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Showing posts with label constitution violations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constitution violations. Show all posts

Thursday, 22 September 2016

Options against the dictatorship

I am happy about yesterday annulment of the Recall Election. I know, it is perverse but I have my reasons.

First, there is no need to discuss anymore the dictatorial nature of the regime. Under Chavez there were elections at any turn. Now, there will not be elections, not even for dog catcher. The last argument that chavismo could use internationally "we never lost the boatload of elections we do" only works if you have regular elections.

The consequence of this is that any opposition group that does not call the regime for its true nature will lose quickly its supporters. These simply will fail to understand how faced with the truth their "leaders" do not react more assertively. I agree that increased polarization is dangerous, but at this point, what else can we lose?

Second, as a consequence from the above, the opposition alliance MUD needs to purge itself of its wishy washy elements. Either you support the regime (silence counts), or you oppose it. Again, dictatorial regimes can only be dethroned through unity (or foreign disaster like invasion). See the examples of Chile where all allied against Pinochet. Or even Mexico when all rallied behind the right wing PAN to kick out the eternal PRI and its "perfect" dictatorship. Never mind the exit of Fujimori where the unity of the opposition behind Toledo allowed international sanctions to be effective.

Third, and surprising, any negotiation to get out of the crisis is now more likely to be successful if the opposition unifies better, becomes more assertive. By blocking any election the regime in fact traps itself into a repression must that is not acceptable today in Latin America, at a time where even the Castros are starting to be questioned. Through negotiation we may not get quick regime change but a true negotiation which includes a real progressive release of the tools of power by the narco regime may be a better outcome for the country than ousting suddenly a corrupt elite that will immediately sabotage whatever the incoming administration will try. One reason why some inside the opposition are not as assertive as others is that they simply do not want to deal with the mess.

[NOTE: I am painfully aware that Venezuela is a neutered country. The sacrifices seen in Chile or Peru are not going to happen here. There are too many of us that can only be deranged for a looting party. There is a perfect French word without direct translation to characterize what I think of the bulk of the Venezuelan population: veule. a mix of spineless and coward. And I include there those that are keyboard warriors, calling for all sorts of action from the MUD that they have little intentions to lead themselves. Never mind the chavista colectivos who only attack under pay and military protection. Certainly there are steel soul heroes like Lopez but the indignation only goes so far.]

In front of all this what are the options?

It is time for the MUD to put its neck forward. It has been 24 hours since the CNE did what was foretold. Last night the only minimally acceptable answer for the MUD was "We are not accepting this. We knew it was coming and we have plans. We will not reveal them now because we needed first the details to complete them. Tomorrow we will tell you".

We had to wait a couple of hours until finally someone said something without any further immediate perspective. In short, the MUD is not sure what to do. I assume, hope, they have an idea, that the delay is part of a strategy.

Clearly, if the MUD does not react we are in for a full Maduro term with utter destruction of the country.  Never mind that the regime will use the two years left to destroy physically the opposition and plan for a totally fraudulent presidential election in December 2018. Or later, as the crisis is an open door for all sort of excuses.

Today, for good measure the high court TSJ annulled yet another key vote from the National Assembly. And yet this is where the resistance comes from. The National Assembly needs to vote the illegality of the regime, just as the regime decreed its irrelevance. How to do that? A few things, in no particular order.

Refuse to discuss the budget. Once this one is passed by a TSJ fiat, vote a resolution that any lender is going at its own risk, that the Assembly will not recognize debts contracted through that budget that are not duly monitored. Bankrupt the regime. You may say that the propaganda of the regime will put the blame of the famine on the opposition but I doubt it at this point. And the MUD can always say that they refuse to give money to thieves.

Reduce taxes, in particular sales tax and see how the regime can finance itself.

Claim article 350 of the constitution and start an organized campaign of civil disobedience. The beauty of that is that you do not need to obey the TSJ anymore.

Vote the destitution of the latest TSJ appointment as illegal and announce that the rulings do not need to be followed anymore by anyone in the country.

Vote the destitution of the current CNE board. That it will delay future elections? At this point who cares!

Etc.

There are means that can be acceptable for the international community while the regime would be either pushed to capitulate or become a new Cuba.

But for this you need a unified opposition willing to face down the regime and stand the risks that come with such a fight. I do not see it, or at least not the unity required for this. Nor the vision.

I hope to be corrected, to be proven dead wrong.


Wednesday, 21 September 2016

Thy electoral CNE shoe droppeth

There will be a lot of brouhaha in the next days about the ignominious decision of the CNE to do its utmost to violate the constitution in order to block the Recall Election against Maduro. Let me try to make it clear for readers still hanging around here.

1) The motivation in any case is to annul the Recall Election, or in the very worst case push it to 2017 which means that the regime remains in office until January 2019 at the very least.


In fact, the regime has announced today through one of its formal provocateurs, Pedro Carroña Carreño, that voting was not a fundamental right, that there was more pressing needs like food or medicine than elections. The provocation is, of course, the public knowledge that the crisis is the regime fault and thus it will never win an election again, and it knows it. Never mind that there might not be money for elections but there was cash for the useless NOAL summit in Margarita last week that could have easily paid for an election. Nevermind on how much medicine could have been bought out of the food given, say, to Mugabe.

In short, before I go into details, as I already wrote in previous entries, the regime does not want elections. Period.

