What has inflamed the 2.0 tonight is the late afternoon address of Padrino Lopez, in cadena nonetheless. A quick video analysis follows.
The act at Chavez grave is a "desagravio", that is an act of redress, in this case of the memory of Bolivar, Chavez and the honor of Maduro. We get that in the first seconds. Of course this is a response of yesterday Ramos Allup iconoclast act or removing the images of Chavez and the fake Bolivar at the National Assembly. The fake Bolivar is a "reconstruction" based on the skull of Bolivar that Chavez got through profanation. So, from the start poor Padrino ends up being quite ridiculous defending a 200 yer old reconstruction which present Bolivar with more "negroid" characters than the portrait that Bolivar himself approved of. But this bolivarian Venezuela....
In all truth here the outrage is against chasing Chavez from the National Assembly hallways where he should have never been to begin with. So the alleged Bolivar insult is used as an excuse to justify the defense of 17 years of ideologizing Chavez demi-god status.
Observe the actual camera focus at 40'' on the red foulard with the 4F which is the apology of the failed coup of 1992. Right there this is unconstitutional, illegal, traitorous and what next. Objectively there is no need to listen to the rest of the Padrino crap, but we must.
1:09 Padrino places Cilia flores above all the other representatives of chavismo. Some pigs are more equal than others.
2:03 Observe the panoramic of a fat military. Priceless.
2:35 The idiot taking pictures behind Padrino in what is supposed to be a most solemn occasion. They really cannot behave. Ever.
3:09 According to Padrino the whole fatherland has been "ultrajada" insulted, violated, etc... So he is the avenger.
3:30 He insists on Bolivar being the one offended. Go and see the Ramos Allup video again and tell me about that.
3:50 We finally get to Chavez "hijo insigne de bolivar y de la patria también" notable child of Bolivar and of the fatherland too. Note the order.........
Follows an amalgam as to Ramos Allup "ultraje" to the armed forces. Sure, the idol was toppled! Including biblical references of Jesus saying that you do not fight Satan with Satan. And suddenly at 6:30 Padrino approves of this, that they will not fight Satan with Satan.
7:45 close up of the fake Bolivar as he is cited that good manners make good laws. Really? Under Chavez?
Follows a dissertation about the preservation of Venezuelan history. never mind that Chavez rewrote it.
9:09 Freeze there and notice that the 3 army stars and the title of the communique Padrino then reads. You can see the title there. By then you notice that the event has been very carefully planned.
Follows a series of banalities noting that Maduro is the embodiment of the state so he was also offended.
11;00 Padrino starts justifying the invented Bolivar of Chavez, starting that this image has been accepted by all (not by me anyway, but I do not want to make this post about me).
Follows more bullshit about how Venezuela became bolivarian.
11:35 Anti capitalist jab.
14:15 In defense of Misiones.
14:44 "Bolivar y Chavez", the amalgam is now complete. They cannot be separated and are both the embodiment of the fatherland. There you go!
15:33 The attempt at amalgam of Maduro to Chavez and Bolivar starts.
15:58 Padrino ratifies the army unconditional support to Maduro. Really? How often will that support need to be ratified? One wonders.......
16:59 "conciencia supraracional", supra rational conscience? What the f...? Is this the intellectual excuse for a coup?
And then, surprisingly, Padrino finishes this totalitarian speech with an olive branch of sort stating that all have Venezuelan best interests at heart and that such scenes should be avoided so as not to foster further divisions. I, for one, read into this that Padrino has not read the speech he truly wanted to read. As to what that speech would be, I'd rather not speculate.
I do not know what this all means. However there are a few things that I can advance without fear of beeing too far from the mark.
First, for the armed forces living in inbred chavista and Cuban propaganda the idea that some people actually did not like Chavez at all is a surprise. For some reason they have equated a heavy imposed silence on us as a tacit acceptation of Chavez grandeur. It is not, and they are in shock.
Second, the actions of Ramos Allup have hit at the center of chavismo core beliefs, all that was used to justify years of looting and human rights violations in the name of a higher cause. That mental idol has also taken a hit.
Third, the regime suddenly realizes that the opposition means business and that a confrontation of powers is not a sure success for the regime. A rule in warfare is that you need to know your enemy. Watching the reaction of chavismo it seems that the opposition knows its enemy plexus much better than expected.
Still, Ramos Allup wishes he would have had it as easy as Leo the Isaurian.
Showing posts with label chavez supporters. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chavez supporters. Show all posts
Thursday, 7 January 2016
A new geography of chavismo [Updated]
When political movements suffer a major set back they either go extinct or they reorganize for better days. This means that inside factions shift, balances change and the result of these glissando will be extinction or renewal. With events these last two weeks we can start seeing how this is shaping.
The regime lost bad on December 6 but not everyone inside lost the same. The big loser is Diosdado Cabello; he lost his soap box, a lot of protection and his ability to rule through fear. Maduro lost a lot for sure as the election was a referendum on his tenure. But he is still president while Diosdado is, well, not much more than a minority party representative. If for the sake of survival the rivalry between the two men has been put in the side burner a year ago when polls started to look bad, that rivalry still exists and the need for survival is now desperate.
With the army party slightly on the side as they are not willing to pay the political price of 17 years of misrule, with the corrupt chavista narco elite blamed internally for the catastrophic economic crisis, it is the hour of the radicals and they are going for it.
Maduro formed in Cuba and the Castro's viceroy is naturally fond of radicals. He did not advance them before because chavismo was a coalition of interests where displacing a single group could have dangerous snowball effects. But now he can because the other factions are stunned not only because they lost on 6D so badly but also that the people did not revolt to expel the MUD invaders and restore chavismo to revolutionary glory. I am not making this up, read their own words in the press.
The thing about radicals is that even if they lose a battle or an election they do not care much as to the why and how. They just care about pursuing their agenda at all costs since they truly believe that through its completion people will finally see the goodness of their proposal. Be it radical chavismo, IS or Marine Le Pen. Thus yesterday we saw Maduro finally imposing a cabinet more to his liking where the economy tsar/star is pure lefty, but someone without even a formal Marxist formation. Luis Salas is a prophet. He has had visions that inflation does not exist, that gas is not subsided, that Polar hides months of national production in a small warehouse somewhere. As a prophet now in charge he will demonstrate that his fantasy world was the truth that others failed to see and thus failed to seek.
If some of the chavista factions may be stunned they are not necessary totally oblivious. The army sent back to its barracks keeps a few seats, in particular the defense minister Padrino who was the guy that refused to commit electoral fraud a month ago. Some more sensible heads are still around such as the new vice president or a couple of economy ministers offering a strange balance to Salas. It should be noted that the new vice, Aristobulo Isturiz, would be a great president for a short transition in between Maduro departure and the election of its successor. In fact, Isturiz could well be the best candidate chavismo has to offer but is smart enough not to accept this late in life such a poisoned gift. President for a few weeks will suffice him.
Thus go the moves inside chavismo, the first serious realignment since the civilian faction was ousted when Ramirez and Giordani were expelled. Now the fight in earnest between the radicals and the bolibourgeois narco elite supported by part of the army has started.
We will see if some inside the PSUV have the nerve to form a third faction to avoid the final demise of the Chavez party.
I have my doubts.
--------------------
Update.
Rafael Poleo thinks that the new cabinet and the iconoclast wars are a strategy to remove Diosdado Cabello once and for all. I am not mentioning this because I concur, I am just noting it to illustrate the wide swath of speculation going on.
The regime lost bad on December 6 but not everyone inside lost the same. The big loser is Diosdado Cabello; he lost his soap box, a lot of protection and his ability to rule through fear. Maduro lost a lot for sure as the election was a referendum on his tenure. But he is still president while Diosdado is, well, not much more than a minority party representative. If for the sake of survival the rivalry between the two men has been put in the side burner a year ago when polls started to look bad, that rivalry still exists and the need for survival is now desperate.
With the army party slightly on the side as they are not willing to pay the political price of 17 years of misrule, with the corrupt chavista narco elite blamed internally for the catastrophic economic crisis, it is the hour of the radicals and they are going for it.
