On November first Nicolas Maduro announced that Christmas had started and he went as far as already lightening up the traditional cross on the Avila mountain which is normally turned on December 1. Well, since then he did his utmost to wreck the Christmas of joy he promised in spite of shortages, crime and what not. After what happened this week, he has definitely wrecked Christmas for all, without possible redemption by December 24.
The news of today are dramatic, and even tragic as there is at least one dead protester/looter. At this point people are hungry and frustrated enough so the line between looter and protester is easily crossed.
Reports of looting and protests from all around Venezuela came in. They included even the looting of banks in the belief that the regime kept inside the new bills that are not appearing anywhere. And that is the crux of the problem, the regime has not made available the proposed new bills as it was taken away all the ones that were the blood line of a wrecked economy.
For your understanding. A large portion of Venezuelan everyday economy is run through cash transactions, in particular outside of Caracas. There is a very large sector of the population that does not hold a real job and do not even have a savings account. And even if they have one, they probably do not have an ATM card (not that this matters much as ATM are not delivering bills these days). And in many small towns and villages there may not even be a bank, and if they have electronic payment points those are limited to very few stores and do not work well due to the distance and bad communications with rerouters and the like.
As a consequence of that a large chunk of the population did not deposit their 100 banknotes because they had nowhere to deposit them. They had to wait for today when the banknote exchange would officially start at the state owned banks and the Central Bank. But it did not happen and the population were furious when the only thing offered, if at all, was a certificate of deposit to be honored when the new bills would arrive. How would these people buy food? Take the bus? Buy something for their child's fever? Even less, prepare for Christmas? No wonder we had serious stuff happening all through the day (I re tweeted some, you can find them on my time line on the right).
What is quite amazing is how tone deaf the regime has been. Last night Maduro pushed his chutzpah at reducing the number of days allowed for exchange at the Central Bank, probably assuming that most people had deposited. It is simply amazing that a government of "el pueblo" ignores the real life conditions of that "el pueblo". But tonight we learned that in spite of Maduro words the Central Bank will open this week end... We'll see, and at any rate in an unsafe area of Caracas at 10 PM people were in line at the Central Bank building. Also, additional proof of the regime utter mess is announcing that the subway would be free which is like applying a small bandage on a large open broken bleeding leg.
To finish this post, there is no point in dwelling on how fucked up the regime is, how lost Christmas are, you just need to watch the news or read twitter to understand the magnitude of the disaster. Journalists are having a field day with a furious population that has unusually harsh words against Maduro. Let's instead try to perceive why the regime took such an idiotic, ill planned measure.
From what I can gather, the leftist economic counselors of Maduro, from Cuba and Spain Podemos, suggested that a spiraling black market rate of the dollar could be countered by merely reducing the monetary mass. That simplistic of a theory is believed, ignoring that the structural inflation of Venezuela is its lack of production due to a decade and a half of wrong headed economic decisions. To which you may add internal chavista infighting where a gang was willing to risk such a disaster in order to punish another gang. There were probably other motivations such as increasing control over the populace by making them more dependent on the government by the mere fact of monetary scarcity, so to speak. Indeed there was a tiny grain of truth in it. Incorporating the new higher denomination bills would have been a sudden increase in monetary mass without support, and hence accrued inflation. But the solution was a slow incorporation as the old bills were removed. Not what happened.
So why did the government act so brutally at possibly the very worst time? This is were the conspiracy theories take hold. Some say that the crazy measures may have been ignored by those who knew better in order to speed up the end of Maduro. Others, that Maduro felt that by doing such a change was an irresistible way to show resolve and vision. The border mafias could be accused, The conspiratorial NGO treachery could be advanced with hoards of 100 bills in Switzerland vaults, etc. The nincompoopier the better. While at the same time slowing down inflation long enough for, say, a snap election advantage.
I do not know whether inflation will be stopped, My guess is that December inflation instead of being 30% may end up being a mere 20%, only to roar back in January. The black market rate did indeed dropped by half but that is no surprise. There was a speculative component to it. But what Maduro cannot stop is that there are Colombians that need to buy bolivars to pay for their businesses inside Venezuela and as such they need to sell Pesos even though nobody right now has the cash for them. Hence the temporary drop in the black market quotes. But just you wait. That the black market rate is still the double of what it was two months ago is an early sign of failure.
Had Maduro listened to any one else than the commie hacks that surround him, he would have been told that as long as the lingering structural causes of inflation were not dealt with it the only thing he could get through crunching monetary mass was a brief, very brief lull in inflation. But never an end to it. That and the hubris of wanting to be in control of a general situation that has escaped his hands explains while he took such a gamble that even if well prepared would not have turned out well. Instead it brought upon his regime a new disaster and probably the loss of a significant chunk of whatever support he may have still had.
Now let's see if the opposition can cash in that mess.
Showing posts with label repression. Show all posts
Showing posts with label repression. Show all posts
Friday, 16 December 2016
Thursday, 22 September 2016
Options against the dictatorship
I am happy about yesterday annulment of the Recall Election. I know, it is perverse but I have my reasons.
First, there is no need to discuss anymore the dictatorial nature of the regime. Under Chavez there were elections at any turn. Now, there will not be elections, not even for dog catcher. The last argument that chavismo could use internationally "we never lost the boatload of elections we do" only works if you have regular elections.
The consequence of this is that any opposition group that does not call the regime for its true nature will lose quickly its supporters. These simply will fail to understand how faced with the truth their "leaders" do not react more assertively. I agree that increased polarization is dangerous, but at this point, what else can we lose?
Second, as a consequence from the above, the opposition alliance MUD needs to purge itself of its wishy washy elements. Either you support the regime (silence counts), or you oppose it. Again, dictatorial regimes can only be dethroned through unity (or foreign disaster like invasion). See the examples of Chile where all allied against Pinochet. Or even Mexico when all rallied behind the right wing PAN to kick out the eternal PRI and its "perfect" dictatorship. Never mind the exit of Fujimori where the unity of the opposition behind Toledo allowed international sanctions to be effective.
Third, and surprising, any negotiation to get out of the crisis is now more likely to be successful if the opposition unifies better, becomes more assertive. By blocking any election the regime in fact traps itself into a repression must that is not acceptable today in Latin America, at a time where even the Castros are starting to be questioned. Through negotiation we may not get quick regime change but a true negotiation which includes a real progressive release of the tools of power by the narco regime may be a better outcome for the country than ousting suddenly a corrupt elite that will immediately sabotage whatever the incoming administration will try. One reason why some inside the opposition are not as assertive as others is that they simply do not want to deal with the mess.
[NOTE: I am painfully aware that Venezuela is a neutered country. The sacrifices seen in Chile or Peru are not going to happen here. There are too many of us that can only be deranged for a looting party. There is a perfect French word without direct translation to characterize what I think of the bulk of the Venezuelan population: veule. a mix of spineless and coward. And I include there those that are keyboard warriors, calling for all sorts of action from the MUD that they have little intentions to lead themselves. Never mind the chavista colectivos who only attack under pay and military protection. Certainly there are steel soul heroes like Lopez but the indignation only goes so far.]
In front of all this what are the options?
It is time for the MUD to put its neck forward. It has been 24 hours since the CNE did what was foretold. Last night the only minimally acceptable answer for the MUD was "We are not accepting this. We knew it was coming and we have plans. We will not reveal them now because we needed first the details to complete them. Tomorrow we will tell you".
We had to wait a couple of hours until finally someone said something without any further immediate perspective. In short, the MUD is not sure what to do. I assume, hope, they have an idea, that the delay is part of a strategy.
Clearly, if the MUD does not react we are in for a full Maduro term with utter destruction of the country. Never mind that the regime will use the two years left to destroy physically the opposition and plan for a totally fraudulent presidential election in December 2018. Or later, as the crisis is an open door for all sort of excuses.
Today, for good measure the high court TSJ annulled yet another key vote from the National Assembly. And yet this is where the resistance comes from. The National Assembly needs to vote the illegality of the regime, just as the regime decreed its irrelevance. How to do that? A few things, in no particular order.
Refuse to discuss the budget. Once this one is passed by a TSJ fiat, vote a resolution that any lender is going at its own risk, that the Assembly will not recognize debts contracted through that budget that are not duly monitored. Bankrupt the regime. You may say that the propaganda of the regime will put the blame of the famine on the opposition but I doubt it at this point. And the MUD can always say that they refuse to give money to thieves.
Reduce taxes, in particular sales tax and see how the regime can finance itself.
Claim article 350 of the constitution and start an organized campaign of civil disobedience. The beauty of that is that you do not need to obey the TSJ anymore.
Vote the destitution of the latest TSJ appointment as illegal and announce that the rulings do not need to be followed anymore by anyone in the country.
Vote the destitution of the current CNE board. That it will delay future elections? At this point who cares!
Etc.
There are means that can be acceptable for the international community while the regime would be either pushed to capitulate or become a new Cuba.
But for this you need a unified opposition willing to face down the regime and stand the risks that come with such a fight. I do not see it, or at least not the unity required for this. Nor the vision.
I hope to be corrected, to be proven dead wrong.
First, there is no need to discuss anymore the dictatorial nature of the regime. Under Chavez there were elections at any turn. Now, there will not be elections, not even for dog catcher. The last argument that chavismo could use internationally "we never lost the boatload of elections we do" only works if you have regular elections.
The consequence of this is that any opposition group that does not call the regime for its true nature will lose quickly its supporters. These simply will fail to understand how faced with the truth their "leaders" do not react more assertively. I agree that increased polarization is dangerous, but at this point, what else can we lose?
Second, as a consequence from the above, the opposition alliance MUD needs to purge itself of its wishy washy elements. Either you support the regime (silence counts), or you oppose it. Again, dictatorial regimes can only be dethroned through unity (or foreign disaster like invasion). See the examples of Chile where all allied against Pinochet. Or even Mexico when all rallied behind the right wing PAN to kick out the eternal PRI and its "perfect" dictatorship. Never mind the exit of Fujimori where the unity of the opposition behind Toledo allowed international sanctions to be effective.
Third, and surprising, any negotiation to get out of the crisis is now more likely to be successful if the opposition unifies better, becomes more assertive. By blocking any election the regime in fact traps itself into a repression must that is not acceptable today in Latin America, at a time where even the Castros are starting to be questioned. Through negotiation we may not get quick regime change but a true negotiation which includes a real progressive release of the tools of power by the narco regime may be a better outcome for the country than ousting suddenly a corrupt elite that will immediately sabotage whatever the incoming administration will try. One reason why some inside the opposition are not as assertive as others is that they simply do not want to deal with the mess.
[NOTE: I am painfully aware that Venezuela is a neutered country. The sacrifices seen in Chile or Peru are not going to happen here. There are too many of us that can only be deranged for a looting party. There is a perfect French word without direct translation to characterize what I think of the bulk of the Venezuelan population: veule. a mix of spineless and coward. And I include there those that are keyboard warriors, calling for all sorts of action from the MUD that they have little intentions to lead themselves. Never mind the chavista colectivos who only attack under pay and military protection. Certainly there are steel soul heroes like Lopez but the indignation only goes so far.]
In front of all this what are the options?
It is time for the MUD to put its neck forward. It has been 24 hours since the CNE did what was foretold. Last night the only minimally acceptable answer for the MUD was "We are not accepting this. We knew it was coming and we have plans. We will not reveal them now because we needed first the details to complete them. Tomorrow we will tell you".
We had to wait a couple of hours until finally someone said something without any further immediate perspective. In short, the MUD is not sure what to do. I assume, hope, they have an idea, that the delay is part of a strategy.
Clearly, if the MUD does not react we are in for a full Maduro term with utter destruction of the country. Never mind that the regime will use the two years left to destroy physically the opposition and plan for a totally fraudulent presidential election in December 2018. Or later, as the crisis is an open door for all sort of excuses.
Today, for good measure the high court TSJ annulled yet another key vote from the National Assembly. And yet this is where the resistance comes from. The National Assembly needs to vote the illegality of the regime, just as the regime decreed its irrelevance. How to do that? A few things, in no particular order.
Refuse to discuss the budget. Once this one is passed by a TSJ fiat, vote a resolution that any lender is going at its own risk, that the Assembly will not recognize debts contracted through that budget that are not duly monitored. Bankrupt the regime. You may say that the propaganda of the regime will put the blame of the famine on the opposition but I doubt it at this point. And the MUD can always say that they refuse to give money to thieves.
Reduce taxes, in particular sales tax and see how the regime can finance itself.
Claim article 350 of the constitution and start an organized campaign of civil disobedience. The beauty of that is that you do not need to obey the TSJ anymore.
Vote the destitution of the latest TSJ appointment as illegal and announce that the rulings do not need to be followed anymore by anyone in the country.
Vote the destitution of the current CNE board. That it will delay future elections? At this point who cares!
Etc.
There are means that can be acceptable for the international community while the regime would be either pushed to capitulate or become a new Cuba.
But for this you need a unified opposition willing to face down the regime and stand the risks that come with such a fight. I do not see it, or at least not the unity required for this. Nor the vision.
I hope to be corrected, to be proven dead wrong.
Tuesday, 20 September 2016
There we are not, at freedom
Long time I did not write a summary of what is going on. As usual there is a big yawn along as everything changes fast but everything is, in the end, the same: a gang of thugs will do whatever it is possible to retain power because they know what awaits them once they lose. Nevermind the culture of violence that goes with such mentality where only brute force is the argument. Negotiation? Only to gain time until I finally find a way to screw you once and for all.
This been said things are not going any better for the regime. True, the vice president and the communist minister of economy are saying that lines are lesser, that we are turning around a corner, that imports are on the rise since January, etc. The reality is that indeed lines are lesser. See, supplies are lesser so there is no need to stand in line for stuff that will not come in. Shopping on weekends for groceries is great: since there are no deliveries anymore on Saturdays then what is left is for the people that have money enough to buy what the hoi polloi cannot afford. For the first time in years I am hitting again grocery stores on Saturdays (Sundays are, well, empty no matter what). As for the commie minister (he used to be a PCV member before jumping ship to Chavez), someone in his office should point to him that historically January has always been the lowest month for importation since the country is out of business until mid January. No dockers....
Politically the big fight remains the Recall Election before January 10 2017 since after that date a chased Maduro can name his successor, no election needed for the next two years. As I suspected long ago, it is not going to happen no matter what the opposition does. Too much at stake for the regime. Yet the good fight must be done in the off chance that a division inside chavismo allows in the end for the recall election; or, better, we have Maduro resign before January 10 (which I think is what will happen if chavismo decides not to go full metal jacket on repression).
