a very negative collateral effect: they forgot or did not have time to think about the realities of the country. Not daring to take any of the necessary measures needed to avoid a worsening of the crisis, that had already started in the last year of Chavez, this one came back with a vengeance causing this electoral disaster. They have only themselves to blame and chavismo knows it. Hence the open dissidence of a political system that does not want to go down with Cabello and Maduro.

A vote for the times

What happened today in Venezuela is truly momentous, better than the wildest hopes the opposition could have ever had a year ago. In the last 3-4 months the objective of a nice victory was getting clearer, but tonight the preliminary result announcing a 2 to 1 victory in seats? No way, Jose!

As I type this I am half drunk with the bottle I drowned on my own over the excruciating long wait of the night. No, I am no lush, I did the pilgrimage for a last vote to San Felipe now that I live mostly in Caracas. I have not gotten around to change my district (next in Petare to help Ocariz). But I had kept that semi cheap Chilean champagne that I did not drink in 2009 keeping it for when chavismo would be ousted. It had to wait 5 years in my fridge and me alone but willing. My stupor is accompanied by the streets which are suddenly awake with caravans of opposition supporters in this very chavista state which may be getting back to old former governor Lapi days.

They are right to celebrate as this election marks the end of an era, at last. Chavismo cannot recover from such as stunning disaster that not even Cuban "expertise" could avoid. There are still 17 seats to be decided, too close to call, but the opposition already has secured the 3/5 supernumerary majority and by getting a few of the 17 it may not reach the fabled 2/3 majority needed for certain laws but it will be strong enough to offer a credible resistance against a desperate regime. The future of chavismo is bleak, and it certainly does not pass through its current structure and mood. Implosion is in the future and speedy internal reform is a must if it does not want to disappear, if it wants to remain a leftist option in Venezuela. Appealing crassly to Chavez memory was a mistake, they killed the idol. Now they are on their own.

There is no need to inquire deeply in the causes of the rout. Empty shelves and 200% inflation say it all. As I wrote often, in the last two years the regime has had the chance to take some economic measures that would not have avoided the crisis but made it less politically damaging. But it did not. The regime was hostage to utmost currency exchange arbitration abuse and drug trafficking, all protected by the upper army cadres. What happened in the end was that the populist government lost contact with the populi. And that was that.

What comes next is an exciting page in our history and renewed blogging fervor from yours truly. Only one thing can be more interesting to blog about than the downfall of a regime: the birth of a new order.

Make no mistake, the road is still flush with ambushes. A narco regime was stunned by a defeat they truly never believed could happen. But as the international penal law starts closing in there is no telling what desperate measures they could be willing to risk. Keep in mind that in spite of the disaster, a 40% still voted for the regime. A quick renewal could mean a quick return.

Yet, the economic disaster will kill political support for whatever system comes next and even that 2/3 potential victory will require for the opposition to reach out to chavismo to avoid the worst, something that could even include an increased civil war. Yes, the daily number of violent death in the country are already the signs of a civil war waged between drug and corrupt gangs for their turf, both against the common citizen.

But how to deal with that is best left for the coming days. Tonight we must celebrate one thing: el pueblo spoke and proved that freebies and promises of freebies are not enough. In the end maybe democratic values are not the decisive factors when voting, but accounting is. And demanding accounting for the rulers is where democracy starts. Let's savor that moment when Venezuelans put aside political polarization, artificially created class and race divides and went all together, from negritos to catires, from tierruos to sifrinos, to say that enough is enough, that equality is not standing all together in line for a little bit of milk.

The decalogue of a new opposition (eventually?) led National Assembly

A thought exercise first. If the MUD opposition alliance gains a majority in the new National Assembly, who is the opposition? Maduro or the MUD?


This being said, when the National Assembly settles in next January which could be the initial measures that can prove new times have come, even if there a simple majority of seats?

Before the swearing in. In no particular order, as they come to mind during my morning coffee.

1) Announce the new directors of ANTV, the C-span of sorts. This network, mostly cable, is one the propaganda tools of the regime. It is also the network that the MUD can reopen to public debate and democracy from day one. Voiding this way the need to buy back one the private networks bought by regime mystery figures. ANTV would go in a few days from the least watched network to the most watched in Venezuela.

2) Announce that control of the Assembly will be all in the hands of the MUD. BUT...  offering two or three commissions to chavismo as a good gesture to start a useful debate. After the sectarian years of Diosdado Cabello at the head, that would improve the political climate greatly, nation wide. Note: that measure can be strengthened by the MUD offering these commissions chairs to PSUV representatives not associated with previous sectarian practices: folks like Cabello or Eekhout cannot chair any commission.

3) Announce before Christmas, or even next week, who will be the new Assembly chair, so as to have a forceful spokesperson to counter regime's last minute treacheries.

4) Announce that any Maduro's initiative before the Assembly is sworn in will be dead on arrival, that is, will not be funded and legally reverted. The simple objective here is to announce regime's treachery before this one is even proposed, countering from the start any propaganda effect.

