The 2015 election: final review

The good thing about landslides is that detailed study of vote movement is not necessary nor possible since the anger vote is difficult to assess and predict for the future. In democratic countries this is not really an issue: Mauritius had once a 100% district parliament win fort a single party and it never stopped being a democracy. Thus after reviewing the highlights we may try to summarize the whole thing.

I reviewed the worst chavista defeats, the crown jewel falling to the opposition in full, the ill fate of the dissidents, the division in the new majority. For further details Tal Cual has a nice graph about the MUD growth in each district from 2010 to 2015. So let's summarize a few points.

Below is the update of the Caucaguita graph including Sunday 6 result.

Caucaguita went to the opposition and thus the help it supposed to be for chavismo in the gerrymandering did not work out. As reader Boludo Tejano pointed out, that gerrymandering does not work does not mean "it blew up in your face". Though in Barinas it was a clear case of such thing: the newly drawn three seats district could have gone only one or two for opposition before but went down all three. Another infamously redrawn district, Valencia South, went all three seats for the opposition.

What is interesting in the Caucaguita numbers above is that the opposition growth followed its old pattern: the vote to punish Maduro only played a role in that the opposition went above chavismo when in projection it should have been slightly below. There is the bad news for chavismo: there was an anger vote but there was also growing opposition vote. Which one is which will be revealed over the next years, but the trend was there even if in some states the MUD vote had truly circumstantial "angry voter" jumps.

The angry vote as it explained anything was the extreme polarization of the country. Third party candidates fared particularly bad. You were for Maduro or you were not. And let's not forget that a significant portion of the Maduro vote was out of fear. Had elections be free we may be talking today of a National Assembly Mauritius style. Yet, this uncertainty about how much of its gains are real should give pause to the MUD as it must find ways to retain enough of this angry vote to retain a parliamentary majority in the future. The upcoming CNE will probably eliminate the gerrymandering of the currently chavista controlled CNE and future 2/3 majorities cannot be counted upon again.

Another lesson should be taken away from these elections: the electoral fraud of chavismo may be everywhere but at vote counting time it only works if turnout is rather low. From all information we can listen to, if there are possible local vote padding, those were ineffective. True, the electoral fraud actually takes place BEFORE the vote by making it impossible for the opposition to campaign effectively. But we hope that from today on the campaign in pro of abstention will be finally silenced and redirected to fight pre-election fraud.

In the end the strategy of the opposition to do nothing and wait for the elections worked ONLY because the economy got worse than anyone expected. Thus at this point trying to figure out the effect of Leopoldo Lopez protest of 2014 and subsequent martyrdom cannot be evaluated out of the vote itself. Yet I propose that the spectacular sweep of Caracas by the opposition owes something to Leopoldo (and Maria Corina and Ledezma). His Caracas protest and the locally felt regime's overboard reactions have energized the opposition there even though people like Capriles poo-pooed it.

We thus got a 2/3 majority which contrary to the pessimist crowd I think should hold long enough to pass key decisions that will affect future electoral contests. One is the renewal of the electoral board CNE. Another one is to remove part of the censorship that affects election campaigns. With this the material advantage of the regime at election time will be lowered considerably. If we can get at least that much next year, and I trust we will, then this election would have been worth it just for that, for allowing the return of a real political debate that may avoid a civil war.

Finally, when we look at the results in some details there is no way to hide the unmitigated disaster the vote was for the regime even if it tries to disguise the disaster by, well, ignoring it. Even though the PSUV held "primaries", even though it did manage to spread a few goodies at the last minute, two years of long lines under the sun and rain have done the regime a permanent damage. And it seems that all hell is about to break lose inside chavismo. Let's not forget that when such a mass movement finds itself so degraded is when it can become more dangerous and bring more harm than ever. Or peter out fast. Let's hope for the alter.

The 2015 results: polarization, when thou hold us enthralled!

This entry is for the anecdotal part. There were some "independents/dissenter" candidates. What was their fate?

The polarization of the country rolled over them without pity.


The ones from the opposition side, who should have fared batter than those from PSUV were not only laminated but actually caused the loss of at the very least one seat for the MUD. Imagine it at 113! And because of two of them Maria Corina Machado has created a lot of grief for herself, when she should have been one of the heroines of the election campaign for her selfless dedication to campaigning for whomever wanted her presence at meetings.

There was one seat where I thought that MCM would have scored; the one in Lara for Palavecino where she supported Gomez Sigala. The MUD, unwisely, had decided to put one of the aides of governor Falcon, suspected of hiding in the MUD until better days were ahead for an alliance with the PSUV, together with Marquina who apparently moves a lot across Venezuela, having been representative for the states of Sucre and Miranda.

Gomez Sigala, on the liberal right of the MUD, has been a good representative in that he has been working assiduously during his 5 years tenure. The MUD tossed him out because anyone smelling of free market and private property is, well, unpalatable in a country where all, ALL political parties are some shade of populists. One of the reason by the way MCM has not managed to make her political party, VENTE, viable so far. Traditions are hard to break even if they are intellectually correct and coherent.

Unfortunately the polarization was so high, the desire of a punishing vote on Maduro so exacerbated that Gomez got only 4,160 votes to the 146,424 votes that Marquina got on top of the ticket.  Note that the chavista top got only 67,576 so even a perfect split between the two opposition tickets would have still given that seat for the opposition.

But the stubbornness of Gomez and the unwise political flair of MCM only messed his career but weakened MCM position further inside the MUD. And this was made worse by her support of a dissident MUD in Tachira that this time did give an extra undeserved seat to chavismo allowing the reelection of the unsavory Sanguino. This one got 40,7% of the vote while the combined opposition vote was 59+% (and state wise was 2 to 1 for the opposition!). Note that the MUD candidate got 13% more votes than the dissident candidate, so it was not even close.

In other dissident we had in Caracas Berenice Gomez, firebrand personality of Radio Caracas and with a twitter following of 715K. She pitted herself against Ramos Allup because she thought him (justifiably) weak in front of chavismo corruption due to his family links to financial sectors of chavismo. Well, Ramos got 139.435 votes to 458 for our girl Berenice.  An even split there would have given the seat to the opposition anyway as the chavista candidate only got 56.562 but such are the wonders of polarized electorate, the more so in big cities which have suffered most from the regime's policies.

Another very questionable dissent was the MAS, henceforth a weak member of the MUD as the bulk of its leftist electorate went Chavez long ago. Its score nation wide has been dismal, ruining any chance it has to rejoin the MUD. For example 758 votes out of 1.221.224 votes cast in Caracas Libertador where 9 seats were elected.

As for chavismo dissent, hidden through some diverse parties, it is not even worth discussing. Whatever chavismo dissent existed it went straight to the MUD to punish Maduro, not even staying home as the high participation of the electorate showed.

Just a little note on fake dissent. In Petare district chavismo run William Ojeda. What was notable there is that you needed to wait for election day to discover that Ojeda was also the candidate of PSUV. That is, all the campaign of Ojeda was based on a party judicially hijacked by chavismo, MIN, which run as if they were the opposition, with almost the same color of the MUD brand, and placed, surprise, next to the MUD case on the ballot. The a clear intent to confuse voters, even noted overseas. As I described all of the Petare district was plastered with Ojeda pale blue posters. You would be hard pressed to find a single PSUV poster in red supporting Ojeda. Well, it did not work. Ojeda was TRASHED with 73,840 against MUD standard banner Pizarro with 144.727. To add insult to injury through the PSUV label Ojeda got 68.205 votes while under the MIN label 1.759 votes.

In short it is quite possible that there has been more MIN posters for Ojeda than the MIN actually got in votes.

And keep in mind that more than half of the voters in Petare are from what has been termed the largest continuous barrio/favella/slum in the world. Ain't it that something!

Conclusions;
1) polarization has been worse than ever
2) the MUD victory is clearly due to a big chunk of chavismo voting against Maduro's failed policies and
3) those MUD victory votes are "borrowed". If it is true that once a first switch happens, further switches are much easier for the voters. However this switch is not very constructive. MUD strength was built slowly by chavista voter first abstaining from voting Chavez, and then finally going MUD the following election. I would venture that half of the MUD growth this time can revert easily to chavismo once Maduro is removed from office.

Starting Advent a tad late but...

This morning I dusted off my Christmas music. For the first time in over a decade I can enjoy it truly even though the feast will be meager this year.