The strategy of the "legal" chavismo (and institutional military?) is to wait as long as possible in the vain hope that oil prices go up just enough to resupply a little bit food shelves and thus make electoral defeat not a fact. Since production is not promoted and that economic repression is getting worse, I do not see how can this happen even if within one year oil were to go back to, say, 80 a barrel. But chavismo is entitled to dream too.
Meanwhile the "illegal" chavismo (and narko military?), the one that does not give a crap about appearances and that wants not only to get rid of the opposition but also of timorate chavistas, is forging ahead. The packed high court (never a dissenting opinion in the TSJ) has annulled anything the National Assembly does. The problem is that we need to vote next year budget and the constitution is quite clear in that it can only be approved through a National Assembly vote. We are sure that the TSJ will write something to annul yet a new sector of the constitution which for all practical purposes is only good enough to replace scarce toilet paper. The final head-on conflict must happen in the next weeks as the to-do list of TSJ before the end of the year is 1) annul the recall election proceeding 2) decide the budget 3) bar the nomination of a new electoral board 4) support legally repression and, why not, 5) disolve parliament without electing a new one.
While chavismo is desperately establishing a dictatorship without any popular support things outside are not improving for them either. The non aligned summit of last week was a fiasco as only a dozen of the 100+ head of state showed up. And we are talking here of Mugabe, Castro and other undesirable ones that have zero credentials on democracy. No luster from the summit except perhaps for some lumpen chavismo, part of it being carried to a refuge like tent city nearby the luxury hotels to provide Maduro with the adoring crowds he needs to prove his alleged popularity. Indeed, since Maduro was pot banged live in Margarita Villa Rosa community the regime takes no chances, from jailing as many as possible to bring its own sycophants along.
And I will pass on MERCOSUR giving an ultimatum to Maduro...
Thus repression keeps apace. What else could the regime do? We learned this early week alone that now Leopoldo Lopez is deprived of any light at night in his jail, that they search him and force him to undress uncounted number of time, etc... all enough to deserve for the regime a boat load of human rights crimes trials against the regime. But the best example of regime fear and desperation came today.
Primero Justicia hired three guys to do a video on the situation and against repression. The army quickly jailed the three producers on treason charges and put the three civilians at the disposition of a military tribunal. So there you are (while the leadership of Primero Justicia is so far untouched by the army...)
A short summary of what happens in the video.
The girl tends to her sick mother. She looks at the empty fridge and texts her father to tell him that she is off to stand in line because she cannot find the medicine for her Mom and that there is no food at home. It just happens that her father is in the army and getting ready to repress a student march. The daughter reminds her father that the people he is about to repress suffer of the same problems that they do.
Too close for comfort?
This been said things are not going any better for the regime. True, the vice president and the communist minister of economy are saying that lines are lesser, that we are turning around a corner, that imports are on the rise since January, etc. The reality is that indeed lines are lesser. See, supplies are lesser so there is no need to stand in line for stuff that will not come in. Shopping on weekends for groceries is great: since there are no deliveries anymore on Saturdays then what is left is for the people that have money enough to buy what the hoi polloi cannot afford. For the first time in years I am hitting again grocery stores on Saturdays (Sundays are, well, empty no matter what). As for the commie minister (he used to be a PCV member before jumping ship to Chavez), someone in his office should point to him that historically January has always been the lowest month for importation since the country is out of business until mid January. No dockers....
Politically the big fight remains the Recall Election before January 10 2017 since after that date a chased Maduro can name his successor, no election needed for the next two years. As I suspected long ago, it is not going to happen no matter what the opposition does. Too much at stake for the regime. Yet the good fight must be done in the off chance that a division inside chavismo allows in the end for the recall election; or, better, we have Maduro resign before January 10 (which I think is what will happen if chavismo decides not to go full metal jacket on repression).
The strategy of the "legal" chavismo (and institutional military?) is to wait as long as possible in the vain hope that oil prices go up just enough to resupply a little bit food shelves and thus make electoral defeat not a fact. Since production is not promoted and that economic repression is getting worse, I do not see how can this happen even if within one year oil were to go back to, say, 80 a barrel. But chavismo is entitled to dream too.
Meanwhile the "illegal" chavismo (and narko military?), the one that does not give a crap about appearances and that wants not only to get rid of the opposition but also of timorate chavistas, is forging ahead. The packed high court (never a dissenting opinion in the TSJ) has annulled anything the National Assembly does. The problem is that we need to vote next year budget and the constitution is quite clear in that it can only be approved through a National Assembly vote. We are sure that the TSJ will write something to annul yet a new sector of the constitution which for all practical purposes is only good enough to replace scarce toilet paper. The final head-on conflict must happen in the next weeks as the to-do list of TSJ before the end of the year is 1) annul the recall election proceeding 2) decide the budget 3) bar the nomination of a new electoral board 4) support legally repression and, why not, 5) disolve parliament without electing a new one.
While chavismo is desperately establishing a dictatorship without any popular support things outside are not improving for them either. The non aligned summit of last week was a fiasco as only a dozen of the 100+ head of state showed up. And we are talking here of Mugabe, Castro and other undesirable ones that have zero credentials on democracy. No luster from the summit except perhaps for some lumpen chavismo, part of it being carried to a refuge like tent city nearby the luxury hotels to provide Maduro with the adoring crowds he needs to prove his alleged popularity. Indeed, since Maduro was pot banged live in Margarita Villa Rosa community the regime takes no chances, from jailing as many as possible to bring its own sycophants along.
And I will pass on MERCOSUR giving an ultimatum to Maduro...
Thus repression keeps apace. What else could the regime do? We learned this early week alone that now Leopoldo Lopez is deprived of any light at night in his jail, that they search him and force him to undress uncounted number of time, etc... all enough to deserve for the regime a boat load of human rights crimes trials against the regime. But the best example of regime fear and desperation came today.
Primero Justicia hired three guys to do a video on the situation and against repression. The army quickly jailed the three producers on treason charges and put the three civilians at the disposition of a military tribunal. So there you are (while the leadership of Primero Justicia is so far untouched by the army...)
.RT | ANTES QUE LO CENSUREN - El vídeo que tiene al Gobierno de Maduro desatando una ola de persecución y arrestos en Venezuela (1/3) pic.twitter.com/AHhN5Eae7V— Alberto Rodríguez (@AlbertoRT51) 20 de septiembre de 2016
A short summary of what happens in the video.
The girl tends to her sick mother. She looks at the empty fridge and texts her father to tell him that she is off to stand in line because she cannot find the medicine for her Mom and that there is no food at home. It just happens that her father is in the army and getting ready to repress a student march. The daughter reminds her father that the people he is about to repress suffer of the same problems that they do.
Too close for comfort?
Thursday, 1 September 2016
The opposition MUD alliance great political victory
There is no way around it. Today the opposition political umbrella alliance MUD scored a brilliant victory. Here is why.
It resisted all sorts of terrible pressures to prevent the meeting in Caracas, from blockade of people going to Caracas (Sometimes even robbed by soldiers) to the jailing of half the leadership of Voluntad Popular (And some of other parties for good measure).
In spite of all of this pressure it managed to hold at least three major gatherings in Caracas. The safe one where I was in Cafetal/Chiao. The less safe but of expected higher output along the Miranda Avenue. The definitely riskier one from Western ex Chavez-strongholds which gave us the better video of the day when a small group of forlorn red shirted creeps could do nothing against thousands walking in white.
The pictures are clear, a flood of people reaching at least a million walked. Probably more than in 2002 with way more threats than then.
In many places inside Venezuela rallies were held. Even one in New York Saint Patrick.
In spite of all fears the rally/marches run smoothly except for some localized incidents that for all that I know where caused by undercover chavista agents.
But the best evidence is the reaction of the regime. We had all sorts of desperate counter propaganda clearly destined to the remaining lumpen chavismo, because charitably I cannot find another way to express it.
Of course, the regime called the rally a failure, but claiming that there were at most 30,000 people when the whole world is putting, sometimes in front pages, specific local shots that by themselves show more than that number? Diosdado Cabello went one further by posting a possibly altered picture of a Chavez rally at Bolívar Avenue in 2012 as it were today when not even the cameras of state TV could hide the low turnout of Maduro there this afternoon (with a heavy dose of light brown shirted militia to fatten up attendance). What has been more amazing is that in spite of a quick refutal of the fraudulent picture many governors and chavistas posted it as true, even in far distant Bogota where ex mayor Gustavo Petro made once again a fool of himself talking about Venezuela.
But the most telling moment of the opposition success was when Maduro announced that he was planning to lift parliamentary immunity so as to put straight to jail any opposition member he does not like. As in all one must assume. Assorted with truly vulgar insults that should be censored on TV. The democratic option is not in chavismo plans.
There is no arguing the success of the MUD today. The question now is what next.
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I am not putting links for lack of time tonight but a lot of it can be found in my time line on tweeter
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I am not putting links for lack of time tonight but a lot of it can be found in my time line on tweeter
Tuesday, 30 August 2016
Kalends of September for chavismo, or so it seems
The regime has made its business to turn into a fateful day the vast opposition rally planned for next Thursday September 1st. The regime has a lot to lose on that day, but it made sure that its losses would be greater than necessary. And, personally, at this point I do not see how the regime could rake any gain.
It all started when the opposition tired of waiting for a Recall Election date decided to mount a massive protest against Maduro's regime, that is, demanding his exit as soon as possible. Of course, the chosen way is to hold a Recall Election before January 10 2017. The opposition to Maduro has nothing to gain from any unconstitutional settlement of the political crisis: all polls give the opposition soaring numbers since last December stunning electoral victory. Besides, even if the opposition did not enjoy a 70+ against Maduro and wanted to do a stunt, how would it do that? The Venezuelan opposition has been deprived of arms, newspapers, TV, and even of its politicians as many are in jail.
The regime knows all of this, certainly. It also can read polls. And it knows that outside of the likes of Cuba or Nicaragua it has no international support left, at least of the kind that would speak favorably of Maduro. Even supposed allies like Putin or Correa are, well, rather discreet in their praise, if any.
The battle for the regime is lost. They are unwilling to change the economic system, to open up. As such the economy will keep spiraling down and soon there will be outright bouts of near starvation with all the political mess that comes along. The laws of the economy are finally speaking up in Venezuela and there is no hope that the only economic policy left for the regime, oil at 80 USD a barrel, will happen in the near future. And never mind its personnel as Venezuela is the only country we know of where its interior and security minister cannot travel out of the country least Interpol grabs him and sends him to a trial in the US. Needless to recall the awaited fate of other regime's luminaries.
Faced with what is predicted to be the largest anti regime rally since 2002/2003 the regime decided against the wise move: let it happen and ignore it the best you can, using this as a demonstration that democracy is not dead in Venezuela. Instead it has chosen the worst way to prove that this is indeed a dictatorship.
All sorts of means to block the rally are attempted, too long to list. Here follows the main ones.
- Threats of all type, verbal menaces from higher up in the regime
- Outright fascist firing of public employees that dare criticize in any way the regime's results (examples here, here and here)
- Forbidding Al Jazeera journalists from entering the country to cover the events
- Forbidding any private flight, even drones, until September 5, so that there would be no evidence of the large turnout, as if roof tops were not enough to establish that anyway. And it does not matter as the opposition announced it will fly drones anyway (so I can illustrate for you the mood)
- Blocking access to Caracas for the possibly 100+ thousand people that will show up from all parts of the country
- After months of absence reopen food fairs like Mercal so as to try to divert folks from the march to go and get some of the scarce food. Though it is not clear if it is just counter propaganda planted by the regime.
- Call for its own counter rally downtown Caracas to block the opposition possible march there
- Promises of all sorts for Caracas, all to be done by Christmas
- All sorts of conspiracy theories as to the opposition wanting to reedit April 11 2002 (from the hands of the Empire in the North, of course)
Etc...
But the worst assault has been on Voluntad Popular, the political party of Leopoldo Lopez, the cause celèbre of political prisoners. For the last week there has been an onslaught against the leadership of the party, from accusing the mayor of El Hatillo of smuggling arms, to take San Cristobal mayor from his sick bed in the middle of the night to send him to jail, to outright kidnapping of militants. The vindictiveness of the large concerted attack on Voluntad Popular is simply amazing. Other political parties are not buying: they know they are next. And the OAS least raised its tone as its secretary has issued, in Spanish for now, a long letter which resumes all fo the above and can be read as a stern warning against the regime.
We must wonder what is the regime seeking. Can it be so clumsy? Is there some master plan behind?
I am afraid that the regime seeks an act of violence that it can provoke easily itself by sending under cover to the rallies Thursday delinquents that will pretend to pin on the opposition a violence that the regime will have started itself. That would explain all of the conspiracy theories blurted these past few days and the arrest of Voluntad Popular leadership which will presumably bear the brunt of the accusation. The ridicule for the regime's cause that Voluntad Popular would have committed the crimes AFTER their incarceration does not seem to have been considered. But that is not the point.
A desperate regime is building a narrative to justify its September repression in the eyes of the followers it still has. In short, the regime is preparing itself to cut loose from the civilized world and drive into oblivion the Venezuelan populations just as the Cuban one was pushed down to nothing within months of the arrival of Fidel in 1958. All seems to point out to that strategy, from ignoring the OAS to put in jail Voluntad Popular leadership, the most active in the streets, the one that apparently must be threatening the most chavismo.
Let's not forget that the loudest voices inside chavismo are the ones most likely to go to jail as soon as they set foot outside of the country. They have nothing to lose anymore. Hence...
Which does not mean they will succeed and as they fail, well...
It all started when the opposition tired of waiting for a Recall Election date decided to mount a massive protest against Maduro's regime, that is, demanding his exit as soon as possible. Of course, the chosen way is to hold a Recall Election before January 10 2017. The opposition to Maduro has nothing to gain from any unconstitutional settlement of the political crisis: all polls give the opposition soaring numbers since last December stunning electoral victory. Besides, even if the opposition did not enjoy a 70+ against Maduro and wanted to do a stunt, how would it do that? The Venezuelan opposition has been deprived of arms, newspapers, TV, and even of its politicians as many are in jail.
The regime knows all of this, certainly. It also can read polls. And it knows that outside of the likes of Cuba or Nicaragua it has no international support left, at least of the kind that would speak favorably of Maduro. Even supposed allies like Putin or Correa are, well, rather discreet in their praise, if any.