5) Announce that from day one the press corps will be allowed to monitor live the debates of the Assembly. Yet announcing that the other rules of the Assembly will be kept as is for the first year (to teach the regime representatives a lesson in democracy).

And announce the first laws that will be discussed starting day 1.

6) An amnesty law. Since there is no way to have fair trials the new assembly has to assume a provisional guilty status of the political prisoners until at a later date the unfair and infamous trials can be reversed. By proclaiming an amnesty law the opposition thus in a way recognizes the sentences but also gets to free all political prisoners and even allow the return of many political exiles. Leopoldo Lopez back in the streets with his acquired Mandela status courtesy of the regime clumsiness, will be the nightmare of the executive power of Maduro...

7) A budget reform to guarantee that local financial needs are met as intended. This will strike at the heart of the regime financial muscle. Chavez had managed by all sorts of tricks to deprive the states and city halls of a large chunk of  what constitutionally should have gone to them. On one hand the regime gained a weakening of local authorities and on the other Chavez gained more direct patronage. Yes, such a measure would appear to strengthen the existing large majority of chavista governors, but it will also force then to give to their own opposition city halls the funds they require to function, a dramatic gain for some town halls that the regime has sabotaged to the extreme. Two notes: the regime should willingly sign in such a reform because it will get a more effective help from the local administrations to solve the humanitarian crisis at hand. And the governors have only one year left in their tenure so it will be difficult for them to use that windfall efficiently enough to build a reelection machinery.

8) An administrative reform of the comptrollers office to stop the practice of depriving politicians of their rights without the legal ruling in court: inahabilitaciones. Currently an obscure bureaucrat at the order of the regime can simply forbid so and so to run for election or become a public employee.

9) An anti expropriation bill. This way the recent abuses such as those of SUNDEE, Dakazo and the like will be stopped unless the regime previews a fair return before proceeding to expropriation. A way to restore a minimum of trust to bring back some investments to the country.

10) A bill to review the functioning of the expropriations done before. Those which have been a failure should be returned free of charge (and indemnity for the robbed properties?) to the owners who still want to get them back. If indemnity cannot be offered right now, at least offer them tax breaks for a few years to allow them to restart the business.

I am not including laws to revert some of the ruinous social programs. After all inflation will take care of their undoing and the regime executive privileges would force Maduro's combo to finance them at the very least through less corruption. In fact it will be cheap talk to proclaim the Assembly support for existing programs"as is". Also some unpopular measures such as the price of gas, are left at Maduro's doorstep. The common thread in the above Decalogue is to restore some trust in the battered political and economical needs of the country, to jump start what can be jump started legally through the specific constitutional powers of the assembly. The Assembly is not closing down on the regime's alleged reforms, it is building on them by correcting excesses. A fine line but a line worth threading.

And by announcing such type of laws before starting audits and inquiries on corruption would be a good PR operation, the more so that through ANTV and a reform of CONATEL, the media regulation agency, the MUD will have a way to counter the communication abuses of the regime.

Of course, if the opposition gets a 3/5 or 2/3 majority things will be simplified, and we can even foresee a regime collapse sped up through these very simple initial measures.

NOTE: I list all of these but let's not forget that there will be a full month in between the election and the swearing in, a period long enough for the regime to do enough treachery to stop some of these initiatives. A good measure on how to fight for the next thousand measures required will proceed....

The truth on the weeks after (elections YV-11)

So tomorrow we vote. And what will happen next?


First, a mea culpa of sorts. Until 2-3 weeks ago I still thought that the regime was going to find a way to suspend the election. It did not (well, it still has about 8 hours left). From this we can conclude that the regime is so aware of its defeat, and so aware that there is no way to recover part of the lost ground in a short time, that it decided to go ahead anyway and see what happens next. For me, that there are elections, is paradoxically a way for the regime to recognize in advance that they lost and cannot turn around the result in a "good and timely manner".

Tomorrow they certainly will do their utmost to gain votes even by forcing people to vote, even by carrying busloads of people at 10 PM to vote, etc...  After all they even jailed the head of Sucre district police and keep the police in their barracks so the colectivos of Sucre will have a free reign of terror to "bring in the vote". Yet, no matter what, these last minute despair tactics will be limited in scope (the world is watching) and they cannot change the fundamental event of the election: the power shift, the end of chavismo grip over the collective imaginary.

What happens tomorrow and Monday I have written about. Now as a responsible blogger I should pen down what I think may happen in the next weeks.

There are lots of OpEd around, speculating on what legally the new assembly can do whether the opposition MUD gains a simple majority or a supernumerary 2/3 majority. Other people already discuss the agreements that the regime and the opposition will have to reach. There is even talk of civility and Harina P.A.N. returning to our every day lives and shelves. I am not going to enter these discussions since even Monday morning, results in hand, it will be dangerous to speculate.

