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Showing posts with label 2016 crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2016 crisis. Show all posts

Monday, 26 December 2016

And now what?

I have been avoiding it, but it is time to think about what these last weeks mean for Venezuela. Whether we like it, political tectonics are at work and January announces itself as a very difficult month, though January may start before December 31. To try to simplify this a little bit let's start with what apparently not even tectonic forces can change.


The premise of the political crisis is that a group of gangsters have taken over the country and there is no way they are going to forgo control because they know that any improvement in governance means that they will end up in jail. It is that simple, it explains it all. It even explains why the outside world is not doing much because they know that gangsters can only be disposed off through violence. After all, the democratic West did nothing for Aleppo, why should we assume they would do something for Caracas? I am looking at you Obama, by the way.

The other factor that is not changing and makes the above one the worse is the economic crisis. The nature of this one at this point is such that only a change of personnel at Miraflores Palace can offer a faint hope of improvement. What happened in December with state sponsored confiscations, reaction looting and currency debacle should carve that in.

Thus we can discuss the options for each side.

Chavismo has a Maduro problem. His erratic behavior and his absolute incompetence keeps making the crisis worse by the day. Until now he had the legitimacy that Chavez gave him which was replaced fast by the need for a figure head to preside over the country while corrupts, gangs, Cubans and the like fought it out over controlling Venezuela. This will not do anymore.

Maduro (or the people he spoke for) have made two grievous mistakes. The first one was to pass a budget without it being voted as a law by the National Assembly. That unconstitutional fiat was bad enough, as no one would lend money without a legal process of state guarantee.  But it got worse for would be lenders, if any. The stupendous crass management of the banknote change early this month has killed any credit or authority he may have had inside chavismo. That is, deciding that the 100 banknote was illegal, then shortening the time for exchange and deposit the notes, and THEN offer a spectacular neck breaking U-turn once rioting started is the kind of political mistake that will kill the love of your most ardent supporters. While making sure that no one will lend you a penny. Not a slight petty problem for a bankrupt country.

Maduro is done, he cannot rule anymore. In any country with a semblant of normal he would have resigned by now, or asked to do so by his own party. Nobody will willingly obey him anymore. For Maduro and chavismo there are only two paths ahead, either go the massive repression way as of right now, or resign mid January to let a newly named vice president, likely a general, to deal with the last two years of the presidential term. I am going on record that by March first 2017 we will either have a new president or hundreds of new political prisoners with possibly hundreds of killed folks. Though the two are not exclusive, unfortunately....

On the opposition side the ability to resit and offer solutions seems gone to naught. The dialogue forced upon it by Obama though Thomas Shannon has proven its undoing. It should not have been so but it has. We have reached the point were the leadership of the opposition is admitting that they underestimated the resolve of the regime. Clearly, they would have benefited from reading this blog.

The reason for such paralysis is that some inside the opposition alliance will not agree on any hard measure of active resistance unless the result ensures them to be on top. If that is not possible then these people have no major problem in helping the regime survive until the time comes for them to be on top. How extensive is this inside the opposition leadership I do not know. But it is clear now that the local political Zulia group, UNT, whose national hopes have failed, will satisfy itself with its leader, Rosales, back in the streets and the new governor of Zulia from its ranks. UNT is the first clear suspect but I am afraid it is not the lone one.

The debacle of the new Electoral Board election was the main evidence for that more than duplicitous role of UNT. In the end it does not matter who is directing the Electoral Board CNE since there is no election in sight. But the point of UNT dealing behind the opposition back was painfully put forward. That was way worse than who ever is sitting at the CNE.

How can the opposition alliance MUD recover from these recent setbacks escapes me. They had a 2/3 majority seats and, well, they could do nothing about it. But that I can still understand, considering that they are dealing with gangsters. In fact I even made excuses for them through the year. What I cannot understand is that a year passed and there has been no red line left uncrossed, no Little Big Horn moment, nothing to show. And I suspect that even the little bit of international good will harvested in the first 6 months of 2016 has been wasted. With Trump election and a shifting of foreign paradigms I wonder if anyone will care much about Venezuela's fate anymore. As far as I can see it, Trump administration is not only willing to revive the Cuban embargo but will have no qualms including in it Venezuela letting Colombia and Brazil deal with the millions of refugees. Venezuela, the next refugee crisis? See if Trump cares a shit. A country full of Machados.....

So now what?


Tuesday, 13 December 2016

And give us our everyday chaos

This could well be the chavista prayer because these people truly thrive in chaotic conditions. Well, not always but they certainly manage better than most.

As expected it was pandemonium today. Banks were closed Monday as per legal banking holiday several Mondays a year. So we had to wait for this morning to appreciate fully the effect of the crazy measure of last Sunday when Maduro annulled the 100 Bs, banknote, the highest denomination of a country deep in inflation.  Let me put it this way: the bank next to our office had a long line outside all day long, and that line was almost as long as the line for toilet paper that happened to arrive at the grocery store next door.

Let's not get into the minutiae. The regime already backpedaled some by extending the time at which people will be able to deposit their bills, though not wanting to put Maduro into further ridicule the fiction of the 72 hours validity of the bill was kept. Yet many as of yesterday refuses to accept 100 bills. Though I suspect that at least some will keep accepting bills until Thursday now that they know they will be able to deposit these next week without having to trek downtown Caracas to the Central Bank offices.

What has not happened is a coherent explanation for the measure. If you take individually any of the excuses presented by the intense propaganda machine, each and everyone can be taken down with ease. At this point my initial supposition written last Sunday is that this craziness originates into some intra-chavista gang dispute. Since they are all narko-crooks, they have no qualm in taking down the country with them if they can get their loot back, or avenge themselves, or ruin the guys that conned them. This is the way mafia wars work out.

If you need proof you just need to observe that in spite of the calamitous situation of the country the high Court TSJ managed once again today to flout the constitution by naming the new Electoral Board above the will of the National Assembly. This story would deserve a full post so let's not get bogged down in that issue. My point here is that the country is falling appart, literally, and these people can only think about political treachery to keep their hold on power. That is their lone obsession. This example illustrates the issue the more so that elections are not even a solution to the problem anymore. Who truly cares who leads the CNE at this point?

That deconnexion of the regime with the country reality is becoming an embarrassing gap for a regime that was born out of their alleged love of the lumpen. A deconnexion that is shared, by the way, with many of the opposition elites. One of the things I wrote Sunday night was the impact of the measure on the large portion of Venezuelan society that lives on cash, the lower economic classes that will suffer the most from the withdrawal of the 100 bills. But you had to wait for Monday to have this considered by opposition writers, most focusing first on money loads, reserves, amount of banknotes and other brainy issues that do not make an arepa appear on your plate this week.  In that way bizarrely rejoining the regime equally disconnected claims of economic agression and contraband of paper notes to Switzerland.......

At least the regime today started realizing its gross political mistake among its followers, For example they have decided to force banks to open accounts with a mere ID card so people can deposit.  And they of course decided to extend the exchange period though not doing the real measure that would have helped them the most with their natural electorate, to disown Maduro 72 days death certificate of the 100 bill.  But the regime has a bigger problem on its hand. Among the news and videos circulating today on twitter we saw the looting downtown Caracas of a corn flour truck. From Barquisimeto we saw a furious crowd in line at a bank forcing the Nazional Guard to withdraw the protection they offered to some people trying to bring inside for deposit boxes of bills, and of course trying to pass in front of the line under the cover of the Guard.  They had to retreat. These are sure signs of the chaos ahead. And the regime, I am afraid, may not be able to control it to its advantage this time around.

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Bank protest of the day

Truck looting of the day


Thursday, 1 December 2016

Dialogue ante-mortem

I am going to comment a short note by Carlos Ocariz, the mayor of Eastern Caracas, a masterpiece of political conciseness. This will explain perfectly why there is no hope that a dialogue can ever happen between the regime and anyone else.




Translation, step by step, with my comments.