The battle for the regime is lost. They are unwilling to change the economic system, to open up. As such the economy will keep spiraling down and soon there will be outright bouts of near starvation with all the political mess that comes along. The laws of the economy are finally speaking up in Venezuela and there is no hope that the only economic policy left for the regime, oil at 80 USD a barrel, will happen in the near future. And never mind its personnel as Venezuela is the only country we know of where its interior and security minister cannot travel out of the country least Interpol grabs him and sends him to a trial in the US. Needless to recall the awaited fate of other regime's luminaries.
Faced with what is predicted to be the largest anti regime rally since 2002/2003 the regime decided against the wise move: let it happen and ignore it the best you can, using this as a demonstration that democracy is not dead in Venezuela. Instead it has chosen the worst way to prove that this is indeed a dictatorship.
All sorts of means to block the rally are attempted, too long to list. Here follows the main ones.
- Threats of all type, verbal menaces from higher up in the regime
- Outright fascist firing of public employees that dare criticize in any way the regime's results (examples here, here and here)
- Forbidding Al Jazeera journalists from entering the country to cover the events
- Forbidding any private flight, even drones, until September 5, so that there would be no evidence of the large turnout, as if roof tops were not enough to establish that anyway. And it does not matter as the opposition announced it will fly drones anyway (so I can illustrate for you the mood)
- Blocking access to Caracas for the possibly 100+ thousand people that will show up from all parts of the country
- After months of absence reopen food fairs like Mercal so as to try to divert folks from the march to go and get some of the scarce food. Though it is not clear if it is just counter propaganda planted by the regime.
- Call for its own counter rally downtown Caracas to block the opposition possible march there
- Promises of all sorts for Caracas, all to be done by Christmas
- All sorts of conspiracy theories as to the opposition wanting to reedit April 11 2002 (from the hands of the Empire in the North, of course)
Etc...
But the worst assault has been on Voluntad Popular, the political party of Leopoldo Lopez, the cause celèbre of political prisoners. For the last week there has been an onslaught against the leadership of the party, from accusing the mayor of El Hatillo of smuggling arms, to take San Cristobal mayor from his sick bed in the middle of the night to send him to jail, to outright kidnapping of militants. The vindictiveness of the large concerted attack on Voluntad Popular is simply amazing. Other political parties are not buying: they know they are next. And the OAS least raised its tone as its secretary has issued, in Spanish for now, a long letter which resumes all fo the above and can be read as a stern warning against the regime.
We must wonder what is the regime seeking. Can it be so clumsy? Is there some master plan behind?
I am afraid that the regime seeks an act of violence that it can provoke easily itself by sending under cover to the rallies Thursday delinquents that will pretend to pin on the opposition a violence that the regime will have started itself. That would explain all of the conspiracy theories blurted these past few days and the arrest of Voluntad Popular leadership which will presumably bear the brunt of the accusation. The ridicule for the regime's cause that Voluntad Popular would have committed the crimes AFTER their incarceration does not seem to have been considered. But that is not the point.
A desperate regime is building a narrative to justify its September repression in the eyes of the followers it still has. In short, the regime is preparing itself to cut loose from the civilized world and drive into oblivion the Venezuelan populations just as the Cuban one was pushed down to nothing within months of the arrival of Fidel in 1958. All seems to point out to that strategy, from ignoring the OAS to put in jail Voluntad Popular leadership, the most active in the streets, the one that apparently must be threatening the most chavismo.
Let's not forget that the loudest voices inside chavismo are the ones most likely to go to jail as soon as they set foot outside of the country. They have nothing to lose anymore. Hence...
Which does not mean they will succeed and as they fail, well...
Saturday, 11 June 2016
Understanding the political moment
I have been back for two weeks now and events are just unfolding too fast for me to write about them, considering the depression that arises from coming back to what has become a hell hole. Let's just order our thoughts together, shall we?
One way is to look at the main hard data and its effects. The reader on its own will be able to draw the general picture after the fact.
Jail for you
The driving force in this mega crisis is that under the concept of world justice and transparency a few dozens of the higher up in the regime know they will never be able to find peace and solace once out of office. Their fate for them is jail, tomorrow, in a decade, it does not matter. If they do not die first they will end up in jail. They know that.
See, they have stolen too much money, abused too many human rights, played too much on the drug traffic front. They are doomed and thus under no circumstance they can surrender power. Period. They will do what it takes to remain in office. Whatever. Second period.
I am not asking you to understand this, I am asking you to get this. If you do not get the implications of the above you cannot make sense of what is going on in Venezuela these days. Might as well stop reading now.
No food while we wait for oil price to rise
The awful economic crisis that is now open comment world wide has not its origin in the low oil prices. After all Venezuela has had downfalls in oil price before and we managed. For that matter the first two years of Chavez rule had oil price way lower than they are today and yet shelves were full of food and he did not need to create food distribution systems like those of today which reek of corruption and political apartheid while being ineffective, even in their political goals.
The real, the only reason for the food and medicine shortages today has been a more than dismal management of the economy over the last 17 years, not to mention its willful destruction to the profit of the new corrupt oligarchies of military origin. The productive apparatus of the country has been destroyed through a system of price controls, political harassment to business and corrupt importations to sabotage local production. Today, even if magically all restrictions were lifted, if security was magically restored to producers and workers, it would take at least 5 years for Venezuela to be able to insure food for its people at subsistance level. Period.
There is a clear understanding now that this situation can only be solved with a removal from office of the current leadership. The proposed means may differ from the opposition to radical left of Marea Socialisa, but all agree that as long as Maduro is in office he is unable/unwilling to take any real measure to face down the crisis. In fact, Maduro's political faction is trying to use the crisis as a way to control the country by deciding who gets food. The social explosion risks are worrying the army while at the same time they risk to wipe out the remnants of the private sector that will be needed to rebuild.
The saddest thing is that the regime puts its salvation on a return to high oil prices, which are at best for late 2017 when it would be too late for the country. But see if they care.
International paralysis
What is complicating the crisis is the inability of the rest of the world to come together to put adequate pressure on the regime. Or to support it for that matter.
During his tenure with a deep oil check book that Chavez had no problem using cash for corruption and waste on political patronage overseas, Thus we have, for example, small shitty island nations of the Caribbean which have no problem letting Venezuelans starve for their petty gains (note that neither Europe of the US have the will to help and put pressure on these islands, hypocrisy everywhere).
But countries that should know better are mired in contradictions. Let's start with the US which amazingly think that helping a Castro transition is less costly in the long run that to put pressure on the Venezuelan regime. Why? Because the US hopes that Venezuela will foot the bill for Cuba's regeneration. That this, a now turned idiotic policy may create two problems for the US where it had only one. This seems not to flicker in the outgoing administration who seems now resigned to let whoever is sworn in in January 2017 deal with it.
That or the US business hopes to pick clean the bones of Venezuela after the debacle. All is possible.
Another pathetic case is the fast unraveling of Argentin's Mauricio Macri support for the Venezuelan cause. 6 months ago Macri was dancing on his election victory stage with Leopoldo Lopez wife Lilian Tintori. Now for reasons that are not clear to any one, and probably not even to Macri, it is Argentina who seems to sabotage any bite in possible OAS resolutions/sanctions against the regime. Whatever reasons Macri may have, they are so far failing him badly and he is looking like a fool. Heck, even Susana Malcorra were his mistress in addition to his foreign secretary could not explain the blunders.
Where the voters are
All of this is enough to create a potent crisis brew. But the debacle of the pre-recall election maneuvers was a wake up call for a regime that has grossly overestimated its real support. Actually, make that a dramatic wake up call for a regime that has lost its political flair. Apparently the regime truly thought that in the country of Tascon extortion records, official blackmail and indentured social programs the opposition would have all the trouble of the world to gather 1% of the electorate to sign up for a recall election. It got 8 %. In three days. And could have gotten 20% with a couple more of days and advance notice.
This has been the trigger for the current paranoia. Since early May the regime has realized that they are electorally doomed, for the time being at the very least. No elections whatsoever can be held in what was under Chavez a plebiscitary system. In fact, as far as Maduro is concerned, we probably cannot even have elections for dog-catcher, ever.
All the regime maneuvers since mid May are designed to avoid an election until next year, in particular a Recall Election. In fact the regional elections are probably going to be annulled any time soon as the regime is certain to loose way more than half of the state houses. The Army certainly cannot accept that so many ex-military now turned corrupt governors may be democratically unseated. But I digress.
While the regime finds a way to ease our transition into fully developed election free dictatorship it needs to avoid a Recall Election on Maduro this year. All excuses are valid, even the stupidest ones. I am not going to narrate what the electoral board CNE is doing in detail. Suffice to mention the latest incident where the CNE has voided the signature of 600.000 folks on absurd technicalities. The perversity and outright provocation was clearly underscored by the discovery that many opposition politicians who signed on camera had their signature annulled. Capriles, for one, the main promoter of the recall election, had his form annulled because it was not clear whether the form spelled Maduro or Madoro. You cannot make up things like that. And to add insult to injury Capriles cannot fix the "mistake" while the regime got yet another week prolongation for those who wished to have their signature taken away. And with the Tascon method of blackmail you can be sure that a few are going to blink and revert their name while those who want to add theirs cannot do so.
Prognosis
I personally hope, for charity, that the CNE intention was provocation rather than sloppiness. But it may well carry a steep dose of sloppiness in the methods chosen to void a recall election. The regime feels so cornered, so weak, that it is acting on reflex, on survival instinct. Thus the legality, or even basic common sense of its measures do not matter anymore. We are past the time of fig leaves.
The fact of the matter is that the economic depression has been getting worse and this week we saw major riot trouble in Petare and Catia, two zones which should be, on paper, chavista strongholds. But people are hungry. And I mean, hungry. And no matter what Argentina as a fool, or the shitty Caribbean island states may try, the OAS may be about to apply the Democratic Charter. That or Venezuela being booted out of Mercosur. Whichever comes first, for starters.
The truly big question here is whether the army will accept to pay the price of political repression, the last remaining option for the regime.
Some, like general Zavarce seem ready. He deliberately had his men push Representative Borges toward a crowd of colectivos on the pay roll of Caracas mayor Jorge Rodriguez. They did not kill Borges but they did break his nose, probably for lack of time. All is now in the open on the Thursday assault.
Others like Cliver Alcala are not on board anymore even if his name is linked to narco traffic.
The decision on a recall election rests there, in what the army will decide. And for that matter the decision whether Maduro remains president. See, the problem is not how to remove Maduro, this is actually quite easy once a political agreement is reached and he is made to resign. No election needed. Maduro is not ruling anymore, he is the front man. Thus the problem is truly not how to get rid of Maduro but who to put in his place.
That is the Gordian knot.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional material
Observe the goonery look of the colectivos on chavista payroll. Again, such things cannot be made up. Do not accuse me of profiling!
 |
| L'air du temps: Borges getting his nose broken |
One way is to look at the main hard data and its effects. The reader on its own will be able to draw the general picture after the fact.
Jail for you
The driving force in this mega crisis is that under the concept of world justice and transparency a few dozens of the higher up in the regime know they will never be able to find peace and solace once out of office. Their fate for them is jail, tomorrow, in a decade, it does not matter. If they do not die first they will end up in jail. They know that.
See, they have stolen too much money, abused too many human rights, played too much on the drug traffic front. They are doomed and thus under no circumstance they can surrender power. Period. They will do what it takes to remain in office. Whatever. Second period.
I am not asking you to understand this, I am asking you to get this. If you do not get the implications of the above you cannot make sense of what is going on in Venezuela these days. Might as well stop reading now.
No food while we wait for oil price to rise
The awful economic crisis that is now open comment world wide has not its origin in the low oil prices. After all Venezuela has had downfalls in oil price before and we managed. For that matter the first two years of Chavez rule had oil price way lower than they are today and yet shelves were full of food and he did not need to create food distribution systems like those of today which reek of corruption and political apartheid while being ineffective, even in their political goals.
The real, the only reason for the food and medicine shortages today has been a more than dismal management of the economy over the last 17 years, not to mention its willful destruction to the profit of the new corrupt oligarchies of military origin. The productive apparatus of the country has been destroyed through a system of price controls, political harassment to business and corrupt importations to sabotage local production. Today, even if magically all restrictions were lifted, if security was magically restored to producers and workers, it would take at least 5 years for Venezuela to be able to insure food for its people at subsistance level. Period.
There is a clear understanding now that this situation can only be solved with a removal from office of the current leadership. The proposed means may differ from the opposition to radical left of Marea Socialisa, but all agree that as long as Maduro is in office he is unable/unwilling to take any real measure to face down the crisis. In fact, Maduro's political faction is trying to use the crisis as a way to control the country by deciding who gets food. The social explosion risks are worrying the army while at the same time they risk to wipe out the remnants of the private sector that will be needed to rebuild.
The saddest thing is that the regime puts its salvation on a return to high oil prices, which are at best for late 2017 when it would be too late for the country. But see if they care.
International paralysis
What is complicating the crisis is the inability of the rest of the world to come together to put adequate pressure on the regime. Or to support it for that matter.
During his tenure with a deep oil check book that Chavez had no problem using cash for corruption and waste on political patronage overseas, Thus we have, for example, small shitty island nations of the Caribbean which have no problem letting Venezuelans starve for their petty gains (note that neither Europe of the US have the will to help and put pressure on these islands, hypocrisy everywhere).
But countries that should know better are mired in contradictions. Let's start with the US which amazingly think that helping a Castro transition is less costly in the long run that to put pressure on the Venezuelan regime. Why? Because the US hopes that Venezuela will foot the bill for Cuba's regeneration. That this, a now turned idiotic policy may create two problems for the US where it had only one. This seems not to flicker in the outgoing administration who seems now resigned to let whoever is sworn in in January 2017 deal with it.
That or the US business hopes to pick clean the bones of Venezuela after the debacle. All is possible.
Another pathetic case is the fast unraveling of Argentin's Mauricio Macri support for the Venezuelan cause. 6 months ago Macri was dancing on his election victory stage with Leopoldo Lopez wife Lilian Tintori. Now for reasons that are not clear to any one, and probably not even to Macri, it is Argentina who seems to sabotage any bite in possible OAS resolutions/sanctions against the regime. Whatever reasons Macri may have, they are so far failing him badly and he is looking like a fool. Heck, even Susana Malcorra were his mistress in addition to his foreign secretary could not explain the blunders.