The reason that I do not want to partake in the guessing game is that we are not dealing here with a normal democratic regime which has become, shall we say, a little tense over the last decades. The regime has reduced itself to a gang of thugs and narco traffickers and with such people you cannot discuss, you cannot make an agreement. They eliminate you or you eliminate them first. This is the logic of street gangs. Force. Period.

For a speculation to make any sense it should start with the basic effect that the result will have over the inner divisions of chavismo. This movement can be divided roughly in three, for the purposes of this discussion.

One group has it all on line and will fight for its survival until the end. I am talking of course of the higher up in the regime which has dabbled in phenomenal corruption and, apparently, also ALL in drug trafficking now that we know that first lady Cilia Flores nephews are into DEA custody. This group that includes Cabello and Maduro are willing to go to the deep end.

The second group is the wavering one. Those did benefit from the regime but neither to the extremes of the first group, or not as much as they would have liked to. The point for that group is that many do not feel the need to immolate themselves for the sake of the first group.

The last group is formed by the "transactional" chavistas (public employees, mision beneficiaries). As long as their livelihood is not unduly threatened they will be unwilling to immolate themselves, the more so that the regime has proven himself unable to sustain its financial support. We could add a fourth group, the ideological one, but I think it will spread across the three groups, the more so that part of that radical group does not like Maduro or Cabello.

Now, what will truly happen depends on how these groups will individually react to tomorrow's result. That is the key at to what changes may be possible. We could see either a speedy downfall of the regime or an attempt at outright repression. But "negotiations" for a transition will only be made possible if chavismo finally divides publicly with an important faction deciding to seat down and talk with the opposition.

What can bring this about? Not the actual number of seats in the Assembly. After all, with the control exerted over all the branches of power the regime has many ways to limit the reach of the new assembly even if that one gets the magical 2/3 supernumerary.  No, what will really affect chavismo is its actual vote, and how far from the opposition it will be. And this nuanced to some specific local results.

For example a 10% vote difference may still allow for a certain cohesion within chavismo. However if in spite of a that rather good result for chavismo we have some noted figures bite the dust anyway, like radical evil Jaua in Miranda, then all demons may get loose. Or if you prefer, the MUD wins by 15% but Jaua survives and chavismo retains a majority in ten states then the impact is not that bad and chavismo may want to try arm twisting for size.

Finally if the opposition manages a 20% spread, even if it does not get the 2/3 majority, chavismo will simply implode.

A final note before concluding this entry. Do not forget that the MUD is an electoral alliance and that inside it there are groups only too willing to make deals with chavismo, like the representatives that will be elected under the Lara governor wing, Falcon. Or even Ramos Allup needing to protect some of his relatives involved in juicy bolibourgeois deals. The MUD is not an alliance of saints. The MUD is an alliance of people forced to do so if they do not want to be politically annihilated. For the MUD to keep its resolve, to remain united to forge ahead with the displacement of the regime, it needs at the very least a 20% victory margin over the PSUV.

So there you are. Do not read too much into tea leaves or constitutional manuals. What comes next is the browbeating of a gang of thugs with as little as possible of collateral damage.

Flowers and letters: no romance for the revolutionary corpse

It is hard to underestimate the weigh of this week's events on an agonizing Maduro's headed regime. Even your prudent blogger is cautiously allowing himself to believe that yes, indeed, the regime's life should be counted in weeks... Or that at the very least a major change is just around the corner.

The week started with the reply sent to Tibisay Lucena by OAS Secretary Luis Almagro. See, Almagro got really upset about the flippancy of Tibisay Lucena, head of the CNE, Venezuela's electoral board. The woman, on orders from the regime that she is only too happy to oblige, is refusing ANY supervision to the crucial electoral process coming on December 6.


As it turns out the international community has been sending lots of hints as to the validity and fairness of the coming election. These hints have not been duly responded. Thus these hints became more and more direct, asking formally the CNE to allow real international observation, not the mere tourist tour on election day by "friendly" countries which in addition are barred from direct comment on elections. Lucena (and so many others in the regime) have become ruder and ruder, going as far as saying that people like Almagro were interfering on sovereign matters (injerencia). In short: butt off.

The latest curt and undiplomatic reply of Tibisay to Luis was just too much for him and he replied in a long 18 pages letter (PDF in Spanish here). He needed that much space because the letter reads like the longest most comprehensive indictment on Tibisay Lucena's work. Nothing was missed, from the cheapest electoral treacheries, to the lack of access by the opposition to TV, through all the material abuses of the regime, without forgetting political prisoners. Almagro even shows his clear understanding of gerrymandering as done in Venezuela. All, ALL is there. Asking for an observation is in fact a courtesy of sorts, to offer a chance for the regime to state its case.

This letter is of utmost importance because he lays at the feet of Lucena all the guilt for any negative consequence that the fraudulent elections may have. Almagro's team (and allies as he cannot have sent such a letter without the acquiescence of a few OAS members) is absolutely clear on that guilt: either Lucena has been promoting that treachery or she has remained silent in front of it. In the end all will be her direct responsibility. In short, the letter is, well, an ultimatum.