To the Vatican, mediators and the people of Venezuela.

Note: it is not even directed to the regime. Only the parts that have a certain level of seriousness, or for whom a lot is at stake. As is implied in the rest of the message, the MUD at this point does not care anymore about what the regime has to say on those matters, it has become a waste of time to listen.

We ratify the coherence and dedication to the [good] fight considering the MUD communique

There is no need to read the detailed communique of the opposition umbrella group, MUD. This note is eloquent enough as you'll see. Ocariz states unambiguously that this is a fight, and henceforth the dialogue was an attempt at a truce. But the causes of the good fight are still present. He also implies that the ways of his own people, the Primero Justicia party, are their own but that they share the common core and goals with the other players of the MUD. In short, we are united no matter what people may have speculated. And our union is way stronger than what anyone may think, in particular the regime.

It is inhumane that the government, in front of the crisis it created and we all Venezuelan suffer [the consequences], does not fulfill its engagements. The Vatican and the mediators bear witness of our dedicated efforts.

The Vatican and the said mediators are pushed against the wall. Let's see if they dare to say that the opposition did not do its best, that it should do more. And were they to attempt to say such thing, a further crass moves to favor the regime blaming the opposition, they better be ready to show the evidence. That is: the credibility of the Vatican and the mediators is what is at stake now. The Vatican and its Pope, mind you!

Also it bears underlining that if the opposition accuses the regime of the crisis, what cannot be argued is that ALL Venezuelans are suffering its consequences. For this reason alone the regime should try harder than what it does. If it ever tried, for that matter.

The internal divisions between government groups blocks them from honoring their word, and Venezuelans cannot be subjected of the contradictions/vagaries within the government/regime [exact word to translate not available].

What we all knew, the problem is within chavismo. What the opposition points out is to the direct problem of chavismo, that one group, led by Diosdado Cabello, wants no negotiation, no compromise, whatsoever. There may or may not be more than two groups of power within chavismo, but the one that is blocking any solution, that is aggravating the crisis, is the group of Diosdado Cabello who knows that their final destiny is jail because of their involvement in drug trafficking. And that crime, my friends, cannot go through any form of international amnesty. There is nothing the opposition can do about that.

What Ocariz says here is that any political outcome needs to go through an internal chavismo resolution, if it has a chance to become a relatively peaceful national settlement. Because if the Cabello groups takes over the only possible outcome is violence. They are the ones to find a solution for the Cabello problem, even an amnesty of which te regime should assume full responsibility in case some judge later decides against.

To the mediators and the Vatican if the government does not fulfill its [last meeting] engagements, there will be no reunion on December 6.

Note the simplicity. The MUD is not standing up and leaving. It simply states that the regime made commitments that were to be fulfilled by December 6, commitments made of its own volition. There is no point in discussing further commitments, or evaluating those made before, if the regime does not do what it promised to do [release of more political prisoners, recognition of the National Assembly constitutional role at least for the objectives set then, such as the election of a new Electoral Board]. As soon as the regime does its self accorded part, the opposition will return to the discussion table.

In other words, still without addressing the regime by name, the opposition advises the mediators and the Vatican not to waste their time, the time of all of them, MUD included. The mediators either show that they have what it takes, or get out of town.

Gettysburg address this ain't, but in Venezuelan political lingo it is as close as it will ever get. I, for one, am impressed by this short note from Ocariz.

Wednesday, 30 November 2016

In two tweets, the collapse of Venezuelan economy

Two tweets, one from November 21 and one this morning this morning, November 30


(word play on Chavez promising that his revolution would last with him at the helm until the year 2012, his version of the thousand years Reich).




The Venezuelan currency on the black market lost 50% of its value in not even ten days. Note that in October it was hovering at 1100 and this afternoon it has already crossed the 4200 barrier. Thus we can say that the depreciation over a month is around 75%.  I do not think that historically Venezuela's currency has experienced such a drop in such a short time.

Economist will have all sorts of fancy explanations to give you. The regime will speak of a terrorist attack on Venezuela by the imperialism, refusing to consider that the Fidel Castro, finally croaked, model is the guilty party. What I am going to tell you is what this means at ground zero, the one of yours truly.

It means that with the hyperinflation setting in with our two paycheck combined we may not be able to cover food and medical expenses of my SO, even with insurance.

It means that assuming that I can find and purchase raw material to keep producing it would be so expensive to produce that no one will be able to afford me (or no one else for that matter).

It means that considering that national food is insufficient we will not be able to purchase imported food.

It means that come February, when the full effect of this is felt, I may be out of a job, out of food, out of medicine for the SO. And it will not be a question of price and money in the bank. Simply, the shelves will be barren.

Why o why?

Well, it all started when the regime decided to pass a national budget without approbation by the National Assembly. As expected, once creditors were told that nothing outside of a National Assembly vote would be recognized as debt, then loans stopped. Oil prices did not go up. Plus other well known factors of a dysfunctional economy. Conclusion? Bankruptcy and a dollar that goes from 1000 to a USD to 4000 in about a month time.

It is just that simple folks, truly. An absolute lack of confidence in the regime.

The worst thing of all is that there is little that can be done at this point, the damage is too deep. A mere relaxation on price controls or currency exchange will not do. We are like in Eastern Europe circa Berlin Wall collapse. The regime tried for so long to avoid an economy bang that it created the conditions for a nuclear economic bang. Now we need to do, SIMULTANEOUSLY, removing currency control, removing price controls, negotiate with the IMF some sort of bridge loan to help the poorest people to eat.

And all of this is only possible with a change of government. It is not even a matter of sharing responsibilities with the opposition, it is too late for that (and I have my doubts about the opposition wanting to reach office now, but that is matter for a future post).

Sunday, 13 November 2016

Divisional Perplexity in Caracas

Confused about the rather dismal "dialogue" results, and further confused by the strange reactions to these results (besides the previsible ones in Twitter from Miami demanding that we go without fault tomorrow to burn down Miraflores Palace) I have been trying to understand what the heck is going on.

In a word: divisions.


The dialogue cannot advance any faster for many reasons. First it is not a dialogue, it is a discussion about a ransom note that kidnappers have no intention to honor anyway. They want to cash the rescue and kill you at the end in case you go to the police to report the crime. That is the level of dysfunctional psychosis reached by the regime, they still think they can have an honorable career.

The second reason remains an old one. Too many inside the regime know what their fate would be if an agreement were to be signed. These people cannot be rescued under any term and thus they will do the utmost to sabotage, deny, torpedo any discussion. The most glaring case being Diosdado Cabello who keeps touring the country saying that the dialogue is going nowhere. People like him know that if an agreement is signed they can start measuring their jail cell for drapes.

A third but lesser reason is that some inside of the opposition are willing to settle more than others. But even there the regime seems unwilling to accommodate as these people will not settle for mere cash as it used to be the case in past defections from the opposition.

That is why we did not see more self congratulation from the regime than what one would have expected but also less outrage from the opposition than one would have been expecting. After all, the regime knows it has got to negotiate something, anything, and the opposition knows it has no weapons to take Maduro out so its options are limited.  It remains for us now to resume briefly the divisions in each camp.

Inside the regime right now, as it changes fast, we have the negationists, those that refuse to sit at the table. Diosdado is the leader. Then we have the negationist light who sit there because at least they know what the other guys are talking about. We can include foremost here the governor of Aragua, Tareck El Aissami, equally under investigation by the DEA. Let's note that these people will take everyone down with them, chavista or not.

We move on to the radical-psychos, those who have lost their mind long ago but feel obscurely somewhere that the gig is up and only by gaining time they may find a way out. I have named of course the Rodriguez duo who want to shoot you whenever they will be able to get away with it but meanwhile they consent just to insult you across a table.

Finally we have the razzmatazz of chavismo that goes from military that do not want to end up at The Hague to those still with a marble or two in their heads and think that maybe some negotiation may allow them to retire somewhere. At the table we have the infamous Chaderton, the best they can offer. Ain't it something?

