There is an unwritten rule when dealing about information on Venezuela and chavismo: when you try to be objective you always end up with egg on your face. Respected magazine Foreign Policy is feeling the pinch and risks much discredit for its poor managing of a situation coming from a hatchet job text pretending to set the record straight on Leopoldo Lopez.
The offending article was written by Roberto Lovato for Foreign policy: "the making of Leopoldo Lopez". I am not going much into the details of that article nor for the reasons on Foreign Policy reasons to commission such an article from someone that was found to be, after the fact, a collaborator of Telesur. This network is the propaganda vehicle of chavismo. Not that there is anything wrong to pay for a propaganda network, so is FOX in the US. But the point here is that you do not commission an "objective" article from someone working with a network which has for mission to criticize in any possible way, true or false, the Venezuelan opposition to the regime. Might as well trust FoxNews for a fair article on, say, Hillary Clinton (or Bernie Sanders for that matter).
The first mistake of Foreign Policy was to actually dare to have an objective piece on a political prisoner. As if this were possible in Venezuela or elsewhere. A political prisoner by nature is a victim and one cannot be neutral or objective on a victim.
The second mistake, was not to dig a little bit more on Lovato's background, the kind of mistake that the former editor, Moises Naim, would not have done. Moises Naim, a Chavez opponent before this one was elected first, has never been criticized on its seriousness and use of true facts when arguing his criticism of the bolivarian farce. The surprising demonizing of Lopez was promptly noted for its deep inaccuracies and twisting of "facts", never mind the use of hearsay on Lopez. We can already observe that Foreign Policy has sensed the problem by appending 7 "updates", something which I am willing to bet is unheard of for other pieces, or is at least a rare phenomenon.
But that was not enough. The evidence of the hatchet job piece by Lovato has forced Foreign Policy to publish a rebuttal article from Leopoldo Lopez lawyer: "The other side of Leopolodo Lopez". I am not going to enter on the details of that piece either. The reader can read both and make up his or her mind on that matter. However I cannot fail to observe that Lovato was granted a reply in that article, a luxury that has not been accorded to critics of the Lovato piece.
On this reply by Lovato I will comment. He is not forthcoming on his partisanship and writes disingenuously that "My story is about López’s political history, particularly as it relates to events surrounding Venezuela’s 2002 coup attempt.". Reading that piece you will see that it is about much more than that and aims at casting a shadow on Lopez with more than just 2002. He also has the gall to call my estimated colleague Juan Nagel to his defense as if he were praising the article when this one is quite clear that it is a necessary read to understand how the chavista mind sees Lopez. He even writes "it is not a hack job" which in my book, is far from justifying the use of the word "hailed" by Lovato.
All in all this does not damage Mr. Lovato credit in pro Chavez groups where his article has been widely used for propaganda. It is an unnecessary attack on what is a political prisoner whose history of victimization by the regime has reached as far as vindication from International Human rights courts and organizations. In the end it is a discredit on the editors of Foreign Policy and a new proof that objectivity when dealing with rogue regime is a doomed farce.
Update: Mr. Lovato also seems to have worked for outright Chavez propaganda outlets.
Showing posts with label political prosecution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label political prosecution. Show all posts
Tuesday, 8 September 2015
Thursday, 13 August 2015
Baduelismus
A strange surprise came yesterday. General Baduel, former savior of Chavez (2002), former defense minister of Chavez, one of his personal own first political prisoners has been released from jail. Sure enough he is blocked at home, but he is out of military jail.
That he served most of his jail sentence on trumped up charges (who is not corrupt inside chavismo?) and thus was "released" to complete the rest of his sentence at home is a mere detail. What is important here is that the regime has dared to release who was a seen as one of Chavez very own political prisoners.
The reader must understand one thing about Venezuela: there are two type of political prisoners, those of the revolution and those that are Chavez personal prisoners, such as judge Afiuni, Baduel and even Lopez, though this one is a prisoner of both. The revolution political prisoners can be jailed or released at will, such are the cases of Ceballos, former mayor of San Cristobal or Simonovis of 2002 fame unjustly jailed for revolutionary political need. There are also Chavez very own political exiles, such as Rosales former Zulia governor and Chavez 2006 campaign opponent, or journalist Poleo. In short, those that Chavez has placed on his very own list in theory cannot benefit from any measure of grace. Only Afiuni did get some alleviation to her plight due to the intense international pressure, but her trial is going fast nowhere.
