So, coverage of the election by this blog has been light this time around. But that is no excuse to make it complete. One thing is to vote and another what happens Monday 7. Let's see.
There could be still a suspension/coup
The violence in the campaign trail with the numerous attacks on opposition politicians and the murder of at least one activist has to give us pause. The signs are clear, the regime is not going away peacefully. Still, at this late date I am not betting all of my money that elections will be actually held on Sunday. Also, I am not betting all of my money that elections will be held and results accepted. Whatever the regime chooses to do on these aspects, it will be sorry for it.
The opposition victory
This is now a given, though some disaster can still strike. At this point there is no pollster that states that the regime may win the election, even with a one seat majority. The only question here is how large the opposition win will be. On this respect I have kept updating my Excel sheet and came up on a tighter result than the first "prediction" one. I have accepted that the MUD to PSUV spread will be 10% (I resist giving it more no matter what pollsters say). I tweeted the result and the observation is that with a 10% advantage the "safe" and "leaning" MUD seats barely reach half! It will all depend on how the toss up seats go. This is a measure on how biased the electoral system is in favor or chavismo that a 10% advance barely gives the opposition a half dozen seats majority!
Recognizing victory
Let's say for the sake of the argument that the regime indeed accepts that the opposition alliance MUD wins. Will the regime accept full victory? Or will the regime subjects us to hours of delays while backroom negotiations take place so that the opposition recognizes a lower seat count in exchange of having a majority recognized? e.g. give up on a 3/5 majority in exchange of a regime recognition of a simple majority.
The week after
Depending on the shock wave of Sunday 6, it is quite possible that the regime uses what days are left from its 2010 majority to pass further laws to restrict the role of the elected National Assembly. That one may be able to shake that away but there will be a waste of time before the elected assembly can start its real job.
Miscellaneous
And of course there are all sorts of things that can go bump in the dark. For example there could be violence from the out of control "colectivos". There could be riots, hunger riots as surprisingly stores do not get food as soon as the opposition majority is proclaimed, etc, etc.
As for what happens once the opposition victory is acknowledged? Matter for another post.
Monday, 30 November 2015
Sunday, 29 November 2015
The Macri effect
One week ago Argentina elected a new president, the first certifiably peronist free in decades. As expected there will be changes in Argentina foreign policy. What was less expected is the speed at which president elect Macri started those changes, more than two weeks before being sworn in. To begin with, of the few people allowed on the election night stand, one was Leopoldo Lopez wife, Lilian Tintori. This made it to the opening news of CNNSpanish...
So what now?
The first thing to note is that Macri means what he said. He repeated it twice on his morning after first press conference. Other countries are taking notice and are not amused, like Uruguay. To which Macri replied stating point blank that human right violations were public and notorious in Venezuela and it was up to other countries to chose interest over ethics. In Venezuela they took a few days to acknowledge the hit, hoping, I suppose, that Dilma or somebody would call Macri to ask him to shut up. When nothing more but very gauche declarations like the one from Uruguay came, the regime finally reacted. National Assembly chair Diosdado Cabello called Macri a fascist (it takes one to know one, I suppose). And president Maduro, not to be left behind, went as far as saying that the Argentinian people were ready to raise against Macri (interesting statement since he just got elected, is not sworn in yet,but then again Maduro was never suspected of being a democrat).
And yet, for of his apparent democratic ethics Macri thinks more about Argentina interests than those of Venezuela. He knows that a battle in Mercosur to evict Venezuela is lost because Brazil and Uruguay are too involved with Venezuela corruption and Venezuela owes them too much money. Macri's target is not only the increasingly abhorrent regime of Venezuela, it is Mercosur itself.
Mercosur is failing since Lula reached power. It has become for Brazil something like its private economic zone and as such things like true economic integration and political developments have been sub-ordained to Brazil's interests. The devastating Argentina crisis 13 years ago, and the very light weight of Uruguay and Paraguay made that possible. In other words, with the fraudulent incorporation of Venezuela Mercosur is going nowhere, and Macri seems to have no patience with that. In fact, Macri is looking towards relations with the Pacific Alliance which would favor Argentina more as its economy is more complementary to the P.A. needs than Brazil's one. If Mercosur fails to tame Venezuela it will be a perfect excuse for Macri to start taking its distances with it.
There is also more than Mercosur in the target, there is also the useless UNASUR, a presidential left self protection club for South America. Note that the the swearing in of Macri is on December 10, just when an eventual election fraud crisis in Venezuela would be at its apex. Apparently Macri has chosen his new foreign minister for her experience even though he did not know here personally. He gave her an agenda where two points were nonnegotiable: his pressure on Venezuela and the end of Argentina's relations with Iran. Clearly UNASUR received a notification that any unjustified support to Venezuela will not be approved by Macri and such a division could well mean also the end of the useless UNASUR.
¡Plop! Café CÑN empieza su cobertura de resultado Argentino con abrazo de @liliantintori y @mauriciomacri en tarima pic.twitter.com/t2NkUB7x0e— daniel duquenal (@danielduquenal) November 23, 2015So what now?
The first thing to note is that Macri means what he said. He repeated it twice on his morning after first press conference. Other countries are taking notice and are not amused, like Uruguay. To which Macri replied stating point blank that human right violations were public and notorious in Venezuela and it was up to other countries to chose interest over ethics. In Venezuela they took a few days to acknowledge the hit, hoping, I suppose, that Dilma or somebody would call Macri to ask him to shut up. When nothing more but very gauche declarations like the one from Uruguay came, the regime finally reacted. National Assembly chair Diosdado Cabello called Macri a fascist (it takes one to know one, I suppose). And president Maduro, not to be left behind, went as far as saying that the Argentinian people were ready to raise against Macri (interesting statement since he just got elected, is not sworn in yet,but then again Maduro was never suspected of being a democrat).
And yet, for of his apparent democratic ethics Macri thinks more about Argentina interests than those of Venezuela. He knows that a battle in Mercosur to evict Venezuela is lost because Brazil and Uruguay are too involved with Venezuela corruption and Venezuela owes them too much money. Macri's target is not only the increasingly abhorrent regime of Venezuela, it is Mercosur itself.
Mercosur is failing since Lula reached power. It has become for Brazil something like its private economic zone and as such things like true economic integration and political developments have been sub-ordained to Brazil's interests. The devastating Argentina crisis 13 years ago, and the very light weight of Uruguay and Paraguay made that possible. In other words, with the fraudulent incorporation of Venezuela Mercosur is going nowhere, and Macri seems to have no patience with that. In fact, Macri is looking towards relations with the Pacific Alliance which would favor Argentina more as its economy is more complementary to the P.A. needs than Brazil's one. If Mercosur fails to tame Venezuela it will be a perfect excuse for Macri to start taking its distances with it.
There is also more than Mercosur in the target, there is also the useless UNASUR, a presidential left self protection club for South America. Note that the the swearing in of Macri is on December 10, just when an eventual election fraud crisis in Venezuela would be at its apex. Apparently Macri has chosen his new foreign minister for her experience even though he did not know here personally. He gave her an agenda where two points were nonnegotiable: his pressure on Venezuela and the end of Argentina's relations with Iran. Clearly UNASUR received a notification that any unjustified support to Venezuela will not be approved by Macri and such a division could well mean also the end of the useless UNASUR.
Friday, 27 November 2015
La Marseillaise is back
Today there was a very moving tribute to those who died in the Paris attack of November 13. The chosen venue for its austerity and splendor, and security, was the yard at L'Hotel des Invalides, built by the Sun King and that is used without any remorse by La République. At the end of the ceremony the French anthem was powerfully sung by all the political participants from all crosses of the republic, all security forces and, I dare to venture, at least 90% of the victims relatives that attended.
Although not clear for non French national the tribune behind the president, all alone in front, included all relevant figures, from all ex prime ministers, figures from both extremes, high army officers mixed with civilians, and more. All freezing cold together in republican unity behind the figure of the state. You have to give it to the French for Republican restrained but telling pageantry, one that only the US may outdo. Republic is not an empty feeling.
The values of the republic are obvious from those pictures, there is no need for me to discuss except to note that these values are cruelly missing today in Venezuela where such a gathering is today unthinkable.
I have refrained to discuss the terror attacks on Paris two weeks ago because I could not believe I would had to do such twice in a year. And then, the show of national unity moved me, made me proud of my French passport (a feeling I have lost about my Venezuelan passport circa 2009).
These days in Paris there is the palpable feeling that comes from the distinction between patriotism, the love of your countrymen, and nationalism, the hatred of what is foreign. And perhaps nothing shows it more than the revival of the French anthem, La Marsellaise.
I may be wrong about this but from my years in the US I met a lot of foreigners and as it turned out, a lot of Japanese colleagues. I came to think that Japanese and French were, curiously, cultures closer than one would expect a priori. The point is that only Japanese seem as self assured of their cultural origins and "superiority" than the French. This seems so self-evident for us that we do not feel threatened by other cultures. We do not need to travel as some do with a bottle of ketchup or can "diablitos" if you come from Venezuela.
The paradox here is that this self confidence of the French make us have little attachment to some exterior signs of our nationality. If we live overseas, like I do, we are more likely touched by our anthem than those living in France, who may even consider it gauche and pedestrian to wave the flag or sing La Marseillaise in public. The terror attacks of November 13 may have put an end to this.
In the last two weeks there has been a rather extraordinary display of the "bleu, blanc, rouge" to the point that the government asked the population to try to display the French flag everywhere possible. This request would have been inconceivable on November 12, and even less coming from a socialist government. We are told that these days the French army is beating all records for new recruits, and beyond. And now most of us have no qualms singing La Marseillaise in public.
This new found reverence for our anthem may be something that IS/DAESH did not anticipate and may be sorry for it.
It was not easy for La Marseillaise to gain status, no matter how exciting was its music. Napoleon dropped it and we had to wait for the third Republic in 1879 to have it as the national anthem, something that was not amusing for the monarchies controlling the rest of Europe then. In fact La Marseillaise was the revolutionary chant until finally others emerged like the Internationale.
The words of its first stanza sound even bloodier today than what they used to be; "bloody banners" "ferocious soldiers roaring" "slaughtering your children and women" "grab your weapons citizens" "drown your soil with impure blood". And yet, it survived and is even considered to have one of the easiest tunes to sing along, certainly a reason for its popularity.
But the Marseillaise words also remind folks that France has a warrior past that cannot be forgotten just because the country collapsed ignominiously in one single month of 1940, something that the ancestral enemies of France are fond of recalling. Even friends like the US...
What the terror attack has done, unwillingly, is to wake up this warrior past of France, forgotten since 1940 and the unwinnable wars in Vietnam and Algeria. The peacenick side of France has always been fashionable since the 60ies, and today it is questioned seriously. Of course that does not mean we are going to go to Napoleonic warfare again, times have changed fortunately. But I, for one, was disconcerted a little with how easy it was for socialist president to "declare" war on IS and get near unanimous support at home. Not even in the US Bush had it that easy. IS will be punished, it has been agreed on.
If the IS launched its attacks to shame France, to feed its internal divisions, right now it seems to have badly backfired. France is as united as it has been since WW2, with a patriotic fervor that goes without cheap chauvinism and without hatred. France is reawakening and I think the French may be the most surprised at it. The problem here is mostly for the large Muslim community inside France who now will have to join in and accept that they are French in a secular state. Or? We will see, but we can be sure that this play is just starting.
I am leaving you with this video from today about La Marseillase alone. Enjoy and be thrilled. Aux armes citoyens, sing it aloud and feel
Although not clear for non French national the tribune behind the president, all alone in front, included all relevant figures, from all ex prime ministers, figures from both extremes, high army officers mixed with civilians, and more. All freezing cold together in republican unity behind the figure of the state. You have to give it to the French for Republican restrained but telling pageantry, one that only the US may outdo. Republic is not an empty feeling.
 |
| (Mayors are the only officials allowed to wear the tricolor sash) |
The values of the republic are obvious from those pictures, there is no need for me to discuss except to note that these values are cruelly missing today in Venezuela where such a gathering is today unthinkable.
I have refrained to discuss the terror attacks on Paris two weeks ago because I could not believe I would had to do such twice in a year. And then, the show of national unity moved me, made me proud of my French passport (a feeling I have lost about my Venezuelan passport circa 2009).
These days in Paris there is the palpable feeling that comes from the distinction between patriotism, the love of your countrymen, and nationalism, the hatred of what is foreign. And perhaps nothing shows it more than the revival of the French anthem, La Marsellaise.
I may be wrong about this but from my years in the US I met a lot of foreigners and as it turned out, a lot of Japanese colleagues. I came to think that Japanese and French were, curiously, cultures closer than one would expect a priori. The point is that only Japanese seem as self assured of their cultural origins and "superiority" than the French. This seems so self-evident for us that we do not feel threatened by other cultures. We do not need to travel as some do with a bottle of ketchup or can "diablitos" if you come from Venezuela.
The paradox here is that this self confidence of the French make us have little attachment to some exterior signs of our nationality. If we live overseas, like I do, we are more likely touched by our anthem than those living in France, who may even consider it gauche and pedestrian to wave the flag or sing La Marseillaise in public. The terror attacks of November 13 may have put an end to this.
In the last two weeks there has been a rather extraordinary display of the "bleu, blanc, rouge" to the point that the government asked the population to try to display the French flag everywhere possible. This request would have been inconceivable on November 12, and even less coming from a socialist government. We are told that these days the French army is beating all records for new recruits, and beyond. And now most of us have no qualms singing La Marseillaise in public.
This new found reverence for our anthem may be something that IS/DAESH did not anticipate and may be sorry for it.
It was not easy for La Marseillaise to gain status, no matter how exciting was its music. Napoleon dropped it and we had to wait for the third Republic in 1879 to have it as the national anthem, something that was not amusing for the monarchies controlling the rest of Europe then. In fact La Marseillaise was the revolutionary chant until finally others emerged like the Internationale.
The words of its first stanza sound even bloodier today than what they used to be; "bloody banners" "ferocious soldiers roaring" "slaughtering your children and women" "grab your weapons citizens" "drown your soil with impure blood". And yet, it survived and is even considered to have one of the easiest tunes to sing along, certainly a reason for its popularity.
But the Marseillaise words also remind folks that France has a warrior past that cannot be forgotten just because the country collapsed ignominiously in one single month of 1940, something that the ancestral enemies of France are fond of recalling. Even friends like the US...
What the terror attack has done, unwillingly, is to wake up this warrior past of France, forgotten since 1940 and the unwinnable wars in Vietnam and Algeria. The peacenick side of France has always been fashionable since the 60ies, and today it is questioned seriously. Of course that does not mean we are going to go to Napoleonic warfare again, times have changed fortunately. But I, for one, was disconcerted a little with how easy it was for socialist president to "declare" war on IS and get near unanimous support at home. Not even in the US Bush had it that easy. IS will be punished, it has been agreed on.
If the IS launched its attacks to shame France, to feed its internal divisions, right now it seems to have badly backfired. France is as united as it has been since WW2, with a patriotic fervor that goes without cheap chauvinism and without hatred. France is reawakening and I think the French may be the most surprised at it. The problem here is mostly for the large Muslim community inside France who now will have to join in and accept that they are French in a secular state. Or? We will see, but we can be sure that this play is just starting.