Where the voters are
All of this is enough to create a potent crisis brew. But the debacle of the pre-recall election maneuvers was a wake up call for a regime that has grossly overestimated its real support. Actually, make that a dramatic wake up call for a regime that has lost its political flair. Apparently the regime truly thought that in the country of Tascon extortion records, official blackmail and indentured social programs the opposition would have all the trouble of the world to gather 1% of the electorate to sign up for a recall election. It got 8 %. In three days. And could have gotten 20% with a couple more of days and advance notice.
This has been the trigger for the current paranoia. Since early May the regime has realized that they are electorally doomed, for the time being at the very least. No elections whatsoever can be held in what was under Chavez a plebiscitary system. In fact, as far as Maduro is concerned, we probably cannot even have elections for dog-catcher, ever.
All the regime maneuvers since mid May are designed to avoid an election until next year, in particular a Recall Election. In fact the regional elections are probably going to be annulled any time soon as the regime is certain to loose way more than half of the state houses. The Army certainly cannot accept that so many ex-military now turned corrupt governors may be democratically unseated. But I digress.
While the regime finds a way to ease our transition into fully developed election free dictatorship it needs to avoid a Recall Election on Maduro this year. All excuses are valid, even the stupidest ones. I am not going to narrate what the electoral board CNE is doing in detail. Suffice to mention the latest incident where the CNE has voided the signature of 600.000 folks on absurd technicalities. The perversity and outright provocation was clearly underscored by the discovery that many opposition politicians who signed on camera had their signature annulled. Capriles, for one, the main promoter of the recall election, had his form annulled because it was not clear whether the form spelled Maduro or Madoro. You cannot make up things like that. And to add insult to injury Capriles cannot fix the "mistake" while the regime got yet another week prolongation for those who wished to have their signature taken away. And with the Tascon method of blackmail you can be sure that a few are going to blink and revert their name while those who want to add theirs cannot do so.
Prognosis
I personally hope, for charity, that the CNE intention was provocation rather than sloppiness. But it may well carry a steep dose of sloppiness in the methods chosen to void a recall election. The regime feels so cornered, so weak, that it is acting on reflex, on survival instinct. Thus the legality, or even basic common sense of its measures do not matter anymore. We are past the time of fig leaves.
The fact of the matter is that the economic depression has been getting worse and this week we saw major riot trouble in Petare and Catia, two zones which should be, on paper, chavista strongholds. But people are hungry. And I mean, hungry. And no matter what Argentina as a fool, or the shitty Caribbean island states may try, the OAS may be about to apply the Democratic Charter. That or Venezuela being booted out of Mercosur. Whichever comes first, for starters.
The truly big question here is whether the army will accept to pay the price of political repression, the last remaining option for the regime.
Some, like general Zavarce seem ready. He deliberately had his men push Representative Borges toward a crowd of colectivos on the pay roll of Caracas mayor Jorge Rodriguez. They did not kill Borges but they did break his nose, probably for lack of time. All is now in the open on the Thursday assault.
Others like Cliver Alcala are not on board anymore even if his name is linked to narco traffic.
The decision on a recall election rests there, in what the army will decide. And for that matter the decision whether Maduro remains president. See, the problem is not how to remove Maduro, this is actually quite easy once a political agreement is reached and he is made to resign. No election needed. Maduro is not ruling anymore, he is the front man. Thus the problem is truly not how to get rid of Maduro but who to put in his place.
That is the Gordian knot.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional material
Observe the goonery look of the colectivos on chavista payroll. Again, such things cannot be made up. Do not accuse me of profiling!
Para que se rechace de verdad la violencia y se haga Justicia, 2 de los agresores: Roberto Marcano y Franklin López. pic.twitter.com/xPOaYDqUaP— Julio Borges (@JulioBorges) June 11, 2016
Monday, 23 May 2016
So, are we invaded or not?
One maddening thing about being overseas is dependency on tweeter to try to follow what is really going on in Venezuela. Except for the honorable mention of El País in Spain the rest of the world has, understandably, more important matters to deal with than a suicidal asshole of a country. And yet even French TV, the all news channels that is, find time between the ridiculous "Nuit Debout" with their spoiled trade unions protests and Egyptian mystery planes to cover recent Venezuelan events.
The point here is that no one seems to believe anymore what the regime says. True, there are some like PODEMOS in Spain who unable to hide their past financing by Chavez are still defending the regime or at least remain silent. But the fact of the matter is that Venezuela is an embarrassment for all, for having let it go so far or for having supported it so long. All want it to go away. At least this is the impression I get.
And why would it be otherwise?
Maduro publishes a super-duper emergency decree controlling everything under the sun. The National Assembly turns it down. The high court TSJ declares it constitutional, which it is not, and the way it was turned down by the Assembly was so constitutional that even the TSJ could not directly assail it. So now, for the love of the deity, I am not sure whether the decree is applicable or not. Though apparently there is a state of commotion or something at play.... You tell me.
Saturday the military exercises to defend Venezuela took place. We saw pictures of soldiers? militia? wearing Cuban flags, wielding sticks in lieu of rifles for a gran total of "troops" larger than D-day operations, if we are to believe tweeter wits. Meanwhile no one nowhere reported of any troop concentration unless you count an AWACS doing its routine drug traffic control over the Caribbean as the preparation of massive US Marine landing. If Uribe is raising an mercenary army against Maduro he learned well from the FARC on how to hide it.
But the cherry over the cake of ridicule was added by Maduro himself who with anti invasion military maneuvers, threat of coups, internal commotions, left Saturday to promote scientific and commercial exchanges with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
Huh?
These islands have not much to offer Venezuela, and Venezuela even less back. However Maduro goes there for one and only one reason, to start a campaign to ensure he will retain at least a third of the OAS vote he needs to stop the application of the Democratic Charter on Venezuela. If Jamaica and Trinidad vote for the sanctions the small islands will follow and Venezuela will be an official pariah state. Brazil and Argentina lost there is only some cash left to buy these island votes, cash coming from killing a few Venezuelans from malnutrition and lack of medicine. But who cares?
That much we can understand. Coups, revolt and invasion are all smoke screens to distract the Venezuelan hoi poloi. What really matters is revolutionary respectability, and places where to hide when the time comes.
The Hague is starting to look too good for some in the regime........
.
The point here is that no one seems to believe anymore what the regime says. True, there are some like PODEMOS in Spain who unable to hide their past financing by Chavez are still defending the regime or at least remain silent. But the fact of the matter is that Venezuela is an embarrassment for all, for having let it go so far or for having supported it so long. All want it to go away. At least this is the impression I get.
And why would it be otherwise?
Maduro publishes a super-duper emergency decree controlling everything under the sun. The National Assembly turns it down. The high court TSJ declares it constitutional, which it is not, and the way it was turned down by the Assembly was so constitutional that even the TSJ could not directly assail it. So now, for the love of the deity, I am not sure whether the decree is applicable or not. Though apparently there is a state of commotion or something at play.... You tell me.
Saturday the military exercises to defend Venezuela took place. We saw pictures of soldiers? militia? wearing Cuban flags, wielding sticks in lieu of rifles for a gran total of "troops" larger than D-day operations, if we are to believe tweeter wits. Meanwhile no one nowhere reported of any troop concentration unless you count an AWACS doing its routine drug traffic control over the Caribbean as the preparation of massive US Marine landing. If Uribe is raising an mercenary army against Maduro he learned well from the FARC on how to hide it.
But the cherry over the cake of ridicule was added by Maduro himself who with anti invasion military maneuvers, threat of coups, internal commotions, left Saturday to promote scientific and commercial exchanges with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
Huh?
These islands have not much to offer Venezuela, and Venezuela even less back. However Maduro goes there for one and only one reason, to start a campaign to ensure he will retain at least a third of the OAS vote he needs to stop the application of the Democratic Charter on Venezuela. If Jamaica and Trinidad vote for the sanctions the small islands will follow and Venezuela will be an official pariah state. Brazil and Argentina lost there is only some cash left to buy these island votes, cash coming from killing a few Venezuelans from malnutrition and lack of medicine. But who cares?
That much we can understand. Coups, revolt and invasion are all smoke screens to distract the Venezuelan hoi poloi. What really matters is revolutionary respectability, and places where to hide when the time comes.
The Hague is starting to look too good for some in the regime........
.
Tuesday, 17 May 2016
The developping coup
You need to keep following closely what is going on in Venezuela. Any distraction, the more so if you are overseas like yours truly these days, and you may miss the gran finale.
As expected, a cornered regime has started its moves to abolish the national assembly and establish a bona fide dictatorship. It has no choice: elections are not an option for them, they cannot win them even with massive fraud. And lose they cannot because a change of government means that too many of them will go to jail. Thus in front of the perspective of a recall election on Maduro that all indicate will be a sure defeat for Maduro there is nothing else left but to block the drive for recall election. This is underway at great risk as the mood of the country is clearly set for change. Not necessarily in favor the opposition but most definitely to kick out Maduro.
Meanwhile there is the financial question that the National Assembly controls and the impossibility to annul each and every single law the assembly votes. The OAS is getting ready to apply the Democratic Charter and time presses. Using the silly excuse that a foreign ex-president can by himself raise a mercenary army able to defeat the Venezuelan one last week end Maduro decreed a state of emergency with wide ranging attributions for Maduro. One of the worrisome ones is that PSUV committee for food distribution control, CLAP of recent creation, will have power to collaborate with army and police for public order. Translation : civilians from Maduro political party will become gauleiters directing armed folks to control non chavista folks, in particular those demanding a recall election. From denial of food to outright repression is how it will work.
Sure enough a few minutes ago the National Assembly exerted it's constitutional right, and duty, to reject the said decree established to defend, allegedly, the fatherland. Now we are left to see how Maduro and the rubber stamp cum private regime attorney high court TSJ rules out such a momentous and necessary Assembly vote. Beyond constitutional considerations just on ethical parameters, the decree of Maduro cannot be accepted. Period.
And thus we are now on the "my way or the highway" moment we were all awaiting eagerly.
Is Maduro going to be allowed to "defend" the country at any price, including democracy, human rights and parliamentary representation?
Is the Assembly to be allowed to control an executive clearly going bonkers?
Friday, 13 May 2016
Time's up
UPDATED: unknown to me as I was typing this overseas, Maduro was in cadena announcing a new emergency decree rendering moot the National Assembly and annuling Recall Election efforts for all practical purposes. In short confirming all that I wrote below.
....................
I have the feeling that the fall of Dilma in Brazil is going to speed up the conclusion of the Venezuelan farce. For the Narko-Cubano-Colonial regime action is required before the Temer presidency gets a chance to settle in. Not that the odds are with Temer, but Raúl and Maduro simply cannot take the chance.
....................
I have the feeling that the fall of Dilma in Brazil is going to speed up the conclusion of the Venezuelan farce. For the Narko-Cubano-Colonial regime action is required before the Temer presidency gets a chance to settle in. Not that the odds are with Temer, but Raúl and Maduro simply cannot take the chance.
I do not agree on the way that Dilma was pushed out. The nominal excuse was silly. But that she richly deserved what was coming her way, she did. What sealed her fate was naming Lula minister to protect him from prosecution. Such a breach of ethics makes any sitting president unfit for office. They, Brazilian congress, simply decided to act on what was in the mill and the lack, so far, of popular support for her and Lula show that "o povo" has a hard time to rally, or at least is not convinced that keeping Dilma in office is going to improve its lot.
Temer and his new cabinet are far from inspiring confidence. But if you have bothered reading the hisstory of Brazil you will know that they are used to such shifts and that they will likely give him a few weeks, maybe months. After all there is the technicality that Dilma may win her trial and be reinstated within 6 months though the impeachment tally makes that highly doubtful.
This being said the Castros and Maduro/narco-military have lost their main support. The head of Odebretch is in jail, provisional president Temer may chose, or not, to ventilate corruption cases to silence Lula and Dilma as needed since he is the one with the key to the files now. Even a return of Dilma cannot guarantee the strong support of yore.
What would Brazil do if there were a massive constitutional and human right violation in Venezuela? If Brazil goes against Venezuela it is likely that Uruguay will follow and Mercosur will be unanimous in its condemnation. Once Peru election is held in June even Unasur would go against Venezuela (and the recent hurried support to Dilma by Unasur secretary, the highly discredited puppet Samper, betray that worry).
Thus the time for Castro to give the order to Maduro, and/or the narco-military to take the initiative to dissolve the national assembly once and for all is now. It is still possible that the OAS could fail to get enough votes to apply the democratic charter to Venezuela after Maduro acts. But once Temer decides to act against Venezuela, with the support of Macri in Argentina, the US and Canada, Mexico would follow. Small countries then will chose the big countries against a flat broke violent Venezuela and game over: Venezuela would be a pariah state and go the way of Cuba out of regional organizations.
But with the narco-military still in charge. Or that is the plan anyway.
And thus it is the time to act for them, the thugs, now, before Temer even has a chance to look at Venezuela. All that has been going on since last Monday points that way.
Wednesday, 11 May 2016
1%, a world in a number
I have been very distracted by many problems and now I am overseas, among other objectives, to fetch medicines not available anymore in Venezuela for me and my SO (and others). But I could not pass on a brief comment on what should be called the 1 % affair that was held as I fixed to leave the country.
In short, the electoral board, CNE, established fictitious requirements to request for a recall election on Nicolas Maduro. The constitution previews that the requirement to force a recall election on an elected official is to gather 20% signatures of the registered voters of the given electoral circuit. But the CNE in a crass delaying tactic decided that even though Maduro electoral district is the whole country the MUD alliance needed to get first 1% in EVERY state and THEN it would be allowed to collect the needed 20%. The objective was simple: the regime hoped that in very chavista, very dependent states like, say, Delta Amacuro, the MUD could not manage the 1% holy grail. There is, after all, the infamous Tascón List precedent of the 2004 recall election that affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of folks, including yours truly. If this was scandalous enough by itself there were plenty of other road blocks set by the CNE, quite often of a very childish nature.
To make a long story short, after quite a long arm wrestling the CNE finally released a specific form (la planilla) to collect that 1%. Yet, in a rushed and improvised operation within three days the MUD collected around 8%. That is right, the regime truly thought that the MUD would have trouble collecting in 3 days in all states the fateful 1%. The MUD largely overtook that goal in every state, probably by the end of the first day.
Now, that was a political miscalculation......