The opposition is certainly more palatable, at least they speak in complete sentences with correct punctuation, even if it is to admit defeat.  Fortunately for them the radicals are not sitting. Maria Corina has not been invited and the arguably more organized opposition party of Venezuela, Voluntad Popular, has refused to sit down as long as Leopoldo is in jail. We do not know for sure at this point whether this is a plus for the opposition. Indeed, Voluntad Popular  can offer the excuse to stand up and leave, or be the carrot to bring the regime to a real measurable concession so as to bring VP to the table. We shall see.

There are two sets from the opposition at the table. One is old party AD of Ramos Allup, who already conceded that the Recall Election is dead, together with up comer PJ with Capriles and divisions of its own apparently. They represent the hard negotiation, with hues. The other side are the wishy-washy like governor Falcon or UNT from Zulia state. These are willing to negotiate something rather favorable for the regime, but they are not willing to go beyond a long transition. That is, the regime will have to leave power by January 2019 at the latest.  They are not doing that out of their good heart: they know very well that once VP, PJ and AD are in jail their turn will come no matter what. As such they want guarantees, in addition of help to avoid being rolled over by the other opposition parties.

So there you have. How can negotiations, already complex, advance fast when there is already such problems for each side to get their act together?  The real problem seems not to be that negotiations are slow but that the opposition negotiators give the impression that the regime is winning hands down...........

Surely something can be done as to how the message is broadcast?

Tuesday, 1 November 2016

48 hours of dialogue and it ain´t looking good. Unless...

I am not opposed to political dialogue. It has proven its worth through history. It could, on paper, be a good thing for Venezuela. I do not think it is because in historical dialogues either side had something to lose and did not want to lose it all. Here chavismo is of the scorched earth orthodoxy and they prefer to bring everything down before surrendering any piece of power. Reasons are multiple, from the knowledge of many of them ending up in jail were the regime to collapse to simply the castroite brain washing of a particularly virulent totalitarian nature, of tyrants long used to living out of thin air in a island cum concentration camp system.

In short, I believe in dialogue when there is the knowledge that both sides have something to lose or win, and when there is a dutiful respect on the symbols attached to such difficult endeavor. Visibly the first criteria is not met here, and the second criteria, on symbolism, was f....d up from the start as I reported Sunday night. Thus let's see what the first 48 hours have brought.

First, the division of the opposition that existed all along became quite obvious. Clearly the fear of the regime was a thin glue that is meting fast as the regime pretends to dole out some goodies to those behaving nice (I am looking at you, UNT, who had the chutzpah to send totally discredited Timoteo Zambrano to the dialogue table!). Certainly Maduro wasted no time in exploiting the opening and tonight went on attacking and demanding jail against the remaining leadership of Voluntad Polar. For good measure he also called Capriles a drug addict. I suppose it takes one to know one, but I digress. I have put the infamous video of Maduro tonight at the end of this entry if someone has the stomach for it. We must note that Chuo Torrealba came strongly to defend the opposition union and Voluntad Popular, but I am waiting for UNT to do the same.

More worrisome is the reaction of the opposition followers where we find a HUUGGEE chunk so outraged by sitting down for a dialogue, any dialogue that it has sent into frenzy the keyboard warriors insulting Capriles, Torrealba et all in ways that remind me of chavista bots. But again I digress. The point is that the clumsy management of the dialogue, to qualify it generously as clumsy, is exacting quite a toll inside the opposition ranks. Note: a lot of those twitter/key board warriors are not going to lead open shirted, chest upfront, the march on Miraflores. But again, I digress, apologies.

Even though that negative mood was detectable already Monday the opposition today in the National Assembly called away two of its top anti regime agenda points: the trial against Maduro and the said march on Miraflores. There are merits for that: after all why would you march to overthrow a regime if you are sitting down talking to them? But maybe you could have prepared public opinion as early as yesterday. No?

So the regime can score so far the following: no recall election this year; the apparent blow out of the opposition; no trial for Maduro; no march on Miraflores; great photo ops for Maduro; a hapless if not outwardly complicit Vatican, US et al. Note that Thomas Shannon from State made a surprise visit today, as usual with no comments, and probably as usual with a bad outcome in the following days. When Shannon deals with Venezuela I start shivering in fear even if it is not Halloween. True, technically all the opposition initiatives are on the freeze until November 12 when it could all start again. But does anyone think that the unity of purpose will be recovered by then? Not me.

Since this is a dialogue surely the regime made a concession somewhere. A few political prisoners were released. 5 I think, it is not clear. And not the most notorious ones, And a few dozens were incarcerated in the preceding days anyway. So, Castro style, any release is always compensated for a new jailing, a constant prison population being a healthy tool to impress the populace. Note two interesting details: no Voluntad Popular prisoner released, while all the releases were done without judicial action proving that those unfortunate souls were mere hostages to the regime, jailed because I said so, released because I got bored with them (and quite frankly in the XXI century I cannot get away as easily with murder as any dictator could in the past century).

So far so bad.  Unless, my wild hope, it is all because the opposition inner sanctum knows something we do not know, something that it cannot say.  Maybe Maduro is about to resign?  Maybe his military are going to depose him? Maybe the inner sanctum was told to wait a couple of weeks more and all would be fine and dandy? Maybe they were told that as soon as the US election is settled Obama will send a gazillion marines, the exact number depending on the number of votes Hillary gets?

This late in the game outside UNT I do not think that any opposition leader could have been bought. There are in for the fight even though differences exist. So clearly there must be a reason, a positive reason why reasonable folks like Ramos Allup, Borges, Torrealba have swallowed hard in the past two days to sit down and call a two weeks truce. Heck, one can even hope that the "division" with Voluntad is a show to distract chavismo.

But I doubt it. I hope to be proven wrong. Give me some sign MUD!

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Sunday, 30 October 2016

Dialogue-schmuckalogue

Today finally the first face off between the regime and the opposition under Vatican and Unasur guidance was held. Allow me to be deeply pessimistic about the prospects by just looking at the first picture.



What is wrong with that picture? Or if you prefer, what could possibly go wrong when the first scene of that movie is the one above?

Maduro IS PRESIDING!!!!!!!!! And far removed from anyone else!!!!!!

Symbols matter. Even more so when dialogue to avert civil wars are undertaken.

Here we have the guy who is the psychological focus of all that has been going wrong since Chavez died, and he is presiding? How could the opposition accept to sit down with Maduro? One thing is to try to dialogue with Maduro's people, another is to discuss under his direct oversight. At a moment when Maduro is cornered and totally done overseas, such a picture gives him a new legitimacy at home. The more so that only state TV is showing news on the scene, and manipulating the whole thing at will.

I am haggardly in shock. Well, until I found my way to this key board anyway.





Friday, 28 October 2016

7 ways to tell if a strike is a success

Today the opposition has called for a work stop for individuals. The regime is in full propaganda mode to claim that the move is a failure. The opposition claims it is a success. So here are 7 items to figure out whether it was a success

1- It is NOT a strike, nor a lock out. What the opposition did was to ask folks to stay put at home between 6 AM and 6 PM.


2- Whether a strike or a lock out or a stay-put, one fact is that it was called on Wednesday for Friday, not even 48 hours before it was supposed to start. A general movement of this nature is not easy to start, and it certainly require preparations so that adverse propaganda will be reduced to a minimum. In France where strikes are too regular an occurrence and where employees are highly trained at such activities, they are rarely called with less than a week notice.

3- You need to understand that the regime has used threats that it often brings to fruition. Never mind that fascist piglets like Diosdado Cabello have said they will seize whatever closes. So public employees will mostly show up for work. And many vulnerable stores/business will not close. To give you an example, my office is next to a small shopping center and this morning the NAZI-onal guard accompanied some agency to take pictures of the stores that did not open. (ADDED LATER: they made another inspection round at lunch time!)