2) The constitution states clearly that any recall election must be asked by 20% of the voters in the district that elected the said person. The electoral board CNE today announced that even though Maduro was elected nation wide the opposition will need to collect 20% in each and every state. So, even if, say, 30% nationwide signed for the recall election it is enough that in a single state there is ONE VOTE missing for the 20% to annul the whole experience. The article 72 is clear and precise, there is a need for a 20% nation wide and it is irrelevant if that number is reached through 100% of voters in state X while state Y has 0% signatures.

Thus we have right there a flagrant violation of the constitution. If they do that so bluntly what can we expect for the "details" next?

3) The CNE said that it would give the opposition only 3 weekdays, 7 hour week day, with one hour for lunch for the CNE workers. That is there will be a Wednesday, Thursday and Friday allocated, from 8 AM to noon and from 1 PM to 4 PM. That is, unless your boss gives you the time to stand in line for hours you will not be able to sign up for the recall election. Never mind public workers who will be tightly controlled those days and fired on the spot if they are out of office during that timetable.

4) And to make sure that this timetable is even more difficult to fulfill the CNE has allocated only 5,392 finger printing machines. Let's do some simple arithmetic.

If all goes well, no electric outage, no sabotage, no violence, etc, etc...  we have 21 hours per machine. Let's assume that each machine can collect one signature per minute in such perfect conditions. The maximum signatures that can be thus collected in those three days are:

5,392 X 21 X 60 = 6,793,920 signatures.

We need, besides the per state quota difficulty, 3,893,129 signatures. That is not bad you may say. Think again. I have assumed that the 21 hours will be indeed perfect 21 hours. Also, there are always imponderables and we know from experience that the CNE has a proclivity to annul signatures at will, even if collected by themselves. The "safe number" is not 20% per state, it is 25% per state, which is above 5 million nationwide.

A couple of rainstorms across the country is enough to already make you lose half a million. A few well designed power outages and there you have another half a million gone. Since it is to be collected state by state all those that cannot return to their home state will not be able to sign. Etc.....

Not collecting on a week end makes it, just becasue of logistics, very difficult to get that 4 million signatures. Since elections are on Sundays, you can appreciate in full the hypocrisy and cynicism of the CNE in deciding on working days and working hours for signature collection.

5) And at this point we do not know yet other details such as where the limited numbers of collection centers will be located.  If you vote here but you need to go over there, preferably in a rough neighborhood, to sign up, will you?

6) But just for good measure the CNE has announced that it will take its sweet time to decide whether the signatures have indeed been collected. Nevermind that they collected them themselves, with their people, their machines, etc. They blithely said that the Recall Election "could take place" during the first quarter of 2017. Thus annulling its desired effect, as I mentioned above.

Voila!

This being said.

Technically there is still a possibility for the recall election to be held before January 10. After all, January 9 IS in the first quarter of 2017. All will depend of course on what the opposition MUD will do in the coming days and how willing is the army to repress as needed.

Right now, today, it would seem that the regime has accepted to remove Maduro from office. But that is all, he must be replaced by someone inside the regime, WITHOUT presidential election. That is right, if Mauro were to be recalled in the first quarter of 2017, the vice president HE NAMES one day before the vote would be the one that would complete the remaining two years of the term. AN UNELECTED PRESIDENT, AN APPOINTED PRESIDENT FOR TWO YEARS. If you think that this will solve the political crisis........... think again.

As I have written several times, the solution to the crisis is not electoral, it is political through a show of force. The easiest exit is for Maduro to resign today and we elect a new president (in office for only 2 years, so incoherent is the 1999 constitution). The opposition would win that election and for two years would have to deal with the horrendous crisis. Thus in December 2018 chavismo could make again a case to be returned to office.

But that would be if chavismo were in the hands of democrats which is not the case. Chavismo is owned by a military-narko-mafia which will be indicted in many an international court. A mafia controlled from Havana at that.

Tell me, is there a possible pacific electoral outcome? No. No way. The only outcome is through a break up inside the army to force out of office the most corrupt elements. That is, chavistas against chavistas. The best we can hope is for Maduro to be forced to resign.

The Recall Election is not an option but it is about the only pressure the opposition has right now. Unless we go into civil disobedience, a constitutional assembly election (mbwahahah!) or something of the sort.

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Two not quite related comments.

1) it seems that chavismo wants the opposition to do the dirty job of removing Maduro and only that. It is almost as if the regime wanted the opposition to give up on the Recall Election and negotiate something like a power sharing arrangement which would allow for some legal protection for the narko-personnel.

2) observe that the CNe conditions do not make it absolutely impossible for the opposition to get the 20% it needs but it makes it impossible for the opposition to get more signatures than the votes Maduro got in 2013. At least that humiliation would be spared the regime, if worse came to worse for it.

Tuesday, 17 May 2016

The developping coup

You need to keep following closely what is going on in Venezuela. Any distraction, the more so if you are overseas like yours truly these days, and you may miss the gran finale.


As expected, a cornered regime has started its moves to abolish the national assembly and establish a bona fide dictatorship. It has no choice: elections are not an option for them, they cannot win them even with massive fraud. And lose they cannot because a change of government means that too many of them will go to jail. Thus in front of the perspective of a recall election on Maduro that all indicate will be a sure defeat for Maduro there is nothing else left but to block the drive for recall election.  This is underway at great risk as the mood of the country is clearly set for change. Not necessarily in favor the opposition  but most definitely to kick out Maduro.