Clearly at this stage, in spite of the December electoral loss, in spite of the worsening economical and scarcity crisis, in spite of galloping inflation, in spite of negative unanimous polling, the regime is still underestimating popular rejection of its policies, probably still riding on the illusion that Chavez-dreaming is enough to numb the masses though hungry nights. By putting so many obvious roadblocks the regime only angered further the people, hence the opposition stunning success. The reactions of the regime shows that the wake up call was harsher than in December, at least as I see it.
The problem for the regime is not that the opposition is all but certain to get the 20% signatures it needs. The problem is not that the opposition is all but certain to win the recall election since roughly any signature represents at least two votes considering the fear political context of repression in the country. The problem is that the opposition MUD could well get more signatures than the number of votes that Maduro got three years ago making the recall election a moot point... Such a humiliation would be worse than losing any election and could cause a regime instant debacle.
The problem of the regime has not been Maduro for a while: the military have been the real rulers since the 2014 repression. The problem for the regime if not how to replace Maduro but with what. Now, with that 1% thing it has become an urgent matter.
I see two options for the regime.
The regime "negotiates" a way out through either a recall election or a Maduro resignation where it accepts that a tolerable opposition figure runs to finish the two years left in the presidential term. I do not see why the opposition should accept this or how the narco generals would even bow to that limited amount of real politik.
The regime stalls and blocks the recall election and Maduro resigns next year letting an appointed transition vice president finish the term. Very perilous unless it is a national agreement and the said vice president is appointed like, well, now. Again, I doubt Cuba and the narco generals will be on board.
And there is always the option to kick the game board and establish an outright dictatorship.
And there is always the option to kick the game board and establish an outright dictatorship.
Wednesday, 13 April 2016
How long can Maduro hold?
The annulation of the Amnesty Law was so predictable that I did not bother with a post. Twitter was enough. However, what is worth a post is a meditation on how long a kleptocracy cum drug trafficking regime can hold it together.
The first thing we must consider is that by now the regime makes no pretense whatsoever. Under Chavez, at least some minimal delay was held, when possible. Some lengthy presidential cadena "predicted" what a wished for action of other "powers of the state" should happen, and a few days later, voilá! X got to jail, Y was expelled, Z was annulled. Now progress has been made: Maduro asks for an opinion and within a couple of days the high court, TSJ, serves notice. Unanimously of course.
There is no pretense whatsoever, not even the occasional dissent vote in the bench. You know, they could take turns to say a nay out of 32 justices. Rulings are written even sloppier than they used to be. In fact we even wonder if the court takes the time to read the annulled law. I, for one, think that as soon as a given article is voted at the Assembly, some chavista sends it to the court to prepare the annulment before the final law is even voted. How else could the TSJ beat any speed ruling record observed in any democracy, or even dictatorship for all that I know?
It is not only the TSJ that is blunt about paying no attention to the Assembly or the opposition wishes. The illegal electoral board, CNE, is writing new rules as it goes to stop any electoral initiative from the opposition. That is, the Chavez regime who went from plebiscite to plebiscite is now in the no-election mode. See, Chavez made victory credible (albeit known cheating). Today everyone knows, even chavistas, that neither Maduro nor Cabello could get elected consejo comunal dog catcher.
There are two ways to understand what is going on. Of course, what I repeat all the time, the driving force here is that the regime cannot allow to hand in power to someone else because that would mean that scores of chavistas would soon find their way to jail. Thugs and criminals and narco-traffickers are not known to surrender peacefully to popular will, no matter how lopsided that one is.
Thus the question: is this a show of strength or a show of weakness?
The weakness is easy to demonstrate. The regime has its own polls, even if it refuses to acknowledge the real life poll of December 6 2015. Popular support is fading so fast that open air meetings are rarer, least someone would take a picture of the real attendance (not long until a drone is flown over a chavista real-rally?). Thus the regime is in survival mode, a mode where chutzpah is significantly enhanced along irresponsibility and all sorts of crazy. Yes, the regime is scared, but as in cornered dog scared, biting right and left.
But the show of strength is also easy to understand. This is a regime that is in it for the long run. It is a regime that has made peace with brute force. Already legal and psychological brute force is employed from holding political prisoners to annulling even a weather report voted at the Assembly. Physical force is not as well set yet but the training has been done as we can see from how 2014 protests were repressed, but also now how food riots are repressed these days.
In short, it is a regime that knows it has the weapons and that is the holder of its own truth, a truth of having the financial power to ensure the survival of a small elite which has robbed enough for it. Golden exile is not an option for many of them anymore, but they have stashed enough to pay all the mercenaries they will need to pay to stay in Venezuela and enjoy the riches of life even though the people that placed them into office are starving and dying of unspeakable diseases that normal countries have eradicated. In short, they have become such criminals that they are beyond good and evil, they are amoral, pitiless.
Which brings us to the longevity of such regimes. Considering the continuous degradation of the standard of living, the equilibrium point is when Catia and Petare will get so hungry that they are the ones that will be starting the opposition marches instead of Prados del Este. The date? I do not know, they are not hungry enough yet, not enough of their children have died yet. But the time will come, probably sooner than expected. After all, let's not forget that no matter how military like Padrino, the defense minister, are associated to the corruption of the regime, when they give the order to shoot to the troop this one may not follow: the troop will know why the people are protesting because, well, it is their parents and brothers, and cousins...
I will remind the patient reader that there are historical precedents where the troop refused to follow generals orders, and that was that. I see no reason for Venezuela to be any different, the more so that the troop did not enjoy the booty that their generals grabbed.
The first thing we must consider is that by now the regime makes no pretense whatsoever. Under Chavez, at least some minimal delay was held, when possible. Some lengthy presidential cadena "predicted" what a wished for action of other "powers of the state" should happen, and a few days later, voilá! X got to jail, Y was expelled, Z was annulled. Now progress has been made: Maduro asks for an opinion and within a couple of days the high court, TSJ, serves notice. Unanimously of course.
There is no pretense whatsoever, not even the occasional dissent vote in the bench. You know, they could take turns to say a nay out of 32 justices. Rulings are written even sloppier than they used to be. In fact we even wonder if the court takes the time to read the annulled law. I, for one, think that as soon as a given article is voted at the Assembly, some chavista sends it to the court to prepare the annulment before the final law is even voted. How else could the TSJ beat any speed ruling record observed in any democracy, or even dictatorship for all that I know?
It is not only the TSJ that is blunt about paying no attention to the Assembly or the opposition wishes. The illegal electoral board, CNE, is writing new rules as it goes to stop any electoral initiative from the opposition. That is, the Chavez regime who went from plebiscite to plebiscite is now in the no-election mode. See, Chavez made victory credible (albeit known cheating). Today everyone knows, even chavistas, that neither Maduro nor Cabello could get elected consejo comunal dog catcher.
There are two ways to understand what is going on. Of course, what I repeat all the time, the driving force here is that the regime cannot allow to hand in power to someone else because that would mean that scores of chavistas would soon find their way to jail. Thugs and criminals and narco-traffickers are not known to surrender peacefully to popular will, no matter how lopsided that one is.
Thus the question: is this a show of strength or a show of weakness?
The weakness is easy to demonstrate. The regime has its own polls, even if it refuses to acknowledge the real life poll of December 6 2015. Popular support is fading so fast that open air meetings are rarer, least someone would take a picture of the real attendance (not long until a drone is flown over a chavista real-rally?). Thus the regime is in survival mode, a mode where chutzpah is significantly enhanced along irresponsibility and all sorts of crazy. Yes, the regime is scared, but as in cornered dog scared, biting right and left.
But the show of strength is also easy to understand. This is a regime that is in it for the long run. It is a regime that has made peace with brute force. Already legal and psychological brute force is employed from holding political prisoners to annulling even a weather report voted at the Assembly. Physical force is not as well set yet but the training has been done as we can see from how 2014 protests were repressed, but also now how food riots are repressed these days.
In short, it is a regime that knows it has the weapons and that is the holder of its own truth, a truth of having the financial power to ensure the survival of a small elite which has robbed enough for it. Golden exile is not an option for many of them anymore, but they have stashed enough to pay all the mercenaries they will need to pay to stay in Venezuela and enjoy the riches of life even though the people that placed them into office are starving and dying of unspeakable diseases that normal countries have eradicated. In short, they have become such criminals that they are beyond good and evil, they are amoral, pitiless.
Which brings us to the longevity of such regimes. Considering the continuous degradation of the standard of living, the equilibrium point is when Catia and Petare will get so hungry that they are the ones that will be starting the opposition marches instead of Prados del Este. The date? I do not know, they are not hungry enough yet, not enough of their children have died yet. But the time will come, probably sooner than expected. After all, let's not forget that no matter how military like Padrino, the defense minister, are associated to the corruption of the regime, when they give the order to shoot to the troop this one may not follow: the troop will know why the people are protesting because, well, it is their parents and brothers, and cousins...
I will remind the patient reader that there are historical precedents where the troop refused to follow generals orders, and that was that. I see no reason for Venezuela to be any different, the more so that the troop did not enjoy the booty that their generals grabbed.
Saturday, 9 April 2016
And they shall go to jail
I am not sure if people outside Venezuela truly measure how miserable it is to live here. However one thing is certain, the political situation makes it impossible for things to improve any time soon. Even more certain are the odds of things getting worse. The photo below is National Assembly chair Ramos Allup showing on TV the picture of the defense minister Padrino Lopez in bowed deference to Fidel. This is the clearest sign that the confrontation with the regime is reaching pitch fork level.
Why is this picture, which has widely circulated in the web months ago, back in front?
For this you need to come back to what this blog has gotten tired to repeat over and over: the regime cannot, CANNOT, leave office because this would mean that dozens if not hundreds of regime luminaries will find their way to trials and jail sentences, some as far as reaching The Hague tribunal (it is my opinion that, at the very least, Maduro's criminal actions against the well being of the Venezuelan population make him worthy of sitting at the accused bench of The Hague international court for human rights).
If you do not get this, or disagree with this, then you really have wasted your time reading this blog over the years.
The Games of Thrones played in real life here is as confusing as the fictional one, and probably many a political career would be demised as in the series, hopefully with not as much blood though I am now certain that some will be spilled..
To try to understand this let's start by the game played by the National Assembly. It's only weapon is legality, voting laws that bring answers to the plight of people. The process is long and tedious and exasperating not only to the radical minds inside the opposition but even to more rational spirits like a dear friend from overseas with whom I had a long talk yesterday. It is indeed hard to keep cool in front of the onslaught suffered by the Assembly.
The regime indeed is annulling every law the Assembly passes. Even if the political cost for the regime may be high. For example we are waiting for the oncoming, announced, annulment of two laws. One is designed to allow quick and full ownership to those who got public housing in recent years. This is a No-No for the regime as that housing is sort of a grant that people can preserve as long as they support the regime. But denying such law goes against the human nature of even many hard core chavistas who, well, like any human being want their very own refuge...
More damaging still are the ridiculous pretension that the "bono alimentación" (kind of a food stamp system) for retired people is too expensive for the regime to accept. To which it was replied immediately that if there is money for weapons then there is money to help retirees living of a pension that is today at 40 USD a month (according to DICOM already in free fall since its creation weeks ago). The problem here is that the regime cannot permit under any circumstances to have the populace believe that they can get stuff outside of Chavez or his appointed heir. I suppose that in the regime mental construct the political price to screw the elderly is preferable to the political price of people starting to think that there is life after chavismo.
I pass on other laws annulled which are more abstract to the point made here. The objective of the regime is to annul the National Assembly. Since this cannot be done easily in front of the public opinion, and because the Assembly has two atomic bombs in reserve, the regime is proceeding to discuss nincompoopy proposals such as an amendment to bring down the Assembly term from 5 years to 60 days. Amen that such a constitutional amendement would have to be voted in a referendum (article 341) that the regime cannot win without massive and thus obvious fraud.
Or go the way of a mere coup and that is that.
Indeed the National Assembly has two bombs that are very dangerous to all, but more to the regime. One is the ability to call for a Constituent Assembly that if it proves effective could result in sweeping away all of the regime office holders (articles 348 and 349).
The other bomb is immediate: the regime is short on cash and the only way to borrow more dollars is to get a favorable vote from the Assembly (as a guarantee to the lender). This one will certainly give it IF AND ONLY IF the regime accounts for how the loan will be spent, monitored through a mechanism that will not be under regime control. Something that is totally unacceptable for an hyper corrupt regime. Will the regime pick bankruptcy? Coup? Negotiation?
I am going for coup even though no one will lend a dollar to the regime in such conditions. A coup would only result in utter misery for the people with the regime's hope to control the populace through control of food. A gamble that at least Maduro, Cabello and their close corrupt entourage are willing to take with the assumption that the army will help killing whatever needs to be killed through heavy repression.
Which brings us to the picture opening this entry.
I, for one, consider that Ramos Allup and the opposition have acted to the best of their abilities. There may be better ways to proceed but NO ONE so far as made the case that there is another strategy for the opposition to corner the regime until this one blows a fuse and close the Assembly, or collapses. Either way, many will have to go to jail...
The pressure over the regime has been gradual but continued and unfaltering. And at each time the regime has shown its dark nature. First the emergency economic decree was rejected but approved through yet another judicial coup. The the courts decided that the National Assembly did not have the right to call for hearings on public servants unless allowed by the regime. Then populists reforms are rejected at political cost for the regime. Then the amnesty Law is now under threat and if the regime rejects it it will result in a strongly welded opposition against the regime. On this last one we had the Defense Minister that chimed in as to his opinion that the Amnesty Law was bad. Not only this is not true, and not of his resort, but coming from someone who is linked to coup mongers that benefited in their time from an amnesty of sorts it is simply an indefensible position.
Ramos Allup thought that the time has come to put the armed forces in front of their duty. Showing the picture of an adoring minister of defense in front of a foreign potentate, publicly, on TV, simply questions the loyalty to the nation, to democracy, of the head of the armed forces.
The implications of this are so obvious that I will dispense the patient but smart reader from further explanations.
Only one comment to close this entry: Padrino Lopez today must regret not to have accepted the massive fraud that Cabello wanted to perpetrate on December 6. I will let you think on that too.
Why is this picture, which has widely circulated in the web months ago, back in front?
For this you need to come back to what this blog has gotten tired to repeat over and over: the regime cannot, CANNOT, leave office because this would mean that dozens if not hundreds of regime luminaries will find their way to trials and jail sentences, some as far as reaching The Hague tribunal (it is my opinion that, at the very least, Maduro's criminal actions against the well being of the Venezuelan population make him worthy of sitting at the accused bench of The Hague international court for human rights).