Thus the importance of Baduel's release. For this to happen there must have been a powerful reason, a significant movement inside chavismo to face down a Chavez order. The reader should be immediately reassured: this mean nothing good for the opposition no matter what a portion of Twitterzuela tried to make of it last night.
You can speculate, offer many readings. Here is mine for those still reading.
The jailing of Baduel had created a rift inside the armed forces. For sure, these were not going to oppose Chavez for many reasons, one being that cash was flowing into their pocket. But there was a rift inside because Baduel as a former defense minister was the voice of the army for a while and as such deserved more respect, even from Chavez. Baduel's jail was a direct message to the army to behave and it was understood as such.
But the resentment remained and now that Chavez is gone the army feels the need to come together again and freeing Baduel goes a long way even if the guy now has little power in it. Thus the real question is why is the army coming back together, taking such a stand?
The situation of the country is deteriorating fast. It is clear now with the recent looting and recent polls that the regime is overstaying its welcome and is decided in leaving nothing standing in its wake. Burnt earth they also call it. The people that will be left behind to try to hold things together, no matter what government comes, are the armed forces that will have to do all the necessary repression.
Thus, for me at least, the army comes together because it not only needs to be united to face coming harder times, but also because it needs to weigh carefully its actions so as not to be blamed for the mess left behind by Chavez. That does not mean the army is good or bad, or that a coup is around the corner. To begin with, a coup is unnecessary as this is already a military regime. What the army is probably doing at this point is getting its act together to intervene as a single voice to dictate to the civilians in the regime what to do, or to rule over a transition regime, or if needs be, to tolerate an opposition government as long as the army goes unscathed of any crime it committed during the Chavez years.
Nothing major happens inside Venezuela without the consent or action of the Army. Releasing Baduel cannot have happened without this one consent as I, for one, am absolutely sure that Maduro would not have released of his own accord a Chavez prisoner, amen of the proven cruelty of Maduro.
That is why Baduel's release is so interesting. All specuatlions maybe allowed, but what this really means is that pieces are moving inside the regime. Perhaps faster than one may surmise.
That he served most of his jail sentence on trumped up charges (who is not corrupt inside chavismo?) and thus was "released" to complete the rest of his sentence at home is a mere detail. What is important here is that the regime has dared to release who was a seen as one of Chavez very own political prisoners.
The reader must understand one thing about Venezuela: there are two type of political prisoners, those of the revolution and those that are Chavez personal prisoners, such as judge Afiuni, Baduel and even Lopez, though this one is a prisoner of both. The revolution political prisoners can be jailed or released at will, such are the cases of Ceballos, former mayor of San Cristobal or Simonovis of 2002 fame unjustly jailed for revolutionary political need. There are also Chavez very own political exiles, such as Rosales former Zulia governor and Chavez 2006 campaign opponent, or journalist Poleo. In short, those that Chavez has placed on his very own list in theory cannot benefit from any measure of grace. Only Afiuni did get some alleviation to her plight due to the intense international pressure, but her trial is going fast nowhere.
Thus the importance of Baduel's release. For this to happen there must have been a powerful reason, a significant movement inside chavismo to face down a Chavez order. The reader should be immediately reassured: this mean nothing good for the opposition no matter what a portion of Twitterzuela tried to make of it last night.
You can speculate, offer many readings. Here is mine for those still reading.
The jailing of Baduel had created a rift inside the armed forces. For sure, these were not going to oppose Chavez for many reasons, one being that cash was flowing into their pocket. But there was a rift inside because Baduel as a former defense minister was the voice of the army for a while and as such deserved more respect, even from Chavez. Baduel's jail was a direct message to the army to behave and it was understood as such.
But the resentment remained and now that Chavez is gone the army feels the need to come together again and freeing Baduel goes a long way even if the guy now has little power in it. Thus the real question is why is the army coming back together, taking such a stand?
The situation of the country is deteriorating fast. It is clear now with the recent looting and recent polls that the regime is overstaying its welcome and is decided in leaving nothing standing in its wake. Burnt earth they also call it. The people that will be left behind to try to hold things together, no matter what government comes, are the armed forces that will have to do all the necessary repression.