But any rational answer that the regime may have considered to Almagro's letter was taking a back seat when we learned today that two close relatives of Cilia Flores, Maduro's wife and probably the real power behind the throne, were arrested in Haiti as 800 kilos deal of cocaine traffic was busted. As the amateurs that these kids were they blurted immediately their status and their diplomatic passport. To no avail of course for the DEA personnel. Within hours all major papers in the world have been carrying the news that Maduro's close step-relatives were busted, and busted bad.

No link needed, just pick up WSJ, NYT, El Pais, Veja, etc...  for details. In short, the two kids fell like amateurs trusting what seemed a rather casual contact from Honduras who was in fact a DEA undercover agent.  Cilia Flores nepotism has defrayed the chronicles so there is no surprise in seeing these kids with a high sense of entitlement showing their diplomatic passport (though being nobodies), and promptly saying that they were Maduro's family, and then stating that the drug belonged to Diosdado and Tarek El Aissami (Aragua's governor, on the DEA list). These kids are going to chirp as much as asked.

One can only wonder if they were not set up from the start by a rival Venezuelan drug cartel to sink another one.

Now, this is a big problem. The only way for Cilia and Nicolas out of that mess is to condemn the kids and ask for justice to apply firmly. But we all know that this is not going to happen. So, what? We may have all sorts of invective against the US. Even a final break with closing embassies. Perhaps even a formal notification of Venezuela leaving the OAS (remember the letter at the beginning).  The regime may even go as far as cancelling the election for "national security reasons since diplomatic passports are not respected".

But nobody outside of Venezuela will follow. Diplomatic immunity is no blanket immunity to begin with. And it applies only in the country where your mission is. Unless the Flores kids were attached to the Venezuelan embassy in Port au Prince there is little Venezuela can do. A crime is a crime and drug traffic is a crime everywhere in the world except in Venezuela, it seems. Though we can be sure that Haiti will stop receiving its allowances (and may have stopped to do so for a while which means they turned to the US where the bucks are).

I really do not see how the regime can wiggle out of this one. Someone will have to pay, if anything for allowing such a mess to happen, for being such a careless operator. The facts are clear. The world has served notice to the regime that its elections are rigged. The world has announced to the regime that its narco state character is not acceptable. The DEA has learned its lesson form the Carvajal fiasco in Aruba and now they are ready to pick up regime narco officials one by one, as soon as they set foot outside of Venezuela. There must be feverish meetings tonight at Miraflores Palace and major military camps.

I do not know what is going to happen, but something is going to. Since the odds of Cilia abandoning her brood are nil (never mind that they implicated Maduro's own son) we must look elsewhere.  Since this is an irrational thug system anything crazy can happen.  I would dare to suggest that the only way the regime can try to limit damage from this, and maybe even gain some leverage, is by forcing Maduro to resign in the coming days.

Maduro and Cilia are now beyond "damaged goods", even for their Cuban puppet masters. Forcing them to resign would have one immediate effect: suspend legislative elections where the spread is now reaching 20% against the regime in polls. In a presidential system presidential elections come first and the regime can hope that a presidential election may favor an opposition division while the anti Maduro chavista base may decide to come back to the regime once Maduro is out.  Legislative elections can be held later. If the regime loses the presidency it will not matter much for chavismo in the Assembly; if it retains the presidency then it will be easier to retain a legislative majority. Or so would the strategy go.  It would be easy to play around electoral agenda using primaries, etc, to postpone presidential elections all the way until February/March and legislative ones all the way until May or June.

That is what I would do if I were the regime, try to gain a few months in the hope oil prices go up again, or that opposition leadership is all in jail.

At any rate, tonight I truly feel for the first time that something has been set into motion, for better or for worse.

PS: note that 800 seem to be a magic kabalistic number for chavismo, like in the Antonini cash bag for Kirchner reelection or the 800 kilos of cocaine in Haiti.

Weil sums up the Venezuelan situation

Cartoonist Weil publishes an extraordinary cartoon (and he has quite a few of them!)

In the background the symbol of the corrupt regime gangs fighting against each other for political control through colectivos, grenades, etc...

Further in front petty thieves stealing in hunger whatever they can (toilet paper, for example, how can that be any more pathetic?).

In front two items, paupers fighting over a chicken while someone is dead on ground through hunger, crime, whatever....

There you have it, Venezuela today. I am impressed.

2015: the lost year

It has been three weeks without posting. But in all truth what should have I written about?


That the regime has decided to become outright cruel, be it Leopoldo Lopez jail or the Colombian border disgraceful human rights abuses?

That new electoral cheating is performed?

That now criminal gangs are using grenades against police quarters, when grenades are supposedly exclusive property of the military?

That even Putin tries to explain to Maduro that the price of oil ain't going back up any time soon?