If you do not get this, or disagree with this, then you really have wasted your time reading this blog over the years.
The Games of Thrones played in real life here is as confusing as the fictional one, and probably many a political career would be demised as in the series, hopefully with not as much blood though I am now certain that some will be spilled..
To try to understand this let's start by the game played by the National Assembly. It's only weapon is legality, voting laws that bring answers to the plight of people. The process is long and tedious and exasperating not only to the radical minds inside the opposition but even to more rational spirits like a dear friend from overseas with whom I had a long talk yesterday. It is indeed hard to keep cool in front of the onslaught suffered by the Assembly.
The regime indeed is annulling every law the Assembly passes. Even if the political cost for the regime may be high. For example we are waiting for the oncoming, announced, annulment of two laws. One is designed to allow quick and full ownership to those who got public housing in recent years. This is a No-No for the regime as that housing is sort of a grant that people can preserve as long as they support the regime. But denying such law goes against the human nature of even many hard core chavistas who, well, like any human being want their very own refuge...
More damaging still are the ridiculous pretension that the "bono alimentación" (kind of a food stamp system) for retired people is too expensive for the regime to accept. To which it was replied immediately that if there is money for weapons then there is money to help retirees living of a pension that is today at 40 USD a month (according to DICOM already in free fall since its creation weeks ago). The problem here is that the regime cannot permit under any circumstances to have the populace believe that they can get stuff outside of Chavez or his appointed heir. I suppose that in the regime mental construct the political price to screw the elderly is preferable to the political price of people starting to think that there is life after chavismo.
I pass on other laws annulled which are more abstract to the point made here. The objective of the regime is to annul the National Assembly. Since this cannot be done easily in front of the public opinion, and because the Assembly has two atomic bombs in reserve, the regime is proceeding to discuss nincompoopy proposals such as an amendment to bring down the Assembly term from 5 years to 60 days. Amen that such a constitutional amendement would have to be voted in a referendum (article 341) that the regime cannot win without massive and thus obvious fraud.
Or go the way of a mere coup and that is that.
Indeed the National Assembly has two bombs that are very dangerous to all, but more to the regime. One is the ability to call for a Constituent Assembly that if it proves effective could result in sweeping away all of the regime office holders (articles 348 and 349).
The other bomb is immediate: the regime is short on cash and the only way to borrow more dollars is to get a favorable vote from the Assembly (as a guarantee to the lender). This one will certainly give it IF AND ONLY IF the regime accounts for how the loan will be spent, monitored through a mechanism that will not be under regime control. Something that is totally unacceptable for an hyper corrupt regime. Will the regime pick bankruptcy? Coup? Negotiation?
I am going for coup even though no one will lend a dollar to the regime in such conditions. A coup would only result in utter misery for the people with the regime's hope to control the populace through control of food. A gamble that at least Maduro, Cabello and their close corrupt entourage are willing to take with the assumption that the army will help killing whatever needs to be killed through heavy repression.
Which brings us to the picture opening this entry.
I, for one, consider that Ramos Allup and the opposition have acted to the best of their abilities. There may be better ways to proceed but NO ONE so far as made the case that there is another strategy for the opposition to corner the regime until this one blows a fuse and close the Assembly, or collapses. Either way, many will have to go to jail...
The pressure over the regime has been gradual but continued and unfaltering. And at each time the regime has shown its dark nature. First the emergency economic decree was rejected but approved through yet another judicial coup. The the courts decided that the National Assembly did not have the right to call for hearings on public servants unless allowed by the regime. Then populists reforms are rejected at political cost for the regime. Then the amnesty Law is now under threat and if the regime rejects it it will result in a strongly welded opposition against the regime. On this last one we had the Defense Minister that chimed in as to his opinion that the Amnesty Law was bad. Not only this is not true, and not of his resort, but coming from someone who is linked to coup mongers that benefited in their time from an amnesty of sorts it is simply an indefensible position.
Ramos Allup thought that the time has come to put the armed forces in front of their duty. Showing the picture of an adoring minister of defense in front of a foreign potentate, publicly, on TV, simply questions the loyalty to the nation, to democracy, of the head of the armed forces.
The implications of this are so obvious that I will dispense the patient but smart reader from further explanations.
Only one comment to close this entry: Padrino Lopez today must regret not to have accepted the massive fraud that Cabello wanted to perpetrate on December 6. I will let you think on that too.
Tuesday, 29 March 2016
Onward the final constitutional crash: amnesty law and high court reform
The Easter lull came and went without making much of a difference. The "calima" suffocated us in Caracas while the country went on a standstill to try to spare a few meters from the water gauge of the Guri dam, before El Niño, and regime's utter incompetence, forces a shut down of 50% of the country's electricity.
But the country is back at work, as much as it is possible, and the National Assembly has started the road to open confrontation not only with the executive, but on the true meaning of the Venezuelan constitution, as this one may be.
A few minutes ago the National Assembly voted the final version of the amnesty law which aims, among other things, to free political prisoners incarcerated in kangaroo courts. An amnesty is needed since there is no way to get a truly fair trial in Venezuela these days.
But this law, which intents is also the start of some form of national reconciliation by forcing every side to face the reality that justice is in the hands of the executive (even though this cannot be said in the law), is far from being applied and Leopoldo Lopez is not out of jail yet. Maduro's regime has announced that he will not sign the law, that it will not be applied. Presidential veto power is limited in Venezuela, at best a delaying tactic. Thus within days, with or without the signature of Maduro the law will become the law of the land. Maduro can only stop this law application if the high court TSJ rules it to be unconstitutional. This is certainly the case as the TSJ has always managed to find any "unconstitutional" way to make a given an unconstitutional one, even if the means used is itself unconstitutional. Repetition intended.
Which brings us to the second point of this entry: after the vote the national Assembly went straight ahead in the modification of the laws describing how the TSJ is designated. The aim is to find a way to go around the latest crop of appointees who got their job through unconstitutional ways to allow for the pre-electoral packing of the court. Yes, it is that naked but then again the TSJ submission to the regime is that naked: nobody remembers when was the last time that the state/regime lost a case in court.
In short, the regime is going to be placed in front of this dilemma: either accept the revision of the latest appointments so those can be made according to the original intent of the law, or accept an expansion of the TSJ members so that there is at least dissenting opinions. A dilemma the regime will refuse by declaring that legal reform unconstitutional, even though it will violate the very own regime jurisprudence that was itself a constitutional violation. This is how things work in Venezuela: several wrongs are required to improve the odds of making a right.
In a way it is irrelevant whether the regime will release Lopez from jail, or allow for a limited dissent at the TSJ. It is quite clear now that the regime faction aligned around Maduro and Cabello will go out of its way to avoid any move that could undermine its power and drive through regime change, a change that would find soon in jail Maduro, Cabello, Ramirez and scores of other corrupt and abusive office holders.
The regime has made it abundantly clear that it will not let the new National Assembly function as it should be. The TSJ has already gutted its control authority. It is finding a way to avoid votes on financial resources (which may be difficult at the Assembly has already stated that credits not approved by the Assembly do not put the state under the obligation of repaying them). More blockades to the Assembly are not obvious yet as its election is, after all, still recent. But the tone is set: the TSJ will provide what the regime cannot get through the Assembly.
Since the regime has embarked into such a course to void the National Assembly then this one has no choice but to face down the confrontation by voting on legal laws (redundancy intended) to dismantle the regime. Either the regime will have to back down or it will have to come up to terms with its own dark intentions and, well, proceed once and for all to the "autogolpe", self-inflicted-coup á la Fujimori once upon a time in Peru.
For the regime going all the way to a constitutional crisis is a gamble. Not only the Amnesty Law and the TSJ reform are politically unacceptable for the reduced chavista hard core, but more laws in the work (on recall elections and referenda) are even less acceptable. The political cost, here and abroad, maybe simply to high for the regime to pay. Times are changing, Obama visited Cuba, Argentina is gone and Kirchner is not able to make the opposition that some thought she would be able to do. In Brasil the corruption of Lula is now public knowledge. Talk of applying the democratic charter agaisnt Venezuela is now open talk. But what is worse for the regime is that there is no food nor medicine, and soon there will be no electricity besides providing homes with a very few hours a day, forget about energy for production. Amen of the political capital lost abroad: the regime has no political capital left to spend at home.
Common sense would make the regime start negotiating a political solution to start taking measures to avoid the nation's collapse. But it seems that Maduro et al are seeking actively such collapse as there last desperate gambit to retain power.
La politique du pire, they called it in the agonizing French Ancien Regime.
But the country is back at work, as much as it is possible, and the National Assembly has started the road to open confrontation not only with the executive, but on the true meaning of the Venezuelan constitution, as this one may be.
A few minutes ago the National Assembly voted the final version of the amnesty law which aims, among other things, to free political prisoners incarcerated in kangaroo courts. An amnesty is needed since there is no way to get a truly fair trial in Venezuela these days.
Aprobada en 2da discusión la #LeyDeAmnistia pic.twitter.com/2ztnDWC7aq— María Corina Machado (@MariaCorinaYA) March 30, 2016
But this law, which intents is also the start of some form of national reconciliation by forcing every side to face the reality that justice is in the hands of the executive (even though this cannot be said in the law), is far from being applied and Leopoldo Lopez is not out of jail yet. Maduro's regime has announced that he will not sign the law, that it will not be applied. Presidential veto power is limited in Venezuela, at best a delaying tactic. Thus within days, with or without the signature of Maduro the law will become the law of the land. Maduro can only stop this law application if the high court TSJ rules it to be unconstitutional. This is certainly the case as the TSJ has always managed to find any "unconstitutional" way to make a given an unconstitutional one, even if the means used is itself unconstitutional. Repetition intended.
Which brings us to the second point of this entry: after the vote the national Assembly went straight ahead in the modification of the laws describing how the TSJ is designated. The aim is to find a way to go around the latest crop of appointees who got their job through unconstitutional ways to allow for the pre-electoral packing of the court. Yes, it is that naked but then again the TSJ submission to the regime is that naked: nobody remembers when was the last time that the state/regime lost a case in court.
In short, the regime is going to be placed in front of this dilemma: either accept the revision of the latest appointments so those can be made according to the original intent of the law, or accept an expansion of the TSJ members so that there is at least dissenting opinions. A dilemma the regime will refuse by declaring that legal reform unconstitutional, even though it will violate the very own regime jurisprudence that was itself a constitutional violation. This is how things work in Venezuela: several wrongs are required to improve the odds of making a right.
In a way it is irrelevant whether the regime will release Lopez from jail, or allow for a limited dissent at the TSJ. It is quite clear now that the regime faction aligned around Maduro and Cabello will go out of its way to avoid any move that could undermine its power and drive through regime change, a change that would find soon in jail Maduro, Cabello, Ramirez and scores of other corrupt and abusive office holders.
The regime has made it abundantly clear that it will not let the new National Assembly function as it should be. The TSJ has already gutted its control authority. It is finding a way to avoid votes on financial resources (which may be difficult at the Assembly has already stated that credits not approved by the Assembly do not put the state under the obligation of repaying them). More blockades to the Assembly are not obvious yet as its election is, after all, still recent. But the tone is set: the TSJ will provide what the regime cannot get through the Assembly.
Since the regime has embarked into such a course to void the National Assembly then this one has no choice but to face down the confrontation by voting on legal laws (redundancy intended) to dismantle the regime. Either the regime will have to back down or it will have to come up to terms with its own dark intentions and, well, proceed once and for all to the "autogolpe", self-inflicted-coup á la Fujimori once upon a time in Peru.
For the regime going all the way to a constitutional crisis is a gamble. Not only the Amnesty Law and the TSJ reform are politically unacceptable for the reduced chavista hard core, but more laws in the work (on recall elections and referenda) are even less acceptable. The political cost, here and abroad, maybe simply to high for the regime to pay. Times are changing, Obama visited Cuba, Argentina is gone and Kirchner is not able to make the opposition that some thought she would be able to do. In Brasil the corruption of Lula is now public knowledge. Talk of applying the democratic charter agaisnt Venezuela is now open talk. But what is worse for the regime is that there is no food nor medicine, and soon there will be no electricity besides providing homes with a very few hours a day, forget about energy for production. Amen of the political capital lost abroad: the regime has no political capital left to spend at home.
Common sense would make the regime start negotiating a political solution to start taking measures to avoid the nation's collapse. But it seems that Maduro et al are seeking actively such collapse as there last desperate gambit to retain power.
La politique du pire, they called it in the agonizing French Ancien Regime.
Friday, 4 September 2015
Is the sentence on Leopoldo Lopez relevant?
No, this is no bait title. Whether Leopoldo Lopez is freed or condemned today has become almost irrelevant for the coming history. As I type this a small crowd of opposition leaders (small on purpose, by the way) is barred from the court building where the final sentence on Leopoldo Lopez is supposedly to be pronounced at any minute. And whatever the result is, even if I learn it as I type, it does not change much the coming text.
I think the regime will condemn Leopoldo Lopez. They are crazy enough to do that and make Lopez the "great" leader of the opposition. Capriles has been fading steadily and even went into ridiculous having to fight a silly battle on Tweeter to pretend that he did not say what he said on some of the fallout of the Colombian border crisis. Maria Corina Machado seems to have realized that Primero Justicia and AD, and others, prefer to keep chavismo at Miraflores before giving her a chance at anything. Thus she seems to have decided to support Lopez until better days come for her. Henri Falcon is now fatally flawed as he is trying to position himself as a transition figure that would allegedly draw in a chavismo dissidence. And there is no one else, really, that can even pretend at disputing the leadership to Lopez.
Whether the leadership of Lopez is what the country needs is now irrelevant. The regime not only has made this to happen, but it is speeding up the final outcome by its inability to face to the economic and political crisis of Venezuela. Recent polls are lapidary and even "pro Chavez" pollsters give a double digit advantage for the opposition, big enough that one can hardly see a way for the regime to reduce it. Somewhat it will shrink some as the campaign goes on but 2 years of mismanagement and long lines for a little bit of food and toilet paper cannot be forgotten easily.