Thus, for me at least, the army comes together because it not only needs to be united to face coming harder times, but also because it needs to weigh carefully its actions so as not to be blamed for the mess left behind by Chavez. That does not mean the army is good or bad, or that a coup is around the corner. To begin with, a coup is unnecessary as this is already a military regime. What the army is probably doing at this point is getting its act together to intervene as a single voice to dictate to the civilians in the regime what to do, or to rule over a transition regime, or if needs be, to tolerate an opposition government as long as the army goes unscathed of any crime it committed during the Chavez years.
Nothing major happens inside Venezuela without the consent or action of the Army. Releasing Baduel cannot have happened without this one consent as I, for one, am absolutely sure that Maduro would not have released of his own accord a Chavez prisoner, amen of the proven cruelty of Maduro.
That is why Baduel's release is so interesting. All specuatlions maybe allowed, but what this really means is that pieces are moving inside the regime. Perhaps faster than one may surmise.
Wednesday, 16 October 2013
A disabling enabling law
Certainly, that the Maduro's enabling law was presented yesterday officially does not mean that it will be approved and that even if it is approved a predictable Armageddon will follow. The outrage yesterday is that when a regime decides to roll the dice with such a law it means that we are in dire straits, that its ability to run the country is on the skids.
There is a difference between this enabling law and the ones passed before, or even the attempt at constitutional change sought in 2007. These previous attempts were at least supported by the clear preference of the country for Chavez, for whatever misguided love his voters had for him. Also their scope was less ambitious in that Chavez sought to control specifics (or all in 2007 but at least it was through a constitutional reform submitted to popular vote). What we got yesterday was the declared intention of the regime to control all of the economic aspects of the country and, through them, our private lives. Fascism or Communism, your choice, there are both of these elements in the brief proposal submitted yesterday.
By submitting such an unconstitutional law, and worse, simply an improper law, the regime has rolled the dice and called for an open, unavoidable, political crisis. The reasons are a dropping popularity, a misfit president with Maduro, a camarilla of desperate people afraid to lose their privileges and go to jail after a regime change. And more that we have discussed in the past. What is more interesting today is to see the possible scenarios. With the pathological secretiveness of the regime coupled with constant disinformation leaks, we cannot foresee any specific one. But we can draw general consequences.
The easiest, in a way, scenario to imagine is that the law does not pass. The regime needs 99 votes and it has only 98 "certain". The thing here that could bring an unexpected surprise is that the enabling law can be, and would be used to purge chavismo rank and file as needed. As such we can be sure that more than one chavista representative is secretly wondering what is the worse fate for him/her: to vote against or to vote for. Voting against makes you a pariah, maybe, inside chavismo but gives enough time to resign, pack your stuff and leave the country if needed. Voting for it means that suddenly some day you can be thrown speedily to the wolves when needed, just as it happened last week with Valencia mayor, Parra, and his family.
This possibility, not to be discarded, would be a major setback for Maduro, make the division inside chavismo wide open which is all but certain to provoke the departure of Maduro in a matter of months. We do not know what would replace Maduro, from fair elections to open military regime, but such a political defeat coupled to his very questionable legitimacy would make his position unsustainable.
The scenario of approval are two, depending on how the law is approved.
If the regime cannot find inside the opposition that 99th vote, it may be tempted to pass the law anyway though the help of the high court which is now used to violate the 1999 Constitution as needed. The high court could either remove representatives on any pretext or even "interpret" constitutional requirement. It does not matter, a political crisis would follow. Capriles is already on record saying that if the enabling law is not voted according to the Constitution he will not recognize it. And we can be sure that he will not be alone as one objective of the enabling law is to destroy the current opposition structure. If the chavista regime were to pass illegally the enabling law it would mean that they are also doing a final coup, they will have no other choice. The opposition leadership will be cornered and forced to take a stand.
The regime may also find that mysterious 99th vote. It has been at work on that for months now, blackmailing and bribing as many representatives as possible. They may yet succeed though so far it does not seem to be the case. But if indeed suddenly an additional opposition representative were to go to the dark side the "victory" would be an empty one. A political crisis would also follow in this scenario but it will operate in two times. At first, there may be a rather small political crisis inside the opposition since the betrayal may lead a handful more representatives to feel lost in the dictatorship and seek some accommodation.