I am leaving you with this video from today about La Marseillase alone. Enjoy and be thrilled. Aux armes citoyens, sing it aloud and feel
Friday, 20 November 2015
A casual electoral prediction (election YV-5)
In past elections I have made predictions that often turned out acceptable to excellent (and sometimes not). This time around as announced, I have not made any exhaustive analysis of numbers and trends because, well, I have no time, not that much interest, the election is too emotional, etc... And mostly because I do not know what will happen on December 6, but I know quite well what will start on December 7. If the regime does not cancel the election, still a possibility for a crazed Maduro.
Yet, I should still play a little.
How did I come up with this graph? After looking at the Caucaguita tale telling trend I did my district excel table, tossed around a few numbers based on the 2010 election, got inspiration on results in between, kept in mind that being angry at Maduro does not mean that the chavista voter will cross the line, and never forgot that the regime has enough of a blackmailing machinery to still be able to save the basics. This, of course, allow me to remain skeptic of the very enthusiastic polls in favor of the opposition. I mean, at this point, I do not think that the treachery of the regime will be enough to save its skin but I am willing to bet that the opposition will not reach the 2/3 grail (power to change the constitution).
Thus the above is my pessimistic result where chavismo retains as much clout as possible. But for that it will need to retain all the seats that I termed "Lean PSUV" and, well, all the toss up seats. I doubt that it can manage that and chavismo should be thankful that it keeps 3/4 of the leaning one and half of the toss up, which will be enough for the opposition to win and get close to a 3/5 majority.
Say, statistically:
45 of the safe +19 of the lean MUD, + 14 tossup, + 6 lean PSUV that makes 84 out of 167, that is 1 seat majority. This for me is the very least the MUD will get.
My max? At this point:
49 safe +24 lean MUD + 16 toss up +10 lean PSUV +2 upset of the red ones that makes 101 out of 167. Or 60% of the seats (with more than 60% of the vote, kind of a stretch no matter what polls say). That is, a 3/5 majority by one seat. Sorry, I cannot come up with a better number for you anti chavista crowd at this time. We'll see December 5.
Reminder: I am not sticking out my neck on this prediction as I have not been able to do all the local research I used to do for other elections. It is as serious a work as I can do according to circumstances but it is still incomplete.
Yet, I should still play a little.
How did I come up with this graph? After looking at the Caucaguita tale telling trend I did my district excel table, tossed around a few numbers based on the 2010 election, got inspiration on results in between, kept in mind that being angry at Maduro does not mean that the chavista voter will cross the line, and never forgot that the regime has enough of a blackmailing machinery to still be able to save the basics. This, of course, allow me to remain skeptic of the very enthusiastic polls in favor of the opposition. I mean, at this point, I do not think that the treachery of the regime will be enough to save its skin but I am willing to bet that the opposition will not reach the 2/3 grail (power to change the constitution).
Thus the above is my pessimistic result where chavismo retains as much clout as possible. But for that it will need to retain all the seats that I termed "Lean PSUV" and, well, all the toss up seats. I doubt that it can manage that and chavismo should be thankful that it keeps 3/4 of the leaning one and half of the toss up, which will be enough for the opposition to win and get close to a 3/5 majority.
Say, statistically:
45 of the safe +19 of the lean MUD, + 14 tossup, + 6 lean PSUV that makes 84 out of 167, that is 1 seat majority. This for me is the very least the MUD will get.
My max? At this point:
49 safe +24 lean MUD + 16 toss up +10 lean PSUV +2 upset of the red ones that makes 101 out of 167. Or 60% of the seats (with more than 60% of the vote, kind of a stretch no matter what polls say). That is, a 3/5 majority by one seat. Sorry, I cannot come up with a better number for you anti chavista crowd at this time. We'll see December 5.
Reminder: I am not sticking out my neck on this prediction as I have not been able to do all the local research I used to do for other elections. It is as serious a work as I can do according to circumstances but it is still incomplete.
Monday, 16 November 2015
As Caucaguita goes so will the election go (election YV-4)
Long time readers of this blog will remember that I have picked up Caucaguita as a bell-weather district in all election analysis that I have written along these many years. Sometimes even with regularly updated graphs as years added more data. As I have written a few months ago this time around I have neither the intention, nor the time to analyze in detail this most emotional of elections, amen of the worst treachery factor since 1999. But I did promise a few short posts in the last days to help interested people understand what is going on. So I went to my Caucaguita electoral figures and came up with this simplified version.
To make a long story short, Cuacaguita is a poor downtrodden area of Eastern Caracas in the Petare district. It has been used as an electoral propaganda ground, most notoriously in the Luis Herrera election (1978). But things never improved much since. It should be a district where chavismo should get always 75% of the vote. And yet it does not.
Now there is a lot of data available for the behavior of Caucaguita voter and one observation is that abstention rates are at least 10% higher in "local" elections than in "national" elections. And more variable. But now I can use only "national" elections data, presidential, referenda and legislative in the graph above. And the results can be simplified to that subset of data, and become more telling.
Interestingly the abstention trend line is to decrease. Slowly but surely. This shows that not only the "bring in the vote" machinery has perfected over the years, but even the opposition benefits from it in what is normally hostile territory. Never mind the possibility of a better educated elector, more aware of its role.
The second observation is that the advantage of chavismo is eroding, slowly but equally surely. The graph shows what percentage of the opposition vote would represent of the chavista vote. That is, 60% means that for every 100 chavista voters 60 opposition voters showed up.
I think that the graph above is quite clear in its meaning even though the total chavista votes varies a lot according on what is actually on the ballot. The opposition vote is increasing its share, and it has gone from a 1 to 2 deficit advantage to barely a 4 to 5.
This is bad news for the regime as we cannot see how this one can stop that trend, the more so that the economic situation is near catastrophic. If the opposition were to manage a count of at least 85% of the chavista count in Caucaguita we can predict a general victory for the opposition country wide. Only rural districts can escape the electoral logic of the Cuacaguita urban nature.
I will note that in its latest attempt at gerrymandering Cuacaguita was taken away from Petare, considered lost for chavismo, to supplement the Guarenas-Guatire district now under heavy opposition pressure (Guatire is already lost). However if the opposition equates 85% of chavismo in Caucaguita I am afraid that it all will have been for naught for the regime.
Then again there is also naked electoral fraud, but that is another story. The take home lesson here is that the lower the abstention the better the chances for the opposition. This graph, in this most difficult district, is explicit. In other words, for the assholes that still preach abstention, please, shut up, you are an embarrassment.
To make a long story short, Cuacaguita is a poor downtrodden area of Eastern Caracas in the Petare district. It has been used as an electoral propaganda ground, most notoriously in the Luis Herrera election (1978). But things never improved much since. It should be a district where chavismo should get always 75% of the vote. And yet it does not.
Now there is a lot of data available for the behavior of Caucaguita voter and one observation is that abstention rates are at least 10% higher in "local" elections than in "national" elections. And more variable. But now I can use only "national" elections data, presidential, referenda and legislative in the graph above. And the results can be simplified to that subset of data, and become more telling.
Interestingly the abstention trend line is to decrease. Slowly but surely. This shows that not only the "bring in the vote" machinery has perfected over the years, but even the opposition benefits from it in what is normally hostile territory. Never mind the possibility of a better educated elector, more aware of its role.
The second observation is that the advantage of chavismo is eroding, slowly but equally surely. The graph shows what percentage of the opposition vote would represent of the chavista vote. That is, 60% means that for every 100 chavista voters 60 opposition voters showed up.
I think that the graph above is quite clear in its meaning even though the total chavista votes varies a lot according on what is actually on the ballot. The opposition vote is increasing its share, and it has gone from a 1 to 2 deficit advantage to barely a 4 to 5.
This is bad news for the regime as we cannot see how this one can stop that trend, the more so that the economic situation is near catastrophic. If the opposition were to manage a count of at least 85% of the chavista count in Caucaguita we can predict a general victory for the opposition country wide. Only rural districts can escape the electoral logic of the Cuacaguita urban nature.
I will note that in its latest attempt at gerrymandering Cuacaguita was taken away from Petare, considered lost for chavismo, to supplement the Guarenas-Guatire district now under heavy opposition pressure (Guatire is already lost). However if the opposition equates 85% of chavismo in Caucaguita I am afraid that it all will have been for naught for the regime.
Then again there is also naked electoral fraud, but that is another story. The take home lesson here is that the lower the abstention the better the chances for the opposition. This graph, in this most difficult district, is explicit. In other words, for the assholes that still preach abstention, please, shut up, you are an embarrassment.
Sunday, 15 November 2015
A small gathering at Plaza Altamira
Plaza Francia Caracas 18:15 pic.twitter.com/1Pp7Dr5AOT— daniel duquenal (@danielduquenal) November 15, 2015It had to be opposition mayors that had a gathering in support of France after the Paris attacks. In addition of the Embassy top brass, the mayors of Chacao and El Hatillo attended (Muchacho and Smolanski). As far as I know no chavista mayor did shit. But they are too busy trying to save their electoral skins and covering up for the first family drug deals.
Incidentally, most head of states or government have sent personal messages of support to France from their tweeter account. On @nicolasmaduro you will find a simple re-tweet of the foreign ministry which is as lame as possible a communique, but dozens and dozens of electoral re-tweets, many or all of them violating campaign rules.
Then again the regime has been a faithful ally of Assad and of the kind of good and bad terrorist. So I should not be surprised.....
Also I am in shock reading that some in Venezuela disqualify support for France as there are as many victims on a single week end crime spree in Caracas. We are really a fucked up society here.
Saturday, 14 November 2015
Paris
This is also my flag, and more so today.
This is the flag that stands for a secular society ruled by law.
Wednesday, 11 November 2015
Flowers and letters: no romance for the revolutionary corpse
It is hard to underestimate the weigh of this week's events on an agonizing Maduro's headed regime. Even your prudent blogger is cautiously allowing himself to believe that yes, indeed, the regime's life should be counted in weeks... Or that at the very least a major change is just around the corner.
The week started with the reply sent to Tibisay Lucena by OAS Secretary Luis Almagro. See, Almagro got really upset about the flippancy of Tibisay Lucena, head of the CNE, Venezuela's electoral board. The woman, on orders from the regime that she is only too happy to oblige, is refusing ANY supervision to the crucial electoral process coming on December 6.
As it turns out the international community has been sending lots of hints as to the validity and fairness of the coming election. These hints have not been duly responded. Thus these hints became more and more direct, asking formally the CNE to allow real international observation, not the mere tourist tour on election day by "friendly" countries which in addition are barred from direct comment on elections. Lucena (and so many others in the regime) have become ruder and ruder, going as far as saying that people like Almagro were interfering on sovereign matters (injerencia). In short: butt off.
The latest curt and undiplomatic reply of Tibisay to Luis was just too much for him and he replied in a long 18 pages letter (PDF in Spanish here). He needed that much space because the letter reads like the longest most comprehensive indictment on Tibisay Lucena's work. Nothing was missed, from the cheapest electoral treacheries, to the lack of access by the opposition to TV, through all the material abuses of the regime, without forgetting political prisoners. Almagro even shows his clear understanding of gerrymandering as done in Venezuela. All, ALL is there. Asking for an observation is in fact a courtesy of sorts, to offer a chance for the regime to state its case.
This letter is of utmost importance because he lays at the feet of Lucena all the guilt for any negative consequence that the fraudulent elections may have. Almagro's team (and allies as he cannot have sent such a letter without the acquiescence of a few OAS members) is absolutely clear on that guilt: either Lucena has been promoting that treachery or she has remained silent in front of it. In the end all will be her direct responsibility. In short, the letter is, well, an ultimatum.
But any rational answer that the regime may have considered to Almagro's letter was taking a back seat when we learned today that two close relatives of Cilia Flores, Maduro's wife and probably the real power behind the throne, were arrested in Haiti as 800 kilos deal of cocaine traffic was busted. As the amateurs that these kids were they blurted immediately their status and their diplomatic passport. To no avail of course for the DEA personnel. Within hours all major papers in the world have been carrying the news that Maduro's close step-relatives were busted, and busted bad.
No link needed, just pick up WSJ, NYT, El Pais, Veja, etc... for details. In short, the two kids fell like amateurs trusting what seemed a rather casual contact from Honduras who was in fact a DEA undercover agent. Cilia Flores nepotism has defrayed the chronicles so there is no surprise in seeing these kids with a high sense of entitlement showing their diplomatic passport (though being nobodies), and promptly saying that they were Maduro's family, and then stating that the drug belonged to Diosdado and Tarek El Aissami (Aragua's governor, on the DEA list). These kids are going to chirp as much as asked.
One can only wonder if they were not set up from the start by a rival Venezuelan drug cartel to sink another one.
Now, this is a big problem. The only way for Cilia and Nicolas out of that mess is to condemn the kids and ask for justice to apply firmly. But we all know that this is not going to happen. So, what? We may have all sorts of invective against the US. Even a final break with closing embassies. Perhaps even a formal notification of Venezuela leaving the OAS (remember the letter at the beginning). The regime may even go as far as cancelling the election for "national security reasons since diplomatic passports are not respected".
But nobody outside of Venezuela will follow. Diplomatic immunity is no blanket immunity to begin with. And it applies only in the country where your mission is. Unless the Flores kids were attached to the Venezuelan embassy in Port au Prince there is little Venezuela can do. A crime is a crime and drug traffic is a crime everywhere in the world except in Venezuela, it seems. Though we can be sure that Haiti will stop receiving its allowances (and may have stopped to do so for a while which means they turned to the US where the bucks are).
I really do not see how the regime can wiggle out of this one. Someone will have to pay, if anything for allowing such a mess to happen, for being such a careless operator. The facts are clear. The world has served notice to the regime that its elections are rigged. The world has announced to the regime that its narco state character is not acceptable. The DEA has learned its lesson form the Carvajal fiasco in Aruba and now they are ready to pick up regime narco officials one by one, as soon as they set foot outside of Venezuela. There must be feverish meetings tonight at Miraflores Palace and major military camps.
I do not know what is going to happen, but something is going to. Since the odds of Cilia abandoning her brood are nil (never mind that they implicated Maduro's own son) we must look elsewhere. Since this is an irrational thug system anything crazy can happen. I would dare to suggest that the only way the regime can try to limit damage from this, and maybe even gain some leverage, is by forcing Maduro to resign in the coming days.
Maduro and Cilia are now beyond "damaged goods", even for their Cuban puppet masters. Forcing them to resign would have one immediate effect: suspend legislative elections where the spread is now reaching 20% against the regime in polls. In a presidential system presidential elections come first and the regime can hope that a presidential election may favor an opposition division while the anti Maduro chavista base may decide to come back to the regime once Maduro is out. Legislative elections can be held later. If the regime loses the presidency it will not matter much for chavismo in the Assembly; if it retains the presidency then it will be easier to retain a legislative majority. Or so would the strategy go. It would be easy to play around electoral agenda using primaries, etc, to postpone presidential elections all the way until February/March and legislative ones all the way until May or June.