Meanwhile there is the financial question that the National Assembly controls and the impossibility to annul each and every single law the assembly votes. The OAS is getting ready to apply the Democratic Charter and time presses. Using the silly excuse that a foreign ex-president can by himself raise a mercenary army able to defeat the Venezuelan one last week end Maduro decreed a state of emergency with wide ranging attributions for Maduro. One of the worrisome ones is that PSUV committee for food distribution control, CLAP of recent creation, will have power to collaborate with army and police for public order. Translation : civilians from Maduro political party will become gauleiters directing armed folks to control non chavista folks, in particular those demanding a recall election. From denial of food to outright repression is how it will work.

Sure enough a few minutes ago the National Assembly exerted it's constitutional right, and duty, to reject the said decree established to defend, allegedly, the fatherland. Now we are left to see how Maduro and the rubber stamp cum private regime attorney high court TSJ rules out such a momentous and necessary Assembly vote. Beyond constitutional considerations just on ethical parameters, the decree of Maduro cannot be accepted. Period.

And thus we are now on the "my way or the highway" moment we were all awaiting eagerly.

Is Maduro going to be allowed to "defend" the country at any price, including democracy, human rights and parliamentary representation?

Is the Assembly to be allowed to control an executive clearly going bonkers?

Wednesday, 11 May 2016

1%, a world in a number

I have been very distracted by many problems and now I am overseas, among other objectives, to fetch medicines not available anymore in Venezuela for me and my SO (and others). But I could not pass on a brief comment on what should be called the 1 % affair that was held as I fixed to leave the country.


In short, the electoral board, CNE, established fictitious requirements to request for a recall election on Nicolas Maduro. The constitution previews that the requirement to force a recall election  on an elected official is to gather 20% signatures of the registered voters of the given electoral circuit. But the CNE in a crass delaying tactic decided that even though Maduro electoral district is the whole country the MUD alliance needed to get first 1% in EVERY state and THEN it would be allowed to collect the needed 20%. The objective was simple: the regime hoped that in very chavista, very dependent states like, say, Delta Amacuro, the MUD could not manage the 1% holy grail. There is, after all, the infamous Tascón List precedent of the 2004 recall election that affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of folks, including yours truly. If this was scandalous enough by itself there were plenty of other road blocks set by the CNE, quite often of a very childish nature.

To make a long story short, after quite a long arm wrestling the CNE finally released a specific form (la planilla) to collect that 1%. Yet, in a rushed and improvised operation within three days the MUD collected around 8%. That is right, the regime truly thought that the MUD would have trouble collecting in 3 days in all states the fateful 1%. The MUD largely overtook that goal in every state, probably by the end of the first day.

Now, that was a political miscalculation......

Clearly at this stage, in spite of the December electoral loss, in spite of the worsening economical and scarcity crisis, in spite of galloping inflation, in spite of negative unanimous polling, the regime is still underestimating popular rejection of its policies, probably still riding on the illusion that Chavez-dreaming is enough to numb the masses though hungry nights. By putting so many obvious roadblocks the regime only angered further the people, hence the opposition stunning success. The reactions of the regime shows that the wake up call was harsher than in December, at least as I see it.

The problem for the regime is not that the opposition is all but certain to get the 20% signatures it needs. The problem is not that the opposition is all but certain to win the recall election since roughly any signature represents at least two votes considering the fear political context of repression in the country. The problem is that the opposition MUD could well get more signatures than the number of votes that Maduro got three years ago making the recall election a moot point... Such a humiliation would be worse than losing any election and could cause a regime instant debacle.

The problem of the regime has not been Maduro for a while: the military have been the real rulers since the 2014 repression. The problem for the regime if not how to replace Maduro but with what. Now, with that 1% thing it has become an urgent matter.

I see two options for the regime.

The regime "negotiates" a way out through either a recall election or a Maduro resignation where it accepts that a tolerable opposition figure runs to finish the two years left in the presidential term. I do not see why the opposition should accept this or how the narco generals would even bow to that limited amount of real politik.

The regime stalls and blocks the recall election  and Maduro resigns next year letting an appointed transition vice president finish the term.  Very perilous unless it is a national agreement and the said vice president is appointed like, well, now. Again, I doubt Cuba and the narco generals will be on board.

And there is always the option to kick the game board and establish an outright dictatorship.

Wednesday, 30 March 2016

Tweet of the day

Last night I was writing about laws voted that displease chavismo. Here is the tweet of the National Assembly chair, Ramos Allup.




The unconstitutional thug law firm gathered past midnight preparing the annulment of the central bank reform and amnesty law, as well as first draft of High court reform

Such is the rush of the TSJ that they cannot even pretend to follow normal legal decorum and in a rush they are trying to make up rulings that will make no sense, at least legally and constitutionally. But give an excuse to Maduro for propaganda.

The problem with that strategy for the regime is that it cannot keep annulling everything parliament sends its way. At some point the legal crisis will be such that the country will enter into utter paralysis as no one will sign any deal with the country, no matter what.
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Note: observe that the Chair of the National Assembly is calling the TSJ thugs (malandro, no exact translation but that is what it means, street thugs, without any racial connotation US style). The partiality of sides make it possible that Ramos Allup tweet raises hardly an eye brow. So low as fallen the political discourse in Venezuela....