Maduro formed in Cuba and the Castro's viceroy is naturally fond of radicals. He did not advance them before because chavismo was a coalition of interests where displacing a single group could have dangerous snowball effects. But now he can because the other factions are stunned not only because they lost on 6D so badly but also that the people did not revolt to expel the MUD invaders and restore chavismo to revolutionary glory. I am not making this up, read their own words in the press.
The thing about radicals is that even if they lose a battle or an election they do not care much as to the why and how. They just care about pursuing their agenda at all costs since they truly believe that through its completion people will finally see the goodness of their proposal. Be it radical chavismo, IS or Marine Le Pen. Thus yesterday we saw Maduro finally imposing a cabinet more to his liking where the economy tsar/star is pure lefty, but someone without even a formal Marxist formation. Luis Salas is a prophet. He has had visions that inflation does not exist, that gas is not subsided, that Polar hides months of national production in a small warehouse somewhere. As a prophet now in charge he will demonstrate that his fantasy world was the truth that others failed to see and thus failed to seek.
If some of the chavista factions may be stunned they are not necessary totally oblivious. The army sent back to its barracks keeps a few seats, in particular the defense minister Padrino who was the guy that refused to commit electoral fraud a month ago. Some more sensible heads are still around such as the new vice president or a couple of economy ministers offering a strange balance to Salas. It should be noted that the new vice, Aristobulo Isturiz, would be a great president for a short transition in between Maduro departure and the election of its successor. In fact, Isturiz could well be the best candidate chavismo has to offer but is smart enough not to accept this late in life such a poisoned gift. President for a few weeks will suffice him.
Thus go the moves inside chavismo, the first serious realignment since the civilian faction was ousted when Ramirez and Giordani were expelled. Now the fight in earnest between the radicals and the bolibourgeois narco elite supported by part of the army has started.
We will see if some inside the PSUV have the nerve to form a third faction to avoid the final demise of the Chavez party.
I have my doubts.
--------------------
Update.
Rafael Poleo thinks that the new cabinet and the iconoclast wars are a strategy to remove Diosdado Cabello once and for all. I am not mentioning this because I concur, I am just noting it to illustrate the wide swath of speculation going on.
El nuevo gabinete y el discurso de Padrino son las pinzas conque sacan del poder a Diosdado.
— Rafael Poleo (@PoleoRafael) January 8, 2016Saturday, 19 December 2015
Left press review
On a slow Saturday night I decided to do what I have stopped doing long, long ago, to examine the misinforming to plain idiotic articles supporting the bolivarian farce. But two upset readers sent me these pieces and by sheer courtesy I read them and went ahead to comment below.
The first one is from CounterPunch. Since I do not read such pages I cannot evaluate how far left these people are. Nor I care for, taking the piece for itself as objectively as I could. It did not go far... All started well enough, pointing out the wish for the revolutionaries to fight back while acknowledging a major electoral setback. But then by the 4th large paragraph we were back in 2002... Really? It is OK that here, in Venezuela, they use that argument because they have no other one left, but overseas? Can't they afford to be a tad more creative in defending the revolutionary farce? Here the paragraph in full:
In April 2002, the U.S.-backed opposition in Venezuela staged a coup against then President Chavez in a desperate attempt to reassert their control over the country and extinguish the Bolivarian Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans poured into the streets of Caracas, with millions more in other parts of the country, calling for Chavez to be restored tohis rightful office, and for the coup leaders to be arrested. There was really no doubt that the U.S. was responsible for this attempt at forced regime change, with many mainstream news outlets reporting within days that high-ranking officials in the Bush administration were intimately involved in orchestrating the coup.
The US had sympathies but it was NEVER proved that the Bush administration gave a "go ahead". Apparently for the left it is absolutely impossible to conceive that actually there would be a strong popular movement against a leftist regime, a movement that does not need to be stoked on by the CIA. Sigh... The good savage theory from the North Atlantic do-gooders....
As for the hundred of thousand in Caracas and the millions across the country, pictures please. Amazing how some urban legends that started with a small crowds of looters on Friday 12 and some protest gatherings in the name of Chavez AFTER it was becoming clear that the army may be returning Chavez to office ended up becoming throngs of freedom seeking folks who did all the work. Apparently the author was in Caracas and I wasn't.
You can gather by yourself that the rest of the piece read like an open propaganda pamphlet. No need to comment further, just to point out that the piece appeared first in Telesur. 'nuf said!
The other piece graced Huff Post, where you can find about everything if you are patient enough to set through it (I do not). It is written by Dan Kovalic who presents himself as an adjunct professor. And has his twitter avatar posing next to Chavez tombstone. So there goes academic objectivity.
At least, in a way, he is more honest: you do not need to wait for the 4th paragraph, you get it right in the face from the start.
Of course, given the fact that the opposition was able to win such an election, and that President Maduro and the PSUV are going to honor that election, is a true testament to what many of us have been saying for years -- that, despite the claims of the U.S. government and its compliant media (collectively, the U.S.), Venezuela under Chavez/Maduro governance is authentically democratic. Indeed, one of the great achievements of the Chavista revolution has been democratic reforms.
So right there you have it, before Chavez there was no democracy (how did he get elected, to begin with?). And poor Mr. Kovalic: he should have waited a few days before writing on the Huff: Maduro et al. are not "honoring" the result.
For the rest Mr. Kovalic reveals his true colors: the bolivarian farce is good and worth defending no matter what because, well, it is anti US. Mr. Kovalic does in very broad strokes. Not for him to have read the 18 pages letter from OAS secretary exquisitely detailing all the electoral treachery BEFORE the first vote was cast. Nor for him either to take a calculator and verify that the minimum wage today in Venezuela is not even 20 USD a month and as such ALL social advances of Chavez, whatever those may be, are now voided, leaving people worse off than what they were in 1998. The rest of the note is thus quite predictable. As is predictable that both notes do not expand much on the reasons why people voted against the regime: years of waiting on line under the sun for food and medicine and sanitary items. Conditions that neither one would tolerate for a minute in the cozy countries where they live and from where it is so easy to decide what is best for Venezuela (even if it is OK to sacrifice it on the anti US altar).
The problem with people like these two authors is that debate with them is useless, It is not that they believe in what they write about, it is that they desperately want to believe. And against that, history, logic and facts are impotent.
May the dear readers do as they wish with this blog entry.
The first one is from CounterPunch. Since I do not read such pages I cannot evaluate how far left these people are. Nor I care for, taking the piece for itself as objectively as I could. It did not go far... All started well enough, pointing out the wish for the revolutionaries to fight back while acknowledging a major electoral setback. But then by the 4th large paragraph we were back in 2002... Really? It is OK that here, in Venezuela, they use that argument because they have no other one left, but overseas? Can't they afford to be a tad more creative in defending the revolutionary farce? Here the paragraph in full:
In April 2002, the U.S.-backed opposition in Venezuela staged a coup against then President Chavez in a desperate attempt to reassert their control over the country and extinguish the Bolivarian Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans poured into the streets of Caracas, with millions more in other parts of the country, calling for Chavez to be restored tohis rightful office, and for the coup leaders to be arrested. There was really no doubt that the U.S. was responsible for this attempt at forced regime change, with many mainstream news outlets reporting within days that high-ranking officials in the Bush administration were intimately involved in orchestrating the coup.
The US had sympathies but it was NEVER proved that the Bush administration gave a "go ahead". Apparently for the left it is absolutely impossible to conceive that actually there would be a strong popular movement against a leftist regime, a movement that does not need to be stoked on by the CIA. Sigh... The good savage theory from the North Atlantic do-gooders....
As for the hundred of thousand in Caracas and the millions across the country, pictures please. Amazing how some urban legends that started with a small crowds of looters on Friday 12 and some protest gatherings in the name of Chavez AFTER it was becoming clear that the army may be returning Chavez to office ended up becoming throngs of freedom seeking folks who did all the work. Apparently the author was in Caracas and I wasn't.
You can gather by yourself that the rest of the piece read like an open propaganda pamphlet. No need to comment further, just to point out that the piece appeared first in Telesur. 'nuf said!
The other piece graced Huff Post, where you can find about everything if you are patient enough to set through it (I do not). It is written by Dan Kovalic who presents himself as an adjunct professor. And has his twitter avatar posing next to Chavez tombstone. So there goes academic objectivity.