That is what I would do if I were the regime, try to gain a few months in the hope oil prices go up again, or that opposition leadership is all in jail.
At any rate, tonight I truly feel for the first time that something has been set into motion, for better or for worse.
PS: note that 800 seem to be a magic kabalistic number for chavismo, like in the Antonini cash bag for Kirchner reelection or the 800 kilos of cocaine in Haiti.
The week started with the reply sent to Tibisay Lucena by OAS Secretary Luis Almagro. See, Almagro got really upset about the flippancy of Tibisay Lucena, head of the CNE, Venezuela's electoral board. The woman, on orders from the regime that she is only too happy to oblige, is refusing ANY supervision to the crucial electoral process coming on December 6.
As it turns out the international community has been sending lots of hints as to the validity and fairness of the coming election. These hints have not been duly responded. Thus these hints became more and more direct, asking formally the CNE to allow real international observation, not the mere tourist tour on election day by "friendly" countries which in addition are barred from direct comment on elections. Lucena (and so many others in the regime) have become ruder and ruder, going as far as saying that people like Almagro were interfering on sovereign matters (injerencia). In short: butt off.
The latest curt and undiplomatic reply of Tibisay to Luis was just too much for him and he replied in a long 18 pages letter (PDF in Spanish here). He needed that much space because the letter reads like the longest most comprehensive indictment on Tibisay Lucena's work. Nothing was missed, from the cheapest electoral treacheries, to the lack of access by the opposition to TV, through all the material abuses of the regime, without forgetting political prisoners. Almagro even shows his clear understanding of gerrymandering as done in Venezuela. All, ALL is there. Asking for an observation is in fact a courtesy of sorts, to offer a chance for the regime to state its case.
This letter is of utmost importance because he lays at the feet of Lucena all the guilt for any negative consequence that the fraudulent elections may have. Almagro's team (and allies as he cannot have sent such a letter without the acquiescence of a few OAS members) is absolutely clear on that guilt: either Lucena has been promoting that treachery or she has remained silent in front of it. In the end all will be her direct responsibility. In short, the letter is, well, an ultimatum.
But any rational answer that the regime may have considered to Almagro's letter was taking a back seat when we learned today that two close relatives of Cilia Flores, Maduro's wife and probably the real power behind the throne, were arrested in Haiti as 800 kilos deal of cocaine traffic was busted. As the amateurs that these kids were they blurted immediately their status and their diplomatic passport. To no avail of course for the DEA personnel. Within hours all major papers in the world have been carrying the news that Maduro's close step-relatives were busted, and busted bad.
No link needed, just pick up WSJ, NYT, El Pais, Veja, etc... for details. In short, the two kids fell like amateurs trusting what seemed a rather casual contact from Honduras who was in fact a DEA undercover agent. Cilia Flores nepotism has defrayed the chronicles so there is no surprise in seeing these kids with a high sense of entitlement showing their diplomatic passport (though being nobodies), and promptly saying that they were Maduro's family, and then stating that the drug belonged to Diosdado and Tarek El Aissami (Aragua's governor, on the DEA list). These kids are going to chirp as much as asked.
One can only wonder if they were not set up from the start by a rival Venezuelan drug cartel to sink another one.
Now, this is a big problem. The only way for Cilia and Nicolas out of that mess is to condemn the kids and ask for justice to apply firmly. But we all know that this is not going to happen. So, what? We may have all sorts of invective against the US. Even a final break with closing embassies. Perhaps even a formal notification of Venezuela leaving the OAS (remember the letter at the beginning). The regime may even go as far as cancelling the election for "national security reasons since diplomatic passports are not respected".
But nobody outside of Venezuela will follow. Diplomatic immunity is no blanket immunity to begin with. And it applies only in the country where your mission is. Unless the Flores kids were attached to the Venezuelan embassy in Port au Prince there is little Venezuela can do. A crime is a crime and drug traffic is a crime everywhere in the world except in Venezuela, it seems. Though we can be sure that Haiti will stop receiving its allowances (and may have stopped to do so for a while which means they turned to the US where the bucks are).
I really do not see how the regime can wiggle out of this one. Someone will have to pay, if anything for allowing such a mess to happen, for being such a careless operator. The facts are clear. The world has served notice to the regime that its elections are rigged. The world has announced to the regime that its narco state character is not acceptable. The DEA has learned its lesson form the Carvajal fiasco in Aruba and now they are ready to pick up regime narco officials one by one, as soon as they set foot outside of Venezuela. There must be feverish meetings tonight at Miraflores Palace and major military camps.
I do not know what is going to happen, but something is going to. Since the odds of Cilia abandoning her brood are nil (never mind that they implicated Maduro's own son) we must look elsewhere. Since this is an irrational thug system anything crazy can happen. I would dare to suggest that the only way the regime can try to limit damage from this, and maybe even gain some leverage, is by forcing Maduro to resign in the coming days.
Maduro and Cilia are now beyond "damaged goods", even for their Cuban puppet masters. Forcing them to resign would have one immediate effect: suspend legislative elections where the spread is now reaching 20% against the regime in polls. In a presidential system presidential elections come first and the regime can hope that a presidential election may favor an opposition division while the anti Maduro chavista base may decide to come back to the regime once Maduro is out. Legislative elections can be held later. If the regime loses the presidency it will not matter much for chavismo in the Assembly; if it retains the presidency then it will be easier to retain a legislative majority. Or so would the strategy go. It would be easy to play around electoral agenda using primaries, etc, to postpone presidential elections all the way until February/March and legislative ones all the way until May or June.
That is what I would do if I were the regime, try to gain a few months in the hope oil prices go up again, or that opposition leadership is all in jail.
At any rate, tonight I truly feel for the first time that something has been set into motion, for better or for worse.
PS: note that 800 seem to be a magic kabalistic number for chavismo, like in the Antonini cash bag for Kirchner reelection or the 800 kilos of cocaine in Haiti.
Monday, 9 November 2015
Can the opposition win? (election YV-3)
This is a rhetorical question: even the once neutral to favorable pollsters historically putting chavismo even or ahead are now giving the opposition a two digit lead. And yet things are not that simple.
I am not talking here of the obvious: electoral cheating that has taken this time around a many splendored scope. This December election will be one for the annals of deceit, treachery and plain banditry.
Yet it is very difficult to imagine a scenario where chavismo could get back to trailing the opposition no more than 5% which is enough for them to get a one seat advantage. I have already discussed that a "victory" for the opposition is a 3/5 majority. Nothing less will be good enough to force the country into a fairly negotiated political transition. Actually I am starting to think that a 2/3 parliamentary majority is what the opposition needs to win. Equally for the regime at this point a "victory" is 45% of the vote cast. Anything less will not do as no "revolution" can retain a semblance of credibility with such poor result in vote. Never mind that the military will start having doubts about supporting a plebiscite based regime that cannot even get 40+% of the vote.
This being said, the point of this blog entry is to think about whether the opposition can indeed get a 2 digit leaded, that is 10%+ margin over chavismo. No matter what the polls say it is hard to guess. True, a larger vote count seems now assured, but the margin will be volatile for many reasons.
First, many folks who have voted for Chavez consistently for over a decade will have a hard time to admit that they were wrong even if their heads are now sun baked through food scarcity lines. I, for one, cannot imagine many chavistas hoping happily from chavismo to opposition without an "abstention" election in between. That "abstain first and then vote oppo next" has been the pattern in the slow electoral growth of the opposition. But going from a documented trend to an hypothetical landslide.....
From this first observation you can understand that the second observation will be about the emotional content of the vote. True, the natives are restless but it is my belief that the bulk of chavista "desertion" will be more through abstention than actual switching. This because many of them will decide for real what to do in the very last days of the campaign and no poll can see that. True, such last minute decisions will not affect the outcome but could at the last minute carve out 2, 3 or 4 points of the opposition advantage. For a 3/5 majority these few points are crucial.
But this could backfire badly for chavismo too, my third observation. Chavismo will try its bring in the vote machinery. But if it pushes too hard, if it forces too much of its voters it could create a resentment reaction turning a lot of folks into former voters.
A fourth observation is how many voters the opposition lost to emigration. A million? A million and a half? Another key factor to reach the fabled 3/5.
Etc.
In short as we reach the last stretch of the campaign chavismo is left to rely on Chavez love and the effectiveness of its bring in the vote now that it has very little to pay for it. As for the opposition, deprived of media and campaign money it has to rely on people being upset enough to give it the crucial 3/5.
As you can guess yourself, an election based on emotions is hardy quantifiable in advance. As of today anything is possible, from a small opposition victory to a landslide. But all decided in the very last week.
I am not talking here of the obvious: electoral cheating that has taken this time around a many splendored scope. This December election will be one for the annals of deceit, treachery and plain banditry.
Yet it is very difficult to imagine a scenario where chavismo could get back to trailing the opposition no more than 5% which is enough for them to get a one seat advantage. I have already discussed that a "victory" for the opposition is a 3/5 majority. Nothing less will be good enough to force the country into a fairly negotiated political transition. Actually I am starting to think that a 2/3 parliamentary majority is what the opposition needs to win. Equally for the regime at this point a "victory" is 45% of the vote cast. Anything less will not do as no "revolution" can retain a semblance of credibility with such poor result in vote. Never mind that the military will start having doubts about supporting a plebiscite based regime that cannot even get 40+% of the vote.
This being said, the point of this blog entry is to think about whether the opposition can indeed get a 2 digit leaded, that is 10%+ margin over chavismo. No matter what the polls say it is hard to guess. True, a larger vote count seems now assured, but the margin will be volatile for many reasons.
First, many folks who have voted for Chavez consistently for over a decade will have a hard time to admit that they were wrong even if their heads are now sun baked through food scarcity lines. I, for one, cannot imagine many chavistas hoping happily from chavismo to opposition without an "abstention" election in between. That "abstain first and then vote oppo next" has been the pattern in the slow electoral growth of the opposition. But going from a documented trend to an hypothetical landslide.....
From this first observation you can understand that the second observation will be about the emotional content of the vote. True, the natives are restless but it is my belief that the bulk of chavista "desertion" will be more through abstention than actual switching. This because many of them will decide for real what to do in the very last days of the campaign and no poll can see that. True, such last minute decisions will not affect the outcome but could at the last minute carve out 2, 3 or 4 points of the opposition advantage. For a 3/5 majority these few points are crucial.
But this could backfire badly for chavismo too, my third observation. Chavismo will try its bring in the vote machinery. But if it pushes too hard, if it forces too much of its voters it could create a resentment reaction turning a lot of folks into former voters.
A fourth observation is how many voters the opposition lost to emigration. A million? A million and a half? Another key factor to reach the fabled 3/5.
Etc.
In short as we reach the last stretch of the campaign chavismo is left to rely on Chavez love and the effectiveness of its bring in the vote now that it has very little to pay for it. As for the opposition, deprived of media and campaign money it has to rely on people being upset enough to give it the crucial 3/5.
As you can guess yourself, an election based on emotions is hardy quantifiable in advance. As of today anything is possible, from a small opposition victory to a landslide. But all decided in the very last week.
Sunday, 8 November 2015
Tourism in Venezuela: at your own risk
So I was away for a few days of beach, sand and surf. Not quite.
I have a time share for a yearly week in Margarita which is why there are occasional pics of the area through this blog. Considering that the S.O. does not like the beach and was OK in health, I risked leaving. Next, all the problems I had to endure for a meager 4 days break.
Preparing for the trip:
-. Get your reservation. Since I did not take my usual time slot the resort only confirms my change two weeks ahead. As a consequence since it is difficult to find airline tickets in such short notice, I already lost one day as I could not find flights for the day the week started. Plus, the confirmation coming so late, I had some unavoidable engagement that made me lose two other days. So form the start I had to pay for 7 days while being able to enjoy only 4. I know, I know, little bourgeois disgust, but as you will read they keep piling up.
- Since a lot of taxis will be involved, since you cannot pay them with plastic, since there is no high currency note, then you have to get yourself a big bundle of bank notes of 100, the highest available. The shortest ride will set you back at least 500 VEB so you will need at least 5 banknotes of 100, if you can find them. See, the problem is that there is such a demand for 100 banknote (about 13 USD cents, that is, 0,13, barely a dime) that banks will not provide them that easily. Your best bet is frequent visits to ATM the week before, maxing out your daily withdrawal until you get the wad you need. In my case I estimated 20,000 in cab fair so I had to get 200 banknotes. TWO HUNDRED. An ATM run not from my bank will give me only 6. At my bank ATM I can get 40 (if available). Do the math. And then visualize getting out a wad of bills when you pay your cab and counting patiently dozens of bills......
- Of course, you have to pack very carefully as you do not know whether a missing item can be replaced at your destination. And yet it does not help: in my case my beach tongues broke and I could not find a replacement to my size so I had to get an overpriced pair of Crocs......
The trip:
- Mistakes abound and you cannot correct them easily. My airline screwed up on my ticket and I had to pay an extra 20% at the airport or else. Sure, I can appeal, but that meant I could not board....
- Creatures comfort are scarce. There is no bottled water. So it is a soda or Gatorade for your thirst. I was hungry and I got inside the fast food court aiming at "¡Que Arepa!" which looked clean and appealing. Except that there were out of corn flour so NO Arepa.
- Harassment in miscellaneous ways is present. The worst offender is that in Margarita you have an immigration check point for all. Allegedly to protect the island form the arrival of criminals and drug smugglers. Ask the natives if they feel any safer.....
- You arrive tired and hungry at your hotel. Yet relief is not there. The Caracas office screwed up and you have to wait half an hour until they can finally untangle part of the screw up and give you keys to your room. But since the screw up was big I had also to advance 50 banknotes so I could eat that night until next morning things got settled and I could enjoy my plan as planned (and get back my precious banknotes!!!!!)
The stay:
- So there we are and there is water but the toilet does not flush. So before I unpack I go to the front desk to report and change room. It turns out that there is a shortage of water in Margarita so they dropped the water pressure to save. Since the toilets are of the high pressure type, without reservoir, well, you can only flush in the few hours during the day where pressure is set to normal.
- Flushing my toilet off hours required me to fill up the paper basket with the thread of water from the shower and lug it to the john. 5 stars it wasn't.
- And after the second day the water was cut outright 20 hours a day, so there was not even a water thread.
- Food was actually not bad. Usually I do not get the food plan as I like to go out on occasion, and I eat munchies so as to spend the week dieting and exercising (there is a fridge in the room and I bring a water boiler). Considering the food shortages I decided that this time around I'd better get them to deal with it. But if food was not bad it was showing a total lack of variety. In short, 50% of the offerings were the same all the time and the other 50% alternated one day each.... After 4 days I had already enough of the cafeteria.
- Drinks were included but you'd better have a solid liver. See, over are the days of fancy liquor. Now what you have is basic rum and local made vodka and gin which are, well, at least for me, a fast source of headaches and hangovers. Still, there is also creativity at the bar. Bailey has disappeared in Venezuela as way, way overpriced. So the barman invented a "Margarita Bailey" which is Ponche Crema (kind of bottled eggnog) with a dash of Venezuelan made whisky and coffee liqueur. Well, it sort of worked and became my night cap....