But as the regime starts publishing the laws derived from the enabling law, chavismo will go into purge mode as the conflict between Maduro and Cabello, the radicals and the pragmatists will have to be played out, each side trying to take advantage of the splinter opposition. Or not, it does not matter. Chavismo owes its current façade of unity to the unified opposition which slow but continuous grow scares the heirs of Chavez. The paradox of an Enabling Law victory through dividing the opposition is that this could speed up the break down of chavismo.
As the "debate" starts in the Assembly for the dictatorship law we can only be pessimistic. Corruption and the economic crisis will not be solved though that law because the only thing it will do is exacerbate the economic control system, held by the same people who have proven their disregard for economic realities in the last decade and a half. The Venezuelan currency went from 500 to 50,000 for a US dollar, no more comments are needed to prove that point. Unfortunately the other aspect of the enabling law that some people on each side wish for, to postpone a political crisis, will not work either as described above.
The enabling law will accelerate the economic and political crises, whether it passes, whether it is applied if it passes.
---------------------------------------
Notes
The Enabling Law of Maduro, as justified by chavismo, is not justifiable. All the laws necessary for the objectives searched are in the books already or could be voted by the comfortable majority that chavismo holds in parliament courtesy of the obscene gerrymandering of 2010 election. The problem for chavismo is that some of the laws needed to either control the economy or make it more manageable, more pragmatical, could not find a consensus inside chavismo if they were to be discussed. By imposing them from above it is supposed to spare chavismo from potential divisions. At the price of democracy of course, but these people never were democrats.
Without entering into dramatic major conspiracy theories about chavismo putting up big brother screens in our homes courtesy of the enabling law, we can observe cynically that the enabling laws seeks strict control of opposition political parties finances. Even though chavismo abuses the money of the states for its campaigns, and has severely limited access to opposition candidate sin the media, the disastrous economy keeps strengthening the opposition. The only way left for chavismo to control the opposition, short of putting them into concentration camp, it to make it impossible to find electoral financing. That can only push the opposition, AND dissident chavismo toward violence.
Corruption has so corroded chavismo, has created so many groups wanting their share that the only way the regime can find to control and to spread around the money to its true supporters is to make all currency managed directly by a political group inside the presidential palace. The enabling law does offer that possibility. Increased corruption is certain because now all importations would be made in theory through the regime which will sell to the private sector, forbidding them to do their own timely purchases overseas. That the economy will be pushed fast to a standstill is not a problem for the regime, what they want is to centralize all the commissions gained though imports at favorable currency exchanges.
The three notes above will have devastating effects fast, something that chavismo in its ideological arrogance is unable to perceive. And thus once the "noble" objectives fail, within 6 months at most, the enabling law will still be running long enough to start emitting the repressive laws that will invade our private lives.
 |
| Will that change this week? |
There is a difference between this enabling law and the ones passed before, or even the attempt at constitutional change sought in 2007. These previous attempts were at least supported by the clear preference of the country for Chavez, for whatever misguided love his voters had for him. Also their scope was less ambitious in that Chavez sought to control specifics (or all in 2007 but at least it was through a constitutional reform submitted to popular vote). What we got yesterday was the declared intention of the regime to control all of the economic aspects of the country and, through them, our private lives. Fascism or Communism, your choice, there are both of these elements in the brief proposal submitted yesterday.
By submitting such an unconstitutional law, and worse, simply an improper law, the regime has rolled the dice and called for an open, unavoidable, political crisis. The reasons are a dropping popularity, a misfit president with Maduro, a camarilla of desperate people afraid to lose their privileges and go to jail after a regime change. And more that we have discussed in the past. What is more interesting today is to see the possible scenarios. With the pathological secretiveness of the regime coupled with constant disinformation leaks, we cannot foresee any specific one. But we can draw general consequences.
The easiest, in a way, scenario to imagine is that the law does not pass. The regime needs 99 votes and it has only 98 "certain". The thing here that could bring an unexpected surprise is that the enabling law can be, and would be used to purge chavismo rank and file as needed. As such we can be sure that more than one chavista representative is secretly wondering what is the worse fate for him/her: to vote against or to vote for. Voting against makes you a pariah, maybe, inside chavismo but gives enough time to resign, pack your stuff and leave the country if needed. Voting for it means that suddenly some day you can be thrown speedily to the wolves when needed, just as it happened last week with Valencia mayor, Parra, and his family.