4- Some business simply cannot close because the regime has long decided that certain sectors of the economy are of "public interest" and thus cannot do as they please. For example, all business dealing with food production or selling groceries or banks cannot close because, well, you know what will happen.

5- In addition business that work with perishables (agriculture, livestock, and the like) simply cannot stop. Period. The best they can do is to close the administrative offices but production cannot close, not even on Christmas day.

6- Other folks cannot close, like Emergency Rooms, hospital care for people that got surgery that week, etc...

7- And there is the nature of the Venezuelan. Many of us will do what they do everyday regardless of what happens outside. The bubble in which many live is truly astounding. Never mind those who say "heck, I am not working but it is a good opportunity for social visits, exercise, whatever" not realizing that their cars will be counted as activity.

So there you are, weigh carefully these parameters before you succomb to regime propaganda.

My take?  The more strident the propaganda the more successful the stay-put. That gauge never fails.

As far as I can tell it is more of a success than what I thought it would be. Heck, even people like me thought it was an error to call such actions so soon!

Thursday, 27 October 2016

The splendors of well aged chavismo

Thus we are in the middle of a social, economic and, thus, political crisis of major proportions. The regime assuredly thinks about what to do to counter an opposition that has been setting up the agenda for quite a while now. After a massive brain storm they come up with a minimum wage increase of 40% . I think, I cannot even be bothered to check whether it is 40 or X: it makes no difference.


So chavismo is recurring to the LONE policy it knows: throw good money after bad. Even if now it needs to print it.

OK, I could still deal with that. But what I cannot wrap my mind around is that the regime calls it a major success to raise wages artificially for the fourth time in one year. Never mind that the wage increase may be no more than a fourth of inflation, tanking any purchasing power at any pay scale...

Of course, I have heard today employees happy about the increase. Note, I heard more of them bitch that it is not enough and will solve nothing. But the point is that after two years of massive inflation  and food shortages you can still find people that cannot see economical connections between the way the economy is run and their wallet problems.

While we are at it, they probably do not see connections between expropriation of private business and shortages.  Which explains why the outlaw of Diosdado Cabello threatened to take over any idle business tomorrow. That works right into the chavista mind set that inflation and shortages are nothing but a conspiracy. Which also explains why tonight we had state security in front of POLAR's Lorenzo Mendoza office, and home, waiting for him.  Probably they finally decided to torture him so he reveals where 2 years of food for 30 million of Venezuelans is hidden. Maybe in his basement.

We are a country of idiots, them for  believing such crap and me for not going postal.

Wednesday, 26 October 2016

The rebellion has started

What else could the regime expect today after the annulation of all elections? Or is is it what the regime hoped for? And will it still be of any use for the regime this late a confrontation?

A fraction of the river of people in Caracas today October 27 2016

What has happened today is transcendent, on many aspects.


The causes are the naked abuse of the regime which has refused to recognize the duly elected majority of the National Assembly. A regime that has refused to recognize the constitutional right to call for a a recall election. A regime that has suspended all elections until they decide to hold them again, someday, when conditions are good for them. A regime that has decided to assault the national assembly. And of course, most importantly, a regime that has left its population with not enough food, not enough medicine and not enough money to buy from the little that is left to find.

In not even 48 hours the opposition managed to organize spontaneously what is probably the largest NATION WIDE protest ever in our history. If the Caracas one was not as large than the one on September, it remains quite impressive as per the picture above in front of the military base of La Carlota, without even bothering to ask for permission tot he regime. Think about that for a second. The opposition simply called it and people came. What makes the day noteworthy is that in many cities of the countries huge opposition rallies materialized at the same time, resulting in a major show of strength for the opposition, duly noted even on French TV tonight.

The only thing chavismo could manage was a handful of  "supporter" public employees at the gate of Miraflores. They did not even tried to have some thing significant, they knew that they would not be able to fill up the buses with enough people to carry, no matter how much pressure and/or cash to attend they would provide.

However what they did was to repress. Not in Caracas, mind you, where all eyes are, but inside the country where they think that the world watches less and where they assume that people can be sacred easier to get back in line. We had dozens of arrests and injuries during the day, with an extremely worrying high rate of rubber bullets shot in the face of people, as close to the eyes as possible. A vicious attack, without doubt inspired by the fascist ways of repression the regime imported from Cuba.

The results of all of this are varied and not encouraging.

The first victim is the carelessly dialogue called by the Vatican next Sunday, a clumsiness that surprises everyone. Then again the US and the Vatican have always had in mind solving the Cuban situation thorough Venezuelan pockets never caring much for the fate of the Venezuelan opposition. It will remain one of the biggest failure of US or Vatican diplomacy, to underestimate the level of despair AND resolve of the Venezuelan opposition, a mistake that could cost Obama's"legacy" a big chunk. Never mind Francis himself though he still can recover better than the US.

The second result is that the regime has got in overdrive, invoking article 323 of the constitution, a preamble of sorts to suspend the constitution altogether. Except that ironically the decisions taken out of 323 have a validity only if the chair of the national assembly signs them. Not that it matters much for the regime, of course. But that seems a little paltry after all the other violations of the Constitution by the regime that justify in full all that the National Assembly has decided to undertake. These are also in agreement with the constitution, and include removing illegally appointed justices and electoral board, citing Maduro for investigation on many issues, etc...

The third result may be the most momentous. After today's true show of strength that not even the regime propaganda is taking down with its usual cynicism, the opposition has called for a general strike on Friday and a march on Miraflores Palace on November 3. That is, either the regime decides to give concrete and real responses NOW or the insurrection not only will start but probably could not be controlled by the opposition.

I wrote, and many others, that the regime sought violence as a way to sustain its power. Hence so many provocations. But violence is not necessarily the solution for the regime if it did not happen at the right time. Now, with a long suffering country, the violence that the regime is unleashing seem to scare many of them actually, as a demon that they are not sure they can control to their advantage. In 2014 it worked and gave the regime two more years but this time around conditions are different.

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What follows below does not quite belong tot he the stream of the text above. call it additional info.

First it was my own attendance to the march rally in the picture above.  There is my two videos on Instagram




The second one is a flag sales guy. What is remarkable is that he was openly selling 7 star flags, those of the pre Chavez era. Quite a symbol that those are now the flags made and sold at marches....



This was one of the marches across Venezuela. This one from Barquisimeto.



And a couple of videos on today's repression. You can clearly see how the police was facilitating the chavista storm troopers actions. Observe when the masked aggressor points at the window of the movie takers. Fascism. The real stuff.






And to finish all, in case you doubt how angry Venezuelans are becoming at the regime...











Saturday, 22 October 2016

Recall Election gone. So what?

I suppose I should write about the annulation of the Recall Election.  I had guessed long ago that it would not happen. The intensity of the dislike toward Maduro is so strong, even among chavistas, that the regime could not allow CNN document the huge lines that would have formed for three days this week.  They had no stomach for that, it was better to use an idiotic legal sophistry and send it all ad patres.

To concur with the prevalent head line this week end that Venezuela is officially a dictatorship is an hypocrisy. I have long said it so and I am actually upset at some people having trying to avoid the D world finally pouting it. As if annulling the Recall Election was more despicable than, say, having political prisoners, forcing those freed into exile, stealing the budget of the nation, and more,

I will just comment on how ridiculous the pretext to kill the Recall Election was. In short, a sub judge in Podunk decided that the CNE had not done its job to vet all the signatures for the 1% collection to start the process. The ridicule, of declaring themselves incompetent through their beloved electoral ministry, CNE, is something they cannot worry about anymore. The obsessive objective is to never leave office. All considerations be dammed.

That is all that there is to it.

Now what?

Monday, 3 October 2016

The happy-go-lucky dictatorial news of the day

So the regime of Nicolas Maduro has a problem: how to pass the 2017 national budget controlled by the opposition held National Assembly? Really, if we cannot loot in peace, what good is the revolution for!?