- Of course, with the water crisis you could not have your towels, bed sheets, etc. changed at will. Since the AC was way too cold and too humid you could not dry them properly. Within two days all started to have a weird scent.....
- I went only once out, to make an errand and get a beach thong replacement. So I had to go to a fancy mall (La Vela) where luxury stores exist except that they have a very limited displays and no customers inside anyway. I paid my Crocs three monthly minimum wages (about 40 USD at black market rate, 4700 USD at the official 6,3), But a pair of solid thongs my size, not nice, just solid, would have set me back a monthly minimum wage anyway. If I caved in and bought them is that by experience I know Crocs last more than three times what a pair of solid thongs can last... The question here, of course, is not whether I can truly afford them; the point here is how the poor masses that voted for Chavez and live on minimum wage can afford to put anything between their feet and the dirt.....
Conclusion:
I 'll spare you more details, such as security, blackouts, etc.. I can only tell you that after 24 hours I seriously considered to go back home (the resort was rather empty, by the way). But the Caribbean is there and well....... even if the beaches are eaten up with oil pollution and look more like a Hawaiian volcano beach than a coral sand one........
 |
| Take out the water and it is pretty much like this |
I have a time share for a yearly week in Margarita which is why there are occasional pics of the area through this blog. Considering that the S.O. does not like the beach and was OK in health, I risked leaving. Next, all the problems I had to endure for a meager 4 days break.
Preparing for the trip:
-. Get your reservation. Since I did not take my usual time slot the resort only confirms my change two weeks ahead. As a consequence since it is difficult to find airline tickets in such short notice, I already lost one day as I could not find flights for the day the week started. Plus, the confirmation coming so late, I had some unavoidable engagement that made me lose two other days. So form the start I had to pay for 7 days while being able to enjoy only 4. I know, I know, little bourgeois disgust, but as you will read they keep piling up.
- Since a lot of taxis will be involved, since you cannot pay them with plastic, since there is no high currency note, then you have to get yourself a big bundle of bank notes of 100, the highest available. The shortest ride will set you back at least 500 VEB so you will need at least 5 banknotes of 100, if you can find them. See, the problem is that there is such a demand for 100 banknote (about 13 USD cents, that is, 0,13, barely a dime) that banks will not provide them that easily. Your best bet is frequent visits to ATM the week before, maxing out your daily withdrawal until you get the wad you need. In my case I estimated 20,000 in cab fair so I had to get 200 banknotes. TWO HUNDRED. An ATM run not from my bank will give me only 6. At my bank ATM I can get 40 (if available). Do the math. And then visualize getting out a wad of bills when you pay your cab and counting patiently dozens of bills......
- Of course, you have to pack very carefully as you do not know whether a missing item can be replaced at your destination. And yet it does not help: in my case my beach tongues broke and I could not find a replacement to my size so I had to get an overpriced pair of Crocs......
The trip:
- Mistakes abound and you cannot correct them easily. My airline screwed up on my ticket and I had to pay an extra 20% at the airport or else. Sure, I can appeal, but that meant I could not board....
- Creatures comfort are scarce. There is no bottled water. So it is a soda or Gatorade for your thirst. I was hungry and I got inside the fast food court aiming at "¡Que Arepa!" which looked clean and appealing. Except that there were out of corn flour so NO Arepa.
- Harassment in miscellaneous ways is present. The worst offender is that in Margarita you have an immigration check point for all. Allegedly to protect the island form the arrival of criminals and drug smugglers. Ask the natives if they feel any safer.....
- You arrive tired and hungry at your hotel. Yet relief is not there. The Caracas office screwed up and you have to wait half an hour until they can finally untangle part of the screw up and give you keys to your room. But since the screw up was big I had also to advance 50 banknotes so I could eat that night until next morning things got settled and I could enjoy my plan as planned (and get back my precious banknotes!!!!!)
The stay:
- So there we are and there is water but the toilet does not flush. So before I unpack I go to the front desk to report and change room. It turns out that there is a shortage of water in Margarita so they dropped the water pressure to save. Since the toilets are of the high pressure type, without reservoir, well, you can only flush in the few hours during the day where pressure is set to normal.
- Flushing my toilet off hours required me to fill up the paper basket with the thread of water from the shower and lug it to the john. 5 stars it wasn't.
- And after the second day the water was cut outright 20 hours a day, so there was not even a water thread.
- Food was actually not bad. Usually I do not get the food plan as I like to go out on occasion, and I eat munchies so as to spend the week dieting and exercising (there is a fridge in the room and I bring a water boiler). Considering the food shortages I decided that this time around I'd better get them to deal with it. But if food was not bad it was showing a total lack of variety. In short, 50% of the offerings were the same all the time and the other 50% alternated one day each.... After 4 days I had already enough of the cafeteria.
- Drinks were included but you'd better have a solid liver. See, over are the days of fancy liquor. Now what you have is basic rum and local made vodka and gin which are, well, at least for me, a fast source of headaches and hangovers. Still, there is also creativity at the bar. Bailey has disappeared in Venezuela as way, way overpriced. So the barman invented a "Margarita Bailey" which is Ponche Crema (kind of bottled eggnog) with a dash of Venezuelan made whisky and coffee liqueur. Well, it sort of worked and became my night cap....
- Of course, with the water crisis you could not have your towels, bed sheets, etc. changed at will. Since the AC was way too cold and too humid you could not dry them properly. Within two days all started to have a weird scent.....
- I went only once out, to make an errand and get a beach thong replacement. So I had to go to a fancy mall (La Vela) where luxury stores exist except that they have a very limited displays and no customers inside anyway. I paid my Crocs three monthly minimum wages (about 40 USD at black market rate, 4700 USD at the official 6,3), But a pair of solid thongs my size, not nice, just solid, would have set me back a monthly minimum wage anyway. If I caved in and bought them is that by experience I know Crocs last more than three times what a pair of solid thongs can last... The question here, of course, is not whether I can truly afford them; the point here is how the poor masses that voted for Chavez and live on minimum wage can afford to put anything between their feet and the dirt.....
Conclusion:
I 'll spare you more details, such as security, blackouts, etc.. I can only tell you that after 24 hours I seriously considered to go back home (the resort was rather empty, by the way). But the Caribbean is there and well....... even if the beaches are eaten up with oil pollution and look more like a Hawaiian volcano beach than a coral sand one........
Thursday, 29 October 2015
Does chavismo want an election? (election 2015 YV-2)
Count me in those who still doubt that there will be elections on December 6. I cannot see the regime going through elections unless it is certain that the opposition will not get more than 90 seats (about 55%). With that number it should not be too difficult for the regime to lure away enough opposition representatives to recover a weak majority within a year or two. Considering the complete control over everything else, the regime thinks that this is the worst case scenario they are willing to accept.
Unfortunately all polls indicate that 90 may actually be the opposition floor and that in spite of everything the opposition could reach 100 seats (about 61%). That number still far from the needed 66% majority to change things in the country is still high enough that the National Assembly could exert some controls and launch some damaging investigations. Investigations that of course the regime cannot tolerate, nor dodge. What is worse for the regime is that if the opposition gets 100 or more seats then it is not that unlikely for some chavista to defect to the opposition side if the parliamentary investigations become too spicy. After all Venezuelan politicians are not known for their admirable qualities of sinking with the ship. Their attitude is rather murine.
That increasing desperation inside the regime who justifiably fears for its privileges is sensed more and more. If the sentence on Lopez was a clear salvo, other words are equally telling.
For example the other day nobody less but Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, said that all of the opposition was suspect of plotting against the regime. She did not nuance much, for her there is no one worth discussing on the other side of the isle. Certainly Cilia being one of the worst offenders as far as nepotism is concerned knows for sure that her shenanigans would not be funded anymore under a new management. This is not a matter of fear for her, she is way too amoral for having such feelings, but rather mere technical points to keep her extended brood on tenure. For people like Cilia, the others simply want her job to cash in.
Her husband Nicolas goes further. He is now seeing conspiracy when people discuss among themselves the Venezuelan economic disaster and speculate how big would a rescue package be. Since Maduro is too dumb to understand, and worse, too unwilling to learn how the real world functions, then these people discussing serious matters are mere conspirators. That is why Lorenzo Mendoza is under threat of jail for having a phone call to Ricardo Hausman tapped illegally. I am quite certain that Maduro knows the risks in jailing Mendoza but if this can stop the election he may well be willing to take that risk. Soon attending a mere campaign meeting will be an act of conspiracy.
Of course, there are the constant and multiple insults from the chavista riffraff but I will spare you that. It will be enough with these two examples coming from the very top of the state to figure out what goes on under.
What is more interesting here, when you read the variety and quality of insults, is that it seems that there is a deep divide inside chavismo as to the election. Granted, all agree on maximum abuse against the opposition making this campaign already the worst in chavista history, a campaign that should have already been condemned internationally as it is.
On one side you have people like Maduro who is on record, as president of the nation, saying that the regime has to win the election at any cost, and that if that did not happen well, let's go and hit the streets and refuse recognition. We even have cute and ridiculous scenes where the regime offers a document that all parts should sign to recognize the result when that document was not discussed by anyone. And then of course attack the opposition as warmongers for not signing it.
On the other side you have a relative silence from the army and from some of the regime operators who abound in attacks against the opposition but try not to go overboard with these. It is all a matter of degree in histrionics.
My interpretation is that there are people like Maduro and Flores who are ready to suspend elections that they cannot win. Period. Come what may. On the other side there are chavistas that think not holding elections could be worse than losing them. They certainly cannot be vocal about it inside a regime permeated with spies all around. I would dare to go as far as putting Diosdado Cabello in that group. Why are these people willing to contemplate a loss? The Sandinista experience is a good piece of data. When they left Violeta Chamorro win they burdened the opposition with the management of the crisis they had left behind, and later they helped create a major division inside the opposition that allowed for their return. And now a divided opposition and Chavez cash have consolidated Sandinismo tenure in ways guns could never manage. Note: Sandinistas always kept control of the army.
Also, for chavismo who lacks an Evita, a little bit of opposition epic like Peronism had in Argentina could be of great help long run.
I the end, besides the army, what will decide whether elections are held, how much fraud is applied, what result is accepted, will be the result of the inner battle within chavismo. The battle is between those that want to null elections and those that are willing to take a risk. In the end, what is really at stake here is which group from chavismo will get its hands on the remaining riches, as those may be. The opposition is a mere distraction in that battle.
Unfortunately all polls indicate that 90 may actually be the opposition floor and that in spite of everything the opposition could reach 100 seats (about 61%). That number still far from the needed 66% majority to change things in the country is still high enough that the National Assembly could exert some controls and launch some damaging investigations. Investigations that of course the regime cannot tolerate, nor dodge. What is worse for the regime is that if the opposition gets 100 or more seats then it is not that unlikely for some chavista to defect to the opposition side if the parliamentary investigations become too spicy. After all Venezuelan politicians are not known for their admirable qualities of sinking with the ship. Their attitude is rather murine.
That increasing desperation inside the regime who justifiably fears for its privileges is sensed more and more. If the sentence on Lopez was a clear salvo, other words are equally telling.
For example the other day nobody less but Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, said that all of the opposition was suspect of plotting against the regime. She did not nuance much, for her there is no one worth discussing on the other side of the isle. Certainly Cilia being one of the worst offenders as far as nepotism is concerned knows for sure that her shenanigans would not be funded anymore under a new management. This is not a matter of fear for her, she is way too amoral for having such feelings, but rather mere technical points to keep her extended brood on tenure. For people like Cilia, the others simply want her job to cash in.
Her husband Nicolas goes further. He is now seeing conspiracy when people discuss among themselves the Venezuelan economic disaster and speculate how big would a rescue package be. Since Maduro is too dumb to understand, and worse, too unwilling to learn how the real world functions, then these people discussing serious matters are mere conspirators. That is why Lorenzo Mendoza is under threat of jail for having a phone call to Ricardo Hausman tapped illegally. I am quite certain that Maduro knows the risks in jailing Mendoza but if this can stop the election he may well be willing to take that risk. Soon attending a mere campaign meeting will be an act of conspiracy.
Of course, there are the constant and multiple insults from the chavista riffraff but I will spare you that. It will be enough with these two examples coming from the very top of the state to figure out what goes on under.
What is more interesting here, when you read the variety and quality of insults, is that it seems that there is a deep divide inside chavismo as to the election. Granted, all agree on maximum abuse against the opposition making this campaign already the worst in chavista history, a campaign that should have already been condemned internationally as it is.
On one side you have people like Maduro who is on record, as president of the nation, saying that the regime has to win the election at any cost, and that if that did not happen well, let's go and hit the streets and refuse recognition. We even have cute and ridiculous scenes where the regime offers a document that all parts should sign to recognize the result when that document was not discussed by anyone. And then of course attack the opposition as warmongers for not signing it.
On the other side you have a relative silence from the army and from some of the regime operators who abound in attacks against the opposition but try not to go overboard with these. It is all a matter of degree in histrionics.
My interpretation is that there are people like Maduro and Flores who are ready to suspend elections that they cannot win. Period. Come what may. On the other side there are chavistas that think not holding elections could be worse than losing them. They certainly cannot be vocal about it inside a regime permeated with spies all around. I would dare to go as far as putting Diosdado Cabello in that group. Why are these people willing to contemplate a loss? The Sandinista experience is a good piece of data. When they left Violeta Chamorro win they burdened the opposition with the management of the crisis they had left behind, and later they helped create a major division inside the opposition that allowed for their return. And now a divided opposition and Chavez cash have consolidated Sandinismo tenure in ways guns could never manage. Note: Sandinistas always kept control of the army.
Also, for chavismo who lacks an Evita, a little bit of opposition epic like Peronism had in Argentina could be of great help long run.
I the end, besides the army, what will decide whether elections are held, how much fraud is applied, what result is accepted, will be the result of the inner battle within chavismo. The battle is between those that want to null elections and those that are willing to take a risk. In the end, what is really at stake here is which group from chavismo will get its hands on the remaining riches, as those may be. The opposition is a mere distraction in that battle.
Tuesday, 27 October 2015
The banality of evil, Caracas style
Tonight I twitted this:
In English: Listening to {prosecutor} Nieves I keep thinking of Hannah Arendt and the banality of evil.
One of the top prosecutors in the Leopoldo Lopez show trial has defected to the US and is now saying that the whole operation against Lopez was a scam, that the intention was to put him away for the election of 2015 and more. In fact Nieves went as far as to say, more or less, that the order to arrest Lopez already existed before the events for which he was finally arrested in February 2014.
Franklin Nieves was tonight in the top CÑNe rating show of Fernando del Rincon. Mr. del Rincon rocketed from a CNNE anchor to his own nightly talk show, Conclusiones, as a consequence of his daring reports on Venezuela through the first half of 2014. He has become the journalist to go for any trouble in Latin America, and the specialist on Venezuela, much loved by the opposition, and much more reviled by the regime.