At least, in a way, he is more honest: you do not need to wait for the 4th paragraph, you get it right in the face from the start.
Of course, given the fact that the opposition was able to win such an election, and that President Maduro and the PSUV are going to honor that election, is a true testament to what many of us have been saying for years -- that, despite the claims of the U.S. government and its compliant media (collectively, the U.S.), Venezuela under Chavez/Maduro governance is authentically democratic. Indeed, one of the great achievements of the Chavista revolution has been democratic reforms.
So right there you have it, before Chavez there was no democracy (how did he get elected, to begin with?). And poor Mr. Kovalic: he should have waited a few days before writing on the Huff: Maduro et al. are not "honoring" the result.
For the rest Mr. Kovalic reveals his true colors: the bolivarian farce is good and worth defending no matter what because, well, it is anti US. Mr. Kovalic does in very broad strokes. Not for him to have read the 18 pages letter from OAS secretary exquisitely detailing all the electoral treachery BEFORE the first vote was cast. Nor for him either to take a calculator and verify that the minimum wage today in Venezuela is not even 20 USD a month and as such ALL social advances of Chavez, whatever those may be, are now voided, leaving people worse off than what they were in 1998. The rest of the note is thus quite predictable. As is predictable that both notes do not expand much on the reasons why people voted against the regime: years of waiting on line under the sun for food and medicine and sanitary items. Conditions that neither one would tolerate for a minute in the cozy countries where they live and from where it is so easy to decide what is best for Venezuela (even if it is OK to sacrifice it on the anti US altar).
The problem with people like these two authors is that debate with them is useless, It is not that they believe in what they write about, it is that they desperately want to believe. And against that, history, logic and facts are impotent.
May the dear readers do as they wish with this blog entry.
Tuesday, 27 October 2015
The banality of evil, Caracas style
Tonight I twitted this:
In English: Listening to {prosecutor} Nieves I keep thinking of Hannah Arendt and the banality of evil.
One of the top prosecutors in the Leopoldo Lopez show trial has defected to the US and is now saying that the whole operation against Lopez was a scam, that the intention was to put him away for the election of 2015 and more. In fact Nieves went as far as to say, more or less, that the order to arrest Lopez already existed before the events for which he was finally arrested in February 2014.
Franklin Nieves was tonight in the top CÑNe rating show of Fernando del Rincon. Mr. del Rincon rocketed from a CNNE anchor to his own nightly talk show, Conclusiones, as a consequence of his daring reports on Venezuela through the first half of 2014. He has become the journalist to go for any trouble in Latin America, and the specialist on Venezuela, much loved by the opposition, and much more reviled by the regime.
I am not going into the details of what Nieves said (for those who read Spanish you can visit my Tweeter time line of Tuesday night). In short, he stated that all the evidence against Lopez was fabricated, that he received orders to prosecute anyway on those fake evidences, that all knew about that in the regime, that Diosdado Cabello himself was supervising the first orders and that he fooled the Lopez family in making them believe that if Lopez surrendered nicely a deal would be reached. He accused directly Maduro and Cabello and some of the top officials at the state prosecuting office in such a way that the regime will have to do better than just using the worn out line "he is a liar, paid by the nemesis of the revolution" (which he may well be for all that I know, but that is not the point). There is a situation now that will make supporting the regime almost impossible for some of its allies.
No, my interest is elsewhere. First, let's us start with the one with easiest access: why is the US covering for all those defectors? Is it a strategy to encourage them to defect the regime so as to build a case against its corrupt narco officials? In that case, how come indictments and active prosecutions are not coming through faster? In short, why are the US giving some (minor) credit to some of the accusations the regime hurls at them? I am writing that because informed people know better, know that the regime is indeed a rotten corrupt system, that is not investigated by the US alone. But too many use the people's ignorance and misinformation, even inside the opposition, in such ways that it helps the regime case. I am also writing this so that readers realize that I am not in a blind rage as I type.
There is some confusing evil above, but there is real evil next.
What has struck me more was the composure of Nieves during the whole interview, even as del Rincon was trying not to break down under the shock of having all of his antidemocratic accusations against the regime thus validated.
That made me think of Hanna Arendt, the Eichman trial, the basic nature of totalitarianism the way she explained, creating "the banality of evil". At least Arendt was writing her seminal books based on people following orders. I suppose that concentration camp guards did not have access to Tweeter to get contrasting news to what the Reich told them everyday. Even if pathetic, the defenses of "I was just following orders" " I did not know" "Nobody told me anything, nobody knew" could make one doubt on occasion if the lines were pronounced then with an empty enough glance.
But with Nieves such excuses cannot apply. Nieves tonight told us he knew what he was doing all along was wrong, was a crime, was an abuse of Human Rights. He knew all along that the regime wanted Lopez jailed, found guilty while it figured out, I imagine, a final solution to the Lopez problem.
Nieves knew and yet he did. And I do not buy much his crocodile tears at seeing Lopez little girl go to the same school as the prosecutor's orphan maker girl being too much for him and making him decide to defect.
What was shocking tonight is that all the actors were following orders, indeed, but knowing full well that the orders were wrong. In the end it does not really matter whether Cabello is the one that gave the original order, what matters here is that the chavista regime has been a totalitarian regime for quite a while as the behavior of the people at the nation's prosecution office show. This is way beyond debating whether the regime can be described as a dictatorship. This is a neo-totalitarian system as I have long ago coined it as a tag for some of this blog entries.
In the end one is left perplexed in trying to figure which is the worst evil. The ones giving orders? The ones executing it? The ones confessing to them without much trouble? And thus it all becomes banal.
PS: interview now up for those who understand Spanish
Oyendo Nieves me la paso pensando en Hanna Arendt y la banalidad del mal. #ConcluFiscal— daniel duquenal (@danielduquenal) October 28, 2015In English: Listening to {prosecutor} Nieves I keep thinking of Hannah Arendt and the banality of evil.
One of the top prosecutors in the Leopoldo Lopez show trial has defected to the US and is now saying that the whole operation against Lopez was a scam, that the intention was to put him away for the election of 2015 and more. In fact Nieves went as far as to say, more or less, that the order to arrest Lopez already existed before the events for which he was finally arrested in February 2014.
Franklin Nieves was tonight in the top CÑNe rating show of Fernando del Rincon. Mr. del Rincon rocketed from a CNNE anchor to his own nightly talk show, Conclusiones, as a consequence of his daring reports on Venezuela through the first half of 2014. He has become the journalist to go for any trouble in Latin America, and the specialist on Venezuela, much loved by the opposition, and much more reviled by the regime.
I am not going into the details of what Nieves said (for those who read Spanish you can visit my Tweeter time line of Tuesday night). In short, he stated that all the evidence against Lopez was fabricated, that he received orders to prosecute anyway on those fake evidences, that all knew about that in the regime, that Diosdado Cabello himself was supervising the first orders and that he fooled the Lopez family in making them believe that if Lopez surrendered nicely a deal would be reached. He accused directly Maduro and Cabello and some of the top officials at the state prosecuting office in such a way that the regime will have to do better than just using the worn out line "he is a liar, paid by the nemesis of the revolution" (which he may well be for all that I know, but that is not the point). There is a situation now that will make supporting the regime almost impossible for some of its allies.
No, my interest is elsewhere. First, let's us start with the one with easiest access: why is the US covering for all those defectors? Is it a strategy to encourage them to defect the regime so as to build a case against its corrupt narco officials? In that case, how come indictments and active prosecutions are not coming through faster? In short, why are the US giving some (minor) credit to some of the accusations the regime hurls at them? I am writing that because informed people know better, know that the regime is indeed a rotten corrupt system, that is not investigated by the US alone. But too many use the people's ignorance and misinformation, even inside the opposition, in such ways that it helps the regime case. I am also writing this so that readers realize that I am not in a blind rage as I type.
There is some confusing evil above, but there is real evil next.
What has struck me more was the composure of Nieves during the whole interview, even as del Rincon was trying not to break down under the shock of having all of his antidemocratic accusations against the regime thus validated.
