The priorities ahead

And thus I am on December 28 in a hurry to write something as events keep going on in Venezuela. There is no time for a holiday pause. What, with the regime's shenanigans and the opposition division and only 7 days left for the new National Assembly to be sworn in!


The regime treachery has been exposed just before Christmas and they have remained quiet since. But it is just a lull, they are surely thinking about their next step. The opposition  reacted fast, a surprise for chavismo used by Chavez to do illegal stuff during holiday breaks. More important, the recent quiet  maybe due to divisions of chavismo as one side is getting tired of the acts of a minority only interested in saving their skins. The internal crumbling cannot be hidden anymore.

On the opposition side things have not been going well. Capriles, again, shot himself in the foot which maybe be a reflection of the delusion inside his party, Primero Justicia, at being the recognized leaders of the opposition. Apparently they seem to think that MUD label votes were pretty much PJ label votes. I am not going into the stupidities of Capriles, I am through with him. Let's just say that if his strategy helped for 6D vote, his humanity and political sense are now highly questioned.

So, in face of the current situation what should the opposition do first as of January 5?

What we need to be fully aware of is that a confrontation with the regime is unavoidable. The only things to be settled are the date and intensity of the confrontation. If all goes well we can hope that such confrontation will be an electoral one, not a violent one. And we can advance the latest date for the confrontation: December 2016 when governors's term ends. Yet four other electoral confrontation are possible depending on the degree of regime's despair.

Maduro may resign. New presidential elections need to be called to complete the six years term (1). This would be the wisest for the regime, to let the opposition burn itself dealing with the economic catastrophe next year. The problem with that option (and all others for that matter) is that it gives the opposition time to investigate the wasted oil bonanza of the last decade. In fact that option may be the worst one for the regime, as the ones discussed next give them time to prepare better some form of golden exile.

Maduro is stubborn and with the help of a portion of chavismo a recall election is called. This has to take place BEFORE summer as a later date could reach the fatal 4 year mark in the term and allow chavismo to seat an appointed vice president to complete the term (article #233 of the 1999 constitution). In short if the opposition choses or has to chose that way it should be decided by May at the latest considering the economic costs and the developing economic crisis. Note that the success of this maneuver depends on the electoral participation and the ability of the opposition to campaign actively.

Referendum/referenda for constitutional amendments. This could be a compromise between the opposition, the army and a sector of chavismo. This tool (#341) can be used in many ways, to free the judicial system of political control, to diminish the presidential power, to change electoral system, to approve reforms that the regime blocks, etc... It also has the advantage that it requires a simple majority inside the opposition so divisions are possible in case a faction decides to go to the dark side (yes, I am looking forward to see the new installment of the ninenalogy). The problem with this approach is that it depends on too many variables, one if the eventual willingness of Maduro to play the game and recognize defeat, accepting to stay in office just to preserve the "Chavez legacy", whatever that may mean. In short the regime would evolve into some form of parliamentary system where cohabitation is possible, French way.

Constitutional reform/assembly. The reform (#342) is a more extreme form of the referenda discussed above. This one would be to unseat the judicial system at large, change the electoral system and reestablish a bicameral congress as a way to create a containment wall against a fast return of chavismo, undo a persistent undue military influence and obtain the reinforcement of decentralization. The constitutional assembly (#348) is the ultimate weapon of mass destruction if the judicial power in the hands of chavismo is used in excess against any opposition initiative. The problem with a constitutional assembly is that it is a bomb that can sweep away all parties as the economy degenerates. On  the other hand it can be called at any time if the opposition retains the 2/3 vote, and can be called through signature gathering process and a referendum as long as the opposition retains a working majority.

So?

The consequence of the exposed above indicates that elections are on their way and the opposition needs to get ready for it from the very start, on January 6. For this it needs to do the following actions, ALL EQUALLY IMPORTANT.

Change the composition of the CNE to gain a 3 to 2 majority inside the electoral board.
If time allows modify some key sections of the electoral law and work on gerrymandering negative effects for regional elections of December 2016.

Free political prisoners as everyone is needed on board to campaign, while annulling some of the resentment appearing due, among others, Capriles foot in mouth approach to politics.