I suppose I am late to start Advent but heck, I found this in Facebook so there you go, Christmas is all about sharing!

The last days of Maduro. Or is it of Cabello?

I will try to be short. The actions that Maduro and Cabello are taking are playing against them. One could almost call them suicidal.


Summary: after a begrudging acceptation of results in the wee hours of Monday 7, Maduro and then Cabello have started to push the ante by taking all sorts of measure to neutralize the reach of the newly elected assembly. Accompanying this, of course, we hear a fiery speech to defend the revolution and go above institutions as needed, if we can call the racketeering system that the regime has put in place "institutions". In no particular importance:
- Promotion of the judge that put Leopoldo Lopez in jail
- Swearing o 12 new high court judges without respecting the delays and rules specified in the constitution and laws (written by the regime, by the way).
- Depriving the National Assembly of its own TV network, thus maintaining the country real news black out.
- More promises of the sort such as ruling through "asambleas del pueblo" as if the pueblo had not just voted in 112 seats...
- Sending red shirted thugs to break down press conferences of dissident chavistas (and directing a full blown scale verbal attack on those inside chavismo that want to point out the high levels of the regime as the ones responsible for the defeat).
- Refusing to accept any guilt for the defeat; all is the fault of the economical warfare, of the empire, of the opposition hold on media, etc. Without bothering to present a single shred of evidence: it is my word and that is enough.

Interpretation.

First there was the shock. The regime never expected such a stunning defeat. Like this blogger, it expected that in the end, facing the voting machine, a lot of disgruntled chavista would vote conservative, that is, the 17 year old regime. Except that this blogger knew the polls were too overwhelmingly against the regime and that the vote spread would be 16%, 10% less than what polls were saying.

See, the inner workings of the fraudulent electoral system is that it is not too difficult to apply some make up to bad electoral results. The regime can pad its vote at the last minute if the results are close ("late" voters, voting tables where opposition witness have been banned and which suddenly have 100% participation, and more). But this time around the results were so dramatic that the last minute forcing out of people to go and vote may have resulted in actually more votes for the opposition...

In short the regime was prepared for a narrow victory, at worst. They truly believed it. We cannot conclude otherwise. How come they made such a crass mistake is for the books.

There were two immediate consequences when the results were announced.

The first one was that the repressed dissidence within chavismo was going to cash in, the "I told you so" campaign that the regime had all the trouble in the world to contain would not be contained anymore. And that will be a direct challenge to Maduro and Cabello.

The second one was that the new assembly would sooner or later start investigating the actions of Cabello and his allies (Maduro as the president must be removed from office first before being fully investigated). For Cabello, already under international investigation, it was a sure thing that Venezuela was his safe haven. But not anymore. For him to avoid investigation at home would be at the price of leaving the political scene and, possibly, return part of what he stole or gained illegally. That is, the opposition could only forgive him once it made sure that Cabello could not be a nuisance anymore. Maduro's own unpopularity does not make such process necessary but that his family can now be thoroughly investigated has the same effect on his future.

It is true that the opposition for the sake of political stability and because of the dire economic crisis ahead may chose not to remove Maduro or to investigate Cabello for the time being. But it will happen and there is no way for Maduro and Cabello to recover politically fast enough to block these attempts. A 15% vote defeat cannot be regained in a few month, not even through some form of referendum. By the time chavismo can regain competitiveness it would be too late for both of them.

Hence the sudden and desperate offensive this past week, and the ones to come until January 5. What Maduro and Cabello are doing are desperate measures. Even if they were to be met with some success the economic crisis aggravation as of now would sweep them.

In short, what they are doing right now is counterproductive for their political survival. We are witnessing the last weeks, maybe months at best for them, of Cabello and Maduro. Which is not to say that their replacement would be any better, but that is another story.

Note: since Chavez left for his last trip to Cuba, Maduro and Cabello have been fighting out for his "legacy". Their never ending battle which seemed to go Cabello for a while had a very negative collateral effect: they forgot or did not have time to think about the realities of the country. Not daring to take any of the necessary measures needed to avoid a worsening of the crisis, that had already started in the last year of Chavez, this one came back with a vengeance causing this electoral disaster. They have only themselves to blame and chavismo knows it. Hence the open dissidence of a political system that does not want to go down with Cabello and Maduro.

The 2015 results: Caucaguita (and Caracas) sweetest moment for the MUD

No need to go in where the opposition did its best score, the 112 new 2/3 majority speaks of itself, the blog entry to cover it all would be too long. Instead let's go where the opposition victory may have been the sweetest: Caracas and greater Caracas.

The title of a recent blog entry was "As Caucaguita goes so will the election". I did not know I would be proven so right. Unbelievably the opposition took Caucaguita, going a long way to explain how the MUD took the double seat district of Guarenas and Guatire (and the rest of the country). I was expecting at best, from the graph of that entry, an even score. Well, in Caucaguita the opposition list won with 50.21% against the PSUV list at 46.95%. The closest result for the opposition in Caucaguita were 5 years ago when the opposition list got 80% of what chavismo got. This time it got 110% of the chavista vote....

But if Caucaguita remains justifiably for this blog the bellwether district, the smashing win in Caucaguita was the reflection of the smashing win across the country, none as sweet that the conquest of Caracas and almost all of the greater Caracas. If a popular, urban, low income district like Caucaguita went MUD, how could similar districts of Vargas, Libertador, Petare do otherwise?


The Caracas districts sweep across 5 town-hall, with Libertador, where seat of government resides, being about half the size. The MUD took ALL.

In Libertador the MUD beat 57 to 40 the regime! It took 23 de Enero where the mother of fake revolution martyr Robert Serra was running. In Catia "safe seats" where regime's stars Bernal and Villegas were running, the MUD candidates won by 12%. Jacqueline Faria who said that long lines were fun was trashed by 12% also, in what was supposedly another safe seat reserved for her. Jose Guerra, on foot, house by house, with no budget, took on Jesus Faria, former communist, economist degree from RDA Berlin, ex minister of Chavez, credit control comission at the NA, and beat him by 9 points. In total, 8 out of 9 seats.

In Miranda as expected the opposition took Baruta/Chacao. But the regime had gerrymandered the two districts of Baruta/Chacao/Petare in such ways that from 4 seats it only sends 2 this time around, using the trimmed and outright stolen portion to reinforce chavistas districts in the South and East of Caracas. And yet it did not work. Placing Caucaguita and similar districts with Guarenas and Guatire to improve chavismo chances did not work: Capriles state secretary list took the district. D'Elia beat by 8 points what was supposed to be a relative safe seat for Eekhout, the strident pasionaria of the regime that was a National Assembly vice president. The other greater Caracas districts went one for the MUD (San Antonio/Los Teques) while the Southern district did remain chavista. If Jaua did manage to get elected it is still a bitter defeat for him and the regime. Dispatched in 2013 to Miranda as a viceroy with a parallel budget and organization to sabotage Capriles, the state wide list of the PSUV was trashed by 20 points. TWENTY POINTS! Yet the gerrymandering was so effective that with its total 5 out of 12 seats the PSUV still gets somewhat over represented.

I have saved the best for last: Vargas. As the Northern border of Caracas Vargas is part of the greater Caracas. A state which has been incomprehensibly chavista when we consider how Chavez mistreated them, it went opposition this time, to the surprise of most observers. And not only it went MUD, but it did so clearly with 52 to 45, giving three out of its 4 seats to the MUD.

The victory for the MUD in the greater Caracas was stunning. It got all the district seats of Caracas and 5 out of 8 of the greater Caracas.  It got votes all across demographics, from wealthy Hatillo districts to emblematic 23 de Enero, where Chavez used to vote, with a clown martyr of the revolution in Robert Serra, where paramilitary colectivos like infamous La Piedrita rule. When 23 de Enero votes were counted in full, the MUD had 48.64% to the 48.16% of chavismo alliance (PSUV alone 44.8 %).

Two years of long lines under the sun took a toll: bastions like Caucaguita and 23 de Enero fell in spite of all the blackmail, pressure, bribes, vote buying and even colectivo terror. End of an era for racial and class divides promoted from the regime.

The 2015 results: stable majority, where art thou?