That made me think of Hanna Arendt, the Eichman trial, the basic nature of totalitarianism the way she explained, creating "the banality of evil". At least Arendt was writing her seminal books based on people following orders. I suppose that concentration camp guards did not have access to Tweeter to get contrasting news to what the Reich told them everyday. Even if pathetic, the defenses of "I was just following orders" " I did not know" "Nobody told me anything, nobody knew" could make one doubt on occasion if the lines were pronounced then with an empty enough glance.
But with Nieves such excuses cannot apply. Nieves tonight told us he knew what he was doing all along was wrong, was a crime, was an abuse of Human Rights. He knew all along that the regime wanted Lopez jailed, found guilty while it figured out, I imagine, a final solution to the Lopez problem.
Nieves knew and yet he did. And I do not buy much his crocodile tears at seeing Lopez little girl go to the same school as the prosecutor's orphan maker girl being too much for him and making him decide to defect.
What was shocking tonight is that all the actors were following orders, indeed, but knowing full well that the orders were wrong. In the end it does not really matter whether Cabello is the one that gave the original order, what matters here is that the chavista regime has been a totalitarian regime for quite a while as the behavior of the people at the nation's prosecution office show. This is way beyond debating whether the regime can be described as a dictatorship. This is a neo-totalitarian system as I have long ago coined it as a tag for some of this blog entries.
In the end one is left perplexed in trying to figure which is the worst evil. The ones giving orders? The ones executing it? The ones confessing to them without much trouble? And thus it all becomes banal.
PS: interview now up for those who understand Spanish
Friday, 21 August 2015
Brief electoral report
This is not an electoral report. As I have announced weeks ago, this blog will not cover the coming elections for a variety of reasons. Still, when I read all of the nonsense or wishful thinking elsewhere, I suppose that I feel compelled from time to time to remind people that treating the parliamentary election of December as if it were a normal election is, well, close to idiotic. In other words discussing in detail the intrigues inside the MUD of PSUV is close to irrelevant. Discussing the treachery of the regime is close to redundant at this point. Speculating on the final outcome with polls and calculations is only marginally productive unless one places the comment on the consequences of the vote rather than the actual results.
Thus in no particular order a few talking points, for lack of a more descriptive title.
Electoral treachery. The regime keeps at it. In addition of banning from office for the silliest of reasons opposition leaders (interestingly no significant PSUV is banned, they do not even try to keep a vague pretense of fairness), it has now started to intervene directly into opposition parties organization on the flimsiest of excuses. Any disgruntled party member can sue its direction, win the trial courtesy DIRECTLY from the hand of the high court TSJ so there is no possible appeal whatsoever, and become the new party leader. The objective is simple: try to pry away from the MUD opposition umbrella electoral organization. Since the new "leaders" appointed by the regime are to say the least suspicious in their opposition commitment the MUD has no other choices but to expel the "renovated" parties. These in turn are expected to name their own candidates, certainly financed by the regime.
The point here is not the detail of any given electoral treachery. The point is that the regime will go in crescendo in inventing barriers to any opposition putative electoral victory and, caught in its own game, it will feel justified on December 7 not to recognize the adverse result.
Conclusion, of a sort. All of this in the end matters little. The vote is quite clear. No matter who the candidates are, the crisis has tuned out the election into a referendum on Maduro. Any yellow or red dog will get its due votes. Any treachery form the regime has no effect on the long run of things.
Do the results matter?
They do not. It is irrelevant which side wins on December 6, the task is the same for all, there is no margin of action. The price of oil keeps going down and corruption is stronger than ever. Things are so reckless that I have been asked straight for money if I want a certain permit to be processed: they will receive the request, they cannot refuse, but the evaluation will happen only if I pay a load of cash to X (fake companies exist with fiscal registry so I can even get a bill for tax purposes).
For the regime the strategy is clear: rake as much cash as possible before December 6, either to win votes, or to have a safety net if ousted, AND leave the coffers empty if the opposition wins. This one deprived of means will be destined to failure (with a fast chavista return to office). And if chavismo wins they will find a way to wing it out, using harsh repression as needed. There cannot be any other way for the colony as long as the Cuban master needs whatever it can get from its Venezuelan overseas territory. That the viceroys of that overseas are corrupt narco military and radical low life politicos only aggravates the situation.
In short, the predictably worsening economic crisis in 2016 will lead to political failure of whomever holds office. One is actually tempted to wish for a chavismo "victory" so to be able to finish it off once and for all in the following year.
The opposition will lose the election
Not only electoral treachery will be hard to overcome, but the opposition electoral umbrella, MUD, is doing whatever it takes to demotivate its potential electors. For example sabotaging folks like Leopoldo Lopez or Maria Corina Machado makes their more fervent and dedicated electoral voters want to stay home. Lack of a concrete program is as bad as lack of a principled program: lack of either one sets up the opposition for political failure after the election and has as such a demotivating effect. The current offering of being an kind of efficient chavismo, or efficient populism, an oxymoron of course, is simply not enough to pry away chavista voters who at best, it is hoped for, will stay home.
Because the opposition victory is not to get more seats than chavismo, the opposition needs a victory of at least 3/5 of the seats at stake. Otherwise it will have no veto power and no real control over a public administration and power structures solidly packed with chavista hacks. The reader should remember that the MUD is not a political party based on any ideology or coherent program, even if flawed. The MUD is first an electoral alliance to unify a splintered opposition, an alliance that has really no program beyond restoring some democracy to the country. This is by itself very commendable, but in the current calamitous situation it is not enough. Thus only a 3/5 victory will steel the MUD in front of chavismo and give it a chance to take action, if anything to call for a recall election on Maduro. If the MUD gets a simple majority this one will fall apart in front of the crisis and chavismo will not be controlled and over time will be able to pry away or outright destroy whatever it needs to recover a majority.
Chavismo will not win the election
The paradox here is that I can write that the opposition will lose the election but that chavismo will not win it. The candidate "primary" fixing process of chavismo has been very interesting. First, it was all but transparent. Second, more than half of the outgoing representatives are not running for reelection (I read somewhere that 80% were out). This does not talk at all of internal democracy inside chavismo, this talks of account settling between factions, of an absolute lack of trust in the currently serving personnel for the leaders of the current factions, or vice-versa. All prefer new blood, or have been eaten up by dissent.
If opposition need 3/5 to win, chavismo needs 2/3! If it fails to do that no faction will have an internal majority to rule over the assembly and possible outright divisions may not be contained further. With less than 2/3 of the assembly chavismo will simply have to rely even more on the military to hold unto office, either through repression, or as the only power all factions can agree on, albeit reluctantly.
The grand elector
Which brings us to the only elector that truly matters in this electoral charade: the army.
The army is under great threat. Tendency is for chavismo, and the opposition, to turn the army into the scapegoat of the whole crash. Chavismo because the army may have put the brakes of radicalization of the system. Opposition because the army did not slow down the decay and instead associated itself happily with the looting of the country.
The truth is that to avoid an outright civil war (there is already a larval civil war going on, look at the numbers of people killed every day) a grand pact between opposition and chavismo is necessary. And such negotiation can only be carried through with the consent of the fire power of the country which will be in charge of keeping order while the painful measures are being taken.
It does not matter, thus, who wins in December, the army will either rule or decide who the apparent ruler will be for the unavoidable transition.
Conclusion
Covering the current election as if it were a "normal" one albeit with peculiar/extraordinary parameters is, well, intellectually dishonest. But I suppose that journalists and bloggers and think tankers need to cover their white pages with ink, digital or otherwise.
The only thing worth discussing today is not the election or the immediate exit of Maduro. The only thing worth discussing is to demand a transition government and how to get one. Elections are not necessary. They will not solve the crisis, unless of a presidential or constitutional nature. Period.
Thus in no particular order a few talking points, for lack of a more descriptive title.
Electoral treachery. The regime keeps at it. In addition of banning from office for the silliest of reasons opposition leaders (interestingly no significant PSUV is banned, they do not even try to keep a vague pretense of fairness), it has now started to intervene directly into opposition parties organization on the flimsiest of excuses. Any disgruntled party member can sue its direction, win the trial courtesy DIRECTLY from the hand of the high court TSJ so there is no possible appeal whatsoever, and become the new party leader. The objective is simple: try to pry away from the MUD opposition umbrella electoral organization. Since the new "leaders" appointed by the regime are to say the least suspicious in their opposition commitment the MUD has no other choices but to expel the "renovated" parties. These in turn are expected to name their own candidates, certainly financed by the regime.