Just imagine Obama calling Scalia a scoundrel, or Bush calling Bader Ginzburg a bitch. I thought so....

Tuesday, 29 March 2016

Onward the final constitutional crash: amnesty law and high court reform

The Easter lull came and went without making much of a difference.  The "calima" suffocated us in Caracas while the country went on a standstill to try to spare a few meters from the water gauge of the Guri dam, before El Niño, and regime's utter incompetence, forces a shut down of 50% of the country's electricity.



But the country is back at work, as much as it is possible, and the National Assembly has started the road to open confrontation not only with the executive, but on the true meaning of the Venezuelan constitution, as this one may be.


A few minutes ago the National Assembly voted the final version of the amnesty law which aims, among other things, to free political prisoners incarcerated in kangaroo courts. An amnesty is needed since there is no way to get a truly fair trial in Venezuela these days.



But this law, which intents is also the start of some form of national reconciliation by forcing every side to face the reality that justice is in the hands of the executive (even though this cannot be said in the law), is far from being applied and Leopoldo Lopez is not out of jail yet. Maduro's regime has announced that he will not sign the law, that it will not be applied. Presidential veto power is limited in Venezuela, at best a delaying tactic. Thus within days, with or without the signature of Maduro the law will become the law of the land. Maduro can only stop this law application if the high court TSJ rules it to be unconstitutional. This is certainly the case as the TSJ has always managed to find any "unconstitutional" way to make a given an unconstitutional one, even if the means used is itself unconstitutional. Repetition intended.

Which brings us to the second point of this entry: after the vote the national Assembly went straight ahead in the modification of the  laws describing how the  TSJ is designated.  The aim is to find a way to go around the latest crop of appointees who got their job through unconstitutional ways to allow for the pre-electoral packing of the court.  Yes, it is that naked but then again the TSJ submission to the regime is that naked: nobody remembers when was the last time that the state/regime lost a case in court.

In short, the regime is going to be placed in front of this dilemma: either accept the revision of the latest appointments so those can be made according to the original intent of the law, or accept an expansion of the TSJ members so that there is at least dissenting opinions. A dilemma the regime will refuse by declaring that legal reform unconstitutional, even though it will violate the very own regime jurisprudence that was itself a constitutional violation. This is how things work in Venezuela: several wrongs are required to improve the odds of making a right.

In a way it is irrelevant whether the regime will release Lopez from jail, or allow for a limited dissent at the TSJ. It is quite clear now that the regime faction aligned around Maduro and Cabello will go out of its way to avoid any move that could undermine its power and drive through regime change, a change that would find soon in jail Maduro, Cabello, Ramirez and scores of other corrupt and abusive office holders.

The regime has made it abundantly clear that it will not let the new National Assembly function as it should be. The TSJ has already gutted its control authority. It is finding a way to avoid votes on financial resources (which may be difficult at the Assembly has already stated that credits not approved by the Assembly do not put the state under the obligation of repaying them). More blockades to the Assembly are not obvious yet as its election is, after all, still recent. But the tone is set: the TSJ will provide what the regime cannot get through the Assembly.

Since the regime has embarked into such a course to void the National Assembly then this one has no choice but to face down the confrontation by voting on legal laws (redundancy intended) to dismantle the regime. Either the regime will have to back down or it will have to come up to terms with its own dark intentions and, well, proceed once and for all to the "autogolpe", self-inflicted-coup á la Fujimori once upon a time in Peru.

For the regime going all the way to a constitutional crisis is a gamble. Not only the Amnesty Law and the TSJ reform are politically unacceptable for the reduced chavista hard core, but more laws in the work (on recall elections and referenda) are even less acceptable. The political cost, here and abroad, maybe simply to high for the regime to pay. Times are changing, Obama visited Cuba, Argentina is gone and Kirchner is not able to make the opposition that some thought she would be able to do. In Brasil the corruption of Lula is now public knowledge. Talk of applying the democratic charter agaisnt Venezuela is now open talk. But what is worse for the regime is that there is no food nor medicine, and soon there will be no electricity besides providing homes with a very few hours a day, forget about energy for production. Amen of the political capital lost abroad: the regime has no political capital left to spend at home.

Common sense would make the regime start negotiating a political solution to start taking measures to avoid the nation's collapse. But it seems that Maduro et al are seeking actively such collapse as there last desperate gambit to retain power.

La politique du pire, they called it in the agonizing French Ancien Regime.

Wednesday, 6 January 2016

La fuite en avant or is it La politique du pire ?

French political language is rich and dates from the French Revolution where between 1789 and 1815, depending on how you count, up to 12 government systems could be identified. There are two sentences that need to be used for this entry. La fuite en avant refers as when you have no option but just make a run for it straight ahead and hope for the best (escaping straight ahead). La politique du pire refers to make the situation worse in the hope that people will want to go back to a past situation because it was less worse, grammatical mistake on purpose. Or to destroy everything so no one can do anything against you.

Today we can use BOTH expressions.


But before I keep going on you need to understand that the regime is acting as it does because its top leaders know full well that if a semi functional Assembly manages to get hold too many of them will end in jail. If you do not understand that then maybe what comes next will make little sense to you.