That Obama and the Pope and the West are only too happy to let Venezuela sink as long as it keeps financing a Cuban transition and an assortment of ungrateful shitty islands of the Caribbean?

That the Syrian refugee crisis is to be blamed squarely on the West for not assuming its full responsibility when it started applauding the Arab spring?

That Santos seem to have been defeated by the FARC and Cuba and chavismo when the battle was nearly won when he assumed power first, a victory where his participation was stellar?

You already get the hint that 2015 will be a lost year for a lot of people even though we are only on October 4.

That realization came to me a couple of days ago, that the regime had stolen from me 2015, that it has not allowed me to even try to achieve any modest goal. The year has been a constant reaction to try to deal with negative events in increasingly desperate situations.

I have been looking back and there is no joy, nothing positive for me.

The year has been spent in lines trying to find food and toiletries items and medicines, not even for me, but for my cancer stricken life partner (and other people when I can help). See, he cannot stand in lines for the hours required to acquire food. He cannot go to half a dozen of pharmacies in a row to try to find one that has the pain killer or the anti inflammatory, or the anti-whatever the doctors prescribe. Even nutritional supplements are hard to find and too expensive for his budget. That and other stuff I have had to start paying for, never minding that I have had to go to the black market prices because I also need to work and I cannot spend 2-3 days a week looking for stuff.

As if this ordeal was not bad enough, it has made me face to incredible cruelty of the regime, its immense stupidity to boot. See, those long lines under the sun are equal for all, a true socialist victory. Pregnant women, sick people, elderly with mobility problem, etc...  all have to stand in that same line, no consideration whatsoever for any one, starting with the people in the line that have lost any decency in their search for basic items. Eat shit and die is the message.

But there is insult to injury, true injury from what you can get above. I have seen or heard from reliable witnesses how the Nazional Guards or other forms of "authority" help themselves first, or let go ahead of the line their friends or take payment to allow you to do so. The abuse of power is more obvious, more cruel when such situations arise.

And more insult to the intelligence as the system is a mess of confusion and inefficacy.  Some items are by ID card end number, some items are "once a week", more and more stores demand finger prints from BOTH your thumbs, even if you buy, say, a bag of chips. That finger printing is ominous because it seems to be working better than anticipated even though lines to pay are twice as long as the process to pay is twice as long. The implications is clear: at any time through these machines the regime can restrict access to whatever it wants to restrict. And to whomever. Food apartheid in the making.

You may think that perhaps I can find solace elsewhere, like at work. But the situation is getting worse by the day. I have already detailed on occasion how difficult it is to manufacture things in Venezuela, to produce anything. The two main causes are the lack of raw material and the labor laws that not only make it hard to organize efficiency at work but are now creating havoc as you cannot fire the constantly missing workers that have to leave work to stand in food lines. Not that you would fire them anyway as you understand the situation but the "food shortage absenteeism" has become a source of new abuses.

There is also insult to injury. As your business is having a hard time to survive, you observe newcomers that seem to be quite prosperous. For example the Polar group is closing its detergent and soap plants due to lack of raw material. But there is a newcomer, "Clic", that is flooding supermarkets with pricey house cleaning items.  They even run expensive TV ads! How do they manage to get the raw materials to assemble their concoctions? Why are they the only brand with such a complete and well packaged line of products? Because the packaging of other products trying to replace Polar products is dismal, for low quality products to begin with.

And yet that is not all. There is a new plague on business. Once upon a time corruption was expensive but some forms were preserved. For example to get money out of you they would use catch phrases like "the dockets are loaded, but maybe we could find ways to speed up processing your application to X". Now they ask you money upfront, without any shame. Usually assorted with threats that are not based on anything legal, just because they can threaten you as there is nowhere you can go for redress. The reason for this new bluntness that we have observed in recent months is very simple: bureaucrats know that their fate is sealed no matter what happens with December elections. See, even if chavismo were to win, there is not enough money to spread around anymore and many of them will be shown the door if they are on the wrong side of post December chavismo reshuffled leadership. So the time is now for a last push for corruption money. It is that simple.

How can you score any success in front of such a negative environment? Unless survival on the edge of bankruptcy is considered a success. Note that the latest business climate studies put Venezuela dead last, even behind Syria.

That is why I can write already that 2015 has been a lost. That no matter what happens in the last quarter the negativity of the first three quarters cannot be overcome anymore. I feel exactly in the same mood as I felt in October 2014: a sad mood with the certitude that next year will be worse.

Blogger Naky Soto at the NYT

I recommend you read one of the best summaries on recent events on Venezuela at the NYT OpEd from Venezuelan blogger Naky Soto.

Economic electoral planning: institutional bachaqueo and printing money

The election date approaches. Whether these will be held is irrelevant, the regime needs to prepare for it no matter what.  From my sources I get the following tidbits as to how the regime is planning to distribute goodies to try to buy votes.