I am not going into the details of what Nieves said (for those who read Spanish you can visit my Tweeter time line of Tuesday night). In short, he stated that all the evidence against Lopez was fabricated, that he received orders to prosecute anyway on those fake evidences, that all knew about that in the regime, that Diosdado Cabello himself was supervising the first orders and that he fooled the Lopez family in making them believe that if Lopez surrendered nicely a deal would be reached. He accused directly Maduro and Cabello and some of the top officials at the state prosecuting office in such a way that the regime will have to do better than just using the worn out line "he is a liar, paid by the nemesis of the revolution" (which he may well be for all that I know, but that is not the point). There is a situation now that will make supporting the regime almost impossible for some of its allies.
No, my interest is elsewhere. First, let's us start with the one with easiest access: why is the US covering for all those defectors? Is it a strategy to encourage them to defect the regime so as to build a case against its corrupt narco officials? In that case, how come indictments and active prosecutions are not coming through faster? In short, why are the US giving some (minor) credit to some of the accusations the regime hurls at them? I am writing that because informed people know better, know that the regime is indeed a rotten corrupt system, that is not investigated by the US alone. But too many use the people's ignorance and misinformation, even inside the opposition, in such ways that it helps the regime case. I am also writing this so that readers realize that I am not in a blind rage as I type.
There is some confusing evil above, but there is real evil next.
What has struck me more was the composure of Nieves during the whole interview, even as del Rincon was trying not to break down under the shock of having all of his antidemocratic accusations against the regime thus validated.
That made me think of Hanna Arendt, the Eichman trial, the basic nature of totalitarianism the way she explained, creating "the banality of evil". At least Arendt was writing her seminal books based on people following orders. I suppose that concentration camp guards did not have access to Tweeter to get contrasting news to what the Reich told them everyday. Even if pathetic, the defenses of "I was just following orders" " I did not know" "Nobody told me anything, nobody knew" could make one doubt on occasion if the lines were pronounced then with an empty enough glance.
But with Nieves such excuses cannot apply. Nieves tonight told us he knew what he was doing all along was wrong, was a crime, was an abuse of Human Rights. He knew all along that the regime wanted Lopez jailed, found guilty while it figured out, I imagine, a final solution to the Lopez problem.
Nieves knew and yet he did. And I do not buy much his crocodile tears at seeing Lopez little girl go to the same school as the prosecutor's orphan maker girl being too much for him and making him decide to defect.
What was shocking tonight is that all the actors were following orders, indeed, but knowing full well that the orders were wrong. In the end it does not really matter whether Cabello is the one that gave the original order, what matters here is that the chavista regime has been a totalitarian regime for quite a while as the behavior of the people at the nation's prosecution office show. This is way beyond debating whether the regime can be described as a dictatorship. This is a neo-totalitarian system as I have long ago coined it as a tag for some of this blog entries.
In the end one is left perplexed in trying to figure which is the worst evil. The ones giving orders? The ones executing it? The ones confessing to them without much trouble? And thus it all becomes banal.
PS: interview now up for those who understand Spanish
Oyendo Nieves me la paso pensando en Hanna Arendt y la banalidad del mal. #ConcluFiscal— daniel duquenal (@danielduquenal) October 28, 2015In English: Listening to {prosecutor} Nieves I keep thinking of Hannah Arendt and the banality of evil.
One of the top prosecutors in the Leopoldo Lopez show trial has defected to the US and is now saying that the whole operation against Lopez was a scam, that the intention was to put him away for the election of 2015 and more. In fact Nieves went as far as to say, more or less, that the order to arrest Lopez already existed before the events for which he was finally arrested in February 2014.
Franklin Nieves was tonight in the top CÑNe rating show of Fernando del Rincon. Mr. del Rincon rocketed from a CNNE anchor to his own nightly talk show, Conclusiones, as a consequence of his daring reports on Venezuela through the first half of 2014. He has become the journalist to go for any trouble in Latin America, and the specialist on Venezuela, much loved by the opposition, and much more reviled by the regime.
I am not going into the details of what Nieves said (for those who read Spanish you can visit my Tweeter time line of Tuesday night). In short, he stated that all the evidence against Lopez was fabricated, that he received orders to prosecute anyway on those fake evidences, that all knew about that in the regime, that Diosdado Cabello himself was supervising the first orders and that he fooled the Lopez family in making them believe that if Lopez surrendered nicely a deal would be reached. He accused directly Maduro and Cabello and some of the top officials at the state prosecuting office in such a way that the regime will have to do better than just using the worn out line "he is a liar, paid by the nemesis of the revolution" (which he may well be for all that I know, but that is not the point). There is a situation now that will make supporting the regime almost impossible for some of its allies.
No, my interest is elsewhere. First, let's us start with the one with easiest access: why is the US covering for all those defectors? Is it a strategy to encourage them to defect the regime so as to build a case against its corrupt narco officials? In that case, how come indictments and active prosecutions are not coming through faster? In short, why are the US giving some (minor) credit to some of the accusations the regime hurls at them? I am writing that because informed people know better, know that the regime is indeed a rotten corrupt system, that is not investigated by the US alone. But too many use the people's ignorance and misinformation, even inside the opposition, in such ways that it helps the regime case. I am also writing this so that readers realize that I am not in a blind rage as I type.
There is some confusing evil above, but there is real evil next.
What has struck me more was the composure of Nieves during the whole interview, even as del Rincon was trying not to break down under the shock of having all of his antidemocratic accusations against the regime thus validated.
That made me think of Hanna Arendt, the Eichman trial, the basic nature of totalitarianism the way she explained, creating "the banality of evil". At least Arendt was writing her seminal books based on people following orders. I suppose that concentration camp guards did not have access to Tweeter to get contrasting news to what the Reich told them everyday. Even if pathetic, the defenses of "I was just following orders" " I did not know" "Nobody told me anything, nobody knew" could make one doubt on occasion if the lines were pronounced then with an empty enough glance.
But with Nieves such excuses cannot apply. Nieves tonight told us he knew what he was doing all along was wrong, was a crime, was an abuse of Human Rights. He knew all along that the regime wanted Lopez jailed, found guilty while it figured out, I imagine, a final solution to the Lopez problem.
Nieves knew and yet he did. And I do not buy much his crocodile tears at seeing Lopez little girl go to the same school as the prosecutor's orphan maker girl being too much for him and making him decide to defect.
What was shocking tonight is that all the actors were following orders, indeed, but knowing full well that the orders were wrong. In the end it does not really matter whether Cabello is the one that gave the original order, what matters here is that the chavista regime has been a totalitarian regime for quite a while as the behavior of the people at the nation's prosecution office show. This is way beyond debating whether the regime can be described as a dictatorship. This is a neo-totalitarian system as I have long ago coined it as a tag for some of this blog entries.
In the end one is left perplexed in trying to figure which is the worst evil. The ones giving orders? The ones executing it? The ones confessing to them without much trouble? And thus it all becomes banal.
PS: interview now up for those who understand Spanish
Monday, 26 October 2015
The cornerstone issue (election 2015 YV-1)
I have been away for yet another long period but I am back for a series of short posts on the December election. Thus the first one should be about the cornerstone issue (plus some minor that are directly implied with the main issue).
As informed readers are aware, the Venezuelan situation is going from bad to worse. As such, any potential "normalcy" that could be associated with the scheduled December election is done away with speedily. Fortunately this has a positive effect: the crudeness of the moment peels away layers of cracked political paint painfully plastered by the regime. Now we have one overwhelming issue for the election: who's gonna deal with the disaster as of December 7.
Put this way the result of the election becomes meaningless: no matter the winner there will be a mix of devastating adjustment measures with a high likeness of bloody repression. This will happen, victims may vary.
The paradox comes from the motivations of the political sides. The opposition is trying to reach power to solve a crisis that it is not its fault, that will not provide them with any credit. In fact the opposition should wish to lose the election and let the regime sink alone. The regime on the other hand wants to retain absolute power when in fact it should wish for the opposition to take charge, or at least contemplate sharing power with the opposition so as to share responsibility. That sharing would work in front of an dumb Venezuelan public opinion.
Political wisdom should dictate that the regime and the opposition break a deal BEFORE the election for a power sharing transition no matter what the election results are. But this will not happen for a very simple reason: the regime is so corrupt, so compromised that it knows the only way it can avoid jail is to retain power at all cost. So the regime forges ahead in its electoral treachery while the opposition more aware of the disaster ahead of us has to try to win anyway so that we do not starve, even if it means assuming an undeserved guilt trip.
You need to understand this clearly if you are trying to figure out what is going on currently and what are the strategies to be deployed in coming weeks which could include suspending elections outright, to everyone's secret relief.
To this we can add other major parameters. One is the role of the army in the near future. Chavismo and opposition could well agree to let the blame for everything on the army and agree together in dismantling its current structure. Easier said than done, of course; but merely trying to do is scary enough for the current army extremely corrupt leadership (from cashing in to drug traffic large scale). The army will make sure that nothing happens from December 7 on that it does not approve. The question is who will the army support and that will depend in part on how the campaign unfolds.
Another parameter is that is is clear that there is a rift inside chavismo. On one side are those that are ready and willing to suspend elections or put to jail opposition leadership or something. On the other side are those that think some form of semi believable election should be held even if there is a real risk that the opposition may prevail. Both sides agree only on one thing: whatever opposition victory takes place, this one should be minimized through any mean, even if it risks trouble with international actors.
This being said and well understood in coming posts we'll go into more details.
-----------------------
PS: do to personal situation I do not see in the near future me coming back to the regular to hectic blogging of the past. If ever: my job is basically done, the world knows. However I am slowly getting into Instagram and I am more active on Twitter since there is free time available for this in all the waiting rooms of doctors and public administration long lines. Links to the accounts on the right. I am even trying to get a little bit better at being interactive with those willing to write, something hard for an Introverted INTP.
As informed readers are aware, the Venezuelan situation is going from bad to worse. As such, any potential "normalcy" that could be associated with the scheduled December election is done away with speedily. Fortunately this has a positive effect: the crudeness of the moment peels away layers of cracked political paint painfully plastered by the regime. Now we have one overwhelming issue for the election: who's gonna deal with the disaster as of December 7.
Put this way the result of the election becomes meaningless: no matter the winner there will be a mix of devastating adjustment measures with a high likeness of bloody repression. This will happen, victims may vary.
The paradox comes from the motivations of the political sides. The opposition is trying to reach power to solve a crisis that it is not its fault, that will not provide them with any credit. In fact the opposition should wish to lose the election and let the regime sink alone. The regime on the other hand wants to retain absolute power when in fact it should wish for the opposition to take charge, or at least contemplate sharing power with the opposition so as to share responsibility. That sharing would work in front of an dumb Venezuelan public opinion.
Political wisdom should dictate that the regime and the opposition break a deal BEFORE the election for a power sharing transition no matter what the election results are. But this will not happen for a very simple reason: the regime is so corrupt, so compromised that it knows the only way it can avoid jail is to retain power at all cost. So the regime forges ahead in its electoral treachery while the opposition more aware of the disaster ahead of us has to try to win anyway so that we do not starve, even if it means assuming an undeserved guilt trip.
You need to understand this clearly if you are trying to figure out what is going on currently and what are the strategies to be deployed in coming weeks which could include suspending elections outright, to everyone's secret relief.
To this we can add other major parameters. One is the role of the army in the near future. Chavismo and opposition could well agree to let the blame for everything on the army and agree together in dismantling its current structure. Easier said than done, of course; but merely trying to do is scary enough for the current army extremely corrupt leadership (from cashing in to drug traffic large scale). The army will make sure that nothing happens from December 7 on that it does not approve. The question is who will the army support and that will depend in part on how the campaign unfolds.
Another parameter is that is is clear that there is a rift inside chavismo. On one side are those that are ready and willing to suspend elections or put to jail opposition leadership or something. On the other side are those that think some form of semi believable election should be held even if there is a real risk that the opposition may prevail. Both sides agree only on one thing: whatever opposition victory takes place, this one should be minimized through any mean, even if it risks trouble with international actors.
This being said and well understood in coming posts we'll go into more details.
-----------------------
PS: do to personal situation I do not see in the near future me coming back to the regular to hectic blogging of the past. If ever: my job is basically done, the world knows. However I am slowly getting into Instagram and I am more active on Twitter since there is free time available for this in all the waiting rooms of doctors and public administration long lines. Links to the accounts on the right. I am even trying to get a little bit better at being interactive with those willing to write, something hard for an Introverted INTP.
Friday, 16 October 2015
Weil sums up the Venezuelan situation
Cartoonist Weil publishes an extraordinary cartoon (and he has quite a few of them!)
In the background the symbol of the corrupt regime gangs fighting against each other for political control through colectivos, grenades, etc...
Further in front petty thieves stealing in hunger whatever they can (toilet paper, for example, how can that be any more pathetic?).
In front two items, paupers fighting over a chicken while someone is dead on ground through hunger, crime, whatever....
There you have it, Venezuela today. I am impressed.
In the background the symbol of the corrupt regime gangs fighting against each other for political control through colectivos, grenades, etc...
Further in front petty thieves stealing in hunger whatever they can (toilet paper, for example, how can that be any more pathetic?).
In front two items, paupers fighting over a chicken while someone is dead on ground through hunger, crime, whatever....
There you have it, Venezuela today. I am impressed.
Monday, 12 October 2015
Electoral scoundrels
No, this is not a post about the constant pro Chavez partisanship of the electoral board CNE. No, this is not a post about the government abuses on the campaign trail. No, this is not about the impossibility of the opposition to voice its political offer on any nation wide network.This is a post about the scoundrels that flourish under a neo-totalitarian regime like the one Venezuela called for and now suffers from.
Electoral campaigns can be a way to bring the best in people but in general it tends to bring the worst. I am going to detail two recent stories.
William Ojeda
The first one is for the turncoat supreme, William Ojeda. This lackluster character/journalist came to his 15 minutes of fame when he published about 20 years a go a book titled "How much is a judge", pretending to illustrate how corrupt was the judicial system before Chavez. That the judicial system has become infinitely worse since is not the point here, the point is that actually some of the tenets of his "investigation book" have been questioned since. That should have given pause to a few wishing to associate with him.
Whatever. At first Ojeda was with Chavez. When he did not get what he wanted, namely Caracas East mayor job (Petare) he went opposition to the point of entering fist fights with pro Chavez folks. He was eventually compensated by getting the nod in 2010 to be Petare's representative. So far so good. Except that for reasons that are not explained directly to this date he went back to chavismo within two years. This betrayal to the electors that voted him in has been a constant source of problems and resentments, the more so when Ojeda not only started voting some of the most unpalatable and anti democratic recent laws, but tried to lure through bribes inside chavismo more opposition figures. (1)
Needless to say that the opposition was not going to renew its name on its list. What is more curious is that the regime delayed until it finally gave him the nod. See, after extensive gerrymandering the regime has been able to take away 2 out of the 5 seats that the opposition has been winning in the greater Caracas. Ojeda previously elected in a two seat constituency is now running in a pared down district that albeit still including juicy portions of popular classes neighborhoods is considered as lost by the regime. Which certainly explains why the regime eventually relented and allowed Ojeda to run for "reelection".