The mechanic of Wednesday events started with a series of videos summarized in a Tal Cual entry. These videos explicitly show how all the Chavez propaganda at the National Assembly was taken down Tuesday evening. But that is not the real story. These videos which pretend to be amateur are, I am sure of it, a carefully thought provocation by the new chair of the Assembly, Ramos Allup. Among other things he says that the only pictographie allowed in the Assembly are the official classic portraits of Simon Bolivar, that the necrophiliac reconstruction of Bolivar by Chavez was something crazy and that it should be taken with all the rest to Sabaneta (Chavez birth place) or Miraflores Palace or the trash, that he could not care less but all had to go.

Sure enough the assembly was under siege by chavista supporters Wednesday night...

So why did Ramos Allup took such a chance? Because he knows that a confrontation with the regime is unavoidable. It is going to happen, it is just a calendar question and Ramos Allup has decided that he will hold the calendar of the confrontation. So far at least today he is proven right: chavismo at Wednesday's session was out of itself to the point of hearing stupid things like a decomposed Cabello saying that there will be no money for the Assembly. I suppose that he thinks that international lenders will come and approve loans to Venezuela that are not signed by its National Assembly.....

Ramos Allup also proceeded into the swearing in of the dismissed representatives of Amazonas (though apparently they are refraining from voting). This is the other side of the coin. It may look as a provocation but as long as these never vote the decisions of the assembly cannot be judged illegal. On the other hand the blood thirsty radical wing of the opposition will get a bone to chew on while Ramos Allup woks on the really pressing matters.

In short, Ramos Allup got today the hysteria of the regime in full display showing them saying anything, preparing any thing to stop (or escape from?) the Assembly, la fuite en avant.

That night we got further regime reaction with the naming of the new Maduro government. I have not much to say on that except for a few points that are telling enough.

First, the regime has decided to cave in its radical left. Luis Salas is the new coordinator of the economy. He is a "professor" at the bolivarian university founded by Chavez to "form" all the public administration he needs. Objectivity has never been a value taught at the UBV. He has worked with PODEMOS in Spain. And if that is enough to scare you to death, you just need to read the titles of his opus at Aporrea where you can find gems like "The price of gas as a fetish" or "Economic war and social war. The mafiosi and paramilitary code behind the fascist violence". Yes, an "economic professor" penned title that a serious blogger would never dare to pen.

In his team we have a Caracas PSUV candidate defeated and now available to occupy a seat in an administration in search of its Kerensky. For commerce Maduro named Jesus Farias, a guy holding a positon in the Communist Party until 2007. As if a commie had any idea about what "Exterior Commerce and Foreign Investment" was all about.

At least for some levity Maduro also appointed someone for the banking system that has an idea of what is to be done. He also named for Vice President the governor of Anzoategui, Aristobulo Isturiz, a survivor of pre Chavez years, just like Ramos Allup.

What can we conclude from that? The regime is unable to change its economical system. It simply cannot. So Maduro names the most radical wing to the economy position, to increase further controls as if it were possible. La politique du pire, burnt earth... And the creation of a ministry of "Urban Agriculture" is not going to make us avoid starvation.

But on the other hand the regime has not solved its internal contradictions and the side aware that things have changed has managed to put someone to try not to see the banks fold, and perhaps the only person in the regime that can negotiate a settlement with Ramos Allup: Isturiz. (1)

The only problem here is that I wonder if Maduro has the luxury of time anymore. If he persists in listening to people like Salas that are convinced that the country can produce enough just if capitalism is flushed out then he may be in for a rude awakening. He lost on 6D in 23 de Enero and they are just across the street from Miraflores.

I cannot believe that our hopes are now solely on Isturiz shoulders!

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1) Besides the impression that reaching to lunatics like Salas show that Maduro is short on people willing to work with him, we should note that Venezuela has a 1.500 million dollar bond issue coming to term. Can anyone imagine Salas negotiating an extension? Is default a near certainty? Is this why Medina went banking control, to prepare for default?

Saturday, 2 January 2016

2015-2016 continuum

Something strange happened to me over the holiday: I did not see the new year coming. At least not politically. Until December 31 the regime has been busy at trying to find ways to sabotage the swearing in of January 5, taking away even the cameras from the National Assembly so that presumably there will be no way to record the ceremony (and whatever vulgarity the regime plans to do then; or to hide that Cabello will not be the chair anymore?).


Thus it felt a little bit empty to write a "Happy New Year" entry for a political blog whose readers are aware that there was no holiday break this year, not even for this blogger with, to boot, a delicate family situation over the holidays. Whatever holiday optimism I may have had was expressed at the Christmas post. Then we were back to business as usual. So, happy holiday new year wishes here and that is that.

On Tuesday 5 the new National Assembly will be sworn in. The MUD opposition victorious alliance has already called for a mass rally at "La Hoyada" which is a couple of blocks from the National Assembly (and conveniently empty from all the buhoneros stalls there as these go on vacation the first two weeks of January, until people receive their first paycheck of the year, all previous income having been wasted away in December).

The regime? We do not know for sure yet. "spontaneously" some colectivos (armed thug gangs cum storm troopers of the regime) are making hot air about defending the revolution. Too bad that one of the most famous colectivo, La Piedrita, has lost its district of 23 de Enero on December 6. Maybe no one told them?

We are expecting the MUD to announce who will be the new chair of the Assembly (and the two vice presidencies which will be equally important at least for the first months of its tenure). We may even know who the chairs of the main committee will be, and whether the MUD will offer as a peace gesture a couple of these chairs to the PSUV (which should reject them on any excuse to accuse the MUD of undemocratic attitude or something).