The "bachaqueo" is bringing some political dividends to the regime, at least from those who can actually profit from it. Bachaqueo for those late in the game is a Venezuelan variety of black market (1). Those that can stand in long lines because they are out of a job buy they share and resell part of it at significant markups. It becomes particularity lucrative when: 1) you belong to an information network from cashiers to truck drivers and storage personnel who can warn you that X will arrive at Z before the neighborhood hoi polloi knows about it, thus the bachaqueros are first in line before supplies disappear; 2) you know someone high ranked in the store or the Nazional Guards on duty to avoid riots and they let you get out with more than your share; 3) you belong to a network well organized with bus and motorbike drivers that can carry you fast from one line to another line so in one day you may be able to stand in line at 2 or 3 locations, and rack it in; and of course 4) you belong to a narco-military-mafia organization that do not even own a store and gives you a certain amount at mark up for you to mark it up further. (2)


The beauty of it all is that the Labor Law "reform" of Chavez to get reelected before he croaked is a major incentive for that line of business.  See, you cannot fire someone for multiple absences. If you try to, it is a long and tortuous process that in 95% of the time ends up with an expensive settlement. In fact today's practice is to call into the office to ask point blank the worker how much he wants to resign from his job. Certainly, you can discount from paycheck the missing day and the meal tickets, but what would a worker mind if s/he can make more in that day through bachaqueo? Which thus has become today the main cause of absenteeism, far above any epidemiological consideration.

Some of my clients, those with a significant payroll of say, more than 50, have observed an interesting arithmetic pattern. Say, you have 200 employees, of which 150 are workers whose paycheck is no more than twice the minimum wage.  In recent months you have discovered that absenteeism is at a steady 15%, EVERYDAY.  And never the same folks, of course. That is, e.g., you have in a single week missing, 26, 22, 38, 23 and 29. Everyday you have at least 22 folks missing, that is 15% of your labor force. Why?

Very simple. Workers have organized a network of absentee turns. No worker will be absent more than what the law "forgives". Sometimes you may even find out that, say, X worker is absent systematically every other Wednesday. And you may find out that the peak at 38 (25%) coincided with a food fair or a major arrival of goods at the market store next door. If it does not get worse than that it is because finger printing and stuff limit the number of people that can shop on a given day (never mind that the bachaquero needs to be able to pay for what s/he gets). Also, many business to ensure a minimum labor force for basic processes have established generous attendance bonus (I kid you not), so that workers will miss only when it is worth their while. Thus a fragile equilibrium exists which will break down anytime as scarcity becomes worse.

I trust the reader can figure out on its own how this affect productivity and costs in Venezuela.....

You may think that this is a conspiracy theory. Think again. Go to any ministry and the systematic absenteeism there is worse. Sometimes it is organized outright by the bosses who may even have shipped in some goods, in particular if linked with the military. From there to spread the habit more or less efficiently to private business is not far fetched. And the regime has gone out of its way to spread in time deliveries of scarce goods to create the illusion that things still arrive somewhat to the the shelves, you were just unlucky that day.

In other words the regime thinks it stands to gain something by promoting a bachaqueo network, not enough perhaps to compensate for the voters lost to the long lines, but a gain nevertheless where open and naked scarcity would cost more politically.

The other thing that I want to mention in passing is that from reliable sources I have learned that the regime is bringing in banknotes. Lots of freshly printed notes of 100, more than what is normally needed to replace the physically deteriorated bills. Those bills may actually be delivered in diverse areas of the country to avoid, I suppose, shipping and the like.

My guess is that they will be used to pay for the campaign and for direct cash payments wherever it is needed. Expect a tremendous surge of inflation next year as a consequence.

It also seems that the regime is trying to open, albeit, some partially made public works, such as a couple of metro stations in Caracas. That has happened in the past in Chavez campaigns, but this time after three years of nothing it is hoped for that opening even a single subway station, even if incomplete, may have a big impact. I doubt it, but that is not the point of this post, the point is that the regime is going to apply skinny populism but populism nevertheless. In the past they could raid, say, electronic stores. But all is empty. Thus fake income from bachaqueo, or a direct worthless cash advance, or a huge ceremony to open shit facilities is all that is at hand.

In addition of jailing opposition leaders; but that is another story.

----------------------------------------------
1) bachaco is the large tropical ant that eats everything on its wake and that laboriously carries huge loads on its back.

2) all courtesy, of course, from crazy price control schemes and currency arbitration (official 6.3, black market 700 to 1 USD; do the math).

Will it hold?

It seems that creating an unjustified "state of emergency" at the border with Colombia has accelerated talk of regime "change". We have Miguel, or a nice article at the FT (subscription) by Daniel Lansberg or a dire "self-coup" from Oppenheimer at the Miami Herald. Readers of this blog should not be surprised as I have expressed often my doubts at the elections on December 6 would be actually held, or when describing how the country was collapsing steadily.

Rather than going into the macro thing covered extensively elsewhere, let me go first into the micro stuff.