Improve access to all parties to media, which means reform the CONATEL law that gives CONATEL too much punishing control over media, return of RCTV network, change ANTV into a true form of C-span, and more. There is no need to investigate the suspicious purchase of some media as those ones have less and less rating. Just allowing for new blood will be enough to finish off this mercenaries (I am looking at you, Universal, Ultimas Noticias, Globovision, etc...)

Change the law on the comptroller office which allows this one by fiat to bar anyone to run for election if it so pleases the regime. It is enough to demand that for barring someone to run for office a fair trial with its subsequent verdict are necessary. And make it retroactive.

And more but those ones are the crucial. The point is that all of these can be voted within three months and be made effective by June.

Of course, these must be made while the assembly attends other extremely urgent matters but nobody said that the work of the New Assembly would be easy and cool.

Is Venezuelan opposition dragged into a coherent strategy?

The end result of this week may be unexpected. Both sides accumulated failure after failure and yet, the opposition may have come on top significantly with the real tool it needs most: a strategy.

The regime accumulated failure after failure, clearly. The undeserved prosecution of representative Mardo was perceived by most in the country as a at best a distraction move from dire reality and at worse an unspeakable abuse of power from people that had no moral grounds for that.  Then, as a knee jerk reaction, the most corrupt regime in Venezuela's history called for a rally against corruption. This rally this morning was by all accounts a failure, as seen on TV. And to complete the day it was announced at the post march rally that the communication minister, a charismaticless journalist, has been named the candidate for Greater Caracas Mayor without consultation and even less of a primary; with the added contradiction that the regime has wanted to destroy that position for the last 4 years and that suddenly it wants it. The accumulation is synergistic and we may have a major political mistake from the regime, a mistake that may be of major consequences.

The opposition errors come more for their erratic organization and centrifugal forces. Mardo may have seen as a victim but he did not raise by himself major sympathy. After all, no politician that keeps bouncing from any elected office to another one rarely garner respect except perhaps from his constituents that know him better. The national attention he garnered was from what was done to him more than any martyrdom essence. A normal opposition would have been divided on that matter but the aggressiveness of the regime had the opposite effect: it showed quite a united front this week. Yet, once Mardo was done in by the Assembly the opposition hurriedly and unwisely called for a few actions across the country.

I can verify that in San Felipe the local rally never reached 100 people. It was ill planned, in an unsuitable spot, at a terrible time for the habits of the town that has Saturday morning as THE shopping time of the week. Mardo counts of little when your chance to get scarce goods coincides with the rally.  That small group was so out of place and out of touch with the concerns of San Felipeños that it probably was counterproductive. The Caracas event was not even a march, but as a gathering it got a respectable attendance. Though not worth writing home about. What saved the day was that it visibly had a bigger draw than the one from the regime, who, by the way, did nothing worth noting outside of Caracas. The opposition carried the day because it failed less. Much less in fact.

The result of all this, of the clear intention of the regime to erase the opposition as needed, is that finally this one is getting is ideas in place.  Today Capriles officially put himself behind a constitutional change call but with the cleverness of putting a condition: the opposition needs to win the mayor elections in December if it wants to have a chance to effect those constitutional changes. Thus the strategy is set: bring in the radical vote by telling them that unless they rally first for December their proposals will be put moot after. That way the hope is to minimize opposition abstention while the individual teams for mayor and councilmen candidates should be more efficient to limit the regime's fraud. Then, obviously for all, with a 100+ mayor it will become much easier to raise the signatures needed for constitutional reform and get the votes after.

I personally think that it is the lone way to avoid a new disaster in December. As long as the concerns of the more radical groups inside the opposition, or the mere disgust of people like me are not taken into account there is no chance to perform decently in December no matter what the polls say today. It even works to attract some chavista that are disgruntled enough to vote for the opposition in December just to force the regime to sit down and negotiate an agreement with the opposition to avoid a constitutional conflagration. And the beauty of it is that there is enough time to make this strategy prosper until December.

Let's not be blind to the reality: the hysterical power show of the regime this week, the crass attempt at creating a good corruption versus a bad corruption cannot hide the inherent weakness of this one. The regime suffers already of two strikes against: no leader able to replace Chavez and a terrible economic inheritance that the lack of leadership makes it impossible to tackle. To this the regime adds a major error: no primary to decide mayor candidates, and worse, to decide councilmen candidates where many want in. All will be appointed from Caracas.  In current political language in Venezuela this means a probable fatal abstention for the regime in December as this one comes along as self serving, as defending the privileges of those already in office, not making room for new ones, not sharing the now scarce benefits.  And this just at a time when the opposition may have found a way to minimize its own losses.