Then, if the newly elected representatives make it to the National Assembly safely (still not a certainty as the army is responsible for that and probably upset at the regime forcing it into an unnecessary awkward to dangerous situation) we need to see if they will seat the 4 representatives barred by the unconstitutional 3 days ago. Unfortunately I am afraid that the MUD has no choice but challenge the court and seat these 4 representatives since, no matter what, a constitutional clash is sought by the regime and we might as well get it over with.

If eventually the New Assembly is installed, before it can even face a "normal" legislative agenda it will need to face the following issues: secure the Assembly perimeter so that people can come and go for the sessions; deal with the problem of live TV coverage of the sessions which means tackling down the control of ANTV (already under work); confront the judicial power which I doubt very much will take it kindly a refusal to abide of its illegal ruling. That last one is a must because we can be pretty confident that if the Assembly decides to vote that during the day time the sun shines the court will overrule it as unconstitutional. The firing of 4 seats was merely the first shot.

And then it will be January 10 and I would not dare to make further forecasts.

On the negative side we have a regime that is fighting for its political survival as it is questioned more and more inside chavismo. So they will take all the risks that they need to take, make all the provocations that are required to justify the fuite en avant that they have undertaken.

On the positive side the world is not fooled and in spite of the holiday season many voices have risen to warn the regime that tampering with the results and not seating the new assembly is not an option.

We will see. Meanwhile you can pass the culinary abuses of the holidays watching Caracas extreme sports events in the coming days. I think that we have the pseudo-Chinese curse on us. "may you live in interesting times".



Tuesday, 15 October 2013

The repressive, dictatorship consecrating, enabling law is out

Original
So, after much, much hot air the regime had to show the enabling law it wants for Maduro to become a full time dictator. It does not matter whether the unconstitutional project is to silence the opposition or to purge the ranks of chavismo of its undesirable elements (they are all undesirable but apparently there are gradations within chavismo). The fact of the matter is that chavismo does not want its bankrupt regime to be discussed either on the air waves, or the newspapers and even less at the Nazional Assembly (yes, I am retaking the "Nazional Assembly" moniker because after this re-edition of Ermächtigungsgesetz the next step is our own version of Nuremberg Laws which the projected enabling law contemplates as an extension of our very own Tascon list).


The excuse the government offered is that there is a need to fight corruption and to face down a severe economic crisis. But the solution offered by this enabling law is to silence the opposition, find corruption there and among some token chavistas for good measure, more to make room for other corrupt chavista officials rather than any good intention.  The economic measures are fake ones as a regime whose currency went from 500 to a dollar to 50,000 to a dollar in 14 years has no credibility anymore on this respect. Amen of an inflation currently at 50% annual. As long as the perpetrators of this economic disaster remain in office no enabling law of any type will solve the problems. This is not a matter of laws, it is a matter of personnel.


80 years later copy
To illustrate the above, I will let you know what each item of the law truly means. The law is rather short, and curiously the Hitler one was very short too, and also 4 articles both. Some coincidences are too amazing to pass over.

Article 1, part 1, is supposedly to fight corruption.

Item 1-A states that the law wants to rebuild the morality of public administration and orient it to socialist values.  We are not far from official segregation, Nuremberg style.

Items 1-B and 1-C give the executive power of the country right to create mew types of crimes and fix the sanctions. See above.

Item 1-D, just as Hitler's article 4 was, allows the regime to take the international measures it sees fit, which basically means expropriate whatever foreign companies own here.

1-E is to make sure opposition parties cannot find electoral financing.

Items 1-F through 1-H are to give the government sole control on any foreign currency in the country.

Part 2 leads to the economic items.

Item 2-A basically gives the regime leeway to get rid of trade unions and contracting. That is, the trade unions of state companies that protest because the regime does not fulfill its obligations will be shut down.

Items 1-B through 1-E give the regime the power to intervene at will any aspect of economic activity, deciding what is done and by whom.  Item 1-F, the last one, is in fact a veiled disguise that expropriations will now proceed without compensations since it will be "to guarantee the right of the people to have goods and services, safe, of quality and just price".  This is impossible to achieve unless you force producers to sell at a loss if necessary, or expropriate them without the burden of owing the value of the property.

Article 2 is the nail in the coffin of private enterprise and freedom because Maduro will in fact have the right to qualify a law "organica", which in Venezuelan law means it can only be changed with a 2/3 majority in the parliament. The absurdity and unconstitutional nature of this provision is obvious since the parliament will not have a 2/3 vote for approving this law and yet Maduro will enact laws as if they got the 2/3 vote.

Now, does anyone still think we are not in a dictatorship?

You are of course all welcome to find the adequate parallels to any enabling law or repressive totalitarian regime of your preference.

Tuesday, 8 October 2013

Enabling law as intra chavista power play of radicals in the ascent

UPDATED There two major news today, one just breaking with the "promotion" of Ramirez to the vice presidency of Economic area while the fate of the previous holder, Merentes, is still unknown (he may retain his seat of finance minister but we have no confirmation at this typing). The second news is the expected formal petition for an enabling law for Maduro. Let's start with this later one although the first one is the more revealing news as to what is truly happening.