So very simple! Since there is a conflict between the National Assembly, NA, and the judicial power, TSJ, that this one annuls 99% of whatever the National Assembly does, we just will decree next year budget and that is that. After all, the budget is against the alleged "guera economica" whatever that means. Il suffisait d'y penser!

Maduro sent today a letter to the TSJ for "consultation". Guess what the result will be?

But the NA has a trump card, if it is willing to play it. Since the regime will require much extra additional debt, the NA just need to say that a budget passed without its approval does not engage the state in paying future debts contracted on such budget. Let's see who is going to lend Maduro money under such terms.

Meanwhile you can see yet another example on how dictatorships work. Books will be written.

Thursday, 22 September 2016

Options against the dictatorship

I am happy about yesterday annulment of the Recall Election. I know, it is perverse but I have my reasons.

First, there is no need to discuss anymore the dictatorial nature of the regime. Under Chavez there were elections at any turn. Now, there will not be elections, not even for dog catcher. The last argument that chavismo could use internationally "we never lost the boatload of elections we do" only works if you have regular elections.

The consequence of this is that any opposition group that does not call the regime for its true nature will lose quickly its supporters. These simply will fail to understand how faced with the truth their "leaders" do not react more assertively. I agree that increased polarization is dangerous, but at this point, what else can we lose?

Second, as a consequence from the above, the opposition alliance MUD needs to purge itself of its wishy washy elements. Either you support the regime (silence counts), or you oppose it. Again, dictatorial regimes can only be dethroned through unity (or foreign disaster like invasion). See the examples of Chile where all allied against Pinochet. Or even Mexico when all rallied behind the right wing PAN to kick out the eternal PRI and its "perfect" dictatorship. Never mind the exit of Fujimori where the unity of the opposition behind Toledo allowed international sanctions to be effective.

Third, and surprising, any negotiation to get out of the crisis is now more likely to be successful if the opposition unifies better, becomes more assertive. By blocking any election the regime in fact traps itself into a repression must that is not acceptable today in Latin America, at a time where even the Castros are starting to be questioned. Through negotiation we may not get quick regime change but a true negotiation which includes a real progressive release of the tools of power by the narco regime may be a better outcome for the country than ousting suddenly a corrupt elite that will immediately sabotage whatever the incoming administration will try. One reason why some inside the opposition are not as assertive as others is that they simply do not want to deal with the mess.

[NOTE: I am painfully aware that Venezuela is a neutered country. The sacrifices seen in Chile or Peru are not going to happen here. There are too many of us that can only be deranged for a looting party. There is a perfect French word without direct translation to characterize what I think of the bulk of the Venezuelan population: veule. a mix of spineless and coward. And I include there those that are keyboard warriors, calling for all sorts of action from the MUD that they have little intentions to lead themselves. Never mind the chavista colectivos who only attack under pay and military protection. Certainly there are steel soul heroes like Lopez but the indignation only goes so far.]

In front of all this what are the options?

It is time for the MUD to put its neck forward. It has been 24 hours since the CNE did what was foretold. Last night the only minimally acceptable answer for the MUD was "We are not accepting this. We knew it was coming and we have plans. We will not reveal them now because we needed first the details to complete them. Tomorrow we will tell you".

We had to wait a couple of hours until finally someone said something without any further immediate perspective. In short, the MUD is not sure what to do. I assume, hope, they have an idea, that the delay is part of a strategy.

Clearly, if the MUD does not react we are in for a full Maduro term with utter destruction of the country.  Never mind that the regime will use the two years left to destroy physically the opposition and plan for a totally fraudulent presidential election in December 2018. Or later, as the crisis is an open door for all sort of excuses.

Today, for good measure the high court TSJ annulled yet another key vote from the National Assembly. And yet this is where the resistance comes from. The National Assembly needs to vote the illegality of the regime, just as the regime decreed its irrelevance. How to do that? A few things, in no particular order.

Refuse to discuss the budget. Once this one is passed by a TSJ fiat, vote a resolution that any lender is going at its own risk, that the Assembly will not recognize debts contracted through that budget that are not duly monitored. Bankrupt the regime. You may say that the propaganda of the regime will put the blame of the famine on the opposition but I doubt it at this point. And the MUD can always say that they refuse to give money to thieves.

Reduce taxes, in particular sales tax and see how the regime can finance itself.

Claim article 350 of the constitution and start an organized campaign of civil disobedience. The beauty of that is that you do not need to obey the TSJ anymore.

Vote the destitution of the latest TSJ appointment as illegal and announce that the rulings do not need to be followed anymore by anyone in the country.

Vote the destitution of the current CNE board. That it will delay future elections? At this point who cares!

Etc.

There are means that can be acceptable for the international community while the regime would be either pushed to capitulate or become a new Cuba.

But for this you need a unified opposition willing to face down the regime and stand the risks that come with such a fight. I do not see it, or at least not the unity required for this. Nor the vision.

I hope to be corrected, to be proven dead wrong.


Wednesday, 21 September 2016

Thy electoral CNE shoe droppeth

There will be a lot of brouhaha in the next days about the ignominious decision of the CNE to do its utmost to violate the constitution in order to block the Recall Election against Maduro. Let me try to make it clear for readers still hanging around here.

1) The motivation in any case is to annul the Recall Election, or in the very worst case push it to 2017 which means that the regime remains in office until January 2019 at the very least.


In fact, the regime has announced today through one of its formal provocateurs, Pedro Carroña Carreño, that voting was not a fundamental right, that there was more pressing needs like food or medicine than elections. The provocation is, of course, the public knowledge that the crisis is the regime fault and thus it will never win an election again, and it knows it. Never mind that there might not be money for elections but there was cash for the useless NOAL summit in Margarita last week that could have easily paid for an election. Nevermind on how much medicine could have been bought out of the food given, say, to Mugabe.

In short, before I go into details, as I already wrote in previous entries, the regime does not want elections. Period.

2) The constitution states clearly that any recall election must be asked by 20% of the voters in the district that elected the said person. The electoral board CNE today announced that even though Maduro was elected nation wide the opposition will need to collect 20% in each and every state. So, even if, say, 30% nationwide signed for the recall election it is enough that in a single state there is ONE VOTE missing for the 20% to annul the whole experience. The article 72 is clear and precise, there is a need for a 20% nation wide and it is irrelevant if that number is reached through 100% of voters in state X while state Y has 0% signatures.

Thus we have right there a flagrant violation of the constitution. If they do that so bluntly what can we expect for the "details" next?

3) The CNE said that it would give the opposition only 3 weekdays, 7 hour week day, with one hour for lunch for the CNE workers. That is there will be a Wednesday, Thursday and Friday allocated, from 8 AM to noon and from 1 PM to 4 PM. That is, unless your boss gives you the time to stand in line for hours you will not be able to sign up for the recall election. Never mind public workers who will be tightly controlled those days and fired on the spot if they are out of office during that timetable.

4) And to make sure that this timetable is even more difficult to fulfill the CNE has allocated only 5,392 finger printing machines. Let's do some simple arithmetic.

If all goes well, no electric outage, no sabotage, no violence, etc, etc...  we have 21 hours per machine. Let's assume that each machine can collect one signature per minute in such perfect conditions. The maximum signatures that can be thus collected in those three days are:

5,392 X 21 X 60 = 6,793,920 signatures.

We need, besides the per state quota difficulty, 3,893,129 signatures. That is not bad you may say. Think again. I have assumed that the 21 hours will be indeed perfect 21 hours. Also, there are always imponderables and we know from experience that the CNE has a proclivity to annul signatures at will, even if collected by themselves. The "safe number" is not 20% per state, it is 25% per state, which is above 5 million nationwide.

A couple of rainstorms across the country is enough to already make you lose half a million. A few well designed power outages and there you have another half a million gone. Since it is to be collected state by state all those that cannot return to their home state will not be able to sign. Etc.....