The observant reader would say: so what? The so what is that that Ojeda is already on campaign even though this is not allowed. His district is now covered with huge posters like the one above I am forced to gaze at several times a week when stuck in traffic. All of them say that "Sucre deserves better" or "Sucre does not deserve this." Sucre is the official name of the district that includes the core of Petare's favellas and the tonier districts of North Eastern Caracas, Macaracuay, the Californias and El Llanito. So what, again?
The problem, for one, is that Ojeda is not running for mayor so blaming current holder Ocariz, who is doing a rather good job considering all the sabotage he has had to endure, is not only unfair but out reality. The second, and worse objection, is that Ojeda has been representing the district for 5 years and yet he has partaken in the effective sabotaging of Ocariz's rule even if that affected directly its constituency. That is, not only he betrayed his electors, but then he went on to screw them.
Voters are not fooled and his nomination has faced significant criticism inside chavismo as can be read from its Aporrea portal directly. In fact, you can find elsewhere in Aporrea more complete criticism of Ojeda than I could hope to write up myself! Even in popular districts of Petare Ojeda is not only disliked but he is booed when he tries to pretend that he works for the community. There is a certain Shakespearean quality to Ojeda's plight except that I doubt an ethically corrupt mentality like his can notice. (2)
Jacqueline Faria
The second case is shorter to deal with. We are talking of Jacqueline Faria who is one of the biggest frauds of chavismo. Her main non-achievement was to clean up the sewer that runs through Caracas so that Chavez could go for a swim together with Evo Morales. Today when we cross any bridge over the open air sewer once known as Guaire river we can see that the millions assigned to her for that purpose have gone anywhere but. The problem with Faria is that she pretends to be for el pueblo when she is in reality a snob, rumored to even go from official position to official position with her personal cook in tow. I do not know how true that thing may be but we all know about her comfortable life as a highly inefficient bureaucrat who would never think of sending her child to a public school or public hospital. Milagros Socorro wrote a few days ago an excellent review of the main lies that Faria blurted out without any hint of shame or even self awareness.
Finally all caught up with her when she said that the long lines were "sabrosas" and that it was what Maduro ordered so we should just pick our shopping bag and go along with it. I kid you not, video below. To understand well in full what a mockery Faria did of all the chavista crowds standing for hours in line, under sun and rain, you should understand that sabrosa in this context is a concept word not directly translatable in English. Sabrosa means here highly enjoyable, very funny, to be sought for, to be done without any remorse. Needless to say that chavismo is not amused by Faria as can be read in Aporera, also. Oh, I forgot, Faria is also running for representative in an area where standing in line for hours has become a full time occupation for some, amen of being an area where buhoneros and bachaqueros hit particularly hard the locals with very high black market resale prices.
Ojeda and Faria mock equally the long suffering electorate, in different ways for sure, but cruel mockery it is.
So there you are, now you know, how chavismo has filed scoundrels to run for office since, well, no one decent would run on that record...........
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1) Ojeda barely used Twitter account as an opposition representative still exists. He cannot even get around to delete that previous account! I have saved a screen shot in case.
2) There is also another issue about the plastering of billboards in Caracas by Ojeda: who is paying for that? PSUV is not "directly" involved. It is never mentioned in any poster, nor the color red appears. In fact Ojeda uses blue mostly. The excuse is that a minor opposition party, MIN, has been hijacked through a judicial fiat. MIN color is blue and the new board, judicially appointed, seems clearly bent on sabotaging the MUD opposition unity (from which it was promptly suspended). MIN has named Ojeda as its candidate though no one knows how it is possible that suddenly MIN can pay for one of those billboards, never mind the dozens that sprung.
Sunday, 4 October 2015
2015: the lost year
It has been three weeks without posting. But in all truth what should have I written about?
That the regime has decided to become outright cruel, be it Leopoldo Lopez jail or the Colombian border disgraceful human rights abuses?
That new electoral cheating is performed?
That now criminal gangs are using grenades against police quarters, when grenades are supposedly exclusive property of the military?
That even Putin tries to explain to Maduro that the price of oil ain't going back up any time soon?
That Obama and the Pope and the West are only too happy to let Venezuela sink as long as it keeps financing a Cuban transition and an assortment of ungrateful shitty islands of the Caribbean?
That the Syrian refugee crisis is to be blamed squarely on the West for not assuming its full responsibility when it started applauding the Arab spring?
That Santos seem to have been defeated by the FARC and Cuba and chavismo when the battle was nearly won when he assumed power first, a victory where his participation was stellar?
You already get the hint that 2015 will be a lost year for a lot of people even though we are only on October 4.
That realization came to me a couple of days ago, that the regime had stolen from me 2015, that it has not allowed me to even try to achieve any modest goal. The year has been a constant reaction to try to deal with negative events in increasingly desperate situations.
I have been looking back and there is no joy, nothing positive for me.
The year has been spent in lines trying to find food and toiletries items and medicines, not even for me, but for my cancer stricken life partner (and other people when I can help). See, he cannot stand in lines for the hours required to acquire food. He cannot go to half a dozen of pharmacies in a row to try to find one that has the pain killer or the anti inflammatory, or the anti-whatever the doctors prescribe. Even nutritional supplements are hard to find and too expensive for his budget. That and other stuff I have had to start paying for, never minding that I have had to go to the black market prices because I also need to work and I cannot spend 2-3 days a week looking for stuff.
As if this ordeal was not bad enough, it has made me face to incredible cruelty of the regime, its immense stupidity to boot. See, those long lines under the sun are equal for all, a true socialist victory. Pregnant women, sick people, elderly with mobility problem, etc... all have to stand in that same line, no consideration whatsoever for any one, starting with the people in the line that have lost any decency in their search for basic items. Eat shit and die is the message.
But there is insult to injury, true injury from what you can get above. I have seen or heard from reliable witnesses how the Nazional Guards or other forms of "authority" help themselves first, or let go ahead of the line their friends or take payment to allow you to do so. The abuse of power is more obvious, more cruel when such situations arise.
And more insult to the intelligence as the system is a mess of confusion and inefficacy. Some items are by ID card end number, some items are "once a week", more and more stores demand finger prints from BOTH your thumbs, even if you buy, say, a bag of chips. That finger printing is ominous because it seems to be working better than anticipated even though lines to pay are twice as long as the process to pay is twice as long. The implications is clear: at any time through these machines the regime can restrict access to whatever it wants to restrict. And to whomever. Food apartheid in the making.
You may think that perhaps I can find solace elsewhere, like at work. But the situation is getting worse by the day. I have already detailed on occasion how difficult it is to manufacture things in Venezuela, to produce anything. The two main causes are the lack of raw material and the labor laws that not only make it hard to organize efficiency at work but are now creating havoc as you cannot fire the constantly missing workers that have to leave work to stand in food lines. Not that you would fire them anyway as you understand the situation but the "food shortage absenteeism" has become a source of new abuses.
There is also insult to injury. As your business is having a hard time to survive, you observe newcomers that seem to be quite prosperous. For example the Polar group is closing its detergent and soap plants due to lack of raw material. But there is a newcomer, "Clic", that is flooding supermarkets with pricey house cleaning items. They even run expensive TV ads! How do they manage to get the raw materials to assemble their concoctions? Why are they the only brand with such a complete and well packaged line of products? Because the packaging of other products trying to replace Polar products is dismal, for low quality products to begin with.
And yet that is not all. There is a new plague on business. Once upon a time corruption was expensive but some forms were preserved. For example to get money out of you they would use catch phrases like "the dockets are loaded, but maybe we could find ways to speed up processing your application to X". Now they ask you money upfront, without any shame. Usually assorted with threats that are not based on anything legal, just because they can threaten you as there is nowhere you can go for redress. The reason for this new bluntness that we have observed in recent months is very simple: bureaucrats know that their fate is sealed no matter what happens with December elections. See, even if chavismo were to win, there is not enough money to spread around anymore and many of them will be shown the door if they are on the wrong side of post December chavismo reshuffled leadership. So the time is now for a last push for corruption money. It is that simple.
How can you score any success in front of such a negative environment? Unless survival on the edge of bankruptcy is considered a success. Note that the latest business climate studies put Venezuela dead last, even behind Syria.
That is why I can write already that 2015 has been a lost. That no matter what happens in the last quarter the negativity of the first three quarters cannot be overcome anymore. I feel exactly in the same mood as I felt in October 2014: a sad mood with the certitude that next year will be worse.
That the regime has decided to become outright cruel, be it Leopoldo Lopez jail or the Colombian border disgraceful human rights abuses?
That new electoral cheating is performed?
That now criminal gangs are using grenades against police quarters, when grenades are supposedly exclusive property of the military?
That even Putin tries to explain to Maduro that the price of oil ain't going back up any time soon?
That Obama and the Pope and the West are only too happy to let Venezuela sink as long as it keeps financing a Cuban transition and an assortment of ungrateful shitty islands of the Caribbean?
That the Syrian refugee crisis is to be blamed squarely on the West for not assuming its full responsibility when it started applauding the Arab spring?
That Santos seem to have been defeated by the FARC and Cuba and chavismo when the battle was nearly won when he assumed power first, a victory where his participation was stellar?
You already get the hint that 2015 will be a lost year for a lot of people even though we are only on October 4.
That realization came to me a couple of days ago, that the regime had stolen from me 2015, that it has not allowed me to even try to achieve any modest goal. The year has been a constant reaction to try to deal with negative events in increasingly desperate situations.
I have been looking back and there is no joy, nothing positive for me.
The year has been spent in lines trying to find food and toiletries items and medicines, not even for me, but for my cancer stricken life partner (and other people when I can help). See, he cannot stand in lines for the hours required to acquire food. He cannot go to half a dozen of pharmacies in a row to try to find one that has the pain killer or the anti inflammatory, or the anti-whatever the doctors prescribe. Even nutritional supplements are hard to find and too expensive for his budget. That and other stuff I have had to start paying for, never minding that I have had to go to the black market prices because I also need to work and I cannot spend 2-3 days a week looking for stuff.
As if this ordeal was not bad enough, it has made me face to incredible cruelty of the regime, its immense stupidity to boot. See, those long lines under the sun are equal for all, a true socialist victory. Pregnant women, sick people, elderly with mobility problem, etc... all have to stand in that same line, no consideration whatsoever for any one, starting with the people in the line that have lost any decency in their search for basic items. Eat shit and die is the message.
But there is insult to injury, true injury from what you can get above. I have seen or heard from reliable witnesses how the Nazional Guards or other forms of "authority" help themselves first, or let go ahead of the line their friends or take payment to allow you to do so. The abuse of power is more obvious, more cruel when such situations arise.
And more insult to the intelligence as the system is a mess of confusion and inefficacy. Some items are by ID card end number, some items are "once a week", more and more stores demand finger prints from BOTH your thumbs, even if you buy, say, a bag of chips. That finger printing is ominous because it seems to be working better than anticipated even though lines to pay are twice as long as the process to pay is twice as long. The implications is clear: at any time through these machines the regime can restrict access to whatever it wants to restrict. And to whomever. Food apartheid in the making.
You may think that perhaps I can find solace elsewhere, like at work. But the situation is getting worse by the day. I have already detailed on occasion how difficult it is to manufacture things in Venezuela, to produce anything. The two main causes are the lack of raw material and the labor laws that not only make it hard to organize efficiency at work but are now creating havoc as you cannot fire the constantly missing workers that have to leave work to stand in food lines. Not that you would fire them anyway as you understand the situation but the "food shortage absenteeism" has become a source of new abuses.
There is also insult to injury. As your business is having a hard time to survive, you observe newcomers that seem to be quite prosperous. For example the Polar group is closing its detergent and soap plants due to lack of raw material. But there is a newcomer, "Clic", that is flooding supermarkets with pricey house cleaning items. They even run expensive TV ads! How do they manage to get the raw materials to assemble their concoctions? Why are they the only brand with such a complete and well packaged line of products? Because the packaging of other products trying to replace Polar products is dismal, for low quality products to begin with.
And yet that is not all. There is a new plague on business. Once upon a time corruption was expensive but some forms were preserved. For example to get money out of you they would use catch phrases like "the dockets are loaded, but maybe we could find ways to speed up processing your application to X". Now they ask you money upfront, without any shame. Usually assorted with threats that are not based on anything legal, just because they can threaten you as there is nowhere you can go for redress. The reason for this new bluntness that we have observed in recent months is very simple: bureaucrats know that their fate is sealed no matter what happens with December elections. See, even if chavismo were to win, there is not enough money to spread around anymore and many of them will be shown the door if they are on the wrong side of post December chavismo reshuffled leadership. So the time is now for a last push for corruption money. It is that simple.
How can you score any success in front of such a negative environment? Unless survival on the edge of bankruptcy is considered a success. Note that the latest business climate studies put Venezuela dead last, even behind Syria.
That is why I can write already that 2015 has been a lost. That no matter what happens in the last quarter the negativity of the first three quarters cannot be overcome anymore. I feel exactly in the same mood as I felt in October 2014: a sad mood with the certitude that next year will be worse.
Friday, 18 September 2015
Thursday, 17 September 2015
Economic electoral planning: institutional bachaqueo and printing money
The election date approaches. Whether these will be held is irrelevant, the regime needs to prepare for it no matter what. From my sources I get the following tidbits as to how the regime is planning to distribute goodies to try to buy votes.
The "bachaqueo" is bringing some political dividends to the regime, at least from those who can actually profit from it. Bachaqueo for those late in the game is a Venezuelan variety of black market (1). Those that can stand in long lines because they are out of a job buy they share and resell part of it at significant markups. It becomes particularity lucrative when: 1) you belong to an information network from cashiers to truck drivers and storage personnel who can warn you that X will arrive at Z before the neighborhood hoi polloi knows about it, thus the bachaqueros are first in line before supplies disappear; 2) you know someone high ranked in the store or the Nazional Guards on duty to avoid riots and they let you get out with more than your share; 3) you belong to a network well organized with bus and motorbike drivers that can carry you fast from one line to another line so in one day you may be able to stand in line at 2 or 3 locations, and rack it in; and of course 4) you belong to a narco-military-mafia organization that do not even own a store and gives you a certain amount at mark up for you to mark it up further. (2)
The beauty of it all is that the Labor Law "reform" of Chavez to get reelected before he croaked is a major incentive for that line of business. See, you cannot fire someone for multiple absences. If you try to, it is a long and tortuous process that in 95% of the time ends up with an expensive settlement. In fact today's practice is to call into the office to ask point blank the worker how much he wants to resign from his job. Certainly, you can discount from paycheck the missing day and the meal tickets, but what would a worker mind if s/he can make more in that day through bachaqueo? Which thus has become today the main cause of absenteeism, far above any epidemiological consideration.
Some of my clients, those with a significant payroll of say, more than 50, have observed an interesting arithmetic pattern. Say, you have 200 employees, of which 150 are workers whose paycheck is no more than twice the minimum wage. In recent months you have discovered that absenteeism is at a steady 15%, EVERYDAY. And never the same folks, of course. That is, e.g., you have in a single week missing, 26, 22, 38, 23 and 29. Everyday you have at least 22 folks missing, that is 15% of your labor force. Why?