I am talking of course of who holds the majority inside the 112 elected representatives. This is of utmost importance because there will be the need for a common front to resist the assaults of the regime, from incarceration to plain bribery. Amen of the required speed to pass urgent laws and go above Maduro's sabotage. The stable majority is also required to agree on a more than likely constitutional reform.

Data gathered from Tal Cual who has assigned party labels to the 112 elected folks.
I have roughly distributed them according to suspected ideology.
Note that in Venezuela EVERYONE claims to be at the very least left of Center.
VENTE (Maria Corina Machado) is the only one openly right of center.
Colors assigned are inasmuch as possible, through Excel, those of the political parties.

The good news is that in spite of the scatter inside that new 112 majority, managing to get the 84 required to get everyday decisions should not be too difficult. Note, those "majority" numbers are from the existence of 55 PSUV that will always vote NO.

The initial weakness of this new assembly is its ability to resist PSUV/Regime pressure. That pressure at first can come from bribes or threats. But as the PSUV makes it through its necessary aggiornamento it is quite possible that some inside the opposition alliance may be tempted to explore dalliances with the PSUV. Thus the next graph where the MUD parties are ranked through what I think are their more leftist to less leftist willingness to seek agreements with the regime. The division is not a comfortable right/left division because some parties, dues to their long time unjustly jailed leader might chose not to speak to the PSUV.

From this figure we can see already that if it is not too difficult for the regime to pry away some members to void the 2/3 supernumerary majority, the one at 3/5 is quite safe for the time being (100). There is simply no way for the regime to get overtime a working bare majority.

Finally we can look at how easy it is to create a majority within that majority, namely 112/2=56 seats. That is the required "inner" majority to lead the rest.

I have put in light lavender the three parties that are more likely to work together on the big issues. And it turns out that they are also the three largest fractions. Between them, UNT, AD and PJ, they would be holding, if Tal Cual is right, 79 which is way more than 56...  And to their right or to their left they can find without much trouble the missing ones to get the 84 parliament simple majority to dispatch everyday matters. I guess that the lone seats from Convergencia and ABP can also be added to the 79 so they are 81. Thus the 3 missing to reach 84 can come on their own from any of 5 other parties which have 3 or more seats.

As I can see for the time being, UNT, AD and PJ are forced to work together, which should not be too difficult at force. Any one of them that can get Voluntad Popular support on a given measure can put pressure on the other two to compromise its way. The minor parties will need to form parliamentary groups to make sure that they can have some influence.

In practical results the presidency and two vice-presidencies of the Assembly will be decided over the three biggies. The smaller players will have to be tamed through commissions chairs and vice chairs.

And chavismo already knows that. Together with the bitterness at some of their defeats (see previous post) goes a long way to explain the panic within Cabello and Maduro entourage....

The 2015 results: chavismo worst losses

Considering how upset chavismo is and how discombobulated Maduro and Cabello are I thought that I would start the result analysis by selecting some of chavimso worst results, losses that are truly troubling for the future of chavismo as a national movement. Namely Omar Prieto in Zulia, the Aragua case and Parequeima in Anzoategui.


Omar Prieto, the Zulia future power that went back to save his town-hall

Omar Prieto was, in my opinion, one of the worst creatures that chavismo has begotten. He managed somehow to get hold of the Southern area of Maracaibo, San Francisco, which normally would go opposition, albeit by narrow margins. From there he managed sabotage campaigns against former governor Perez, and was even promoted against current governor Arias by the more radical wings of chavismo. In short until last Sunday he was the potential future owner of Zulia, in the mold of Cabello like roughness. It also appealed that his tall, mestizo, forceful demeanor was in tune with the racist chavista new man. Thus Prieto was the top ticket of chavismo for Zulia.

Well, all of this changed Sunday, to the point that Prieto decided to give up his freshly gained National Assembly seat to remain San Francisco mayor.

The numbers are without possible appeal.

I would like to point out that there were 12% more voters participating this time around, which makes the result in actual votes above much worse than what they look for our boy Omar. Thus what cynically Prieto is doing is staying at San Francisco where he is the top cacique rather than being an obscure to irrelevant politico at the new National Assembly...  But we also must admit to the political necessity to preserve Zulia's second biggest town-hall in the hands of chavismo because his departure would provoke a new mayoral election that chavismo would surely lose. (Note: his state wide list got ONLY 36.3% !!!; and thus his governor run next year is right now doubtful).

Aragua, "the birth state of the revolution" is a landslide for the opposition

This one gotta hurt a lot.

Aragua has been perhaps the most consistent supporter of chavismo. This time around chavismo only managed one spot in the Aragua state wide list. All the other seats, even the gerrymandered ones, went opposition, sometimes with surprising margins. 8 out 9 seats for the MUD.

From this we can see that the collapse of chavista vote is due in equal parts to abstention and crossing over, amplifying a movement that has been going on haphazardly since 2012 (Capriles was already only 80K behind Maduro in 2013).

Many explanations here. Maneuvers to destroy popular opposition leaders like Richard Mardo backfired. The imposition of Chavez last interior minister, Tarek el-Aissami turned out to be a poor choice for governor as he not only never managed to pass for an aragueño, but was also internationally associated as a drug cartel head. Never mind the abuses he comitted on anyone opposing him, be it oppo or chavo. No matter what monuments to the revolution our boy Tarek kept dotting the Aragua landscape, in the end it was the impossibility of Polar plants in Aragua to supply the locals that carried the day for the MUD.

The end of a cacique power

In Southern Anzoategui state there is a "traditional" family power shared from father to son. The name is even cacique sounding, Paraquiema. But they are equally lambucios, waiting for the best deal, no loyalty whatsoever.

They joined chavismo early but when they did not get what they wanted they went opposition in 2010 and got elected under the MUD/PODEMOS label. If I remember well there was even an assault to a town hall or something of major street trouble in El Tigre. Unfortunately the opposition did not give the governor candidacy nod to his son so Paraquiema went back to chavismo and helped it vote damaging laws even though he was elected by an opposition majority. A perverse double agent if ever.

Paraqueima got defeated this time but he did not do as bad as the cases above. Then again he is the type of local power that is followed by a group of people no matter what. Cacique style. Let's hope that this time around the primitiveness of certain portions of the electorate will be done with. At least Paraqueima dynasty has been given a real blow, if not necessarily lethal. One thing it shows chavismo is that sometimes its strength is subjected to not very loyal whims, which in the end hut more than help.

Conclusion

These three examples will convey, I hope, why chavismo is so nervous these days. The results are not just a matter of discontent with the long lines dues to food scarcity. There is also discontent with the leadership imposed from Caracas, or self imposed through rough means. The damage done in these three districts is real and it goes beyond just a mere clientele provisional disaffection. Long term, in other words.

No matter some in chavismo would like to be done with the electoral system altogether....

100 days of MUD

I suppose that the tradition of the cabalistic "first hundred days/measures/laws" comes from the first famous 100 days, the ones of Napoleon return to Elba which ended in Waterloo. The regime may want to ponder about that history tidbit, the more so that Waterloo bicentennial was celebrated earlier this year.


Last night we had the distinct feeling that Maduro and Cabello were operating as if they had decided for a speedy return from Elba, ignoring the trashing they got 2 days earlier. Napoleon at least spent enough tine in Elba to mark it for history. And while they plan a crash return/hold to power the rest of the world will take 100 days to find a definite way to get rid of the bolivarian monstrosity. Indeed, what Napoleon achieved in 100 days was the lost of any French recovery at the Vienna meeting, where Talleyrand was surprisingly achieving better terms than expected. After Waterloo not even Talleyrand could do a thing.

What can the opposition do? It all depends whether the outburst of Maduro and Cabello are a representation of chavismo or their desperate cry as they sense chavismo maybe willing to sacrifice them. For the following discussion let's assume that they represent chavismo (the other case is easier, these anti Maduro factions will quickly come to the forefront and we'll deal with them as constructively as possible).

The 100 days (or 30 or 50, does not really matter) started ticking yesterday December 8 and thus the resolution of the conflict is for, at the latest, early March. By then the economic and humanitarian crisis will have swept all parties anyway.

My suggestion for the opposition is very simple, find ways to explain to the country that the economy is a matter for the government to resolve and that the new Assembly will kindly oblige by reviewing speedily any proposal sent to them. Period. (1)

For that communication offensive the new Assembly can do the following: the chair can call for cadenas (mandatory broadcasts), there are precedents; the CONATEL law that regulates communications can be modified on the first days of the tenure so that the remaining subjugated but still alive media can unshackle their transmissions from self censorship as the regulatory agency will not be able to fine them anymore for thought "crimes". Plus other measures like recovering ANTV that will take more time.