Not collecting on a week end makes it, just becasue of logistics, very difficult to get that 4 million signatures. Since elections are on Sundays, you can appreciate in full the hypocrisy and cynicism of the CNE in deciding on working days and working hours for signature collection.

5) And at this point we do not know yet other details such as where the limited numbers of collection centers will be located.  If you vote here but you need to go over there, preferably in a rough neighborhood, to sign up, will you?

6) But just for good measure the CNE has announced that it will take its sweet time to decide whether the signatures have indeed been collected. Nevermind that they collected them themselves, with their people, their machines, etc. They blithely said that the Recall Election "could take place" during the first quarter of 2017. Thus annulling its desired effect, as I mentioned above.

Voila!

This being said.

Technically there is still a possibility for the recall election to be held before January 10. After all, January 9 IS in the first quarter of 2017. All will depend of course on what the opposition MUD will do in the coming days and how willing is the army to repress as needed.

Right now, today, it would seem that the regime has accepted to remove Maduro from office. But that is all, he must be replaced by someone inside the regime, WITHOUT presidential election. That is right, if Mauro were to be recalled in the first quarter of 2017, the vice president HE NAMES one day before the vote would be the one that would complete the remaining two years of the term. AN UNELECTED PRESIDENT, AN APPOINTED PRESIDENT FOR TWO YEARS. If you think that this will solve the political crisis........... think again.

As I have written several times, the solution to the crisis is not electoral, it is political through a show of force. The easiest exit is for Maduro to resign today and we elect a new president (in office for only 2 years, so incoherent is the 1999 constitution). The opposition would win that election and for two years would have to deal with the horrendous crisis. Thus in December 2018 chavismo could make again a case to be returned to office.

But that would be if chavismo were in the hands of democrats which is not the case. Chavismo is owned by a military-narko-mafia which will be indicted in many an international court. A mafia controlled from Havana at that.

Tell me, is there a possible pacific electoral outcome? No. No way. The only outcome is through a break up inside the army to force out of office the most corrupt elements. That is, chavistas against chavistas. The best we can hope is for Maduro to be forced to resign.

The Recall Election is not an option but it is about the only pressure the opposition has right now. Unless we go into civil disobedience, a constitutional assembly election (mbwahahah!) or something of the sort.

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Two not quite related comments.

1) it seems that chavismo wants the opposition to do the dirty job of removing Maduro and only that. It is almost as if the regime wanted the opposition to give up on the Recall Election and negotiate something like a power sharing arrangement which would allow for some legal protection for the narko-personnel.

2) observe that the CNe conditions do not make it absolutely impossible for the opposition to get the 20% it needs but it makes it impossible for the opposition to get more signatures than the votes Maduro got in 2013. At least that humiliation would be spared the regime, if worse came to worse for it.

Tuesday, 20 September 2016

There we are not, at freedom

Long time I did not write a summary of what is going on. As usual there is a big yawn along as everything changes fast but everything is, in the end, the same: a gang of thugs will do whatever it is possible to retain power because they know what awaits them once they lose. Nevermind the culture of violence that goes with such mentality where only brute force is the argument. Negotiation? Only to gain time until I finally find a way to screw you once and for all.


This been said things are not going any better for the regime. True, the vice president and the communist minister of economy are saying that lines are lesser, that we are turning around a corner, that imports are on the rise since January, etc.  The reality is that indeed lines are lesser. See, supplies are lesser so there is no need to stand in line for stuff that will not come in. Shopping on weekends for groceries is great: since there are no deliveries anymore on Saturdays then what is left is for the people that have money enough to buy what the hoi polloi cannot afford. For the first time in years I am hitting again grocery stores on Saturdays (Sundays are, well, empty no matter what). As for the commie minister (he used to be a PCV member before jumping ship to Chavez), someone in his office should point to him that historically January has always been the lowest month for importation since the country is out of business until mid January. No dockers....

Politically the big fight remains the Recall Election before January 10 2017 since after that date a chased Maduro can name his successor, no election needed for the next two years. As I suspected long ago, it is not going to happen no matter what the opposition does. Too much at stake for the regime. Yet the good fight must be done in the off chance that a division inside chavismo allows in the end for the recall election; or,  better, we have Maduro resign before January 10 (which I think is what will happen if chavismo decides not to go full metal jacket on repression).

The strategy of the "legal" chavismo (and institutional military?)  is to wait as long as possible in the vain hope that oil prices go up just enough to resupply a little bit food shelves and thus make electoral defeat not a fact. Since production is not promoted and that economic repression is getting worse, I do not see how can this happen even if within one year oil were to go back to, say, 80 a barrel. But chavismo is entitled to dream too.

Meanwhile the "illegal" chavismo (and narko military?), the one that does not give a crap about appearances and that wants not only to get rid of the opposition but also of timorate chavistas, is forging ahead. The packed high court (never a dissenting opinion in the TSJ) has annulled anything the National Assembly does. The problem is that we need to vote next year budget and the constitution is quite clear in that it can only be approved through a National Assembly vote. We are sure that the TSJ will write something to annul yet a new sector of the constitution which for all practical purposes is only good enough to replace scarce toilet paper. The final head-on conflict must happen in the next weeks as the to-do list of TSJ before the end of the year is 1) annul the recall election proceeding 2) decide the budget 3) bar the nomination of a new electoral board 4) support legally repression and, why not, 5) disolve parliament without electing a new one.

While chavismo is desperately establishing a dictatorship without any popular support things outside are not improving for them either. The non aligned summit of last week was a fiasco as only a dozen of the 100+ head of state showed up. And we are talking here of Mugabe, Castro and other undesirable ones that have zero credentials on democracy. No luster from the summit except perhaps for some lumpen chavismo, part of it being carried to a refuge like tent city nearby the luxury hotels to provide Maduro with the adoring crowds he needs to prove his alleged popularity. Indeed, since Maduro was pot banged live in Margarita Villa Rosa community the regime takes no chances, from jailing as many as possible to bring its own sycophants along.

And I will pass on MERCOSUR giving an ultimatum to Maduro...

Thus repression keeps apace. What else could the regime do? We learned this early week alone that now Leopoldo Lopez is deprived of any light at night in his jail, that they search him and force him to undress uncounted number of time, etc...  all enough to deserve for the regime a boat load of human rights crimes trials against the regime. But the best example of regime fear and desperation came today.

Primero Justicia hired three guys to do a video on the situation and against repression. The army quickly jailed the three producers on treason charges and put the three civilians at the disposition of a military tribunal. So there you are (while the leadership of Primero Justicia is so far untouched by the army...)

.

A short summary of what happens in the video.

The girl tends to her sick mother. She looks at the empty fridge and texts her father to tell him that she is off to stand in line because she cannot find the medicine for her Mom and that there is no food at home. It just happens that her father is in the army and getting ready to repress a student march. The daughter reminds her father that the people he is about to repress suffer of the same problems that they do.

Too close for comfort?




Wednesday, 10 August 2016

No recall election in 2016: one hidden motive

As a supplement of yesterday's post where I explained why there would not be a Recall Election , or any election for that matter, we got some declarations today that definitely rule out a recall election in 2016. That is, these declarations technically do not rule out such a referendum but they describe very well that chavismo simply will not accept a recall election before January 10, 2017. After, we'll see but do not get your hopes high and at any rate it would be useless, ta-ta...

Now let's look at what is "new" today. Nothing really, just more clarity, so to speak.


First, we had one of the electoral board CNE rectors coming out to defend the speech of Lucena yesterday. Sandra Oblitas repeated all the same crap that they cannot be pressured, that they respected all the rules (it is a matter of public knowledge that this is a lie), etc...  But what is important here is that she took a potshot at Rondon dissent yesterday. That hinted at a surprise for the regime  4 CNE agents. The dissent was hard enough, surprising enough for them that they sent Oblitas for some desperate damage control. When I mean desperate I do not mean this as a mark of them feeling threatened, but that their lies were so easily exposed that they had to attack Rondon lacking any other argument.