Very simple. Workers have organized a network of absentee turns. No worker will be absent more than what the law "forgives". Sometimes you may even find out that, say, X worker is absent systematically every other Wednesday. And you may find out that the peak at 38 (25%) coincided with a food fair or a major arrival of goods at the market store next door. If it does not get worse than that it is because finger printing and stuff limit the number of people that can shop on a given day (never mind that the bachaquero needs to be able to pay for what s/he gets). Also, many business to ensure a minimum labor force for basic processes have established generous attendance bonus (I kid you not), so that workers will miss only when it is worth their while. Thus a fragile equilibrium exists which will break down anytime as scarcity becomes worse.
I trust the reader can figure out on its own how this affect productivity and costs in Venezuela.....
You may think that this is a conspiracy theory. Think again. Go to any ministry and the systematic absenteeism there is worse. Sometimes it is organized outright by the bosses who may even have shipped in some goods, in particular if linked with the military. From there to spread the habit more or less efficiently to private business is not far fetched. And the regime has gone out of its way to spread in time deliveries of scarce goods to create the illusion that things still arrive somewhat to the the shelves, you were just unlucky that day.
In other words the regime thinks it stands to gain something by promoting a bachaqueo network, not enough perhaps to compensate for the voters lost to the long lines, but a gain nevertheless where open and naked scarcity would cost more politically.
The other thing that I want to mention in passing is that from reliable sources I have learned that the regime is bringing in banknotes. Lots of freshly printed notes of 100, more than what is normally needed to replace the physically deteriorated bills. Those bills may actually be delivered in diverse areas of the country to avoid, I suppose, shipping and the like.
My guess is that they will be used to pay for the campaign and for direct cash payments wherever it is needed. Expect a tremendous surge of inflation next year as a consequence.
It also seems that the regime is trying to open, albeit, some partially made public works, such as a couple of metro stations in Caracas. That has happened in the past in Chavez campaigns, but this time after three years of nothing it is hoped for that opening even a single subway station, even if incomplete, may have a big impact. I doubt it, but that is not the point of this post, the point is that the regime is going to apply skinny populism but populism nevertheless. In the past they could raid, say, electronic stores. But all is empty. Thus fake income from bachaqueo, or a direct worthless cash advance, or a huge ceremony to open shit facilities is all that is at hand.
In addition of jailing opposition leaders; but that is another story.
----------------------------------------------
1) bachaco is the large tropical ant that eats everything on its wake and that laboriously carries huge loads on its back.
2) all courtesy, of course, from crazy price control schemes and currency arbitration (official 6.3, black market 700 to 1 USD; do the math).
The "bachaqueo" is bringing some political dividends to the regime, at least from those who can actually profit from it. Bachaqueo for those late in the game is a Venezuelan variety of black market (1). Those that can stand in long lines because they are out of a job buy they share and resell part of it at significant markups. It becomes particularity lucrative when: 1) you belong to an information network from cashiers to truck drivers and storage personnel who can warn you that X will arrive at Z before the neighborhood hoi polloi knows about it, thus the bachaqueros are first in line before supplies disappear; 2) you know someone high ranked in the store or the Nazional Guards on duty to avoid riots and they let you get out with more than your share; 3) you belong to a network well organized with bus and motorbike drivers that can carry you fast from one line to another line so in one day you may be able to stand in line at 2 or 3 locations, and rack it in; and of course 4) you belong to a narco-military-mafia organization that do not even own a store and gives you a certain amount at mark up for you to mark it up further. (2)
The beauty of it all is that the Labor Law "reform" of Chavez to get reelected before he croaked is a major incentive for that line of business. See, you cannot fire someone for multiple absences. If you try to, it is a long and tortuous process that in 95% of the time ends up with an expensive settlement. In fact today's practice is to call into the office to ask point blank the worker how much he wants to resign from his job. Certainly, you can discount from paycheck the missing day and the meal tickets, but what would a worker mind if s/he can make more in that day through bachaqueo? Which thus has become today the main cause of absenteeism, far above any epidemiological consideration.
Some of my clients, those with a significant payroll of say, more than 50, have observed an interesting arithmetic pattern. Say, you have 200 employees, of which 150 are workers whose paycheck is no more than twice the minimum wage. In recent months you have discovered that absenteeism is at a steady 15%, EVERYDAY. And never the same folks, of course. That is, e.g., you have in a single week missing, 26, 22, 38, 23 and 29. Everyday you have at least 22 folks missing, that is 15% of your labor force. Why?
Very simple. Workers have organized a network of absentee turns. No worker will be absent more than what the law "forgives". Sometimes you may even find out that, say, X worker is absent systematically every other Wednesday. And you may find out that the peak at 38 (25%) coincided with a food fair or a major arrival of goods at the market store next door. If it does not get worse than that it is because finger printing and stuff limit the number of people that can shop on a given day (never mind that the bachaquero needs to be able to pay for what s/he gets). Also, many business to ensure a minimum labor force for basic processes have established generous attendance bonus (I kid you not), so that workers will miss only when it is worth their while. Thus a fragile equilibrium exists which will break down anytime as scarcity becomes worse.
I trust the reader can figure out on its own how this affect productivity and costs in Venezuela.....
You may think that this is a conspiracy theory. Think again. Go to any ministry and the systematic absenteeism there is worse. Sometimes it is organized outright by the bosses who may even have shipped in some goods, in particular if linked with the military. From there to spread the habit more or less efficiently to private business is not far fetched. And the regime has gone out of its way to spread in time deliveries of scarce goods to create the illusion that things still arrive somewhat to the the shelves, you were just unlucky that day.
In other words the regime thinks it stands to gain something by promoting a bachaqueo network, not enough perhaps to compensate for the voters lost to the long lines, but a gain nevertheless where open and naked scarcity would cost more politically.
The other thing that I want to mention in passing is that from reliable sources I have learned that the regime is bringing in banknotes. Lots of freshly printed notes of 100, more than what is normally needed to replace the physically deteriorated bills. Those bills may actually be delivered in diverse areas of the country to avoid, I suppose, shipping and the like.
My guess is that they will be used to pay for the campaign and for direct cash payments wherever it is needed. Expect a tremendous surge of inflation next year as a consequence.
It also seems that the regime is trying to open, albeit, some partially made public works, such as a couple of metro stations in Caracas. That has happened in the past in Chavez campaigns, but this time after three years of nothing it is hoped for that opening even a single subway station, even if incomplete, may have a big impact. I doubt it, but that is not the point of this post, the point is that the regime is going to apply skinny populism but populism nevertheless. In the past they could raid, say, electronic stores. But all is empty. Thus fake income from bachaqueo, or a direct worthless cash advance, or a huge ceremony to open shit facilities is all that is at hand.
In addition of jailing opposition leaders; but that is another story.
----------------------------------------------
1) bachaco is the large tropical ant that eats everything on its wake and that laboriously carries huge loads on its back.
2) all courtesy, of course, from crazy price control schemes and currency arbitration (official 6.3, black market 700 to 1 USD; do the math).
Wednesday, 16 September 2015
Venezuela News on Instagram
I have never liked Facebook and have only a private page for some relatives and friends, more by obligation than anything else. The attempt I did for a parallel Facebook page for the blog just consumed much of my time for something that did not seem worth it. Maybe if someone would collaborate in keeping it up, someone willing to add entries? At any rate after forgetting about it for months I did the logical thing and erased it.
Twitter took me sometime to warm up to. But I did though I never took full advantage of it, e.g., finding it ridiculous to follow everyone that followed just to bulk up numbers (trying to avoid doing the hypocrisy, like I do in Facebook, of masking people). Or failing to understand why I should put narcissistically on Twitter where I eat or feel. Do people actually care much about that? I am sorry, I cannot do it, not even for my friends. I call them and talk when I am interested in their lives. Please, forgive me for not following most of you, it is not personal, it is simply a lack of time.
But finally a week ago I yielded to check on what was Instagram all about. And this one may well be the one I was looking for! The more so that crisis pictures are going to abound and finding time for blogging is more and more difficult. Instagram could be a snappy way to report short stuff that I cannot write on blog but is still interesting to report on.
So, please welcome @duquenal_at_vnv , this blog Instagram support. Do not expect it to be running fast and smooth. I need to get a hand on it but I have a feeling that pictures of protests and empty shelves and long lines will be easy to come up with. Which will not stop me from putting nice pictures of Venezuela which I have even less time to figure on this blog.
Hope to see some of you there!
Twitter took me sometime to warm up to. But I did though I never took full advantage of it, e.g., finding it ridiculous to follow everyone that followed just to bulk up numbers (trying to avoid doing the hypocrisy, like I do in Facebook, of masking people). Or failing to understand why I should put narcissistically on Twitter where I eat or feel. Do people actually care much about that? I am sorry, I cannot do it, not even for my friends. I call them and talk when I am interested in their lives. Please, forgive me for not following most of you, it is not personal, it is simply a lack of time.
But finally a week ago I yielded to check on what was Instagram all about. And this one may well be the one I was looking for! The more so that crisis pictures are going to abound and finding time for blogging is more and more difficult. Instagram could be a snappy way to report short stuff that I cannot write on blog but is still interesting to report on.
So, please welcome @duquenal_at_vnv , this blog Instagram support. Do not expect it to be running fast and smooth. I need to get a hand on it but I have a feeling that pictures of protests and empty shelves and long lines will be easy to come up with. Which will not stop me from putting nice pictures of Venezuela which I have even less time to figure on this blog.
Hope to see some of you there!
Friday, 11 September 2015
Regime gains? Opposition gains? Lopez gains?
The guilty verdict on Leopoldo Lopez was expected though one would have thought that the maximum penalty would not have been decided. At any rate, guilty or free, the decision yesterday by the regime to tell judge Barreiros to condemn Lopez is not going to change much on the events to come. What it does convincingly is marking the moment where the regime stops gingerly crossing over the line between dictatorship and the totalitarian state. Gingerly no more.
Anything but freeing Lopez would not have improved the international regime standing now at junk bond level. Any condemnation, no matter how short the sentence, was equally unacceptable because a guilty verdict on thought crime is unacceptable in civilized world. Any guilty verdict is the clear statement of the regime that politicians will be dealt with through "crime" sentences to ban them from office. Who needs a gulag when a mere sentence disposes of your opponents for a few years in jail and for a life time once out?
So, why is the regime risking such an international condemnation, even though it does not seem to care about that a bit, as witnesses the Colombian border crisis?
Any gain perceived by the regime is strictly internal, safe the historical apologists from Red Ken to the ineffable Eva Golinger. I suppose that now they will be able to state without batting an eye that Lopez is guilty. And it will work to a point. All outside in Venezuela have a sense that justice in Venezuela is not great. But few can grasp how perverted the system is. Thus when a propagandist at Russia Today like Eva Golinger states that Lopez is guilty and has been condemned to 14 years of jail even if you have a doubt about the Venezuelan judicial system you will think that surely Lopez must have done something even if the sentence is overly harsh. A meager compensation when you consider that the Eva Golingers of the world are now quite discredited outside of the few dark caves where they seek refuge.
The "benefits" must be strictly internal, thus. Which may they be?
As an electoral ploy it can only mobilize better the hard core of chavismo. Yesterday a colectivo did attack a peaceful protest resulting with one death through cardiac failure. But the renewed radicalization of the nut wing of chavismo has the advantage at improving the options of the "bring in the vote" machine. Plain coercion as before has not worked in 2013, now chavismo needs actual threats and ferrying of timorate electors. At best this may help chavismo limit the hemorrhage of votes but it will not help them gain new electors. Attitudes like yesterday castigating civil protests or chanting the hopes that Lopez gets 400 year sentence do not make you new friends.
As a demobilizing tool for the opposition it has a limited use. At best it will scare some opposition leaders that do not want to go to jail, but the bulk knows quite well that they must keep the fight because the slammer is their destiny sooner or later. I think personally that condemning Lopez is in fact an incentive for the opposition voter to be more active. But the Cuban inspired regime applies old recipes in a new world of Twitter.
As a tool to create violence and thus get an excuse to suspend elections is far from certain. So far there is no evidence that the opposition will resort to violence. Lopez himself is calling for peace and electoral activism as the best and fastest way to get out of jail, and annul the unjust sentence.
Clearly I see no real advantage for the regime in condemning Lopez to 14 years. The international commendation has been quite vocal today, faster than usual. Peace still reigns in Venezuela and I do not see much spontaneous chavista celebration...
The only advantage that I can see is internal to chavismo. Someone had to make a show of force to prove to one faction that he is the boss. I, for one, have a hard time imagining that Cubans demanded this from Maduro, or at least with a much shorter sentence. Doing so must be the way to announce that we have entered totalitarianism, officially. The other suspect is Diosdado Cabello who, besides his resentment against anything educated smart and fancy, may have wanted to condemn Lopez to blame this on Maduro.
Whatever it is, those who participated in that show trial have put their names first in the list of those who will need to suffer through a Venezuelan Nuremberg when the day shall come. I do not want to be seen as a poseur by using the N word, but the crimes committed by the regime this recent weeks qualify the holders to a trial at The Hague. Period.
There is only one winner yesterday: Leopoldo Lopez. Write it down.
Anything but freeing Lopez would not have improved the international regime standing now at junk bond level. Any condemnation, no matter how short the sentence, was equally unacceptable because a guilty verdict on thought crime is unacceptable in civilized world. Any guilty verdict is the clear statement of the regime that politicians will be dealt with through "crime" sentences to ban them from office. Who needs a gulag when a mere sentence disposes of your opponents for a few years in jail and for a life time once out?
So, why is the regime risking such an international condemnation, even though it does not seem to care about that a bit, as witnesses the Colombian border crisis?
Any gain perceived by the regime is strictly internal, safe the historical apologists from Red Ken to the ineffable Eva Golinger. I suppose that now they will be able to state without batting an eye that Lopez is guilty. And it will work to a point. All outside in Venezuela have a sense that justice in Venezuela is not great. But few can grasp how perverted the system is. Thus when a propagandist at Russia Today like Eva Golinger states that Lopez is guilty and has been condemned to 14 years of jail even if you have a doubt about the Venezuelan judicial system you will think that surely Lopez must have done something even if the sentence is overly harsh. A meager compensation when you consider that the Eva Golingers of the world are now quite discredited outside of the few dark caves where they seek refuge.
The "benefits" must be strictly internal, thus. Which may they be?
As an electoral ploy it can only mobilize better the hard core of chavismo. Yesterday a colectivo did attack a peaceful protest resulting with one death through cardiac failure. But the renewed radicalization of the nut wing of chavismo has the advantage at improving the options of the "bring in the vote" machine. Plain coercion as before has not worked in 2013, now chavismo needs actual threats and ferrying of timorate electors. At best this may help chavismo limit the hemorrhage of votes but it will not help them gain new electors. Attitudes like yesterday castigating civil protests or chanting the hopes that Lopez gets 400 year sentence do not make you new friends.
As a demobilizing tool for the opposition it has a limited use. At best it will scare some opposition leaders that do not want to go to jail, but the bulk knows quite well that they must keep the fight because the slammer is their destiny sooner or later. I think personally that condemning Lopez is in fact an incentive for the opposition voter to be more active. But the Cuban inspired regime applies old recipes in a new world of Twitter.