The point here is not the detail of any given electoral treachery. The point is that the regime will go in crescendo in inventing barriers to any opposition putative electoral victory and, caught in its own game, it will feel justified on December 7 not to recognize the adverse result.
Conclusion, of a sort. All of this in the end matters little. The vote is quite clear. No matter who the candidates are, the crisis has tuned out the election into a referendum on Maduro. Any yellow or red dog will get its due votes. Any treachery form the regime has no effect on the long run of things.
Do the results matter?
They do not. It is irrelevant which side wins on December 6, the task is the same for all, there is no margin of action. The price of oil keeps going down and corruption is stronger than ever. Things are so reckless that I have been asked straight for money if I want a certain permit to be processed: they will receive the request, they cannot refuse, but the evaluation will happen only if I pay a load of cash to X (fake companies exist with fiscal registry so I can even get a bill for tax purposes).
For the regime the strategy is clear: rake as much cash as possible before December 6, either to win votes, or to have a safety net if ousted, AND leave the coffers empty if the opposition wins. This one deprived of means will be destined to failure (with a fast chavista return to office). And if chavismo wins they will find a way to wing it out, using harsh repression as needed. There cannot be any other way for the colony as long as the Cuban master needs whatever it can get from its Venezuelan overseas territory. That the viceroys of that overseas are corrupt narco military and radical low life politicos only aggravates the situation.
In short, the predictably worsening economic crisis in 2016 will lead to political failure of whomever holds office. One is actually tempted to wish for a chavismo "victory" so to be able to finish it off once and for all in the following year.
The opposition will lose the election
Not only electoral treachery will be hard to overcome, but the opposition electoral umbrella, MUD, is doing whatever it takes to demotivate its potential electors. For example sabotaging folks like Leopoldo Lopez or Maria Corina Machado makes their more fervent and dedicated electoral voters want to stay home. Lack of a concrete program is as bad as lack of a principled program: lack of either one sets up the opposition for political failure after the election and has as such a demotivating effect. The current offering of being an kind of efficient chavismo, or efficient populism, an oxymoron of course, is simply not enough to pry away chavista voters who at best, it is hoped for, will stay home.
Because the opposition victory is not to get more seats than chavismo, the opposition needs a victory of at least 3/5 of the seats at stake. Otherwise it will have no veto power and no real control over a public administration and power structures solidly packed with chavista hacks. The reader should remember that the MUD is not a political party based on any ideology or coherent program, even if flawed. The MUD is first an electoral alliance to unify a splintered opposition, an alliance that has really no program beyond restoring some democracy to the country. This is by itself very commendable, but in the current calamitous situation it is not enough. Thus only a 3/5 victory will steel the MUD in front of chavismo and give it a chance to take action, if anything to call for a recall election on Maduro. If the MUD gets a simple majority this one will fall apart in front of the crisis and chavismo will not be controlled and over time will be able to pry away or outright destroy whatever it needs to recover a majority.
Chavismo will not win the election
The paradox here is that I can write that the opposition will lose the election but that chavismo will not win it. The candidate "primary" fixing process of chavismo has been very interesting. First, it was all but transparent. Second, more than half of the outgoing representatives are not running for reelection (I read somewhere that 80% were out). This does not talk at all of internal democracy inside chavismo, this talks of account settling between factions, of an absolute lack of trust in the currently serving personnel for the leaders of the current factions, or vice-versa. All prefer new blood, or have been eaten up by dissent.
If opposition need 3/5 to win, chavismo needs 2/3! If it fails to do that no faction will have an internal majority to rule over the assembly and possible outright divisions may not be contained further. With less than 2/3 of the assembly chavismo will simply have to rely even more on the military to hold unto office, either through repression, or as the only power all factions can agree on, albeit reluctantly.
The grand elector
Which brings us to the only elector that truly matters in this electoral charade: the army.
The army is under great threat. Tendency is for chavismo, and the opposition, to turn the army into the scapegoat of the whole crash. Chavismo because the army may have put the brakes of radicalization of the system. Opposition because the army did not slow down the decay and instead associated itself happily with the looting of the country.
The truth is that to avoid an outright civil war (there is already a larval civil war going on, look at the numbers of people killed every day) a grand pact between opposition and chavismo is necessary. And such negotiation can only be carried through with the consent of the fire power of the country which will be in charge of keeping order while the painful measures are being taken.
It does not matter, thus, who wins in December, the army will either rule or decide who the apparent ruler will be for the unavoidable transition.
Conclusion
Covering the current election as if it were a "normal" one albeit with peculiar/extraordinary parameters is, well, intellectually dishonest. But I suppose that journalists and bloggers and think tankers need to cover their white pages with ink, digital or otherwise.
The only thing worth discussing today is not the election or the immediate exit of Maduro. The only thing worth discussing is to demand a transition government and how to get one. Elections are not necessary. They will not solve the crisis, unless of a presidential or constitutional nature. Period.
Wednesday, 25 September 2013
Nowhere to go for chavismo
It is always sobering when you read that even a firebrand like Marianella Salazar writes in a major paper about the possibility of a coup, naturally, as if she were talking about what to do next Sunday after the family BBQ. I do not know about her sources to take this eventuality such matter-of-factly, but one thing is certain: major governmental paralysis is only too often the surest sign of a regime/government change. Hit your history books.The fact of the matter is that since Chavez left for Cuba the country has been basically on standby. For all the electoral pandering the lone economic decision of importance taken was the devaluation in February which has turned out to be a mere robbery as most private debt of 2012 at 4.3 to the dollar has been paid, if paid, at 6.3 to the dollar. A 40%+ robbery. True, there has been an attempt at reducing expenses though with misguided targets, and probably all efforts voided by the latest loan from China which is for electoral purposes, and once again, leaving us into yet more national debt (I have read 60% of PIB which is terrible for a country that produces nothing of value for export).
Whatever the real numbers are on the economy what we know for certain is that the inflation is killing us while the country infrastructure, without upkeep for a couple of decades is crumbling at a faster speed, from gaping sinkholes in Caracas streets to constant power outages. For those of us still trying to have our business produce something, anything, the fight is harder by the day. Between the increasing difficulty to obtain less and less dollars to purchase our raw materials we are subjected to a relentless assault of bureaucrats acting as free agents to skim whatever they can from us, legally or not, it really makes no difference at this point. For many manufacturing business these days, trapped between abusive price controls, impossibility to manage labor force, scarcity of raw materials, logistical nightmares, it is increasingly coming down to meet payroll or pay our providers. Since by law we must do both then private debt increases or payroll is cut down, generating more social stress.
All of these is felt by the population which is realizing that the regime is simply unable to take any major decision. The regime is trapped into the prospect of radicalizing its system and accept state bankruptcy and the consequent repression that will be needed to control the masses; or the regime can start applying a dose of reality to state management, implicitly admitting that the bolivarian fraudulent revolution is over. The question thus, the real question, is why soon one year after the departure of Chavez the regime is unable to make up its mind.
I am offering one explanation here, of the many possible: chavismo is on the verge of fracturing itself. In Venezuelan history the break up of political parties is a recurrent theme. AD did it several times. Copei did it only once but it cost it its future. Even parties that did not make it to office managed to divide themsleves, such as Causa R, and even Primero Justicia when Lopez left. There is no accident that Venezuelan ballots offer dozens of political parties.
Specific chavismo, the PSUV, cannot escape that fate, the more so that it was founded as a support for Chavez, never along a strong ideological program, or at least a country objective. If the ambitions of Maduro and Cabello have been apparent and determined the inner struggles of 2012 and the first half of 2013, we cannot fail to note that chavismo itself was never able to unify the Venezuelan left, as many parties claiming that image still exist within chavismo (like the Communist party and other assorted small groups). Amen of the left that never joined chavismo or abandoned 2007, or even earlier.