The regime has tried all sorts of tricks to distract public opinion and try to create excuses that would allow it to at the very least postpone elections. The latest attempt, by manufacturing a crisis with Colombia is going nowhere. The alleged victory at the OAS was notable not by its narrowness but by the fast shrinking influence of Venezuela there. Next crisis vote and the regime will lose at the OAS. After a weak to dismal initial reaction of Colombia's president Santos, this one has taken successfully the initiative. The "defeat" at the OAS has allowed it to criticize Brazil for its lack of leadership and to wave away the UNASUR empty shell, an humiliation for it considering that an Colombian ex-president is at its helm. Then he went to the border with lots of international guests to hold a cabinet meeting with the victims of Venezuela's abuse. Then the foreign minster Holguin described with details the duplicity and web of lies weaved by the regime in its failed propaganda.
In contrast not only Maduro has failed to call an equivalent meeting on the Venezuelan side, knowing full well that he would be booed loudly, but the wannabe conquering hero went to China to ask for survival cash for the elections of December. In short, the border crisis seems to have brought him zero benefit on the Venezuelan side.
What is left to do for the regime? This one cannot afford to lose elections because a real government will send a few of its members to jail. So a new crisis has to be created and what better than giving Leopoldo Lopez a maximum sentence. Heck! Why not have him murdered in jail to see if the opposition rise in protest so it can be brutally crushed and elections outright cancelled.
That would be a terrible mistake for the regime, the last straw internationally to force many into recognizing its rogue nature, and speed up the economic downfall: the easiest way to undo the regime, fast, without military intervention. The writing is on the wall. US Secretary of State has posed a few days ago with the wife of Lopez. Thomas Shannon, the political operator that posed with Diosdado Cabello a few weeks ago posed a few days ago with a second fiddle at Lopez party, thus equating him to Cabello in importance, a terrible insult for a narcissistic rogue like Cabello, The Spanish Senate has had a nearly unanimous vote to demand that the Spanish government do more for Venezuelan political prisoners. Last but not least, under internal pressure the weakening Roussef government has had to admit (accept?) that there is a need for international supervision for the December vote in Venezuela.
Truly, can the Venezuelan regime be so blind? It is, because it is a rogue regime, because Maduro obeys Cuban orders, because Cuba cannot give up under any pretense whatever alimony it still cashes from Venezuela. Because, very simply, it has run out of ideas and has only violence left in its belt.
In the end it does not matter. If Lopez is not condemned, and freed, the opposition gets a boost. If Lopez is kept in jail, the injustice will be too flagrant and the opposition not only will also get a boost, but it will get another one from overseas. My guess is that the regime will go ahead and condemn Lopez anyway in the belief that it will radicalize its base and bring out the vote. Or the violence.
I think the regime will condemn Leopoldo Lopez. They are crazy enough to do that and make Lopez the "great" leader of the opposition. Capriles has been fading steadily and even went into ridiculous having to fight a silly battle on Tweeter to pretend that he did not say what he said on some of the fallout of the Colombian border crisis. Maria Corina Machado seems to have realized that Primero Justicia and AD, and others, prefer to keep chavismo at Miraflores before giving her a chance at anything. Thus she seems to have decided to support Lopez until better days come for her. Henri Falcon is now fatally flawed as he is trying to position himself as a transition figure that would allegedly draw in a chavismo dissidence. And there is no one else, really, that can even pretend at disputing the leadership to Lopez.
Whether the leadership of Lopez is what the country needs is now irrelevant. The regime not only has made this to happen, but it is speeding up the final outcome by its inability to face to the economic and political crisis of Venezuela. Recent polls are lapidary and even "pro Chavez" pollsters give a double digit advantage for the opposition, big enough that one can hardly see a way for the regime to reduce it. Somewhat it will shrink some as the campaign goes on but 2 years of mismanagement and long lines for a little bit of food and toilet paper cannot be forgotten easily.
The regime has tried all sorts of tricks to distract public opinion and try to create excuses that would allow it to at the very least postpone elections. The latest attempt, by manufacturing a crisis with Colombia is going nowhere. The alleged victory at the OAS was notable not by its narrowness but by the fast shrinking influence of Venezuela there. Next crisis vote and the regime will lose at the OAS. After a weak to dismal initial reaction of Colombia's president Santos, this one has taken successfully the initiative. The "defeat" at the OAS has allowed it to criticize Brazil for its lack of leadership and to wave away the UNASUR empty shell, an humiliation for it considering that an Colombian ex-president is at its helm. Then he went to the border with lots of international guests to hold a cabinet meeting with the victims of Venezuela's abuse. Then the foreign minster Holguin described with details the duplicity and web of lies weaved by the regime in its failed propaganda.
In contrast not only Maduro has failed to call an equivalent meeting on the Venezuelan side, knowing full well that he would be booed loudly, but the wannabe conquering hero went to China to ask for survival cash for the elections of December. In short, the border crisis seems to have brought him zero benefit on the Venezuelan side.
What is left to do for the regime? This one cannot afford to lose elections because a real government will send a few of its members to jail. So a new crisis has to be created and what better than giving Leopoldo Lopez a maximum sentence. Heck! Why not have him murdered in jail to see if the opposition rise in protest so it can be brutally crushed and elections outright cancelled.
That would be a terrible mistake for the regime, the last straw internationally to force many into recognizing its rogue nature, and speed up the economic downfall: the easiest way to undo the regime, fast, without military intervention. The writing is on the wall. US Secretary of State has posed a few days ago with the wife of Lopez. Thomas Shannon, the political operator that posed with Diosdado Cabello a few weeks ago posed a few days ago with a second fiddle at Lopez party, thus equating him to Cabello in importance, a terrible insult for a narcissistic rogue like Cabello, The Spanish Senate has had a nearly unanimous vote to demand that the Spanish government do more for Venezuelan political prisoners. Last but not least, under internal pressure the weakening Roussef government has had to admit (accept?) that there is a need for international supervision for the December vote in Venezuela.
Truly, can the Venezuelan regime be so blind? It is, because it is a rogue regime, because Maduro obeys Cuban orders, because Cuba cannot give up under any pretense whatever alimony it still cashes from Venezuela. Because, very simply, it has run out of ideas and has only violence left in its belt.
In the end it does not matter. If Lopez is not condemned, and freed, the opposition gets a boost. If Lopez is kept in jail, the injustice will be too flagrant and the opposition not only will also get a boost, but it will get another one from overseas. My guess is that the regime will go ahead and condemn Lopez anyway in the belief that it will radicalize its base and bring out the vote. Or the violence.
Thursday, 13 August 2015
Baduelismus
A strange surprise came yesterday. General Baduel, former savior of Chavez (2002), former defense minister of Chavez, one of his personal own first political prisoners has been released from jail. Sure enough he is blocked at home, but he is out of military jail.
That he served most of his jail sentence on trumped up charges (who is not corrupt inside chavismo?) and thus was "released" to complete the rest of his sentence at home is a mere detail. What is important here is that the regime has dared to release who was a seen as one of Chavez very own political prisoners.
The reader must understand one thing about Venezuela: there are two type of political prisoners, those of the revolution and those that are Chavez personal prisoners, such as judge Afiuni, Baduel and even Lopez, though this one is a prisoner of both. The revolution political prisoners can be jailed or released at will, such are the cases of Ceballos, former mayor of San Cristobal or Simonovis of 2002 fame unjustly jailed for revolutionary political need. There are also Chavez very own political exiles, such as Rosales former Zulia governor and Chavez 2006 campaign opponent, or journalist Poleo. In short, those that Chavez has placed on his very own list in theory cannot benefit from any measure of grace. Only Afiuni did get some alleviation to her plight due to the intense international pressure, but her trial is going fast nowhere.
Thus the importance of Baduel's release. For this to happen there must have been a powerful reason, a significant movement inside chavismo to face down a Chavez order. The reader should be immediately reassured: this mean nothing good for the opposition no matter what a portion of Twitterzuela tried to make of it last night.
You can speculate, offer many readings. Here is mine for those still reading.
The jailing of Baduel had created a rift inside the armed forces. For sure, these were not going to oppose Chavez for many reasons, one being that cash was flowing into their pocket. But there was a rift inside because Baduel as a former defense minister was the voice of the army for a while and as such deserved more respect, even from Chavez. Baduel's jail was a direct message to the army to behave and it was understood as such.
But the resentment remained and now that Chavez is gone the army feels the need to come together again and freeing Baduel goes a long way even if the guy now has little power in it. Thus the real question is why is the army coming back together, taking such a stand?
The situation of the country is deteriorating fast. It is clear now with the recent looting and recent polls that the regime is overstaying its welcome and is decided in leaving nothing standing in its wake. Burnt earth they also call it. The people that will be left behind to try to hold things together, no matter what government comes, are the armed forces that will have to do all the necessary repression.
Thus, for me at least, the army comes together because it not only needs to be united to face coming harder times, but also because it needs to weigh carefully its actions so as not to be blamed for the mess left behind by Chavez. That does not mean the army is good or bad, or that a coup is around the corner. To begin with, a coup is unnecessary as this is already a military regime. What the army is probably doing at this point is getting its act together to intervene as a single voice to dictate to the civilians in the regime what to do, or to rule over a transition regime, or if needs be, to tolerate an opposition government as long as the army goes unscathed of any crime it committed during the Chavez years.
Nothing major happens inside Venezuela without the consent or action of the Army. Releasing Baduel cannot have happened without this one consent as I, for one, am absolutely sure that Maduro would not have released of his own accord a Chavez prisoner, amen of the proven cruelty of Maduro.
That is why Baduel's release is so interesting. All specuatlions maybe allowed, but what this really means is that pieces are moving inside the regime. Perhaps faster than one may surmise.
That he served most of his jail sentence on trumped up charges (who is not corrupt inside chavismo?) and thus was "released" to complete the rest of his sentence at home is a mere detail. What is important here is that the regime has dared to release who was a seen as one of Chavez very own political prisoners.
The reader must understand one thing about Venezuela: there are two type of political prisoners, those of the revolution and those that are Chavez personal prisoners, such as judge Afiuni, Baduel and even Lopez, though this one is a prisoner of both. The revolution political prisoners can be jailed or released at will, such are the cases of Ceballos, former mayor of San Cristobal or Simonovis of 2002 fame unjustly jailed for revolutionary political need. There are also Chavez very own political exiles, such as Rosales former Zulia governor and Chavez 2006 campaign opponent, or journalist Poleo. In short, those that Chavez has placed on his very own list in theory cannot benefit from any measure of grace. Only Afiuni did get some alleviation to her plight due to the intense international pressure, but her trial is going fast nowhere.
Thus the importance of Baduel's release. For this to happen there must have been a powerful reason, a significant movement inside chavismo to face down a Chavez order. The reader should be immediately reassured: this mean nothing good for the opposition no matter what a portion of Twitterzuela tried to make of it last night.
You can speculate, offer many readings. Here is mine for those still reading.
The jailing of Baduel had created a rift inside the armed forces. For sure, these were not going to oppose Chavez for many reasons, one being that cash was flowing into their pocket. But there was a rift inside because Baduel as a former defense minister was the voice of the army for a while and as such deserved more respect, even from Chavez. Baduel's jail was a direct message to the army to behave and it was understood as such.
But the resentment remained and now that Chavez is gone the army feels the need to come together again and freeing Baduel goes a long way even if the guy now has little power in it. Thus the real question is why is the army coming back together, taking such a stand?
The situation of the country is deteriorating fast. It is clear now with the recent looting and recent polls that the regime is overstaying its welcome and is decided in leaving nothing standing in its wake. Burnt earth they also call it. The people that will be left behind to try to hold things together, no matter what government comes, are the armed forces that will have to do all the necessary repression.
Thus, for me at least, the army comes together because it not only needs to be united to face coming harder times, but also because it needs to weigh carefully its actions so as not to be blamed for the mess left behind by Chavez. That does not mean the army is good or bad, or that a coup is around the corner. To begin with, a coup is unnecessary as this is already a military regime. What the army is probably doing at this point is getting its act together to intervene as a single voice to dictate to the civilians in the regime what to do, or to rule over a transition regime, or if needs be, to tolerate an opposition government as long as the army goes unscathed of any crime it committed during the Chavez years.
Nothing major happens inside Venezuela without the consent or action of the Army. Releasing Baduel cannot have happened without this one consent as I, for one, am absolutely sure that Maduro would not have released of his own accord a Chavez prisoner, amen of the proven cruelty of Maduro.
That is why Baduel's release is so interesting. All specuatlions maybe allowed, but what this really means is that pieces are moving inside the regime. Perhaps faster than one may surmise.
Tuesday, 29 October 2013
A Eduardo Samán hay que responder, aunque sea inútil
Eduardo Samán, auto-proclamado radical en la defensas de los consumidores y la Lo que hay que contestar hoy en especifico es su entrevista en YVKE como esta reseña breve por El Universal (no conseguí el enlace YVKE).
Lo que ofende más en esa entrevista de Samán no es de acusar a los productores de bajar la producción adrede, es la ignorancia de Eduardo Samán. Si, se entiende que el cumple su trabajo y que ese trabajo es en gran parte echarle la culpa de la incompetencia del gobierno a quien sea que se le pueda culpar. Pero es que Samán no puede ser tan ignorante. ¿Lo será? Por si acaso sigo con las causas de la baja producción.
Señor Samán, ¿sabe usted que?:
- CADIVI, MILCO y otros no aprueban con la celeridad requerida los dolares para importación de materia prima que se requiere para manufacturar alimentos para consumo humano en Venezuela. ¿Lo ha investigado la agencia que usted dirige?
- Los puertos están colapsados y uno se demora semanas y meses en recibir sus importaciones de materia prima e insumos de producción. ¿Lo ha investigado INDEPABIS?
- Los productores de insumos para la producción de alimentos dentro de Venezuela no pueden a veces producir la cantidad necesaria, ni la calidad requerida, lo que implica que sus clientes, productores conscientes de alimentos, no pueden producir y menos aumentar su producción. ¿Lo ha investigado su despacho?
- Lo que el productor importó en 2012 a una tasa de cambio de 4,3 solamente se le empezó a liquidar en el 2013 después de la devaluación a 6,3. O sea, el productor compro a 4,3 pero esta obligado retroactivamente a pagar a 6,3. Obviamente ese robo perpetrado por el gobierno tiene que pasar en costo al consumidor final ya que si el productor absorbiese ese costo por si solo quebraría. ¿Lo entiende INDEPABIS? (De paso, eso es lo que pasa con las lineas aéreas extranjeras a quien se le paga, si se le paga, los boletos del 2012 en el 2013 a 6,3; es por eso que sabiendo que viene otra devaluación, y otro robo del gobierno contra ellos, cobran la tarifa plena sin descuentos para protegerse; ¿o es que usted cree que mantener aviones es gratis?).