Along leaving the dead economy at the regime door step the new Assembly should be sworn in with already a few law projects to recover intuitions and civil rights, forgetting about revenge or control. This can come only later, once the pulse between the executive and legislative power reaches an equilibrium of sorts. In no particular order since that one must be decided as events unfold, the Assembly should be sworn in with the following measures ready to go: amnesty law; call for nominations for a new CNE; revision of law that assigns a mandatory part of the nation's income to the provinces; suspend for a year any bill for weapon procurement; suspend punitive laws like SUNDEE that will have by itself already positive effects on the economy.

The regime will of course oppose every single one but it will be difficult for it to defend such opposition on public opinion as it will point to its unfairness, corruption, abuse and incompetence, reasons why people voted massively against the regime. And if the regime opposition becomes too vehement then there will be the excuse for the Assembly to call for a recall election or a constituent assembly. The 100 days will end there, in a food crisis and a collapse of the regime.

I suspect that there will be enough folks inside chavismo that will not want to sink with Maduro and Cabello and that before the 100 days are over they will have either started negotiations or asked Maduro to resign.

------
1) regular readers will remember that I wrote over the week end a decalogue which is still valid, what I am writing above being more of a question of pace as the regime is acting foolishly.

The 2015 results: general

Now that the CNE has finally announced the final result we can start more detailed analysis. They will be interesting and I will have a few posts on that through the next couple of weeks. Stay tuned. But first an evaluation of my own predictions.

The CNE does not publish vote count as too embarrassing for the regime, You could be sure that had the PSUV won the election, the vote count would be posted. Never mind, there are people that do so and there is a tweet on this matter:

MUD 7.707.422 votos (56,2%) y 112 dip (67%) / Psuv 5.599.025 (40,8%) votos y 55 dip (32,93%) El sistema chavista de 2010 benefició a la MUD

— Eugenio G. Martínez (@puzkas) December 8, 2015

That is self explanatory. The comment means that the gerrymandering in the end benefited the MUD, a normal occurrence as gerrymandering is designed to protect low votes but when the votes become too important in the other side then it backfires.

My predictions were as follow:
"So I am going to go with 96 seats and 16% more votes for MUD than for PSUV. Why not? As crazy as any other prediction to be found around. My optimist outcome is 18% ahead with 101 and my pessimist is 13% with 92."

I got the seats wrong but I got the spread right: 56.2-40,8 = 15,4.

I did not get the seats right because against my own instincts I had a general shift in voting pattern across the country when in fact that pattern was less than even. A stupid mistake for more opposition leaning areas even though I did give them less shift than elsewhere, but not enough. Thus the bonus seats for the opposition. An error that delights me, by the way.

At any rate, predicting the MUD-PSUV difference that close makes me quite happy. My reasons not to buy into the optimism of most pollsters was right, my knowledge of the electoral map remained sound even if weaker than for previous election due to lack of time for proper study and update. {end of back patting}

A good basis for guessing atr the next presidential election, sooner than what you may expect.... and governor due December 2016.

When consoling the troops makes you certifiable political ass

It is always necessary for the leader of a political party to try to comfort a little bit the troops by promises of keeping up the good fight. If this cannot be done by the harshness of the score or the temperament of the leader then there is always resigning your position. What Maduro did tonight was resigning his subordinates and through Cabello announce open season on the new Assembly.


For those who were hoping for a dialogue between thugs and democrats, there you are.

It all started with a TV show where a bitter Maduro let it be known clearly that he felt betrayed by those who did not vote for him. He went, like a brat, to say that his social plans were now in doubt and that he was hurt that after all his gifts during the campaign (apartment, tablets, taxis,...) he did not get the support he deserved. He did not realize of course that he was also admitting to a crime, of buying votes. But I digress.

Then at some point Cabello joined him (I did not watch, I am just summarizing Twitter, the only open media of Venezuela). It was for Cabello to announce the new battle plans against the incoming Assembly.  They include a series of new laws and appointments to be made before normal sessions end on December 15. Yes, the assembly can call a lame duck session and sit as far as January 4 I guess, but already some of the decisions announced would be illegal if they were to be approved in that delay. For example, laws need a certain numbers of discussion sessions. Naming new High Court (TSJ) judges must include a nomination process that requires weeks.

Thus even if the defeated chavista representatives went along, whose motivation remains to be seen as they are less threatened than Cabello by the courts, most of Cabello's legislative program would be illegal and I, for one, doubt that the TSJ would dare to annul an Assembly vote to revoke those lame duck decisions. Were the TSJ do so the new National Assembly would have no other choice but to call for a constituent assembly to remove ALL judges from their job.

Of course all of this bravado is the result of a bitter deception, the more so that in spite of all maneuvering the CNE finally recognized today that the National Assembly will have a 2/3 majority. To add insult to injury, that majority is due to the 3 elected representatives of the indigenous people. When Chavez wrote his 1999 constitution he included a provision that 3 representatives should be included just for indigenous people. That never worked out because if the candidates had to be named by the natives, too many non natives could affect the election. But that was not the point. The point was that in eternal gratitude for what came to be an empty gesture chavismo would have a lock on those three seats. Guess what? The natives are as fed up with scarcity than the invaders.

The bravado nature is confirmed with the latest on ANTV (our dim C-Span). Now Cabello has decided that it would go to its workers and thus the new leadership of the Assembly will not be able to direct its own TV Channel. This is of course idiotic because the new Assembly would now be forced to revoke the CONATEL law to control media and return TVes to its old owners Radio Caracas TV (and I also doubt that no matter how packed the TSJ is it would annul such decisions).

I, for one, think that Maduro and Cabello tonight are digging fast their own hole. Alone.

Note: Maduro asked for the resignation of his cabinet when he is the one who should resign. Some already suggest that it is to remove from office those that are the more compromised by shady finances and to thus delay their eventual exam by New Assembly. The real question though is who will dare to accpet the new jobs at a collapsing presidency.

Musings on the 0,6666666666.... An Irrational or Transcendental number?

As I type, the opposition claims it got 2/3 of the Assembly and the CNE still tries to find ways to deny that number. But in a way it does not matter much, the psychological effect is there, and what matters more is that the vote against the current regime is 2 million+ votes. That is right, the MUD got more than 2 million votes that the PSUV alliance (GPP). The other candidates, I think , did not go much more than 1%, making this election the most polarized in our history (Chavez presidential victories aside but they were of a different nature, outright plebiscites on a charismatic leader).

By any measure the electoral result is surprising and transcendental. The Maduro's regime has been irremediably trashed, but not ousted. And that is were the key importance of the 2 million vote resides. That the regime conceded, that it was forced to by the army to do so is not democracy. With 2 million votes ahead the armed forces were not going to support a fraud because they would have had the task to kill what was needed to kill to save the regime. In the XXI century such crimes do not prescribe and General Padrino merely voiced the concerns of the bulk of the Army: "this disaster is of the politician's own making and there is no reason why we should take the hit for that". That the army benefited immensely from the regime is, in its eyes, circumstantial: the laws and lack of supervision that allowed such corruption were of the making of the politicians.

To be or not to be sanguine about a 2/3 Assembly majority? Well, for starters, the gerrymandering operated in reverse once a threshold had been reached. Also, that 2 million surprise did not follow what had been taking place slowly. The opposition share of the vote has been growing slowly from disgruntled chavistas that abstain an election or two until their conscience finally brings them to the other side. This time around too many chavistas jumped across the line outright. Too many I write because such shifts can be go back as fast as they came in. Thus the first consideration on sanguinity: that 2/3 is an ephemeral, irrational result that we should not build much on it. Speaking of constitution change right now, in the face of an economic blow out is, well, maybe unwise.

The second factor on sanguinity is the reaction of the regime. All that has been written before, at least on this blog, is still valid. They are a bunch of thugs focused on personal power and wealth. That they retreated Sunday is due to the only language thugs understand: force. 2 million + vote and the refusal of the army to go along with a fraud that could not be covered up in thick make up is a language they understand. The democratic language that people got tired of them and demand at the very least an aggiornamento of their objectives is a message that so far does not seem to have reached the guilt cortex area of Maduro, Cabello, Rodriguez and most heavy weights of the regime.