Since Hitler's enabling law, that tool as never led to good results. In Venezuela its use has been abundant and has been abused under Chavez. But at least in previous Venezuelan applications the president was freshly elected with a clear victory over the runner up, or had high numbers all the time like Chavez. Maduro has neither high numbers in polls, nor a clear mandate and even less of a clear victory whatsoever as April vote is now recognized as a fraudulent one even by many the rank and file chavismo (though they remain discrete about it because, well, they are cashing in, you know...).  It is not that a limited enabling law with a limited scope to speed up necessary legislation over a punctual problem is necessarily a bad idea, but in a country which under Chavez has revealed its deep lack of democratic fiber such a constitutional figure should be abolished outright. Chavez in his last installment used it to annul the newly elected National Assembly and moved on with it to prepare the grotesque state support for his fraudulent reelection of last year.

Maduro advances many made up excuses to request an enabling law of his own, NONE making sense. He wants to use it to fight corruption but all the necessary legislation already exists. The regime simply refuses to apply it, refuses to tackle corruption which latest example is found with a public official caught with 400K euros in cash in Bulgaria. He wants to use it to fight an alleged economic coup, so that there will be no food shortages. But the solution is easy there since the regime already controls all the foreign currency outflow, already controls the price structure, already can expropriate whatever it wants, already can jail any "saboteur". He wants to use it to stop Venezuela's dependency from oil but he forgets that chavismo has been in office for soon 15 years, has had already enabling laws and the end result of them is that MORE THAN EVER we depend on oil. Another enabling law is not going to solve any of these issues. NONE.

So, what gives? We need to search the true reasons of the enabling law elsewhere, in the murky waters of the internal power struggles of chavismo. Basically we have two sides, each with significant subgroups. To simplify matters there are the "moderate" which understand the value of money and that we are in a globalized word that imposes some of the rules that all must follow least they fall on the wayside. If the economic failure of Chavez, and Cuba, and Zimbabwe and others are not enough for you to understand what is meant by a minimum of rules to follow then it means that your interests are elsewhere, in Nincompoopia. The "radicals" are the other side, the ones that praise to high heaven the tyranny of the Castros over Cuba, who think that indeed Venezuela belongs to Nincompoopondwana, the famed continent where the USSR was a production power house and where Cuba is actually a tropical paradise.

Loosely Diosdado Cabello represented the "moderates", those that love dictatorship with profits. One of his men, or at least kindred spirit in the Maduro government, was Merentes, the finance minister in charge of the vice presidency on economic matters. The "radical" wing was better represented though the fact that "moderates" were officially present seemed to indicate a certain falling back after Chavez death. However in recent weeks it was clear that Cabello did not seem to have the ascendant that he once had. The departure of Merentes, foretold by his clear inability to impose his economic views over Giordani, Jaua and Arreaza, seems to indicate that the "radicals" have finally wooed the "neutral" group led by Ramirez, the smaller, more discrete group in the cabinet but the one that knew how much cash was truly available from oil production. Ramirez is an ideologue, a "resentido social", and should have been counted from the starts in the radical group were it not that his utter lack of charisma and link to the common folk made him realize that he had more to gain personally if he stayed aloof in the immediate post Chavez era.

This is how we must read what is going on this week. The "radicals" are trying to edge once and for all whatever "moderates" are left in charge. It is too early to decide for certain whether this is a mere electoral ploy to mobilize the radical bases to avoid a disaster in December. I think unfortunately that it goes deeper than that. The economy is tanking and the radicals feel cornered. They have decided to remove once and for all any democratic pretense so as to remain in power through repression. This start by insuring the unity of chavismo in a single faction, more able to tackle the democratic opposition later on.

The questions are now: Will Cabello allow for the enabling law to be voted? Will the corrupt and rich and lazy military cave in knowing full well that they will soil their hands with bloods if the radicals take over completely? Is the intricate network of corruption and blackmail inside chavismo enough to neutralize Cabello and the army higher ranks?

Maybe the time has come.
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UPDATE.  So I watched the second part of Maduro's speech at the National Assembly tonight requesting the enabling law. I am not going to go into details as I sort of tweeted it live in Spanish. I am just giving you the executive summary.

The performance was pitiful: Maduro had all the trouble in the world reading the speech from a booklet. He did not write the speech, that much was obvious by the amount of words and sentences he had trouble with. In fact it is fair to assume that the speech was written by Giordani, the great apparent winner of the economic struggles of the past months. With the help of some Cuban advisors, of course.

The speech was insulting, idiot, uninformed, mean and ideological in a way that not even Chavez would have dared to do in his best years. As such it is clear that his appointed successor and help have not an inch of Chavez skills, but more than his hatred. Then again you need to understand that the speech was not meant for you or me, it was meant for the chavismo rank and file that is getting harder and harder to emote. And also to those inside chavismo that are refusing to follow the Cuban cue as burped out by Maduro.

I think the performance was pitiful and I doubt that Maduro got much traction with it. It is clear that his objective is to muzzle any opposition to his rule, and not only the democratic one. That Cabello screamed and cheered is simply beyond my understanding as he is one of the targets of the proposed law. I also doubt that trying to blame all of the shortcomings of 14 years of Chavez and 10 months of Maduro on anyone but themselves really does not work much today.  I know, I know, the Venezuelan electorate has demonstrated ample stupidity and venality in the last decade but I am going to remind you the stuff that you can fool all of the time some of the people, some of the time all of the people but never all of the people all of the time. And when I write ALL I mean the group that voted for Chavez in 2000.