This possibility, not to be discarded, would be a major setback for Maduro, make the division inside chavismo wide open which is all but certain to provoke the departure of Maduro in a matter of months. We do not know what would replace Maduro, from fair elections to open military regime, but such a political defeat coupled to his very questionable legitimacy would make his position unsustainable.
The scenario of approval are two, depending on how the law is approved.
If the regime cannot find inside the opposition that 99th vote, it may be tempted to pass the law anyway though the help of the high court which is now used to violate the 1999 Constitution as needed. The high court could either remove representatives on any pretext or even "interpret" constitutional requirement. It does not matter, a political crisis would follow. Capriles is already on record saying that if the enabling law is not voted according to the Constitution he will not recognize it. And we can be sure that he will not be alone as one objective of the enabling law is to destroy the current opposition structure. If the chavista regime were to pass illegally the enabling law it would mean that they are also doing a final coup, they will have no other choice. The opposition leadership will be cornered and forced to take a stand.
The regime may also find that mysterious 99th vote. It has been at work on that for months now, blackmailing and bribing as many representatives as possible. They may yet succeed though so far it does not seem to be the case. But if indeed suddenly an additional opposition representative were to go to the dark side the "victory" would be an empty one. A political crisis would also follow in this scenario but it will operate in two times. At first, there may be a rather small political crisis inside the opposition since the betrayal may lead a handful more representatives to feel lost in the dictatorship and seek some accommodation.
But as the regime starts publishing the laws derived from the enabling law, chavismo will go into purge mode as the conflict between Maduro and Cabello, the radicals and the pragmatists will have to be played out, each side trying to take advantage of the splinter opposition. Or not, it does not matter. Chavismo owes its current façade of unity to the unified opposition which slow but continuous grow scares the heirs of Chavez. The paradox of an Enabling Law victory through dividing the opposition is that this could speed up the break down of chavismo.
As the "debate" starts in the Assembly for the dictatorship law we can only be pessimistic. Corruption and the economic crisis will not be solved though that law because the only thing it will do is exacerbate the economic control system, held by the same people who have proven their disregard for economic realities in the last decade and a half. The Venezuelan currency went from 500 to 50,000 for a US dollar, no more comments are needed to prove that point. Unfortunately the other aspect of the enabling law that some people on each side wish for, to postpone a political crisis, will not work either as described above.
The enabling law will accelerate the economic and political crises, whether it passes, whether it is applied if it passes.
---------------------------------------
Notes
The Enabling Law of Maduro, as justified by chavismo, is not justifiable. All the laws necessary for the objectives searched are in the books already or could be voted by the comfortable majority that chavismo holds in parliament courtesy of the obscene gerrymandering of 2010 election. The problem for chavismo is that some of the laws needed to either control the economy or make it more manageable, more pragmatical, could not find a consensus inside chavismo if they were to be discussed. By imposing them from above it is supposed to spare chavismo from potential divisions. At the price of democracy of course, but these people never were democrats.
Without entering into dramatic major conspiracy theories about chavismo putting up big brother screens in our homes courtesy of the enabling law, we can observe cynically that the enabling laws seeks strict control of opposition political parties finances. Even though chavismo abuses the money of the states for its campaigns, and has severely limited access to opposition candidate sin the media, the disastrous economy keeps strengthening the opposition. The only way left for chavismo to control the opposition, short of putting them into concentration camp, it to make it impossible to find electoral financing. That can only push the opposition, AND dissident chavismo toward violence.
Corruption has so corroded chavismo, has created so many groups wanting their share that the only way the regime can find to control and to spread around the money to its true supporters is to make all currency managed directly by a political group inside the presidential palace. The enabling law does offer that possibility. Increased corruption is certain because now all importations would be made in theory through the regime which will sell to the private sector, forbidding them to do their own timely purchases overseas. That the economy will be pushed fast to a standstill is not a problem for the regime, what they want is to centralize all the commissions gained though imports at favorable currency exchanges.
The three notes above will have devastating effects fast, something that chavismo in its ideological arrogance is unable to perceive. And thus once the "noble" objectives fail, within 6 months at most, the enabling law will still be running long enough to start emitting the repressive laws that will invade our private lives.