As a tool to create violence and thus get an excuse to suspend elections is far from certain. So far there is no evidence that the opposition will resort to violence. Lopez himself is calling for peace and electoral activism as the best and fastest way to get out of jail, and annul the unjust sentence.
Clearly I see no real advantage for the regime in condemning Lopez to 14 years. The international commendation has been quite vocal today, faster than usual. Peace still reigns in Venezuela and I do not see much spontaneous chavista celebration...
The only advantage that I can see is internal to chavismo. Someone had to make a show of force to prove to one faction that he is the boss. I, for one, have a hard time imagining that Cubans demanded this from Maduro, or at least with a much shorter sentence. Doing so must be the way to announce that we have entered totalitarianism, officially. The other suspect is Diosdado Cabello who, besides his resentment against anything educated smart and fancy, may have wanted to condemn Lopez to blame this on Maduro.
Whatever it is, those who participated in that show trial have put their names first in the list of those who will need to suffer through a Venezuelan Nuremberg when the day shall come. I do not want to be seen as a poseur by using the N word, but the crimes committed by the regime this recent weeks qualify the holders to a trial at The Hague. Period.
There is only one winner yesterday: Leopoldo Lopez. Write it down.
Tuesday, 8 September 2015
A slow fuse major embarrassment at Foreign Policy
There is an unwritten rule when dealing about information on Venezuela and chavismo: when you try to be objective you always end up with egg on your face. Respected magazine Foreign Policy is feeling the pinch and risks much discredit for its poor managing of a situation coming from a hatchet job text pretending to set the record straight on Leopoldo Lopez.
The offending article was written by Roberto Lovato for Foreign policy: "the making of Leopoldo Lopez". I am not going much into the details of that article nor for the reasons on Foreign Policy reasons to commission such an article from someone that was found to be, after the fact, a collaborator of Telesur. This network is the propaganda vehicle of chavismo. Not that there is anything wrong to pay for a propaganda network, so is FOX in the US. But the point here is that you do not commission an "objective" article from someone working with a network which has for mission to criticize in any possible way, true or false, the Venezuelan opposition to the regime. Might as well trust FoxNews for a fair article on, say, Hillary Clinton (or Bernie Sanders for that matter).
The first mistake of Foreign Policy was to actually dare to have an objective piece on a political prisoner. As if this were possible in Venezuela or elsewhere. A political prisoner by nature is a victim and one cannot be neutral or objective on a victim.
The second mistake, was not to dig a little bit more on Lovato's background, the kind of mistake that the former editor, Moises Naim, would not have done. Moises Naim, a Chavez opponent before this one was elected first, has never been criticized on its seriousness and use of true facts when arguing his criticism of the bolivarian farce. The surprising demonizing of Lopez was promptly noted for its deep inaccuracies and twisting of "facts", never mind the use of hearsay on Lopez. We can already observe that Foreign Policy has sensed the problem by appending 7 "updates", something which I am willing to bet is unheard of for other pieces, or is at least a rare phenomenon.
But that was not enough. The evidence of the hatchet job piece by Lovato has forced Foreign Policy to publish a rebuttal article from Leopoldo Lopez lawyer: "The other side of Leopolodo Lopez". I am not going to enter on the details of that piece either. The reader can read both and make up his or her mind on that matter. However I cannot fail to observe that Lovato was granted a reply in that article, a luxury that has not been accorded to critics of the Lovato piece.
On this reply by Lovato I will comment. He is not forthcoming on his partisanship and writes disingenuously that "My story is about López’s political history, particularly as it relates to events surrounding Venezuela’s 2002 coup attempt.". Reading that piece you will see that it is about much more than that and aims at casting a shadow on Lopez with more than just 2002. He also has the gall to call my estimated colleague Juan Nagel to his defense as if he were praising the article when this one is quite clear that it is a necessary read to understand how the chavista mind sees Lopez. He even writes "it is not a hack job" which in my book, is far from justifying the use of the word "hailed" by Lovato.
All in all this does not damage Mr. Lovato credit in pro Chavez groups where his article has been widely used for propaganda. It is an unnecessary attack on what is a political prisoner whose history of victimization by the regime has reached as far as vindication from International Human rights courts and organizations. In the end it is a discredit on the editors of Foreign Policy and a new proof that objectivity when dealing with rogue regime is a doomed farce.
Update: Mr. Lovato also seems to have worked for outright Chavez propaganda outlets.
The offending article was written by Roberto Lovato for Foreign policy: "the making of Leopoldo Lopez". I am not going much into the details of that article nor for the reasons on Foreign Policy reasons to commission such an article from someone that was found to be, after the fact, a collaborator of Telesur. This network is the propaganda vehicle of chavismo. Not that there is anything wrong to pay for a propaganda network, so is FOX in the US. But the point here is that you do not commission an "objective" article from someone working with a network which has for mission to criticize in any possible way, true or false, the Venezuelan opposition to the regime. Might as well trust FoxNews for a fair article on, say, Hillary Clinton (or Bernie Sanders for that matter).
The first mistake of Foreign Policy was to actually dare to have an objective piece on a political prisoner. As if this were possible in Venezuela or elsewhere. A political prisoner by nature is a victim and one cannot be neutral or objective on a victim.
The second mistake, was not to dig a little bit more on Lovato's background, the kind of mistake that the former editor, Moises Naim, would not have done. Moises Naim, a Chavez opponent before this one was elected first, has never been criticized on its seriousness and use of true facts when arguing his criticism of the bolivarian farce. The surprising demonizing of Lopez was promptly noted for its deep inaccuracies and twisting of "facts", never mind the use of hearsay on Lopez. We can already observe that Foreign Policy has sensed the problem by appending 7 "updates", something which I am willing to bet is unheard of for other pieces, or is at least a rare phenomenon.
But that was not enough. The evidence of the hatchet job piece by Lovato has forced Foreign Policy to publish a rebuttal article from Leopoldo Lopez lawyer: "The other side of Leopolodo Lopez". I am not going to enter on the details of that piece either. The reader can read both and make up his or her mind on that matter. However I cannot fail to observe that Lovato was granted a reply in that article, a luxury that has not been accorded to critics of the Lovato piece.
On this reply by Lovato I will comment. He is not forthcoming on his partisanship and writes disingenuously that "My story is about López’s political history, particularly as it relates to events surrounding Venezuela’s 2002 coup attempt.". Reading that piece you will see that it is about much more than that and aims at casting a shadow on Lopez with more than just 2002. He also has the gall to call my estimated colleague Juan Nagel to his defense as if he were praising the article when this one is quite clear that it is a necessary read to understand how the chavista mind sees Lopez. He even writes "it is not a hack job" which in my book, is far from justifying the use of the word "hailed" by Lovato.
All in all this does not damage Mr. Lovato credit in pro Chavez groups where his article has been widely used for propaganda. It is an unnecessary attack on what is a political prisoner whose history of victimization by the regime has reached as far as vindication from International Human rights courts and organizations. In the end it is a discredit on the editors of Foreign Policy and a new proof that objectivity when dealing with rogue regime is a doomed farce.
Update: Mr. Lovato also seems to have worked for outright Chavez propaganda outlets.
Friday, 4 September 2015
Is the sentence on Leopoldo Lopez relevant?
No, this is no bait title. Whether Leopoldo Lopez is freed or condemned today has become almost irrelevant for the coming history. As I type this a small crowd of opposition leaders (small on purpose, by the way) is barred from the court building where the final sentence on Leopoldo Lopez is supposedly to be pronounced at any minute. And whatever the result is, even if I learn it as I type, it does not change much the coming text.
I think the regime will condemn Leopoldo Lopez. They are crazy enough to do that and make Lopez the "great" leader of the opposition. Capriles has been fading steadily and even went into ridiculous having to fight a silly battle on Tweeter to pretend that he did not say what he said on some of the fallout of the Colombian border crisis. Maria Corina Machado seems to have realized that Primero Justicia and AD, and others, prefer to keep chavismo at Miraflores before giving her a chance at anything. Thus she seems to have decided to support Lopez until better days come for her. Henri Falcon is now fatally flawed as he is trying to position himself as a transition figure that would allegedly draw in a chavismo dissidence. And there is no one else, really, that can even pretend at disputing the leadership to Lopez.
Whether the leadership of Lopez is what the country needs is now irrelevant. The regime not only has made this to happen, but it is speeding up the final outcome by its inability to face to the economic and political crisis of Venezuela. Recent polls are lapidary and even "pro Chavez" pollsters give a double digit advantage for the opposition, big enough that one can hardly see a way for the regime to reduce it. Somewhat it will shrink some as the campaign goes on but 2 years of mismanagement and long lines for a little bit of food and toilet paper cannot be forgotten easily.
The regime has tried all sorts of tricks to distract public opinion and try to create excuses that would allow it to at the very least postpone elections. The latest attempt, by manufacturing a crisis with Colombia is going nowhere. The alleged victory at the OAS was notable not by its narrowness but by the fast shrinking influence of Venezuela there. Next crisis vote and the regime will lose at the OAS. After a weak to dismal initial reaction of Colombia's president Santos, this one has taken successfully the initiative. The "defeat" at the OAS has allowed it to criticize Brazil for its lack of leadership and to wave away the UNASUR empty shell, an humiliation for it considering that an Colombian ex-president is at its helm. Then he went to the border with lots of international guests to hold a cabinet meeting with the victims of Venezuela's abuse. Then the foreign minster Holguin described with details the duplicity and web of lies weaved by the regime in its failed propaganda.
In contrast not only Maduro has failed to call an equivalent meeting on the Venezuelan side, knowing full well that he would be booed loudly, but the wannabe conquering hero went to China to ask for survival cash for the elections of December. In short, the border crisis seems to have brought him zero benefit on the Venezuelan side.
What is left to do for the regime? This one cannot afford to lose elections because a real government will send a few of its members to jail. So a new crisis has to be created and what better than giving Leopoldo Lopez a maximum sentence. Heck! Why not have him murdered in jail to see if the opposition rise in protest so it can be brutally crushed and elections outright cancelled.
That would be a terrible mistake for the regime, the last straw internationally to force many into recognizing its rogue nature, and speed up the economic downfall: the easiest way to undo the regime, fast, without military intervention. The writing is on the wall. US Secretary of State has posed a few days ago with the wife of Lopez. Thomas Shannon, the political operator that posed with Diosdado Cabello a few weeks ago posed a few days ago with a second fiddle at Lopez party, thus equating him to Cabello in importance, a terrible insult for a narcissistic rogue like Cabello, The Spanish Senate has had a nearly unanimous vote to demand that the Spanish government do more for Venezuelan political prisoners. Last but not least, under internal pressure the weakening Roussef government has had to admit (accept?) that there is a need for international supervision for the December vote in Venezuela.
Truly, can the Venezuelan regime be so blind? It is, because it is a rogue regime, because Maduro obeys Cuban orders, because Cuba cannot give up under any pretense whatever alimony it still cashes from Venezuela. Because, very simply, it has run out of ideas and has only violence left in its belt.
In the end it does not matter. If Lopez is not condemned, and freed, the opposition gets a boost. If Lopez is kept in jail, the injustice will be too flagrant and the opposition not only will also get a boost, but it will get another one from overseas. My guess is that the regime will go ahead and condemn Lopez anyway in the belief that it will radicalize its base and bring out the vote. Or the violence.
I think the regime will condemn Leopoldo Lopez. They are crazy enough to do that and make Lopez the "great" leader of the opposition. Capriles has been fading steadily and even went into ridiculous having to fight a silly battle on Tweeter to pretend that he did not say what he said on some of the fallout of the Colombian border crisis. Maria Corina Machado seems to have realized that Primero Justicia and AD, and others, prefer to keep chavismo at Miraflores before giving her a chance at anything. Thus she seems to have decided to support Lopez until better days come for her. Henri Falcon is now fatally flawed as he is trying to position himself as a transition figure that would allegedly draw in a chavismo dissidence. And there is no one else, really, that can even pretend at disputing the leadership to Lopez.
Whether the leadership of Lopez is what the country needs is now irrelevant. The regime not only has made this to happen, but it is speeding up the final outcome by its inability to face to the economic and political crisis of Venezuela. Recent polls are lapidary and even "pro Chavez" pollsters give a double digit advantage for the opposition, big enough that one can hardly see a way for the regime to reduce it. Somewhat it will shrink some as the campaign goes on but 2 years of mismanagement and long lines for a little bit of food and toilet paper cannot be forgotten easily.
The regime has tried all sorts of tricks to distract public opinion and try to create excuses that would allow it to at the very least postpone elections. The latest attempt, by manufacturing a crisis with Colombia is going nowhere. The alleged victory at the OAS was notable not by its narrowness but by the fast shrinking influence of Venezuela there. Next crisis vote and the regime will lose at the OAS. After a weak to dismal initial reaction of Colombia's president Santos, this one has taken successfully the initiative. The "defeat" at the OAS has allowed it to criticize Brazil for its lack of leadership and to wave away the UNASUR empty shell, an humiliation for it considering that an Colombian ex-president is at its helm. Then he went to the border with lots of international guests to hold a cabinet meeting with the victims of Venezuela's abuse. Then the foreign minster Holguin described with details the duplicity and web of lies weaved by the regime in its failed propaganda.
In contrast not only Maduro has failed to call an equivalent meeting on the Venezuelan side, knowing full well that he would be booed loudly, but the wannabe conquering hero went to China to ask for survival cash for the elections of December. In short, the border crisis seems to have brought him zero benefit on the Venezuelan side.
What is left to do for the regime? This one cannot afford to lose elections because a real government will send a few of its members to jail. So a new crisis has to be created and what better than giving Leopoldo Lopez a maximum sentence. Heck! Why not have him murdered in jail to see if the opposition rise in protest so it can be brutally crushed and elections outright cancelled.
That would be a terrible mistake for the regime, the last straw internationally to force many into recognizing its rogue nature, and speed up the economic downfall: the easiest way to undo the regime, fast, without military intervention. The writing is on the wall. US Secretary of State has posed a few days ago with the wife of Lopez. Thomas Shannon, the political operator that posed with Diosdado Cabello a few weeks ago posed a few days ago with a second fiddle at Lopez party, thus equating him to Cabello in importance, a terrible insult for a narcissistic rogue like Cabello, The Spanish Senate has had a nearly unanimous vote to demand that the Spanish government do more for Venezuelan political prisoners. Last but not least, under internal pressure the weakening Roussef government has had to admit (accept?) that there is a need for international supervision for the December vote in Venezuela.
Truly, can the Venezuelan regime be so blind? It is, because it is a rogue regime, because Maduro obeys Cuban orders, because Cuba cannot give up under any pretense whatever alimony it still cashes from Venezuela. Because, very simply, it has run out of ideas and has only violence left in its belt.
In the end it does not matter. If Lopez is not condemned, and freed, the opposition gets a boost. If Lopez is kept in jail, the injustice will be too flagrant and the opposition not only will also get a boost, but it will get another one from overseas. My guess is that the regime will go ahead and condemn Lopez anyway in the belief that it will radicalize its base and bring out the vote. Or the violence.
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