At any rate, the threat that Oblitas also mentioned that the MUD would be outlawed is the favorite theme of Jorge Rodriguez, mayor of Caracas West and former real boss of the CNE at the time of the first fraud systems circa 2003. I am not going to comment on what is now the calculated hysteria Rodriguez exhibits as his assigned role (could it be otherwise, that he was assigned such a role?). The point of commenting him is that he said that the earliest date for any referendum is late February 2017. This is interesting. First, by late February the opposition will have lost any interest in the referendum and something else will be at the forefront. Second, his subconscious admits that there will be an election next year and the only one I can think of is the governor election (which are due in December 2016 and are quietly forgotten by the regime). That is, the regime knows that sooner than later it will have to face a poll of some sort that it will not win.

What Rodriguez truly hints at is that the failure to hold the recall election this year will be seen by the country as a political defeat and thus they will gravitate back toward chavismo as the only force available. That is exactly what Maduro hinted at last night in one of his vile cadenas (in English here). This poor and vulgar soul had the temerity to gloat over the failure of the opposition to collect the signatures for the recall vote on time. Apparently he is blissfully unaware that no sitting president in Venezuelan recent history has polled as low as he does. Were he aware he would have the good sense not to gloat while his regime is so blatantly cheating.

Certainly the coordination between all these post Lucena declarations is no accident. However the rather hysterical combination of outburst indicates to me something else. The regime is not even intent on postponing an eventual recall election, what the regime truly is seeking is to stop the collection of signatures. By discouraging such activity the regime does not hope to void the recall election (for this it has the high court annulation of the opposition party in the works) but it hopes that were the signature collection to become a must the 20% would not be passed too badly.  The problem for the regime is that the way things are developing there will not be 20% signing to recall Maduro: there will be more people signing for his recall than actually voted for him. And this political disaster is simply too much for chavismo.

At least if the recall is held after January 2017 there is the hope that discouragement of the populace will yield no more than, say, 30% signatures of the electoral body. Enough to oust Maduro in a vote but not enough for regime change.

The opposition truly has its work cut out.






Tuesday, 9 August 2016

Recall Election all but over

Today the head of the electoral board, CNE, Tibisay Lucena announced that "if all goes well" the gathering of the 20% signature from the registered electors could take place late October. TRANSLATION: even if the 20% is gathered late October there will not be enough time to fend off legal challenges so that the Recall Election is held before January 10 2017. If the recall election is held after that date and even if 90% vote to oust Maduro, his serving vice-president will replace in office to complete the two years in the presidential term.

In other words the regime has announced that there is no way they will risk a presidential election before December 2018. And if you still do not get it, the current cabinet of musical chairs will remain presiding over the country until January 2019 at the earliest.

I will add two crusty details. Some inside the CNE have announced publicly that the MUD will be invalidated soon as a political party (which it never was) and as such their petition for a recall election is not valid. That is, the regime, just in case, has still a treacherous tool to annul the late October signature collection.  The second detail is that the lone opposition sitting at the CNE board, Rondon, broke protocol and has refused to attend Tibisay Lucena announcement and instead emitted his strong declaration of dissent separately where among other things he states that there is no reason to wait for more than 38 days to gather the signatures. In short: Rondon was forced to emit a political declaration to counter what was a political declaration from Lucena, because pushing the collection to late October is indeed a political maneuver to annul the recall election.

Now, the kind regular reader may recall that on July 20 I wrote that there would not be a recall election, nor any election as long as the regime did not take the political decision to begin a transition. When, and if, such a decision is taken then there will be an election whose nature will depend on which election is less damaging for the political survival of the regime. It could be for example a presidential election following the simultaneous resignation of Maduro and his vice president. It could be a constituent assembly. It could be a trivial referendum on something justifying a change. It could be a plebiscite establishing a military regime Thailand like. It could be a declaration that a revolution does not require any more competitive elections, a la Castro-Cuba style. It could even be, why not, a Recall Election. Today's declaration of Lucena should be interpreted as such, as a delay until a final decision is taken. For all that we know next week she can decide that, considering new arguments, signatures will be collected mid September. Or never.

Let's keep in mind that the order not to have elections comes from Cuba who cannot risk to lose the Venezuelan stipend of oil that Cuba resells on the spot market. As such even the governor elections scheduled for December will not be held: such elections should have already been formally announced to prepare for them. The CNE, as far as we know, is not working on these mandatory December elections where all polls predict that the regime could lose as much as 100% of the states it holds currently. No regime can survive such an electoral loss, even a Cuban sponsored regime. As such the order also includes to postpone the governor elections.

So, the question tonight is what the opposition MUD will do? I am afraid that civil unrest is the next step. I do not see any other way out. And I am afraid that this is EXACTLY what the regime wants. It all depends on which kind of civil unrest is planned and how it is executed.

The very last "peaceful" weapon left for the National Assembly is a budget discussion which would force the regime into dissolving the National Assembly. But then you would need to elect a new assembly which result for the regime could be even worse than last December.

So civil unrest, here we go!





Sunday, 7 August 2016

Narko-Radikalismus

When everything fails, repeat it all. In particular the parts that clearly are rotten at the root.

This is what Maduro has done last week.

The paradox in covering Venezuela lately is that change is so continuous that it is enough to write about tendency. The rest are details quickly swept under the rug, no need to write about it unless you have time on your hands or are paid for that (lucky you!).

Roughly the story.

*Maduro cannot provide food.
*He names his minister of defense, Padrino, as food tsar, making him a de facto co president.
*Then, as an after thought he decides that it may have been a mistake to give such leeway to the military so he changes three of the non military cabinet position to set in three of the most radical elements he can find.
*Add to this that in the background the few ministers that have suggested change have been immediately shut down by radicals pols not inside of the current cabinet.

Explanations?

*In the previous entry I explained why the regime cannot get out of the currency control policy as its whole graft power based structure will fall in weeks. As such it does not matter who Maduro names as his co president, that befuddled person will not be able to bring diner to the Venezuelan table as the cupboards are empty and stores stopped deliveries until they get paid.

*Surely Padrino must have known that and he took the job for some other reason. Whatever the reasons are for him to become co-president (real president?) he needs to act fast because within two weeks of his nomination nothing has improved. Which were the reasons? One is that the regime being a military sponsored dictatorship it is just natural that the military start assuming a more public role. A novel XXI century military dictatorship if you like.  A velvet coup some have said.

*Alternatively it is possible that he military have decided to get get rid of Maduro and the ascension of Padrino is the first sign of a bona fide transition (towards democracy? open dictatorship? but maduroless for sure). Thus the reaction of Maduro to surround himself of radicals he is used to as a counterweight to Padrino. The real question would thus be how come Padrino did allow those changes.

It is important to note that one of the ministers fired was the lone "pragmatic" one who suggested that currency control had served its course. He was replaced by a communist and that is that (Carlos Faria). It is even more important to note that Ricardo Molina was brought back from the National Assembly to occupy one of the posts where money and graft opportunities abound. He was the radical firing any ministry worker that was not red enough to his taste. But do not think that he is a pure radical: nepotism is also his trade mark as it is apparently the case from Nicaragua to Maduro's wife Cilia Flores. Mouth on the left, privileges on the right, they all are.

And in case you do not get the point that Maduro has no better idea but to veer left/radical for his own protection by hiring ideologues that will be willing to take the fall for him, he also hired as interior minister Nestor Reverol, former Nazional Guard head. The problem here is that Reverol has just been indicted in the US for drug trafficking.  Clearly, Maduro knows that Reverol loyalty is assured since there is nowhere else for him to go.

Why this whole charade of pursuing policies that have failed, making them harsher if possible and have drug traffickers hired for protection?

Besides the obvious, that Miraflores Palace is a nest of scoundrels, assorted thugs and mafiosi, and thus they relate to what they already know, we need to look elsewhere.