I allow myself to think that a 2/3 majority will scare the beejeezuzz of these thugs in charge and push them away of any possible transition. For the opposition to defend and assume the 0,666666... means that it has to be ready to face conflict much sooner than expected. Not that a 3/5 majority would be pleasing to the regime, but it would make negotiations easier to come along.

Let's not forget one thing: there is an economy blow up coming. What we have seen in 2015 is nothing. If we do not want to starve in 2016 or die of fever because we do not even aspirin we are going to have to go hat in hand for money. The only one left that can bail us out is the IMF and there is a need to convince the executive power in the hands of chavismo to accept that reality. Imposing it just because we have a 2/3 majority is not going to do.

To close this, a personal anecdote. The cleaning lady at home came back today from having gone to vote in her village. She has been always anti Chavez even though her village has voted 80% for Chavez (it went down to 62% Sunday...). She was happy. She hopes that the new National Assembly is going to arrange things quickly because she is sick and tired of the long lines. Talking to her I realized, to my great horror, that she has no clue as to what a National Assembly job is. For her, the N.A. is kind of a guardian put in place to replace Maduro at the helm, or something like that. I did not dare go in depth. Yet I explained in simple terms and images what a N.A. is for. It was like a revelation to her. She admitted that she had not been able to find anyone to clear that confusion for her. And she was disappointed to learn that the darn N.A. will not be able to fix up things fast. As in next week.

2/3 you said?

Chavismo is not taking it well

True, even Nicolas Maduro preferred to concede defeat rather than taking to the streets. But his concession was like the Chavez one of 2007, "victoria de mierda" but more banal in its content, "defeated by the economic war" that nobody but chavistas seem to understand what it is about. Which allows us to think that the economic war is just a myth a la Cuban embargo.

No point entering into details but from the chavistas I read or heard of today it was all about battles, temporary tactical retreats and whichever military jargon you wish to use. Truly, 15 years of Chavez have brain washed them and now everything is a battle with the unavoidable conclusion that the battle can only end when the other side is, well, annihilated.  I do not see how we can plan a transition with such people who clearly see this election as an anomaly, a mere bump, an occasion to reorganize the troops before the final battle. So far, the message of el pueblo has been lost.

And this is worrisome, not necessarily for their war wishes that they may or may not desire to execute when the time comes. The worrisome part in all of this is that chavismo is more astounded by the defeat than we could have fairly expected. Clearly, months of rather very negative polling have not prepared them at all for the possibility that they may just lose the election. Amen of being trashed.

It is of great concern that the surprise of chavismo, their basic frame work and ideological "formation", is making it difficult for them to see what happened, to understand what it means, to bring them to some form of self examination. Maduro's word by themselves read of "dead man walking", the empire and capitalism and an economic war beat him, not the Venezuelan people judging his incompetence. Roy Chaderton, the ineffable Chavez ambassador to wherever, always the failed foreign minister, had the nerve to say in all seriousness that the opposition had a unfair media advantage because the world media followed empire orders against the regime. I now that he is stone faced but surely he cannot have forgotten easily the years when the foreign media SUPPORTED Chavez. And he certainly fails to explain us how this could have possibly helped the opposition facing a media blackout inside Venezuela, foreign or national.

And there is also the "traitor" epithet being easily thrown around, the ones that benefited from Chavez and now turned away.  True, you can always call them traitor but at least try to understand why they betrayed you so that next time around you avoid such treason...

A nice little story today tells us a lot about the general mood of chavismo hard core "public servants", those that are in key propaganda and decision sectors. I am talking of the "journalists" and workers of ANTV. This wanna-be Venezuelan C-SPAN is all but. It is the channel through which chavista representatives can promote themselves, usually insulting their opponents with liberal use of propaganda documentaries and the like.

Well, Ramos Allup, the MUD hatchet man on the CNE and one of the engineers of the victory, said that ANTV had to be redrawn fast so it could offer to the country a plural window of opinion. Something that even this blogger promoted this week end as one of the first measures to be taken by the incoming Assembly, an easier way to open the airwaves with a true public network service than starting anew. ANTV workers were not only not amused but offended that their "professional" work could be questioned. In fact, they consider that their "conquest of information rights" cannot be challenged. They have been great journalists, according to their criteria...

Clearly, chavismo had become a very conservative, close minded group. It badly needs a stay in the opposition, a spa stay for mind unclogging we could say. That defeat is not only good for them, but necessary as well.

A vote for the times

What happened today in Venezuela is truly momentous, better than the wildest hopes the opposition could have ever had a year ago. In the last 3-4 months the objective of a nice victory was getting clearer, but tonight the preliminary result announcing a 2 to 1 victory in seats? No way, Jose!

As I type this I am half drunk with the bottle I drowned on my own over the excruciating long wait of the night. No, I am no lush, I did the pilgrimage for a last vote to San Felipe now that I live mostly in Caracas. I have not gotten around to change my district (next in Petare to help Ocariz). But I had kept that semi cheap Chilean champagne that I did not drink in 2009 keeping it for when chavismo would be ousted. It had to wait 5 years in my fridge and me alone but willing. My stupor is accompanied by the streets which are suddenly awake with caravans of opposition supporters in this very chavista state which may be getting back to old former governor Lapi days.

They are right to celebrate as this election marks the end of an era, at last. Chavismo cannot recover from such as stunning disaster that not even Cuban "expertise" could avoid. There are still 17 seats to be decided, too close to call, but the opposition already has secured the 3/5 supernumerary majority and by getting a few of the 17 it may not reach the fabled 2/3 majority needed for certain laws but it will be strong enough to offer a credible resistance against a desperate regime. The future of chavismo is bleak, and it certainly does not pass through its current structure and mood. Implosion is in the future and speedy internal reform is a must if it does not want to disappear, if it wants to remain a leftist option in Venezuela. Appealing crassly to Chavez memory was a mistake, they killed the idol. Now they are on their own.

There is no need to inquire deeply in the causes of the rout. Empty shelves and 200% inflation say it all. As I wrote often, in the last two years the regime has had the chance to take some economic measures that would not have avoided the crisis but made it less politically damaging. But it did not. The regime was hostage to utmost currency exchange arbitration abuse and drug trafficking, all protected by the upper army cadres. What happened in the end was that the populist government lost contact with the populi. And that was that.

What comes next is an exciting page in our history and renewed blogging fervor from yours truly. Only one thing can be more interesting to blog about than the downfall of a regime: the birth of a new order.

Make no mistake, the road is still flush with ambushes. A narco regime was stunned by a defeat they truly never believed could happen. But as the international penal law starts closing in there is no telling what desperate measures they could be willing to risk. Keep in mind that in spite of the disaster, a 40% still voted for the regime. A quick renewal could mean a quick return.

Yet, the economic disaster will kill political support for whatever system comes next and even that 2/3 potential victory will require for the opposition to reach out to chavismo to avoid the worst, something that could even include an increased civil war. Yes, the daily number of violent death in the country are already the signs of a civil war waged between drug and corrupt gangs for their turf, both against the common citizen.

But how to deal with that is best left for the coming days. Tonight we must celebrate one thing: el pueblo spoke and proved that freebies and promises of freebies are not enough. In the end maybe democratic values are not the decisive factors when voting, but accounting is. And demanding accounting for the rulers is where democracy starts. Let's savor that moment when Venezuelans put aside political polarization, artificially created class and race divides and went all together, from negritos to catires, from tierruos to sifrinos, to say that enough is enough, that equality is not standing all together in line for a little bit of milk.

Election day 2015 post

0:46

Tibisay spoketh. It ain't pretty for the regime, a 2 to 1 victory for the opposition. Still 17 seats in play that will decide whether a 2/3 supernumerary majority is reached (and the end of the regime as we knew it). Maduro bitched but accepted with lame references.

Meanwhile suddenly San Felipe is awakening.

And this concludes our election day post. Next? Governor elections December 2016 or... earlier presidential.

11:58

In two minutes we are "the day after"



11:47

Tic-tac, Tic-tac.....

10:54

An insisting rumor is that the opposition would have got 2/3 of the Assembly! 113 seats!

If this is indeed true it not only goes beyond our widest hopes and expectations but it will create a speedy downfall of the regime. Buuut.... leaving all the mess for us to fix with all the political consequences.....