I think that one reason why the regime is unable to take real political and economic measures is that any it may take will alienate one of the branches of chavismo and cause a break up. Since all inside know that a break up is a sure way to be booted out of office, they stick together at all costs, in particular the even higher cost of paralysis which is a slower way to be dismissed from office but the surest one.
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| The genius of Weil at Tal Cual Values or corruption Production or importation Spending or investment Debt, debt, debt.... |
Monday, 23 September 2013
The Venezuelan narco-state caught pants down in Paris: a price to pay
I need to come back to this 1.3 tons of cocaine seized in Paris airport because I think it is as clear an example for all to see on how deep into narco-statism we have descended, and how the rest of the world knows it and deals accordingly.
Once one gets through the massive amount of hot air emissions from journalists in search of front lines we can find a few pieces that start explaining how things may have worked out. True, the French police is not going to give all the necessary precision because they need to hold a few trump cards for future shipments. The magazine Le Point in France offers one of the few serious analysis on how the shipment may have made it to the Air France flight: the drug may have been in overweight bags but it most likely was not shipped through the luggage section of the plane but as freight. Thus the complicity inside the airport is not with the passenger attending personnel but through the "contractor" that distributes freight among the different airlines. This of course does not exonerate Air France since it should have checked better the contents of its freight holds. But it opens the field of wise speculation.
30+ overweight luggage had to enter into Maiquetia/Simon Bolivar (MIQ) through a small truck. We are talking a 2-3T plus vehicle here. One supposes that such a truck is inspected entering any, ANY international airport of the world. Clearly that step was voided here.
The truck had to circulate through the airport and there are restrictions as to who can drive where inside. Clearly we have there not only security violations but also administrative fault from the airport itself. Amen of where the hell 30+ overweight bags were stored for 1? 2? 5? days before the flight.
If we take a number of 35 suit cases for 1.3 tons we have 38 kilos per piece. Anyone taking a plane these days know that you are simply not allowed a 35 kilo luggage even if you pay excess: a special procedure is set in place when you carry overweight stuff. No baggage handler at MIQ complained, that we know of, on September 11 when supposedly the drug was loaded. Interesting detail, no?
Since the luggage went likely through fret then passenger personnel at check in did not see it. But what about Air France personnel? are they not supposed to check the fret embarked?
Last and not least MIQ is reputed internationally as a true pain in the a.. for "security check". As I wrote, bags are opened BEFORE check in and they go all through it without any consideration, take away what they want form it, and as Miguel wrote, you can even be sent for a body X-ray to make sure you have drug in your intestines. The Nazional Guard has no qualms in pushing you through all of these abuses and delaying flights for as long as they please. You are even subjected often to a last body and cabin bag search before stepping inside your plane. How come that cargo freight container went through without trouble? Aren't there supposed to be scanners for these containers as they are for bags since we regularly hear passengers called to custom to open their bags?
I probably can come up with yet more questions, but this above should suffice to make it clear that there must have been MANY security breaches, from the airport administration, from the security personnel and from at least one Air France personnel. I am not going to speculate about what happened in Paris since clearly the traffickers expected clear sailing. After all, Paris did catch the shipment. But one thing is certain, adding the people directly involved in the shipment and those that pretended to see nothing we are talking of around a dozen folks involved (without counting those involved in bringing the drug from Colombia to MIQ in spite of all the constant road checks that cost my business hours in delays and bribes).
And yet the regime was speedy in finding three fall guys, three low ranking military from the Nazional Guard, people without any real authority: a lieutenant and two sergeants who probably would not be caught dead doing physical work loading the fret container..... And quickly advertised a drug capture inside Venezuela of half a ton, taking the opportunity to insist stupidly that Maduro in China is informed of that and gives orders himself as to proceed with the investigation. Geeezzz........
Sorry, but no deal. To ship a ton of drug from Colombia to MIQ, to have it board a regular flight to Paris, you need to coordinate security personnel at a level that cannot be possibly achieved by a mere Lieutenant no matter how skilled he may be at computing or something. To begin with, road blocks are not computerized .... Here, there is at least one General and a couple of helpers strategically placed, probably at Colonel level, to make sure the shipment made it through and through. The three fall guys, for all that I know, may not even have known what was in the container (though they certainly should have suspected it). They simply were the security personnel on duty on September 11 and given orders not to look closely at the stuff. Or, charitably, blackmailed into it as probably was the case of the involved Air France personnel of Venezuelan origin.
An operation like the one of Air France flight can only be mounted in a country that is deeply rotten, deeply corrupted, where drug traffickers have no problem to find all the help they require for their business. Let's not forget something: this is not the first time it happens, from planes landing in emergency in Mali coming from Venezuela with tons of the stuff, to a plane in the Canary Islands, to boats, to whatever..... What happened this time is only a stepping up of the chutzpah of these people.
But at least inside of Venezuela I am not the only one to think that we are a rotten to the core country. Capriles for once was prompt in calling a corrupt spade, a corrupt spade. At least the international scandal is forcing the interior minister to go on record to admit that at least 20 people are being interrogated on the subject. But no one is holding breath: if a General were to be indicted in that event it could be the occasion of a dangerous unraveling of the power base of the regime which relies on massive laundering of public monies stolen to and deep permissiveness on drug traffic in spite of the widely publicized drug hauls.
To all of this we must add one thing. The French government has claimed that the shipment left Caracas on September 11 and yet the haul was made public on the 20th, on for all that we know that was the day Venezuela was told. I do not want to speculate much on that but if indeed the regime was so late in being warned it can only be coming from the experience of the international security community as to how unreliable their Venezuelan colleagues are today. On a public relation point of view, one thing is to catch a stolen fisherman ship with tons of coke on board, another one is to use a normal passenger flight for a ton. This is a degree of magnitude that should not be crossed and I suspect that Venezuela will, for once, pay a price for such a mistake. Not only overseas but also in Venezuela where the spectacular nature of the haul is already used by Capriles. We shall see but for once I am optimistic: it was too much and surely someone inside the regime is going to use that for political advantage.
Once one gets through the massive amount of hot air emissions from journalists in search of front lines we can find a few pieces that start explaining how things may have worked out. True, the French police is not going to give all the necessary precision because they need to hold a few trump cards for future shipments. The magazine Le Point in France offers one of the few serious analysis on how the shipment may have made it to the Air France flight: the drug may have been in overweight bags but it most likely was not shipped through the luggage section of the plane but as freight. Thus the complicity inside the airport is not with the passenger attending personnel but through the "contractor" that distributes freight among the different airlines. This of course does not exonerate Air France since it should have checked better the contents of its freight holds. But it opens the field of wise speculation.
30+ overweight luggage had to enter into Maiquetia/Simon Bolivar (MIQ) through a small truck. We are talking a 2-3T plus vehicle here. One supposes that such a truck is inspected entering any, ANY international airport of the world. Clearly that step was voided here.
The truck had to circulate through the airport and there are restrictions as to who can drive where inside. Clearly we have there not only security violations but also administrative fault from the airport itself. Amen of where the hell 30+ overweight bags were stored for 1? 2? 5? days before the flight.
If we take a number of 35 suit cases for 1.3 tons we have 38 kilos per piece. Anyone taking a plane these days know that you are simply not allowed a 35 kilo luggage even if you pay excess: a special procedure is set in place when you carry overweight stuff. No baggage handler at MIQ complained, that we know of, on September 11 when supposedly the drug was loaded. Interesting detail, no?
Since the luggage went likely through fret then passenger personnel at check in did not see it. But what about Air France personnel? are they not supposed to check the fret embarked?
Last and not least MIQ is reputed internationally as a true pain in the a.. for "security check". As I wrote, bags are opened BEFORE check in and they go all through it without any consideration, take away what they want form it, and as Miguel wrote, you can even be sent for a body X-ray to make sure you have drug in your intestines. The Nazional Guard has no qualms in pushing you through all of these abuses and delaying flights for as long as they please. You are even subjected often to a last body and cabin bag search before stepping inside your plane. How come that cargo freight container went through without trouble? Aren't there supposed to be scanners for these containers as they are for bags since we regularly hear passengers called to custom to open their bags?