What happened tonight was indeed a declaration of war but we are not sure against whom, and for what objective. In fact, I am not sure whether Maduro knows.

Note: Maduro was abundant in his insults and reproaches but we still does not know anything about the specifics of his request.....

Wednesday, 7 August 2013

What happened today: the post-Chavez regime digs in and scales up repression

Certainly today's headline is the Venezuelan High Court, TSJ, emitting one of its most shameful decisions ever (and the competition is stiff). But three other events today are equally telling and all put together are true reasons to worry.
Gladys Gutierrez,
the new chavismo head bitch, dye job and all...

Let's start with the headline. The TSJ had to make a decision on the challenge to the election of last April. The problem it faced is that any decision that would imply an actual revision of voting conditions for last April would without a doubt open a can of worms. There were already two clearly established electoral irregularities that did not require lengthy study: people accompanied forcibly to vote, on video, and the lists of people "dead" that did vote. Those two, by themselves, were enough to erase the "vote advantage" of Maduro in April and examination of the other claims would reveal that Maduro lost. The TSJ, formed by regime's place holders who simply sign decisions written by political agents, were in an impossible situation: accepting to review the challenges was opening the door for proving the illegitimacy of Maduro; refusing to review the challenges was tantamount to recognize that fraud had taken place. They chose a variation of the second, which is that the 10 electoral challenges were ill written and groundless, thus inadmissible for examination. The 10 challenges! As if all lawyers of the opposition were equally incompetent! As if the videos and death roll did not exist! As if what international observers reported on April 14 was misguided!

But that was not all with the TSJ. It decided to fine Capriles for slandering the TSJ and sent the challenge dossier to the prosecutors office to investigate further and see if other criminal charges could be advanced against Capriles. Now, this is exceedingly serious because it is not only a direct attempt at freedom of expression but it offers the regime a precedent for a new repression tool.  What Capriles is accused and condemned before trial (he is already fined!) is to have criticized the TSJ decisions of January and March that gave an unfair advantage to Maduro.  If Capriles is fined then this blogger also should be, and thousands of journalists, lawyers, OpEd columnists, etc, etc... who have stated the obvious, that the TSJ decision of proclaim Maduro sitting president for the electoral campaign was a violation of the constitution as only an "elected" sitting president can enjoy that benefit. This is extremely grave because now any critic of any institution of the state can be attacked by that one as defamation, terrorism and what not.

If this was not enough there are two more items to note. This morning one of the right hand of Capriles apartment was searched at 6 AM. Oscar Perez is accused on nebulous connections with Mardo, because they exchanged e-mails or something.... At this time I still cannot find a good account of the why of the case, besides him being one of the key guys of Capriles for Miranda. The timing is certainly interesting: Capriles and his people have been served notice, they are going to be hounded. And the rest of us if we support him, I presume.

But the signal of intensified repression and the reinforcing of the thugs group in power come from inside chavismo itself. Not only there will be no primary nor discussion over the mayor candidates inside chavismo but we learned that ALREADY 33 outgoing mayors will not be allowed to go for reëlection and are demanded to support their appointed wanna-be successors. Stalinist purge stand trial light version for our times.

Future narco mayor's brother?
And it is not over as all the candidates have yet to be announced.  If there are flash in the pans in the new nominees to districts that are more than likely to be lost by chavismo, it also happens that mayors of safe districts are also given the boot (1). For example in Vargas mayor, the current holder, which I have reliable witness of his particularly corrupt administration, has been booted. Alexis Toledo will be replaced by General Carlos Alcala Cordones. Who is this general, for those of you new to this game?  He is the brother of Cliver Alcala Cordones. This one has already been featured unfavorably in this blog, but what is the most damning is that he is in the DEA/US lists of Venezuelan involved in international drug traffic. Imagine that this just retiring general, but excessively connected with the thuggiest part of the regime, will be controlling the district with the main port and airport of Venezuela, and surely will decide what military is named to control these installations, an officer that will report in all likelihood only to Cliver, or whomever Cliver reports to in Cuba or at Cabello's office.....

I guess that by now the reader will have guessed what is the conclusion of this entry: the regime has decided to intensify its repression. Again, its inability to deal with the economic crisis and its decreasing polls are pushing it to abandon any pretense and serve notice to the opposition, external or internal, that the days of "dissent" are over and that we are moving toward a more classical form of dictatorship.

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1) It is necessary to remind the reader that in a XXI century dictatorship what really matters is the control of money and justice. Thus the regime may allow the opposition to control though elections a few districts that are going to be neutered anyway. What matters for the regime is the control of key districts like those with airport and harbors, military bases, etc...

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Added later. William Neuman of the NYT just out with his piece. I am not impressed, and I merely cite it so you know you need to read blogs to know the whole story....ut I truly think

Added later 2. I realize some will complain I did not write about "what next?". But we need to be serious and think this one carefully through. Let me sleep it over.

Errata. When writing this entry I got misled by one of the links I read into confusing Cliver with Carlos Alcala Cordones. They are brothers together in the army but Carlos is not on the DEA list, it is Cliver. Even though it is Cliver who is the unmasked thug it is hard to think that his brother is not somewhat involved in the "business", or at least with the thugs of the regime on non drug related activities. So I have not changed much the paragraph on them, just corrected for names and explained the relationship. It is up to Carlos, if he is elected mayor, to prove me wrong.