The fact of the matter is that shelves of non controlled products at grocery stores are getting empty. As for the controlled stuff when it arrives, it is in insufficient quantities, immediately sold, often among some trouble and even looting outside of Caracas as the situation there is much worse.  But this you already knew, it's just that it's getting worse by the day.

But scarcity of food and medicine is just the apparent face.  The reality is much worse as it is more and more difficult to produce food and medicine. It is not that raw materials are lesser and lesser amounts, it is that working with the limited amounts available is increasingly difficult. Not only spare parts deficiency stop production lines frequently, in addition to raw material erratic deliveries, but insecurity in transport and distribution make the few still producing reluctant to ship far away or to risky areas.

And that is not all. To the above problems you must add a renewed corruption drive where public "servants" now are asking straight to your face cash to perform the duties that they are required to perform by law. Not only inspectors now are blunt about asking you for money or they will close your facility on some dumb excuse that would carry at worst a small fine, but requesting permits for whatever has become an ordeal.

I am not going to give you references for the above: this all is my personal day to day experience. We are helpless in front of it all. There is nowhere to go for redress of any abuse, of any black market activity.

As expected this is having a deleterious effect on the political climate, explaining why the regime is grasping at any excuse to blame others for its failures. It was the "economic war" then it was the irridente Esequibo, today it is Colombia unable to control its borders and promoting paramilitaries even though we ALL KNOW that the huge contraband at the border can only happen because of the connivance or actual help from the Venezuelan military. Tomorrow?  It will get worse as these political shows have a light traction, at best, for the regime's political aims. Polls this week seem to credit that if fair elections were held the opposition is above 20% the regime and up and up. Difficult to see how the regime could bridge the gap by December 6. Short of miraculously ending all food and medicine lines I do not see how the regime can reduce the spread to less than 10%, the maximum amount that it can compensate through electoral cheating.

This being said it is quite clear that the Tachira "emergency" and the abuses perpetrated  against defenseless Colombian migrants are a clear step in the strategy to falsify the election. The hope is that cheap nationalism will be enough to reverse the regime's fortunes, or otherwise justify a national "emergency" that will allow a postponement of elections in the hope of better electoral days.

This all we can take as "fact". What is more worrisome is that the regime in full economic debacle IS NOT taking ANY MEASURE. ANY. Unless arresting a few assholes with an extra 10 pounds of corn flour or a few gallons of gas on their bike to Colombia count as an economic measure in a country with maybe 30 million folks. Why? Are we that broke that we cannot even buy basic staples overseas? Is the regime so politically helpless that we cannot even increase the price of gas to a dime a gallon? Are divisions and/or incompetence so entrenched in the regime that they cannot come up with or decide on a single measure to deal with the situation? Measures exist, simple, like a devaluation from 6.3 to 100 which, believe it or not, would have more beneficial effects on inflation than negative ones.

Or is it that the regime is so convinced of its own demise that it is playing the burnt earth card?

Which bring us to the title. My own opinion is that it is a distinct possibility that the regime will not hold until December 6. Either Maduro will be gone, or the regime will have morphed into your regular explicit proto-totalitarian dictatorship. Even if measures are taken TODAY they cannot have much effect by December 6. Even if the regime brings in a whole bunch of imports they are not here yet, they would be insufficient, they will not be spread efficiently and at best could only reach the hard core chavismo.

It is just too late to save the regime in December 6, even if electoral cheating is applied bluntly irregardless of world observation. It would be worse than when Ahmadinejad was fraudulently elected against Mousavi.

Thus the possibility of regime "change", from a Maduro resignation to a coup and bloody repression is becoming quite distinct. Whichever it is one thing is certain: it will not go away peacefully.

Brief electoral report

This is not an electoral report. As I have announced weeks ago, this blog will not cover the coming elections for a variety of reasons. Still, when I read all of the nonsense or wishful thinking elsewhere, I suppose that I feel compelled from time to time to remind people that treating the parliamentary election of December as if it were a normal election is, well, close to idiotic. In other words discussing in detail the intrigues inside the MUD of PSUV is close to irrelevant. Discussing the treachery of the regime is close to redundant at this point. Speculating on the final outcome with polls and calculations is only marginally productive unless one places the comment on the consequences of the vote rather than the actual results.

Thus in no particular order a few talking points, for lack of a more descriptive title.


Electoral treachery. The regime keeps at it. In addition of banning from office for the silliest of reasons opposition leaders (interestingly no significant PSUV is banned, they do not even try to keep a vague pretense of fairness), it has now started to intervene directly into opposition parties organization on the flimsiest of excuses. Any disgruntled party member can sue its direction, win the trial courtesy DIRECTLY from the hand of the high court TSJ so there is no possible appeal whatsoever, and become the new party leader. The objective is simple: try to pry away from the MUD opposition umbrella electoral organization. Since the new "leaders" appointed by the regime are to say the least suspicious in their opposition commitment the MUD has no other choices but to expel the "renovated" parties. These in turn are expected to name their own candidates, certainly financed by the regime.