I probably can come up with yet more questions, but this above should suffice to make it clear that there must have been MANY security breaches, from the airport administration, from the security personnel and from at least one Air France personnel. I am not going to speculate about what happened in Paris since clearly the traffickers expected clear sailing. After all, Paris did catch the shipment. But one thing is certain, adding the people directly involved in the shipment and those that pretended to see nothing we are talking of around a dozen folks involved (without counting those involved in bringing the drug from Colombia to MIQ in spite of all the constant road checks that cost my business hours in delays and bribes).
And yet the regime was speedy in finding three fall guys, three low ranking military from the Nazional Guard, people without any real authority: a lieutenant and two sergeants who probably would not be caught dead doing physical work loading the fret container..... And quickly advertised a drug capture inside Venezuela of half a ton, taking the opportunity to insist stupidly that Maduro in China is informed of that and gives orders himself as to proceed with the investigation. Geeezzz........
Sorry, but no deal. To ship a ton of drug from Colombia to MIQ, to have it board a regular flight to Paris, you need to coordinate security personnel at a level that cannot be possibly achieved by a mere Lieutenant no matter how skilled he may be at computing or something. To begin with, road blocks are not computerized .... Here, there is at least one General and a couple of helpers strategically placed, probably at Colonel level, to make sure the shipment made it through and through. The three fall guys, for all that I know, may not even have known what was in the container (though they certainly should have suspected it). They simply were the security personnel on duty on September 11 and given orders not to look closely at the stuff. Or, charitably, blackmailed into it as probably was the case of the involved Air France personnel of Venezuelan origin.
An operation like the one of Air France flight can only be mounted in a country that is deeply rotten, deeply corrupted, where drug traffickers have no problem to find all the help they require for their business. Let's not forget something: this is not the first time it happens, from planes landing in emergency in Mali coming from Venezuela with tons of the stuff, to a plane in the Canary Islands, to boats, to whatever..... What happened this time is only a stepping up of the chutzpah of these people.
But at least inside of Venezuela I am not the only one to think that we are a rotten to the core country. Capriles for once was prompt in calling a corrupt spade, a corrupt spade. At least the international scandal is forcing the interior minister to go on record to admit that at least 20 people are being interrogated on the subject. But no one is holding breath: if a General were to be indicted in that event it could be the occasion of a dangerous unraveling of the power base of the regime which relies on massive laundering of public monies stolen to and deep permissiveness on drug traffic in spite of the widely publicized drug hauls.
To all of this we must add one thing. The French government has claimed that the shipment left Caracas on September 11 and yet the haul was made public on the 20th, on for all that we know that was the day Venezuela was told. I do not want to speculate much on that but if indeed the regime was so late in being warned it can only be coming from the experience of the international security community as to how unreliable their Venezuelan colleagues are today. On a public relation point of view, one thing is to catch a stolen fisherman ship with tons of coke on board, another one is to use a normal passenger flight for a ton. This is a degree of magnitude that should not be crossed and I suspect that Venezuela will, for once, pay a price for such a mistake. Not only overseas but also in Venezuela where the spectacular nature of the haul is already used by Capriles. We shall see but for once I am optimistic: it was too much and surely someone inside the regime is going to use that for political advantage.
Sunday, 28 July 2013
The IAEPHC is born. We may finally start understanding something of the twisted mind of Chavez
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| Hefty, hefty..... |
Let's start by saying that the work is going to be epic. Not because Hugo Chavez left a body of work worth analyzing but because he did not leave anything written except for a few newspaper columns and some letters. What Chavez is leaving are hours and hours and yet more hours of rants. Though "rant" is not a good description of Chavez speeches, the French "déblatérer" would be better, describing abundant and violent speech against something. But I digress.
Yet, the thousand of hours of Chavez speeches are not necessarily the main hurdle for the august work of such a novel institute. First, the profound thinkers that are to study Chavez opus will have to sift through insults, vulgarity and parables to find some substance. And yet, it is not going to be all. Across his entire career Chavez has contradicted himself constantly though admittedly after 2006 he took a more steady course towards a communist approach more in accordance with the way he gave up the country to the Cuban overlords.
And last but not least, it is important to note that Chavez's personal lifestyle, as well as the one of his family, most of the time did not agree with his official positions. So, where is the real Hugo Chavez?
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| IAEPHC poster bimbo? |
Still, let's be optimistic and hope that such an advanced institute may finally shine some light on the tortuous and vile mind of Chavez.
And you thought we could not go any lower.....
Tuesday, 23 July 2013
Comparing Venezuela and Egypt. NOT! Musings on youth protest...
Even though this blog likes historical coincidences readers will have noticed that I have stayed clear from the latest Egyptian revolution cum coup. For one thing, my allergy to anything military, reinforced by the utter corruption and amorality of the military in charge of the Venezuelan regime. Nothing good comes from military and for a single de Gaulle or Eisenhower you have scores of creeps like Chavez or Velasco Alvarado. But apparently some are not so coy and reach the pages of the NYT OpEd.
I do not want to criticize Daniel Lansberg, a polished writer in English or Spanish, with interesting ideas. But his entry in the NYT "We had our Tamarrod, and failed", fails. And it is not the good recommendation of Moises Naim that will save it.
I truly do not understand why Lansberg thinks that the youth movement in Egypt is winning and the one in Venezuela is failing. I suppose that in parts it is the wish of so many to compare situations that cannot be comparable in any way, outside of the generalities that Morsi and Chavez acted more like intolerant religious leaders than democrats. And that is far from satisfying, even to start a line of thoughts.
The youth movement in Egypt (or rather Cairo?) is indeed a youth movement in that it spilled over from campus to working districts, a youth that felt it had no future. From the start the youth of Egypt showed a unity of purpose across social groups that was never present in Venezuela. As such in Egypt it was a powerful motor for political change, at a grass root level, and better comparisons could be found in Paris in 1830 or Vienna 1848. In all cases, sooner than later, the old regimes came back in "gattopardian" ways, just as it seems to be coming back in Egypt.
In Venezuela the youth movement was rather, at first, a Caracas intellectual elite campus, as Lansberg himself admits. I write intellectual elite because it was not a social elite even if those do overlap greatly in Venezuela. The campuses that started the anti Chavez movement were those campus from the private or autonomous universities where the best and brightest, those that actually like to think and hold personal thoughts, want to go. The parallel system of higher education that chavismo has tried to established attracts those that are unwilling or not able to join these campuses and satisfy themselves by going to campuses where ideology is rampant, where party cadres are formed and where a degree is earned more by steady attendance and accommodation rather than technical or scholarly work. As such the university youth movement was handicapped from the start, with a a group of students seeking a true future and freedom on one side while those following the national temperament after decades of handouts were only too willing to play by the regime rules to land a dead end job in some obscure public administration, their skills being mostly useless in the real world.
As such I beg to differ from the pessimistic tone and ending of Daniel Lansberg piece. I think that the Venezuelan youth movement has accomplished a lot, besides being the main motor for the defeat of Chavez in 2007. That its leaders are managing slowly but surely to infiltrate the political parties is actually a victory, it is the seeds of political renewal in Venezuela. Those things take time, perhaps annoying those that want a quick fixes to our political and economic woes.
If anything, the "failure" of the Venezuelan student youth movement comes from the failure of a society who since the times of Gomez is used to the notion that a few banknotes are enough to paper over any difficulty. As such too many prefer to bitch at Chavez's regime from Twitter than actually do something about it. This, of course, as from another window of the same lap top they negotiate subsidized dollars to go on vacation or import what they cannot produce anymore.
I do not mean to belittle Daniel Lansberg for his rather unfair conclusion. I congratulate him greatly for reaching the pages of the New York Times and make aware people of the situation in Venezuela which, no matters how you write about it, is always depressing. What I wish for him next time he has such an opportunity is to think things through a little bit better, a little bit deeper.
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PS: sorry, this post had a part eaten up while I did a minor editing and I had to rewrite a paragraph which maybe different from the previous version but the cache was cached.... This is the fault of chronic internet faults inside Venezuela and blogger simply cuts communication or saves wrongly.
I do not want to criticize Daniel Lansberg, a polished writer in English or Spanish, with interesting ideas. But his entry in the NYT "We had our Tamarrod, and failed", fails. And it is not the good recommendation of Moises Naim that will save it.