- La LOTTTTTTTTT cayo en el peor momento económico, cuando se da todo lo que se describe arriba y que la ley hace imposible modificar la fuerza laboral según la capacidad de producción de las empresas. Es por eso que no han contratado, pero NO es por eso que la producción no ha subido. ¿Lo entenderá la agencia que usted dirige?
- Usted acusa FEDECAMARAS de querer tumbar al gobierno. Si en algo han sido exitosos INDEPABIS y demás agencias represivas del gobierno es en debilitar el sector privado en estos años. Yo le puedo garantizar que si ocurriese que efectivamente en un supuesto FEDECAMARAS estuviese unánime en un deseo de tumbar a balurdos como usted de los puestos que ocupan, no está FEDECAMARAS, ni de lejos, en posición de hacerlo. La situación de FEDECAMARAS no es ni remotamente comparable a lo que era en 2002. ¿O es que usted y INDEPABIS todavía se creen en 1998?
Finalmente, usted insulta al gentilicio de nuestro país cuando usted temerariamente dice que los productores echan "los productos al suelo para que la gente se tenga que matar por agarrar los alimentos".
Primero, si es posible que algún bodeguero obstinado haya tirado un saco de harina PAN al piso para sacudirse a la gente que le trancaba la entrada de su bodega, eso no es cierto para los productores y comerciantes que somos y respetamos el producto de nuestro trabajo. ¿Ha producido usted alguna vez algo de valor comercial con sus propias manos? ¿Cree usted en verdad que lo que me costó tanto producir lo voy a tirar al piso para humillar a mis clientes? ¿En que universo desquiciado vive usted?
Segundo, el que lanzo esa moda de tirarle cosas a la gente amontonada es el "gigante eterno" que con sus inventos de bolsas de Mercal gratis, su repartidera de cerveza en las marchas oficialistas, su agarradera de papelitos que le daba la gente desesperada, ha convertido este tipo de humillación al pueblo en la norma revolucionaria que a usted ahora parece ofender cuando algún portugués o chino se la aplique a algunos. Sepa usted, lo que sabría si usted se calase las colas de los productos escasos, que los alimentos no se tiran al piso, se ofrecen directamente en las paletas que llegan para acelerar la distribución a la gente desesperada por horas de cola al sol. ¿O es que usted pretende que esa pobre gente pasa media hora mas de sol mientras se decoren los anaqueles para que puedan por fin comprar?
Yo se muy bien que su mente trancada no esta en capacidad de entender lo que escribo arriba, asumiendo que mis palabras lleguen algún día a su escritorio. Pero me conformo dejando por escrito aquí la constancia de que usted es un fraude.
--------------------
Post Data.
Hoy pase por el Makro de San Felipe donde como se acostumbra casi cada día, hay una cola (ver foto anterior). Hoy había llegado leche, me informaron. Y efectivamente vi gente que salia con bolsas de latas de leche. Enséñenos Señor Saman adonde tiran la leche en el piso.
Wednesday, 16 October 2013
A disabling enabling law
Certainly, that the Maduro's enabling law was presented yesterday officially does not mean that it will be approved and that even if it is approved a predictable Armageddon will follow. The outrage yesterday is that when a regime decides to roll the dice with such a law it means that we are in dire straits, that its ability to run the country is on the skids.
There is a difference between this enabling law and the ones passed before, or even the attempt at constitutional change sought in 2007. These previous attempts were at least supported by the clear preference of the country for Chavez, for whatever misguided love his voters had for him. Also their scope was less ambitious in that Chavez sought to control specifics (or all in 2007 but at least it was through a constitutional reform submitted to popular vote). What we got yesterday was the declared intention of the regime to control all of the economic aspects of the country and, through them, our private lives. Fascism or Communism, your choice, there are both of these elements in the brief proposal submitted yesterday.
By submitting such an unconstitutional law, and worse, simply an improper law, the regime has rolled the dice and called for an open, unavoidable, political crisis. The reasons are a dropping popularity, a misfit president with Maduro, a camarilla of desperate people afraid to lose their privileges and go to jail after a regime change. And more that we have discussed in the past. What is more interesting today is to see the possible scenarios. With the pathological secretiveness of the regime coupled with constant disinformation leaks, we cannot foresee any specific one. But we can draw general consequences.
The easiest, in a way, scenario to imagine is that the law does not pass. The regime needs 99 votes and it has only 98 "certain". The thing here that could bring an unexpected surprise is that the enabling law can be, and would be used to purge chavismo rank and file as needed. As such we can be sure that more than one chavista representative is secretly wondering what is the worse fate for him/her: to vote against or to vote for. Voting against makes you a pariah, maybe, inside chavismo but gives enough time to resign, pack your stuff and leave the country if needed. Voting for it means that suddenly some day you can be thrown speedily to the wolves when needed, just as it happened last week with Valencia mayor, Parra, and his family.
This possibility, not to be discarded, would be a major setback for Maduro, make the division inside chavismo wide open which is all but certain to provoke the departure of Maduro in a matter of months. We do not know what would replace Maduro, from fair elections to open military regime, but such a political defeat coupled to his very questionable legitimacy would make his position unsustainable.
The scenario of approval are two, depending on how the law is approved.
If the regime cannot find inside the opposition that 99th vote, it may be tempted to pass the law anyway though the help of the high court which is now used to violate the 1999 Constitution as needed. The high court could either remove representatives on any pretext or even "interpret" constitutional requirement. It does not matter, a political crisis would follow. Capriles is already on record saying that if the enabling law is not voted according to the Constitution he will not recognize it. And we can be sure that he will not be alone as one objective of the enabling law is to destroy the current opposition structure. If the chavista regime were to pass illegally the enabling law it would mean that they are also doing a final coup, they will have no other choice. The opposition leadership will be cornered and forced to take a stand.
The regime may also find that mysterious 99th vote. It has been at work on that for months now, blackmailing and bribing as many representatives as possible. They may yet succeed though so far it does not seem to be the case. But if indeed suddenly an additional opposition representative were to go to the dark side the "victory" would be an empty one. A political crisis would also follow in this scenario but it will operate in two times. At first, there may be a rather small political crisis inside the opposition since the betrayal may lead a handful more representatives to feel lost in the dictatorship and seek some accommodation.
But as the regime starts publishing the laws derived from the enabling law, chavismo will go into purge mode as the conflict between Maduro and Cabello, the radicals and the pragmatists will have to be played out, each side trying to take advantage of the splinter opposition. Or not, it does not matter. Chavismo owes its current façade of unity to the unified opposition which slow but continuous grow scares the heirs of Chavez. The paradox of an Enabling Law victory through dividing the opposition is that this could speed up the break down of chavismo.
As the "debate" starts in the Assembly for the dictatorship law we can only be pessimistic. Corruption and the economic crisis will not be solved though that law because the only thing it will do is exacerbate the economic control system, held by the same people who have proven their disregard for economic realities in the last decade and a half. The Venezuelan currency went from 500 to 50,000 for a US dollar, no more comments are needed to prove that point. Unfortunately the other aspect of the enabling law that some people on each side wish for, to postpone a political crisis, will not work either as described above.
The enabling law will accelerate the economic and political crises, whether it passes, whether it is applied if it passes.
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Notes
The Enabling Law of Maduro, as justified by chavismo, is not justifiable. All the laws necessary for the objectives searched are in the books already or could be voted by the comfortable majority that chavismo holds in parliament courtesy of the obscene gerrymandering of 2010 election. The problem for chavismo is that some of the laws needed to either control the economy or make it more manageable, more pragmatical, could not find a consensus inside chavismo if they were to be discussed. By imposing them from above it is supposed to spare chavismo from potential divisions. At the price of democracy of course, but these people never were democrats.
Without entering into dramatic major conspiracy theories about chavismo putting up big brother screens in our homes courtesy of the enabling law, we can observe cynically that the enabling laws seeks strict control of opposition political parties finances. Even though chavismo abuses the money of the states for its campaigns, and has severely limited access to opposition candidate sin the media, the disastrous economy keeps strengthening the opposition. The only way left for chavismo to control the opposition, short of putting them into concentration camp, it to make it impossible to find electoral financing. That can only push the opposition, AND dissident chavismo toward violence.
Corruption has so corroded chavismo, has created so many groups wanting their share that the only way the regime can find to control and to spread around the money to its true supporters is to make all currency managed directly by a political group inside the presidential palace. The enabling law does offer that possibility. Increased corruption is certain because now all importations would be made in theory through the regime which will sell to the private sector, forbidding them to do their own timely purchases overseas. That the economy will be pushed fast to a standstill is not a problem for the regime, what they want is to centralize all the commissions gained though imports at favorable currency exchanges.
The three notes above will have devastating effects fast, something that chavismo in its ideological arrogance is unable to perceive. And thus once the "noble" objectives fail, within 6 months at most, the enabling law will still be running long enough to start emitting the repressive laws that will invade our private lives.
 |
| Will that change this week? |
There is a difference between this enabling law and the ones passed before, or even the attempt at constitutional change sought in 2007. These previous attempts were at least supported by the clear preference of the country for Chavez, for whatever misguided love his voters had for him. Also their scope was less ambitious in that Chavez sought to control specifics (or all in 2007 but at least it was through a constitutional reform submitted to popular vote). What we got yesterday was the declared intention of the regime to control all of the economic aspects of the country and, through them, our private lives. Fascism or Communism, your choice, there are both of these elements in the brief proposal submitted yesterday.
By submitting such an unconstitutional law, and worse, simply an improper law, the regime has rolled the dice and called for an open, unavoidable, political crisis. The reasons are a dropping popularity, a misfit president with Maduro, a camarilla of desperate people afraid to lose their privileges and go to jail after a regime change. And more that we have discussed in the past. What is more interesting today is to see the possible scenarios. With the pathological secretiveness of the regime coupled with constant disinformation leaks, we cannot foresee any specific one. But we can draw general consequences.
The easiest, in a way, scenario to imagine is that the law does not pass. The regime needs 99 votes and it has only 98 "certain". The thing here that could bring an unexpected surprise is that the enabling law can be, and would be used to purge chavismo rank and file as needed. As such we can be sure that more than one chavista representative is secretly wondering what is the worse fate for him/her: to vote against or to vote for. Voting against makes you a pariah, maybe, inside chavismo but gives enough time to resign, pack your stuff and leave the country if needed. Voting for it means that suddenly some day you can be thrown speedily to the wolves when needed, just as it happened last week with Valencia mayor, Parra, and his family.
This possibility, not to be discarded, would be a major setback for Maduro, make the division inside chavismo wide open which is all but certain to provoke the departure of Maduro in a matter of months. We do not know what would replace Maduro, from fair elections to open military regime, but such a political defeat coupled to his very questionable legitimacy would make his position unsustainable.
The scenario of approval are two, depending on how the law is approved.
If the regime cannot find inside the opposition that 99th vote, it may be tempted to pass the law anyway though the help of the high court which is now used to violate the 1999 Constitution as needed. The high court could either remove representatives on any pretext or even "interpret" constitutional requirement. It does not matter, a political crisis would follow. Capriles is already on record saying that if the enabling law is not voted according to the Constitution he will not recognize it. And we can be sure that he will not be alone as one objective of the enabling law is to destroy the current opposition structure. If the chavista regime were to pass illegally the enabling law it would mean that they are also doing a final coup, they will have no other choice. The opposition leadership will be cornered and forced to take a stand.
The regime may also find that mysterious 99th vote. It has been at work on that for months now, blackmailing and bribing as many representatives as possible. They may yet succeed though so far it does not seem to be the case. But if indeed suddenly an additional opposition representative were to go to the dark side the "victory" would be an empty one. A political crisis would also follow in this scenario but it will operate in two times. At first, there may be a rather small political crisis inside the opposition since the betrayal may lead a handful more representatives to feel lost in the dictatorship and seek some accommodation.
But as the regime starts publishing the laws derived from the enabling law, chavismo will go into purge mode as the conflict between Maduro and Cabello, the radicals and the pragmatists will have to be played out, each side trying to take advantage of the splinter opposition. Or not, it does not matter. Chavismo owes its current façade of unity to the unified opposition which slow but continuous grow scares the heirs of Chavez. The paradox of an Enabling Law victory through dividing the opposition is that this could speed up the break down of chavismo.
As the "debate" starts in the Assembly for the dictatorship law we can only be pessimistic. Corruption and the economic crisis will not be solved though that law because the only thing it will do is exacerbate the economic control system, held by the same people who have proven their disregard for economic realities in the last decade and a half. The Venezuelan currency went from 500 to 50,000 for a US dollar, no more comments are needed to prove that point. Unfortunately the other aspect of the enabling law that some people on each side wish for, to postpone a political crisis, will not work either as described above.
The enabling law will accelerate the economic and political crises, whether it passes, whether it is applied if it passes.
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Notes
The Enabling Law of Maduro, as justified by chavismo, is not justifiable. All the laws necessary for the objectives searched are in the books already or could be voted by the comfortable majority that chavismo holds in parliament courtesy of the obscene gerrymandering of 2010 election. The problem for chavismo is that some of the laws needed to either control the economy or make it more manageable, more pragmatical, could not find a consensus inside chavismo if they were to be discussed. By imposing them from above it is supposed to spare chavismo from potential divisions. At the price of democracy of course, but these people never were democrats.
Without entering into dramatic major conspiracy theories about chavismo putting up big brother screens in our homes courtesy of the enabling law, we can observe cynically that the enabling laws seeks strict control of opposition political parties finances. Even though chavismo abuses the money of the states for its campaigns, and has severely limited access to opposition candidate sin the media, the disastrous economy keeps strengthening the opposition. The only way left for chavismo to control the opposition, short of putting them into concentration camp, it to make it impossible to find electoral financing. That can only push the opposition, AND dissident chavismo toward violence.
Corruption has so corroded chavismo, has created so many groups wanting their share that the only way the regime can find to control and to spread around the money to its true supporters is to make all currency managed directly by a political group inside the presidential palace. The enabling law does offer that possibility. Increased corruption is certain because now all importations would be made in theory through the regime which will sell to the private sector, forbidding them to do their own timely purchases overseas. That the economy will be pushed fast to a standstill is not a problem for the regime, what they want is to centralize all the commissions gained though imports at favorable currency exchanges.
The three notes above will have devastating effects fast, something that chavismo in its ideological arrogance is unable to perceive. And thus once the "noble" objectives fail, within 6 months at most, the enabling law will still be running long enough to start emitting the repressive laws that will invade our private lives.
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