The point here is not the detail of any given electoral treachery. The point is that the regime will go in crescendo in inventing barriers to any opposition putative electoral victory and, caught in its own game, it will feel justified on December 7 not to recognize the adverse result.

Conclusion, of a sort.  All of this in the end matters little. The vote is quite clear. No matter who the candidates are, the crisis has tuned out the election into a referendum on Maduro. Any yellow or red dog will get its due votes. Any treachery form the regime has no effect on the long run of things.

Do the results matter?

They do not. It is irrelevant which side wins on December 6, the task is the same for all, there is no margin of action. The price of oil keeps going down and corruption is stronger than ever. Things are so reckless that I have been asked straight for money if I want a certain permit to be processed: they will receive the request, they cannot refuse, but the evaluation will happen only if I pay a load of cash to X (fake companies exist with fiscal registry so I can even get a bill for tax purposes).

For the regime the strategy is clear: rake as much cash as possible before December 6, either to win votes, or to have a safety net if ousted, AND leave the coffers empty if the opposition wins. This one deprived of means will be destined to failure (with a fast chavista return to office). And if chavismo wins they will find a way to wing it out, using harsh repression as needed. There cannot be any other way for the colony as long as the Cuban master needs whatever it can get from its Venezuelan overseas territory. That the viceroys of that overseas are corrupt narco military and radical low life politicos only aggravates the situation.

In short, the predictably worsening economic crisis in 2016 will lead to political failure of whomever holds office. One is actually tempted to wish for a chavismo "victory" so to be able to finish it off once and for all in the following year.

The opposition will lose the election

Not only electoral treachery will be hard to overcome, but the opposition electoral umbrella, MUD, is doing whatever it takes to demotivate its potential electors. For example sabotaging folks like Leopoldo Lopez or Maria Corina Machado makes their more fervent and dedicated electoral voters want to stay home.  Lack of a concrete program is as bad as lack of a principled program: lack of either one sets up the opposition for political failure after the election and has as such a demotivating effect. The current offering of being an kind of efficient chavismo, or efficient populism, an oxymoron of course, is simply not enough to pry away chavista voters who at best, it is hoped for, will stay home.

Because the opposition victory is not to get more seats than chavismo, the opposition needs a victory of at least 3/5 of the seats at stake. Otherwise it will have no veto power and no real control over a public administration and power structures solidly packed with chavista hacks. The reader should remember that the MUD is not a political party based on any ideology or coherent program, even if flawed. The MUD is first an electoral alliance to unify a splintered opposition, an alliance that has really no program beyond restoring some democracy to the country. This is by itself very commendable, but in the current calamitous situation it is not enough.  Thus only a 3/5 victory will steel the MUD in front of chavismo and give it a chance to take action, if anything to call for a recall election on Maduro. If the MUD gets a simple majority this one will fall apart in front of the crisis and chavismo will not be controlled and over time will be able to pry away or outright destroy whatever it needs to recover a majority.

Chavismo will not win the election

The paradox here is that I can write that the opposition will lose the election but that chavismo will not win it. The candidate "primary" fixing process of chavismo has been very interesting. First, it was all but transparent. Second, more than half of the outgoing representatives are not running for reelection (I read somewhere that 80% were out). This does not talk at all of internal democracy inside chavismo, this talks of account settling between factions, of an absolute lack of trust in the currently serving personnel for the leaders of the current factions, or vice-versa. All prefer new blood, or have been eaten up by dissent.

If opposition need 3/5 to win, chavismo needs 2/3! If it fails to do that no faction will have an internal majority to rule over the assembly and possible outright divisions may not be contained further. With less than 2/3 of the assembly chavismo will simply have to rely even more on the military to hold unto office, either through repression, or as the only power all factions can agree on, albeit reluctantly.

The grand elector

Which brings us to the only elector that truly matters in this electoral charade: the army.

The army is under great threat. Tendency is for chavismo, and the opposition, to turn the army into the scapegoat of the whole crash. Chavismo because the army may have put the brakes of radicalization of the system. Opposition because the army did not slow down the decay and instead associated itself happily with the looting of the country.

The truth is that to avoid an outright civil war (there is already a larval civil war going on, look at the numbers of people killed every day) a grand pact between opposition and chavismo is necessary. And such negotiation can only be carried through with the consent of the fire power of the country which will be in charge of keeping order while the painful measures are being taken.

It does not matter, thus, who wins in December, the army will either rule or decide who the apparent ruler will be for the unavoidable transition.

Conclusion

Covering the current election as if it were a "normal" one albeit with peculiar/extraordinary parameters is, well, intellectually dishonest. But I suppose that journalists and bloggers and think tankers need to cover their white pages with ink, digital or otherwise.

The only thing worth discussing today is not the election or the immediate exit of Maduro. The only thing worth discussing is to demand a transition government and how to get one. Elections are not necessary. They will not solve the crisis, unless of a presidential or constitutional nature. Period.