Good article comparing Egypt &Venezuela's youth movmts by the great Daniel Lansberg: We Had Our Tamarrod, and Failed http://t.co/gqp90REllDIn his article my tocayo compares the successes of the youth movement in Egypt and in Venezuela, assuming that it is prospering in Egypt and failing in Venezuela. I will just quote his misguided wistful ending:
— Moisés Naím (@MoisesNaim) July 23, 2013
Seen from this position, Tamarrod’s successes to date are inspiring. The movement has already accomplished far more in Egypt than we ever did or, frankly, ever dreamed of in Venezuela: Twice now, Egypt’s youth has played a critical role in stripping power from governments it thought were keeping the future from it.
Our youth revolution fell short; may yours be realized.
I truly do not understand why Lansberg thinks that the youth movement in Egypt is winning and the one in Venezuela is failing. I suppose that in parts it is the wish of so many to compare situations that cannot be comparable in any way, outside of the generalities that Morsi and Chavez acted more like intolerant religious leaders than democrats. And that is far from satisfying, even to start a line of thoughts.
The youth movement in Egypt (or rather Cairo?) is indeed a youth movement in that it spilled over from campus to working districts, a youth that felt it had no future. From the start the youth of Egypt showed a unity of purpose across social groups that was never present in Venezuela. As such in Egypt it was a powerful motor for political change, at a grass root level, and better comparisons could be found in Paris in 1830 or Vienna 1848. In all cases, sooner than later, the old regimes came back in "gattopardian" ways, just as it seems to be coming back in Egypt.
In Venezuela the youth movement was rather, at first, a Caracas intellectual elite campus, as Lansberg himself admits. I write intellectual elite because it was not a social elite even if those do overlap greatly in Venezuela. The campuses that started the anti Chavez movement were those campus from the private or autonomous universities where the best and brightest, those that actually like to think and hold personal thoughts, want to go. The parallel system of higher education that chavismo has tried to established attracts those that are unwilling or not able to join these campuses and satisfy themselves by going to campuses where ideology is rampant, where party cadres are formed and where a degree is earned more by steady attendance and accommodation rather than technical or scholarly work. As such the university youth movement was handicapped from the start, with a a group of students seeking a true future and freedom on one side while those following the national temperament after decades of handouts were only too willing to play by the regime rules to land a dead end job in some obscure public administration, their skills being mostly useless in the real world.
As such I beg to differ from the pessimistic tone and ending of Daniel Lansberg piece. I think that the Venezuelan youth movement has accomplished a lot, besides being the main motor for the defeat of Chavez in 2007. That its leaders are managing slowly but surely to infiltrate the political parties is actually a victory, it is the seeds of political renewal in Venezuela. Those things take time, perhaps annoying those that want a quick fixes to our political and economic woes.
If anything, the "failure" of the Venezuelan student youth movement comes from the failure of a society who since the times of Gomez is used to the notion that a few banknotes are enough to paper over any difficulty. As such too many prefer to bitch at Chavez's regime from Twitter than actually do something about it. This, of course, as from another window of the same lap top they negotiate subsidized dollars to go on vacation or import what they cannot produce anymore.
I do not mean to belittle Daniel Lansberg for his rather unfair conclusion. I congratulate him greatly for reaching the pages of the New York Times and make aware people of the situation in Venezuela which, no matters how you write about it, is always depressing. What I wish for him next time he has such an opportunity is to think things through a little bit better, a little bit deeper.
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PS: sorry, this post had a part eaten up while I did a minor editing and I had to rewrite a paragraph which maybe different from the previous version but the cache was cached.... This is the fault of chronic internet faults inside Venezuela and blogger simply cuts communication or saves wrongly.
Monday, 8 July 2013
Chavez golden-red boys: Temir Porras as a poster case
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| Porras and pals |
Temir Porras is a nobody that made it big. He is smart enough to have benefited from the educational policies of the reviled ancien regime who sent him to study in Paris. Which does not stop him from criticizing anything that happened before Chavez. While in France he joined that decaying left from the commie sympathies to the trotskyst one, a left that would become the "Front de Gauche" later, led by one of Chavez biggest admirers, Mélanchon, one of the most cynical and destructive of French politicians today. That left pseudo intelligentsia (with people like Ramonet) welcomed Chavez as a savior for their outdated ideology. That did help him a lot to burnish his credentials inside chavismo as a true lefty with contacts in France at a time where Chavez needed as much favorable propaganda as possible, around the years 2002-2004. From then on his career was on the rise even though his uncle is the bishop of Merida and one of the main opponents of Chavez in his earlier years.
Now Temir Porras who accompanied Maduro while he was foreign minister by becoming slowly but surely the real power at the ministry (the article gives him the power of being the one liquidating the old forms of diplomacy to make the ministry a mere propaganda agency and a Cuban ministry executive branch of sorts). With Maduro now at the presidency he has been entrusted the management of the funds that Maduro can control away of Giordani, Ramirez or Cabello grasp. Where real power resides in Venezuela. And Temir is now starting to put his own people in charge such as a French guy who remembered that he also had a Venezuelan passport, Maximilien Sanchez Arvelaiz, former writer for Narco News among others.
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| A product of the French system, nothing less but ENA |
Now for the part that truly concerns this post: what is the profile of these golden-red boys that chavismo is forming (golden because in addition of their red ideas they do not seem to be allergic to money, including Temir who quickly dismisses financial accusations against him and his wife as right wing conspiracy).
They need to come from leftist background either through social resentment (resentimiento), their family, or actual Cuban education. I suspect that Temir is a resentido. His physique is what we would call in Venezuela a "bachaco" a very pejorative term who represents people light skinned, almost Caucasian looking, but with clear African ancestry. I am willing to bet anything that he has suffered from that and that his extensive education in France has not cured him from his social resentment. Even more if he associated with leftist groups who love exoticism.
We can get more hints of his condition through his Facebook page, his blog and a comment from El Nacional article as to him loving to speak in French in front of Venezuelan nationals that do not understand the language. Clearly, based on the pictures shown (of which I lifted these two), the guy has an active ego and is trying to compensate for something. This would go a long way into explaining why he put his skills at the service of a regime that has evolved into the most corrupt of our history but that allows him plenty of figuration. Heck, he was even the official representative to the IberoAmerican summit last year when Chavez was in death throes and Maduro too busy to cash in the inheritance to be bothered by the said summit.
And yet we suspect a lack of personality. His Tweeter account consists mostly of retweets, and when he tweets himself it is a mere rehash of the usual chavista attacks. Has chavismo filled a void in his existence?
Is he any good? By normal standards of ethics no. Besides what I El Nacional tells us, I happen to know someone that worked next to him for a while. I reserve the details to protect that person. Temir had an important supervising position that he never exercised. He spent his days behind closed doors, either in his office or the one of his boss, receiving people that had no business to do there. In short, his official job was an excuse to get a paid check while he was doing political activities elsewhere for his boss of the time. I have been told that his departure from that position was greeted with relief because his continuous absence from his job was creating many problems for the activities of other people in the office whose work depended on his absentee decisions.
But for the regime he must have been a very good operator in ways that we, from the civilized side of society, simply cannot fathom, and less understand. Now his arrival to an outright ministry is a matter of time, depending on when will Maduro be able to finally appoint the people he wants to appoint.
It is interesting to see how someone who had access to French culture and education has been able to sell himself so well to an undemocratic system, espousing closely its intolerance, discrimination, corruption and vulgarity, as El Nacional piece also hints at with comments such as what he makes from the protesting students. But I suppose that this is what the regime does to you when you subject to its wishes for your personal gains and/or revenge. Temir Porras seems to have become the type of person that will be able to destroy other people if needs arise, following orders. We are left to wonder how far he has transitioned into fascism, and I am afraid that we are going to find very similar stories in the next installments of El Nacional series. What we also need to be concerned with is that this class of non democratic bureaucrats are the seedling for tomorrow chavista politicians, those that the democratic opposition will have to confront if it makes it to power some day. A class of people that are at least as devoid of scruples as Temir Porras seems to have become.
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