Tuesday, 27 August 2013
Venezuela's Dog Days of August, as in barking
This summer has been nothing of the quiet vacation time, the regime pushing up its attacks while the country is supposedly anesthetized by the summer break. Well, it is always summer here, let's call it the school break. And yet for all its effort the regime is not reaching its goals. Not that the opposition is reaching theirs, mind you. What is at work here is the relentless crisis that seems to be reshuffling the deck constantly. Thus maybe it is time to do a short summary at where we stand at.
The regime
No more pussy footing here. The regime has barked the dictatorship in that it has announced its intention to demolish the opposition. For this, fake charges are being processed against the opposition leadership, media is bought out, left without printing paper, blackmailed. Assassination attempts are made up on a monthly basis. The regime will do anything it can strong-hand to diminish the adverse result coming its way in December, the last elections that will be held with a semblance of democracy in that the opposition should improve slightly its current holdings. That the opposition will improve its holdings is not of concern for the regime: enforcing of the Communes Law will neuter fast any town-hall lost. What the regime needs is to minimize the opposition gains to avoid to avoid further loss of legitimacy in public opinion, here or abroad. Nobody takes the Maduro regime seriously. All know the electoral fraud of last April and all are actually waiting for a major defeat in December to become more vocal about it. Even the allied rogues are not as supportive as one may think they should.
Inside chavismo things are far from settled. Maduro seems more in place, but not on his own merits. In fact, his personal image is getting worse as it is painfully apparent that he is there because Chavez said so, not out of any merit he may have earned, besides his talents for sycophancy. Let's make it simple: the guy is clearly woefully unprepared for his job. Neither was Chavez but at least he had a sick charisma and a clear personal goal to direct his actions. Maduro seems lost at sea, being mean not enough to give sense to an administration. The impression of him being more in charge than two months ago seems to come more from chavismo rallying around him for electoral purposes, thus postponing the final settlement for next year.
Do not be fooled: chavismo troubles are far from being settled. That the candidates for mayor were appointed rather than selected through primaries proves beyond a doubt that chavismo is afraid of internal democracy as it is afraid of external one. Thus Cabello, for the time being, rallied to Maduro to the point of figuring both in the latest fake assassination target. One may suppose that equality in ridicule is a positive value inside chavismo.
The democrats
The big help for the opposition is the economic crisis that shows no sign of abating. No matter what the regime plans, they exhausted their funds for last October to reelect Chavez and barely had enough to ensure Maduro win in April, with the help of a few dead and multiple voters. The economic mess insure that no matter how much money they throw in the streets, basic food and power shortages will not be solved by December. And may actually get worse! After all the currency keeps diving: the black market rate is 38 for a dollar today while the official is 6,3, and the SICAD is around 11 though the regime does nto give much through SICAD. Think about it for a second: in 1999 when Chavez took office the dollar was around 0.5, and now at 30+ it means a >60 fold loss!!!!! At some point it was meant to hit the regime even with an oil barrel at 100+.
There is trouble inside the democrats too, but compared to trouble inside chavismo, they are doing great. True, there has been a few money induced desertions but all in all the opposition is holding its ground and some of the dissident may still find the way back to the fold. and for those that do not find their way back, the electoral disaster awaiting them will have at least the benefit of purging the opposition of a certain number of moles and saboteurs. The real problems are elsewhere.
There still those idiot enough to preach abstention without offering anything in exchange. Truly, they would be working for chavismo they could not be more efficient. Short of marching together to burn down the CNE and Miraflores the only option is to participate actively in December AND man all the polling stations to minimize as much as possible multiple voting and the zombie vote. I do not see these voices do either one. Fortunately it seems that the movement is starting to ebb as reality hits.
Another problem is coming from a few who decided now to criticize Capriles as the leader of the opposition. As if we had chance to pull one out of the hat to direct the campaign for next December... Certainly I never supported Capriles, only rallying him as the consensus leader. His 50% in April certainly give him the right to hold the helm until at least December 9. But some people seem to want faster exits to our crisis, or more intellectually pleasing ones such as this embarrassing tone deaf entry which proves that when you live for too long outside Venezuela......
Unfortunately the true problem is the loss of Globovision, the last network where albeit its limited national coverage the opposition could still make its points known. The new campaign is now run with a total governmental air waves hegemony where only snippets of the opposition campaign may be seen occasionally. The opposition is now forced to walk the walk and reply on Facebook and Twitter and web pages. We'll see how truly connected the country is.