10:23

JUST BREAKING!

BREAKING NEWS! Blog Venezuela News and Views calls the election! pic.twitter.com/TUczynRDYu

— daniel duquenal (@danielduquenal) December 7, 2015

9:56

It is getting more difficult for the regime to hide the opposition victory. As usual, when compared to, say, recent Argentina elections, the Venezuelan electoral system is pathetic.

On the good side, if rumors I get are confirmed my predictions may turn out to have been good. Note: I would not mind at all being wrong and that the MUD gets 2/3. :-)


9:35

Nothing to report. The CNE does its usual waiting game while they try to cook up the results so as to make not looks so bad for the regime.

At least some figures of the opposotion have gone to twitter to claim victory. We put pressure whichever way we can.

San Felipe is quiet and I am at peace. Few fireworks and coming from different places than usual. Maybe a good omen.


7:19

Looks that there will be a solid victory for the opposition. Maybe I should change my predictions to case 3? Or make up in a hurry a case 4? With 25% spread and a 2/3 majority?


7:11

And there is this.

A fetish/cursed bottle since 2009 in my fridge. Is this the night? pic.twitter.com/oEviAGEAAB

— daniel duquenal (@danielduquenal) December 6, 2015

7:10

The illegal voting hours extension is creating quite a scandal. Best admission that the regime lost the election.


7:02

Apparently in some Zulia districts the PSUV forces people to vote "assisted", being nice enough to push the buttons for the voter least this one pulls a muscle or something.

6:57

Got back in service an old modem and got some Internet. My normal provider, Intercable, not only killed my Internet but also killed my phone! And TV while at it. And no, I did not forget to pay for the service.

Right now the usual ruckus on illegally extending voting hours even though most centers are done with voters. The usual bring in the vote despair and those voting that should not be doing so.


6:06 pm

Made it safely to San Felipe. Roads near empty. Saw one of the "mobile CNE" voting center for poor or distant or hard to reach areas. Big line, red shirts, a PSUV red tent right in front. No pressure...

Voted fast. But next voting station had a huge line. Voting machines down, no permission to start voting manually yet.

No Internet at home. Down many areas of the country. Need to update through my cel phone. A big pain you know where

9:47

To try to go around the news blockade and censorship the MUD did a few things, such as a Youtube channel devoted to election day incidents and results later on. So do particulars with new portals in the provinces. This one from Margarita.

9:41

About to leave Caracas. So far nothing too far fetched as far as I can tell.

But there are illegal things like this:

En La Alta Florida, Caracas pic.twitter.com/rXMsE6GE5E

— Iruña Urruticoechea (@urru_urru) December 6, 2015

Observe the intimidation tactic of the chavista in that illegal PSUV "information tent" too close from a voting center, taking a picture of the one documenting the abuse.

7:20 AM

There are traditions, but....

In 2013 I wrote what I was hoping to be my last election day post. Today I am not going to write down what had become a tradition of sorts for this blog. Since that fateful April 2013 my life and moods and priorities have experienced dramatic changes. It has been for me a significant effort to write down that recent series of YV-X articles on the election held today (YV is the international code for Venezuela). As a consequence of erratic writing and unrestrained bitching all my blog parameters have gone down (to the levels I had in 2010, which were already respectable nevertheless).  The secret of successful blogging is regularity in publication and mood, if possible. And that I have not been able to provide. Yet these election day posts were usually my top visited posts of the year, which makes me feel a little bit guilty toward faithful readers.

In addition this year I have not left for Yaracuy to vote. yet. The thing is that I am basically living in Caracas now for many, many reasons, from personal security to having to take care of my SO (now spouse, by the way). During part of today I will be travelling so as to reach San Felipe before polls close. I thought about not voting but I learned that the San Felipe district had become competitive and I would hate myself if we lost it for a single vote.  Also, after years of losing elections, for once I could place myself on the winning side.........

I will try from the road to Tweet or Instagram things if I come across noteworthy moments. And hopefully after 5 PM I may be able to cover some and update this post. But it is open so that readers who may want to share electoral information can go ahead in comments if they please as I will not be able to purvey then. Because with the arrest of Lopez and exile of others and my own changes I have lost track of my informants and I am now just a spectator like you guys. O tempora..

The decalogue of a new opposition (eventually?) led National Assembly

A thought exercise first. If the MUD opposition alliance gains a majority in the new National Assembly, who is the opposition? Maduro or the MUD?


This being said, when the National Assembly settles in next January which could be the initial measures that can prove new times have come, even if there a simple majority of seats?

Before the swearing in. In no particular order, as they come to mind during my morning coffee.

1) Announce the new directors of ANTV, the C-span of sorts. This network, mostly cable, is one the propaganda tools of the regime. It is also the network that the MUD can reopen to public debate and democracy from day one. Voiding this way the need to buy back one the private networks bought by regime mystery figures. ANTV would go in a few days from the least watched network to the most watched in Venezuela.

2) Announce that control of the Assembly will be all in the hands of the MUD. BUT...  offering two or three commissions to chavismo as a good gesture to start a useful debate. After the sectarian years of Diosdado Cabello at the head, that would improve the political climate greatly, nation wide. Note: that measure can be strengthened by the MUD offering these commissions chairs to PSUV representatives not associated with previous sectarian practices: folks like Cabello or Eekhout cannot chair any commission.

3) Announce before Christmas, or even next week, who will be the new Assembly chair, so as to have a forceful spokesperson to counter regime's last minute treacheries.

4) Announce that any Maduro's initiative before the Assembly is sworn in will be dead on arrival, that is, will not be funded and legally reverted. The simple objective here is to announce regime's treachery before this one is even proposed, countering from the start any propaganda effect.

5) Announce that from day one the press corps will be allowed to monitor live the debates of the Assembly. Yet announcing that the other rules of the Assembly will be kept as is for the first year (to teach the regime representatives a lesson in democracy).

And announce the first laws that will be discussed starting day 1.

6) An amnesty law. Since there is no way to have fair trials the new assembly has to assume a provisional guilty status of the political prisoners until at a later date the unfair and infamous trials can be reversed. By proclaiming an amnesty law the opposition thus in a way recognizes the sentences but also gets to free all political prisoners and even allow the return of many political exiles. Leopoldo Lopez back in the streets with his acquired Mandela status courtesy of the regime clumsiness, will be the nightmare of the executive power of Maduro...

7) A budget reform to guarantee that local financial needs are met as intended. This will strike at the heart of the regime financial muscle. Chavez had managed by all sorts of tricks to deprive the states and city halls of a large chunk of  what constitutionally should have gone to them. On one hand the regime gained a weakening of local authorities and on the other Chavez gained more direct patronage. Yes, such a measure would appear to strengthen the existing large majority of chavista governors, but it will also force then to give to their own opposition city halls the funds they require to function, a dramatic gain for some town halls that the regime has sabotaged to the extreme. Two notes: the regime should willingly sign in such a reform because it will get a more effective help from the local administrations to solve the humanitarian crisis at hand. And the governors have only one year left in their tenure so it will be difficult for them to use that windfall efficiently enough to build a reelection machinery.

8) An administrative reform of the comptrollers office to stop the practice of depriving politicians of their rights without the legal ruling in court: inahabilitaciones. Currently an obscure bureaucrat at the order of the regime can simply forbid so and so to run for election or become a public employee.

9) An anti expropriation bill. This way the recent abuses such as those of SUNDEE, Dakazo and the like will be stopped unless the regime previews a fair return before proceeding to expropriation. A way to restore a minimum of trust to bring back some investments to the country.

10) A bill to review the functioning of the expropriations done before. Those which have been a failure should be returned free of charge (and indemnity for the robbed properties?) to the owners who still want to get them back. If indemnity cannot be offered right now, at least offer them tax breaks for a few years to allow them to restart the business.

I am not including laws to revert some of the ruinous social programs. After all inflation will take care of their undoing and the regime executive privileges would force Maduro's combo to finance them at the very least through less corruption. In fact it will be cheap talk to proclaim the Assembly support for existing programs"as is". Also some unpopular measures such as the price of gas, are left at Maduro's doorstep. The common thread in the above Decalogue is to restore some trust in the battered political and economical needs of the country, to jump start what can be jump started legally through the specific constitutional powers of the assembly. The Assembly is not closing down on the regime's alleged reforms, it is building on them by correcting excesses. A fine line but a line worth threading.