Even though on a foul mood through the week, tonight I find myself surprisingly optimistic.

Dreams of constitutional repression

That ever self serving pseudo panacea of our sub continent, calling for a constitutional assembly to solve problems that politicians have no resolve to deal with directly, is being invoked all around. After all, the brilliant example of Chavez who called for a constitutional assembly to solve Venezuelan problems is there for all: not only he did not solve any of his country problems, but he made them worse, and he certainly did solve the financial future of his relatives and friends, ending himself as a president for life.

These weeks we heard from different points a call for some form of constitutional assembly, and in all cases it comes from a group of people that are unable of unwilling to have their way and thus want to use the mechanism.  Let's not be afraid of words here, what they all want really is a soft, legal repression, that will silence down those that are not allowing them to get their way.

Let's start with Brazil of Dilma Rousseff who has never being characterized by her creativity nor her own political following. She is calling for a constitutional revision process as the only way she can come up to quiet down the brewing revolt in her cities. That in ten years of PT rule through her and Lula they have not being able, or willing, to face the problems of Brazilian politics, even trying to benefit from them as the corruption "mensalao" case under Lula shows, is not something that she is very intent to apologize for. In fact, her latest deal, praised as democratic by many people who should know better, maybe be supported by a PT who finds in it a way to stop ruling as a coalition, something that, well, hindered some of the most extreme proposals that rest in their filing cabinets.

Less obvious but still along the lines is coming from the Bachelet campaign team who wants her back in office. They are trying to have people forget about the poor readiness of her administration in the earthquake that happened a few days before she left office. They think that a constitutional proposal is a good scheme. Hopefully in Chile there are a few minds that understand that even though the constitution is a legacy of Pinochet, changing it brutally is not necessarily the solution: one smart wit calls it a "lyrical coup".

In Colombia of course we have the other naked extreme: the FARC that uses a constitutional assembly as a way to pressure Santos to cave in their demands. This has little chance to fly because Colombia has changed her constitution not that long before Venezuela and the change has worked much better, no comparison, than the one in Venezuela. But the FARC knows that right now, as they are in a defensive position, not to call it cornered, their only chance to obtain an amnesty is by silencing those seeking redress for the crimes committed by the FARC. They thus put forward outrageous demands to have Santos cave in. They are of course pushed by Cuba and Venezuela who desperately need that second corner stone of an anti US league, next door to Panama. As such a constitutional assembly in Colombia would be nothing more than a repression of those intent on punishing the FARC for its crimes, just as the Venezuelan constitution of 1999 was a way to "forgive" the coup-mongers of 1992 who went from a life of violence to a life of obscene corruption.

Which brings us to Venezuela where election-stolen Capriles has finally admitted that going for a constitutional assembly may be the only way to get rid of the hyper corrupt regime issued of 1999. In fact, some even are suggesting that we could ask outright to a simple return to the 1961 constitution through a referendum.

Besides the many legal and electoral obstacles that such a proposal has in a Venezuela dominated by the mob, and worthy of several post of their own, this proposal of Capriles sounds like a little bit too little and too late. What he is doing, in part, is using the idea to silence (repress?)  in his own camp those who demand more action from his part.  Let's not forget that Diego Arria had made a new constitution his main, if only, plank for the 2012 primaries. Just as it was in 1999, a constitutional change is not going to solve the problems of the country who know include a wealthy mob that will sabotage any, ANY, regime that does not oblige them.

To all of these characters, and not wanting to sound pro US, I will remind them that the US has had the same Constitution in effect since 1789, duly amended through extensive processes that required quite a lot of discussion and compromise between the parties involved. The UK still does not have a constitution. France, for all of its apparent historical instability, had no constitution between 1870 and 1946 and the current one is effective since 1958. What is common among them (and other such countries)? That any constitution, or lack thereof, is only as good as the people who apply it.

That is why the current LatAm examples described above are simply ways for a political group to distract from the real work required in each and every country, in each and every reality. They are dreams of legal repression of the antagonistic sides (though in Venezuela at least Capriles has some valid points as he is dealing with the mob).