September is coming. Now you have the scene as it is, before possible momentous changes start. We'll see.
The regime
No more pussy footing here. The regime has barked the dictatorship in that it has announced its intention to demolish the opposition. For this, fake charges are being processed against the opposition leadership, media is bought out, left without printing paper, blackmailed. Assassination attempts are made up on a monthly basis. The regime will do anything it can strong-hand to diminish the adverse result coming its way in December, the last elections that will be held with a semblance of democracy in that the opposition should improve slightly its current holdings. That the opposition will improve its holdings is not of concern for the regime: enforcing of the Communes Law will neuter fast any town-hall lost. What the regime needs is to minimize the opposition gains to avoid to avoid further loss of legitimacy in public opinion, here or abroad. Nobody takes the Maduro regime seriously. All know the electoral fraud of last April and all are actually waiting for a major defeat in December to become more vocal about it. Even the allied rogues are not as supportive as one may think they should.
Inside chavismo things are far from settled. Maduro seems more in place, but not on his own merits. In fact, his personal image is getting worse as it is painfully apparent that he is there because Chavez said so, not out of any merit he may have earned, besides his talents for sycophancy. Let's make it simple: the guy is clearly woefully unprepared for his job. Neither was Chavez but at least he had a sick charisma and a clear personal goal to direct his actions. Maduro seems lost at sea, being mean not enough to give sense to an administration. The impression of him being more in charge than two months ago seems to come more from chavismo rallying around him for electoral purposes, thus postponing the final settlement for next year.
Do not be fooled: chavismo troubles are far from being settled. That the candidates for mayor were appointed rather than selected through primaries proves beyond a doubt that chavismo is afraid of internal democracy as it is afraid of external one. Thus Cabello, for the time being, rallied to Maduro to the point of figuring both in the latest fake assassination target. One may suppose that equality in ridicule is a positive value inside chavismo.
The democrats
The big help for the opposition is the economic crisis that shows no sign of abating. No matter what the regime plans, they exhausted their funds for last October to reelect Chavez and barely had enough to ensure Maduro win in April, with the help of a few dead and multiple voters. The economic mess insure that no matter how much money they throw in the streets, basic food and power shortages will not be solved by December. And may actually get worse! After all the currency keeps diving: the black market rate is 38 for a dollar today while the official is 6,3, and the SICAD is around 11 though the regime does nto give much through SICAD. Think about it for a second: in 1999 when Chavez took office the dollar was around 0.5, and now at 30+ it means a >60 fold loss!!!!! At some point it was meant to hit the regime even with an oil barrel at 100+.
There is trouble inside the democrats too, but compared to trouble inside chavismo, they are doing great. True, there has been a few money induced desertions but all in all the opposition is holding its ground and some of the dissident may still find the way back to the fold. and for those that do not find their way back, the electoral disaster awaiting them will have at least the benefit of purging the opposition of a certain number of moles and saboteurs. The real problems are elsewhere.
There still those idiot enough to preach abstention without offering anything in exchange. Truly, they would be working for chavismo they could not be more efficient. Short of marching together to burn down the CNE and Miraflores the only option is to participate actively in December AND man all the polling stations to minimize as much as possible multiple voting and the zombie vote. I do not see these voices do either one. Fortunately it seems that the movement is starting to ebb as reality hits.
Another problem is coming from a few who decided now to criticize Capriles as the leader of the opposition. As if we had chance to pull one out of the hat to direct the campaign for next December... Certainly I never supported Capriles, only rallying him as the consensus leader. His 50% in April certainly give him the right to hold the helm until at least December 9. But some people seem to want faster exits to our crisis, or more intellectually pleasing ones such as this embarrassing tone deaf entry which proves that when you live for too long outside Venezuela......
Unfortunately the true problem is the loss of Globovision, the last network where albeit its limited national coverage the opposition could still make its points known. The new campaign is now run with a total governmental air waves hegemony where only snippets of the opposition campaign may be seen occasionally. The opposition is now forced to walk the walk and reply on Facebook and Twitter and web pages. We'll see how truly connected the country is.
September is coming. Now you have the scene as it is, before possible momentous changes start. We'll see.
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