And by announcing such type of laws before starting audits and inquiries on corruption would be a good PR operation, the more so that through ANTV and a reform of CONATEL, the media regulation agency, the MUD will have a way to counter the communication abuses of the regime.

Of course, if the opposition gets a 3/5 or 2/3 majority things will be simplified, and we can even foresee a regime collapse sped up through these very simple initial measures.

NOTE: I list all of these but let's not forget that there will be a full month in between the election and the swearing in, a period long enough for the regime to do enough treachery to stop some of these initiatives. A good measure on how to fight for the next thousand measures required will proceed....

The truth on the weeks after (elections YV-11)

So tomorrow we vote. And what will happen next?


First, a mea culpa of sorts. Until 2-3 weeks ago I still thought that the regime was going to find a way to suspend the election. It did not (well, it still has about 8 hours left). From this we can conclude that the regime is so aware of its defeat, and so aware that there is no way to recover part of the lost ground in a short time, that it decided to go ahead anyway and see what happens next. For me, that there are elections, is paradoxically a way for the regime to recognize in advance that they lost and cannot turn around the result in a "good and timely manner".

Tomorrow they certainly will do their utmost to gain votes even by forcing people to vote, even by carrying busloads of people at 10 PM to vote, etc...  After all they even jailed the head of Sucre district police and keep the police in their barracks so the colectivos of Sucre will have a free reign of terror to "bring in the vote". Yet, no matter what, these last minute despair tactics will be limited in scope (the world is watching) and they cannot change the fundamental event of the election: the power shift, the end of chavismo grip over the collective imaginary.

What happens tomorrow and Monday I have written about. Now as a responsible blogger I should pen down what I think may happen in the next weeks.

There are lots of OpEd around, speculating on what legally the new assembly can do whether the opposition MUD gains a simple majority or a supernumerary 2/3 majority. Other people already discuss the agreements that the regime and the opposition will have to reach. There is even talk of civility and Harina P.A.N. returning to our every day lives and shelves. I am not going to enter these discussions since even Monday morning, results in hand, it will be dangerous to speculate.

The reason that I do not want to partake in the guessing game is that we are not dealing here with a normal democratic regime which has become, shall we say, a little tense over the last decades. The regime has reduced itself to a gang of thugs and narco traffickers and with such people you cannot discuss, you cannot make an agreement. They eliminate you or you eliminate them first. This is the logic of street gangs. Force. Period.

For a speculation to make any sense it should start with the basic effect that the result will have over the inner divisions of chavismo. This movement can be divided roughly in three, for the purposes of this discussion.

One group has it all on line and will fight for its survival until the end. I am talking of course of the higher up in the regime which has dabbled in phenomenal corruption and, apparently, also ALL in drug trafficking now that we know that first lady Cilia Flores nephews are into DEA custody. This group that includes Cabello and Maduro are willing to go to the deep end.

The second group is the wavering one. Those did benefit from the regime but neither to the extremes of the first group, or not as much as they would have liked to. The point for that group is that many do not feel the need to immolate themselves for the sake of the first group.

The last group is formed by the "transactional" chavistas (public employees, mision beneficiaries). As long as their livelihood is not unduly threatened they will be unwilling to immolate themselves, the more so that the regime has proven himself unable to sustain its financial support. We could add a fourth group, the ideological one, but I think it will spread across the three groups, the more so that part of that radical group does not like Maduro or Cabello.

Now, what will truly happen depends on how these groups will individually react to tomorrow's result. That is the key at to what changes may be possible. We could see either a speedy downfall of the regime or an attempt at outright repression. But "negotiations" for a transition will only be made possible if chavismo finally divides publicly with an important faction deciding to seat down and talk with the opposition.

What can bring this about? Not the actual number of seats in the Assembly. After all, with the control exerted over all the branches of power the regime has many ways to limit the reach of the new assembly even if that one gets the magical 2/3 supernumerary.  No, what will really affect chavismo is its actual vote, and how far from the opposition it will be. And this nuanced to some specific local results.

For example a 10% vote difference may still allow for a certain cohesion within chavismo. However if in spite of a that rather good result for chavismo we have some noted figures bite the dust anyway, like radical evil Jaua in Miranda, then all demons may get loose. Or if you prefer, the MUD wins by 15% but Jaua survives and chavismo retains a majority in ten states then the impact is not that bad and chavismo may want to try arm twisting for size.

Finally if the opposition manages a 20% spread, even if it does not get the 2/3 majority, chavismo will simply implode.

A final note before concluding this entry. Do not forget that the MUD is an electoral alliance and that inside it there are groups only too willing to make deals with chavismo, like the representatives that will be elected under the Lara governor wing, Falcon. Or even Ramos Allup needing to protect some of his relatives involved in juicy bolibourgeois deals. The MUD is not an alliance of saints. The MUD is an alliance of people forced to do so if they do not want to be politically annihilated. For the MUD to keep its resolve, to remain united to forge ahead with the displacement of the regime, it needs at the very least a 20% victory margin over the PSUV.

So there you are. Do not read too much into tea leaves or constitutional manuals. What comes next is the browbeating of a gang of thugs with as little as possible of collateral damage.

Final prediction for this blog (election YV-10)

Before this blog makes it final prediction I need to repeat again a few things:


1- This is an extremely emotional election, harnessed by powerful blackmail and fear campaign tactics. Voting patterns can change significantly as late as Sunday.

2- Poll are unanimous in predicting a MUD alliance victory. Yet, Datanalisis always in search of notoriety has announced this week that Maduro recovered personally 11% of its "popularity" without explaining what this meant to their earlier numbers. Someone pointed out that Luis Vicente Leon could not rest his ever present wish to be in the forefront, to "declare just for the sake of declaring".

3- This blogger has not performed the painstaking analysis done in previous years. Then he got it right more often than wrong. This time around I will limit myself to examine the possibilities since there was no time, nor will to do the work for personal reasons. Let's say charitably that I base myself on memories and educated gut feeling district per district, under strict prudent assertions, from older data.

4- And of course this assumes that votes will be indeed counted as they come. But let's not be picky about that now as predicting the extent of actual ballot stuffing cannot be predicted. For simplicity let's assume that the regime will count the ballots.

This being said, as in the previous installment, I have divided the 167 seats to be voted on as "safe" "leaning" and "toss up". Let's just say that "safe" means 85% probability of victory, "leaning" 70% probability of victory and toss up, less than that. Thus a final prediction means an arithmetic calculation out of the 5 groups.

Case 1: 10% difference between MUD and PSUV

A narrow victory for the opposition, due to the gerrymandering of electoral districts and the bonus for the PSUV coming from states which are very dependent on social programs.

The opposition would gain between 86 and 92. Majority is 84. A 10% popular vote majority may result in a squeaky parliamentary majority.

Case 2: 15% difference between MUD and PSUV

Things improve a little bit for the opposition but the gerrymandering still plays heavily against the comfortable majority the winner would get in a normally functioning democracy.

Now the opposition gets between 93 and 98, barely 5 seats more than before.

Case 3; 20% spread between MUD and PSUV

This is still not good enough. The MUD needs a 3/5 super-majority to be able to resit the pressure and abuse of the regime. and be "veto" proof on some type of legislation. That is, the MUD needs to gain 101 seats.

In this case things look a little bit better as the gerrymandering effect starts fading some. The opposition MUD would be getting at least 100 seats and as much as 105. The super-majority number being 101, it is clear that the opposition getting less than 20% more votes than the PSUV will allow the regime to postpone the debacle.

I am not going to calculate what is the spread the MUD needs to get the 2/3 majority in parliament which would mean the end of the regime but I guess it is at least a 25% vote advantage, a majority that as of now I do not see happening. Too many people are willing to bitch about Maduro but once in front of the voting machine, their vote becomes conservative, conservative having become PSUV. In democracy a conservative vote is always the one given to a party that has been more than ten years in office, a situation that people simply are afraid to change.

My final prediction?

I think I am going to go with case 2 with a few provisions. There may be a couple of independents squeaking in. Some upsets may not happen.

So I am going to go with 96 seats and 16% more votes for MUD than for PSUV. Why not? As crazy as any other prediction to be found around. My optimist outcome is 18% ahead with 101 and my pessimist is 13% with 92.