This is a strategy to gain time, to intimidate and have people beyond the pale do whatever it takes to ensure Maduro's survival, even if it is for a previous few additional months.

The final question becomes thus who can possibly be so desperate to accept the utter ruin of Venezuela?

Blaming this on people like Diosdado Cabello is not enough, After all someone must have pointed out to him that sanguinary tyrants that die in their beds like Stalin are less frequent than those who meet less settled endings. People like Diosdado are hysterically radical as a way to force unacceptable conditions in an eventual negotiation.

So, who really pushes Maduro to such radicalization, harbinger of disaster without any historical exception? Only someone who will not be directly affected by the eventual collapse of the regime; or at least that will be far enough from ground zero when the day comes.  There is only one candidate that fits the bill and that is Cuba and the Castros. By forcing their creature Maduro to ravage the country to its last penny to support Cuba they know the regime dooms itself and any political future it may have thereafter. But they do not care, they need that extra little bit of money to bridge the gap until they finish negotiating with the US, Europe and even China.

Only a regime as vile as the Cuban one can prod Maduro into doing what he is doing these days. Then again the Castros have a long experience in starving people to death.



Corruption creativity

Two short posts this week end, for your reading pleasure. The first one on corruption latest updates.

The current crisis cannot be solved because the change in economic policies would result in the recognition that the robolución was a gigantic fraud. And I am not even discussing those who would go to jail. The point is that these people are not going to jeopardize their power or income. And yet these measures are possible without immediately questioning their power.

The first measures, not enough to solve the crisis but a must, are simple: stop sending Cuba its colonial stipend; remove price control and replace it with cash stipend to the populations at risk; rein in somewhat corruption so that at least a larger percentage of the state income goes to food and medicine purchase. Not that difficult, no?  Not only these measures are not even broached but corruption is worse than ever as there is less to steal. 

For example we have been offered a deal on DICOM dollars. Our contact would approve a certain sum every week so we can start paying our debts slowly, or at least purchase spare parts and the like. In exchange we need to give them 25% of what we get. That is, once we got the USD transferred to our account outside the country we are supposed to transfer 25% to a given account of a front man. Needless to say that this can only be done through the very opaque state banking system.

You would say "Daniel, that's not too bad and there is no other way to get foreign currency. Go for it!". But there is of course a catch. Once we sum up our expenses and the 25% "commission" the few USD we would get are not even 20% below the black market rate!  That is, I have in hand the proof that DICOM is just a tool for the regime to skim the private business still dysfunctionally working (and willing to pay the "mark up"). If in the middle of a national starvation and disease crisis the regime is unable to let go, even if temporarily, arbitration, then there is nothing to expect.

Note: clearly if the market is accepting a value so close to the black market value, then there is no need pretend that the bolivar value is not 1000 to the dollar.

Another corruption business model updating.

We have had recently "brokers" from Miami and Panama trying to short us on the foreign business we represent. They want them to sell and ship directly to them in Panama or Florida with the excuse that they have a client with access to foreign currency guaranteed. Since they are the ones that "found the client in Venezuela with dollars in hand" they want a commission from our provider. In exchange our providers would be paid directly in cash. No need for paperwork. Then the someone in Venezuela that has the approved USD would buy the lot from the "broker" at a mystery gross overprice (we have been offered our share if we wanted to go that way or at least shut up). It is all squared up by the "broker" and there is no need to go through decent but currency impaired intermediaries like us that, God forbid, would charge the market price. I let you ponder the multiple consequences of such schemes. 

I will just let you know that we have a pretty good idea of who that broker client is and they are, of course, tightly associated with the regime. Also, this makes sense for the "client" since the client will 1) get its share of the overprice paid to the broker, and 2) assuming that the client imports all of it, it will be more than its needs and he could resell enough of it at the black market rate to pay what corresponds to its own needs (we have advised our partners to stay clear of such "brokers").

So there you go, as long as currency control persists in the hands of these people there is nothing that can be done to improve the lot of my fellow countrymen. Regime change is the lone solution. 





Sunday, 31 July 2016

When the statist state runs out of ideas (and other's people money)

AS expected the rise of general Vladimir Padrino as co-president of Maduro has changed nothing. After all Venezuela has been a dictatorship for a while, of a new XXI century kind certainly, but a dictatorship nevertheless. It was all just a formality.

Padrino cannot succeed in his attempt at putting food on the table of Venezuelans. His multiple inspections, in combat drag, of food producers have revealed no scandal so far, no hoarding, no lack of manufacturing will. The reason why there is no food production in Venezuela is simple, it is because there is nothing to make food out of.

For better or for worse, and with chavista bred officers it is likely for worse, Padrino seems to have been put there to prepare, or chair, a transition out of Maduro's mess. We already have the first signs on how doomed this might be as clashes between radicals and pragmatists, military and civilians have come to the forefront this past week.


One, for example, has been setting up a system for forced labor. I kid you not. A decree states that the regime can draft workers from private agribusiness to work for up to 60 days (and 60 more if needed) in the state agricultural undertakings. That is right, I repeat, workers from agribusiness, even myself, could be forced to go to work where the regime decides. I am not insulting the intelligence of readers discussing the historical precedents that say that forced labor never ended up in something positive, and always brought different levels of tragedy. No, the details are more interesting in a decree that cannot be applied.

First, there is no provision as to what would happen to a worker refusing to go to a state run facility (employers MUST part with the employees drafted while preserving their social benefits and their penalty does not need to be expressed since we know by experience what the regime does to us). Second, those business that still produce something could well come to a stop if they lose their trained personnel. Where would be the food relief in the country?.

One chavista union official quickly went to say that no one would be forced to serve against their will. But that is quite hollow when you read the decree where only different forms of expressing obligations can be found (I highlighted them in the scan from the decree on the right, if you can read Spanish).

I find it interesting that besides being an extraordinary sloppy job of a decree it is also so direct and self assuming of its importance. If you ask me it is from the hand of a military turned bureaucrat, used to give orders and be obeyed. But in real life that does not work.

Another example of the confusion reigning inside the regime comes from a "debate" between the head of the state oil monopoly PDVSA and Elias Jaua, a representative of the more radicalo-communist wing of the regime. It all started with del Pino saying that the nationalization of the services of the oil industry in Maracaibo Lake by Chavez in 2009 was a mistake. It is a taboo in Venezuela: oil industry should belong to the state. At least some good sense had prevailed in letting competitive services manage a large chunk of the oil industry, usually the more delicate work that required nimbleness, something that was not a given even in PDVSA best days.

In short what del Pino was suggesting is that the private sector should not be banned outright from Venezuela's oil industry. Something very pragmatic since oil output has been dropping after 2009 and that with current oil prices and Venezuela bankruptcy we do not even have the money to keep the current level of production for much longer. That is anathema to the radical left that is unable to come to grips that the Chavez and Cuban models have failed, that the country is broke and that we have run out of food and medicine. In their minds there is a course traced by Chavez (Plan de la Patria) and it should be followed, period. Elias Jaua even goes one more stating that the said plan was discussed and voted upon and turned into law (it was an emanation of Chavez and thus was never properly discussed to begin with, and a monstrosity to read by the way).

And thus we see the plain division between the "civilian" groups of chavismo, between those who think that something should be done and those that think nothing should be done, that we are all doing fine and that the only thing needed are yet more regulations, more controls, and now forced labor.

It is interesting to note that even if one were to agree with the need for some strong initiative to restart production these come too late for Venezuela. When Chavez came to office in 1999 there was already a strong tendency for the state to rule over everything. On that aspect Chavez simply did one better, pushing the system to its last consequences, benefiting of disproportionate and undeserved oil rent to smooth things over and thus pretending that the private sector was not needed. Now there are voices inside chavismo that want to re discuss the model, and there are even admissions that only the private sector can take us out of the mess, After all, the forced labor decree is simply a way for the regime to force technicians from the private sector to work for derelict state companies. This is an admission, if any, that the public sector is incompetent, at least on that front to be charitable.