The campaign that reached new lows (YV-9)

The electoral campaign of 2015 in Venezuela will make it to the text books of electoral infamy. To find worst campaigning conditions you need to look into outright dictatorships of the communist type. These try to pretend that everybody gets along while folks are forced to vote for the one party state. In fascism they do not even bother with appearances which, in a way, is a tad more honest.

This silly banner says "either you agree or
I will not vote". With all colors from alleged
opposition parties. That are not, only fake
vote robbers. It started appearing 2 days
ago, a timing for distress.

But the bolivarian farce came to power through honest elections and it must retain power through elections, no matter how rigged those are. There must be an appearance that there is an electoral contest. That is why opposition public meetings are still authorized, even though shot down as necessary least they become too large.

Recapping all the electoral treachery is too long for this blog. Besides, the OAS General Secretary has done a magnificent job out of it, through an 18 pages letter to the Venezuelan Electoral board, CNE. Let's just say that you can find it all, from gerrymandering, to funding abuse and even false electoral propaganda of political parties using opposition candidates to promote their own ones, going as far as finding perfectly unknown assholes that happen to have the same name as the opposition candidate. In other places the amount of political posters of unknown parties dwarfs the posters of the PSUV or opposition candidates in numbers and size (see below). We all know of course that the regime itself is financing these efforts trying to pry away vote by vote from the opposition electorate. They have no sense of ridicule.


But when all is said and done, that excess of cheating is nothing new, it has been tried everywhere else although not to that extent in Venezuela, and in the end may turn out to be counterproductive. The strongest electoral campaign will always flounder when the voter has no food nor medicine for its kids. Polls in a rare unanimity give the opposition at the very least 15 points ahead of the regime.

Yet, what will make this electoral campaign truly memorable is that it illustrated in the most cruel fashion the vileness that chavismo has descended into. I, for one, am completely bemused that there are people with some democratic inkling that could support a regime campaigning in such extreme ways. There is a simple explanation, chavismo has stopped long ago being a democratic movement, If it ever was one. From political prisoners, to the insults uttered against opposition respectability, reaching actually shootings of opposition rallies, for that you need to go to Myanmar or the like for comparison. With the provision that Myanmar is actually improving while we may still become a gulag civil war country.

The international outrage has been such that you can only find minimum lip service support for the regime in a scarce number of countries. The democratic countries? None supports the regime anymore. In fact, for the first time, there is actually a country ready not to recognize the Venezuelan election if on Sunday it sees worse than what it has been so far. And that country, Argentina, may be what many other countries are waiting for as the excuse to agree that Venezuela's regime is beyond the pale.

So there you have, a campaign for the history books.
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I have not seen such a concentration of posters for any candidate, PSUV or MUD like the ones you see below for the disgraceful William Ojeda. He claims to be a moderate thinking opposition but he is also the PSUV candidate. Yet, you would be hard pressed to find a single PSUV poster anywhere with Ojeda...

Electoral paranoia (YV-8)

The regime is not helping its cause (albeit hopeless, but that is another story).

It refuses any, ANY criticism or mere suggestion. All are mere ploys serving the Empire of the North. That Cuban line is getting, well, tiresome. In recent days the foreign minister, the ineffable Delcy Rodriguez, has issued communiques against whatever she can write against. Her latest is against Spain, the UK and the European Union. While she does that she receives Rodriguez Zapatero (ex Spanish Prime Minister) and Torrijos, (ex Panama President), both of long tradition of deals with Chavez. Of course, those are invited by the Electoral Board CNE, and thus kosher. But we are waiting for the arrival of over half a dozen of ex-head of states of excellent democratic credentials. But those are not kosher and we are waiting with bated breath as to whether the regime will allow them to leave the airport. (1)

Meanwhile Maduro stung by the infamy criticism yesterday on his words against Ocariz, went ahead and repeated his attacks, visibly picked. For good measure he had the Petare chief of police arrested and quartered all of Petare police. This, of course, will not only make crime worse this week end but will allow for easier electoral fraud by the regime who cannot stand to lose once again in the popular sectors of Petare. Note: apparently the regime thinks that Petare opposition police was the cause of the violence against opposition candidate Pizarro. Go figure!

While he was at it this week end Maduro had no qualms in stating that Lorenzo Mendoza, CEO of Polar Group, paid a full stadium crowd to cheer him. That Maduro is unable to go in an open public space without being booed may have had negative effects on his mood.

And more but the reader gets the drift. I will just note that the public murder of an AD local pol in Guarico, a murder that made front pages around the world, was speedily solved by the regime, from acting arm to "intellectual" responsibilities for the crime. This would be nice if it were not for the exquisite power point details shown by the prosecution when hundreds and thousands of simpler cases have not found any resolution in Venezuela. In other words, nobody believes the inquiry results. CSI-Caracas it ain't.

No need to read tea leaves. The regime knows it is in trouble and it is trying last minute desperate measures, not even to regain votes, but to stop the hemorrhage of its supporters.
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1) You may want to visit the Web page of the Foreign ministry, where you will be allowed to wonder if its purpose is to promote Venezuela overseas or if it is a mere electoral propaganda and insult machinery. Do not miss the page on Chavez alone, deified a la North Korean.

PD: looks like the opposition is finally receiving open support from the LGBT groups... This certainly will feed the regime's paranoia who for some absolutely inexplicable reason had significant gay support.

Hoy en el cierre de campaña de la MUD en ccs y al fin compartí con @edgarmanuel y con @yovr22 pic.twitter.com/hTA0r8JI2L

— euclides™ (@carajitopitt) December 3, 2015

And then there is also this for the paranoia, a real "el pueblo" showing how to vote for the opposition candidate on her street vending cart.

Ella está clarísima pic.twitter.com/ItpOqqvzBW

— Mari Montes (@porlagoma) November 30, 2015

A certifiable "revolution" (election YV-7)

The bolivarian farce is reaching true levels of madness. Not only Maduro is certifiable, but for his supporters to go along with his latest "boutades" is a sign of the general dysfunctionality of a large spectrum of the populace.

Yesterday Maduro scored big on the levels of arbitrary and vile cruelty. Campaigning in a district were the regime is losing bad (Petare) and where the regime is in trouble (Guarenas-Guatire) he resorted to an undeserved arrest and to a humiliating moral abuse.


Campaigning around Guarenas Maduro claimed that he saw a long line at a supermarket. He simply said that this was a conspiracy by management and demanded the manager to be arrested on the spot. He later bragged that the pour soul had indeed been arrested. And to make his threats clearer he ordered an investigation to the local Heinz branch and ordered the managers to be jailed in case there was anything out of normal. In short, Maduro yesterday made it clear that he decided who goes to jail and when. Period.

The second item is worse. Petare's mayor, Carlos Ocariz, happens to have a child sick with leukemia. Since the Venezuelan heath system is a mess (I know it first hand with all the trouble I have finding treatments for my S.O.), amen of the child having probably a difficult form of leukemia, Ocariz has had to travel often to the US to accompany his kid a treatment session at a time. He can do that because I understand his wife family has the means (or got a US insurance). The chavistas at Petare's council also know about that as Ocariz has taken the necessary dispositions to make sure things run when he leaves for a week or two.

That was not enough for Maduro who publicly accused Ocariz of being a parasite, among other things, and of spending his time vacationing in his Miami mansion. Ocariz replied with a very dignified letter that Maduro has not replied to, and even less apologized for his abuse.

The point I want to make is not on the actual facts resumed above. The point is that Maduro is not acting as a Venezuelan. In our political language what Maduro said on Ocariz yesterday is simply not done. It is beyond the pale. Even Chavez would not have stooped so low. This reeks of communist brain washing of the worst kind, the kind that in its extremes joins end with fascism. A kind that is only available in Castro's Cuba. And that is that.

The trouble here is that when a sitting president is reaching such actions (never mind his now frequent promises of not respecting an adverse electoral result) one must fear for election day Sunday and what comes next. Maduro is not a democrat, never was, always acted in consequence. The brain behind him neither is a democrat and I fear she is unable to understand the risks they are taking. After all Cilia Flores has always seen power as a means to get rich, proving his by her more than exaggerated nepotism. Like Maduro and his Cuban masters they think that retaining power is simply acceptable once a few have been shot dead.

Will chavismo follow the crazies that are on board with Maduro? This is another electoral parameter that we cannot assess.