Note to Obama and Santos: appeasing thugs NEVER works

The Venezuela-Colombian border crisis should have been a fantastic opportunity to put the Venezuelan narco-regime on notice. Instead it serves as show case on how the appeasement policies of Obama and Santos are sinking fast.

The crisis was an absolutely artificial creation of the Venezuelan regime, increasingly taxed by its faults. As polls plummet for the regime when crucial elections are scheduled for December 6, this one has done all what it can to sabotage them. One offensive was to go straight ahead and jail major opposition figures, bar from running other, gerrymander further the districts, increase censorship and try to bankrupt the scant remaining free press. Elections? Sure! Just try to campaign! However it was an uphill battle to regain the favor of its electors, the only real way to win elections. Since the economy has tanked there is only one option left to rekindle the love of the chavista voter: chauvinistic nationalism, redundancy intended.

First there was a renewed anti US anti Obama drive. This one floundered when Havana and Washington started real talks and petered out at the recent OAS general assembly when Maduro got to see Obama without cameras for a brief moment, long enough for Obama to talk him down.

It seems thus that the "millions" of anti Obama signatures "freely collected" and validated without scruples by the "electoral authorities" were not enough to raise polls for a durable hold. So Maduro sought a conflict with Guyana over maritime and territorial claims. The only result of that came with a further loss of the Venezuelan case; and that the supposedly meek supporters of Venezuela in CARICOM went Guyana way without batting an eyelash. Isolation is thy name, Maduro.

Having been defeated in the imaginary northern border with the US of A and the Eastern border of Guyana there were only two borders left. The one in the South with Brazil is far and dicey although it seems the regime will try something. But the Western border with Colombia was ripe with existing excuses, or fertile grounds to plant new ones.

There are all sorts of theories on how the pretext came about. Some say that it all started from a rivalry between two narco-gangs in Venezuela, the one of the "Soles" and the one of "Guajira", both pointed out as being at least partially controlled by different wings of the army. Others say that it was a mere rivalry between gangs controlling the heavy contraband system towards Colombia, courtesy of the artificially deflated prices of Venezuelan goods. Others advance that it was a way to get rid of Tachira governor rumored to be in talks with "transition" proposals. Some even go as far as saying the whole show is just to put pressure on Santos who may extradite to the US compromising witnesses of the narco-regime in Caracas. None of these pretexts exclude the others, by the way.

Clearly, something as crazed as that, with damning images of human rights abuses as Colombians in Venezuela are rudely expelled when not leaving in a hurry motu proprio, should have been a bonus, a golden opportunity for Colombian and US diplomacy to read a writ to Venezuela. Unfortunately the errors of Santos and Obama policies toward Venezuela's regime are now paid, most likely under Cuban direction. Which have been these mistakes?

Obama's mistakes come from opening to Cuba without proper reciprocity.  Thinking that making the first step toward a totalitarian regime will bring concessions is a mistake that the West should have learned once and for all in 1938 while drinking beer in Munich. Certainly I approved of Obama's initiatives since everything else tried before by the US has failed; more by lack of will than actual vices or virtues of any legislation. But one thing is to approve the initial gesture, another thing is to approve the mechanism chosen. The result is that as soon as Cuba realized that the big bucks were not coming fast the Castro's regime started increasing repression and moving its pieces elsewhere. Extortion is the natural state for these people and that Obama and Kerry thought it would be different this time around is simply bedeviling.

The second mistake was sending Shannon to discuss with Maduro and Cabello without anything in exchange. Or so it seems so far. True, it is supposed that the release of half a dozen of political prisoners would be a result of that, along the call for elections which was suspiciously delayed. But the released prisoners are under house arrest and suffer all sorts of impediments while elections can be cancelled even on election day. The real result of these "negotiations" is that thug in chief, Diosdado Cabello, pointed out by many as a drug capo, feels vindicated and now indispensable. So as any good thug would do he has increased his attacks on people who dare criticize him, has decided to bankrupt once and for all the remaining free newspapers, and more. So much for Shannon effectiveness.

Colombia's president, Santos, mistakes started 5 years ago when he "befriended Chavez".  It has been downhill since. Chavez under a reprieve as Uribe's parting shot was exposing all FARC training camp inside Venezuela, played nice and stroked Santos ego in that he could indeed bring the FARC to serious negotiations after having been the Uribe's defense minister in charge of blowing them out. Which he nearly did, by the way and may have been able to complete had he wanted to. Under the excuse that Venezuela's role was crucial to the eventual success of Havana's Santos-FARC talks, the Santos administration made all sorts of concessions to the Venezuelan regime, most despicably by handing over to Caracas drug kingpins and political exiles.

Sure enough the FARC is playing Santos through and though. Its first success was to force Santos into a difficult reelection. This conservative, liberal right president has had to ally himself to the fading left of Colombia to get reelected and thus he has unnecessarily promoted its recovery. After reelection the FARC has become even more belligerent, and now it is trying to use the border crisis offering itself as the best guarantor against contraband and the alleged paramilitary infiltration inside Venezuela, as if Venezuela was not the main promoter of paramilitary groups like the colectivos, pranes .....

How can Santos and his ever more idiotic looking foreign minister Holguin whose appeasing smiles and seduction to Maduro are now blowing up to her face have lost the political coup offered to them on a silver tray?

First, the delayed response. Uribe was promptly at the border with Venezuela while Holguin sought a "meeting" with the Venezuelan foreign minister, the insufferable hack sister of Caracas mayor and inventor of all electoral frauds. While Holguin was giving Rodriguez a propaganda platform to accuse Colombia in its own country, the images of Colombians wading the river Tachira with their scarce belongings made front pages.

Santos waited for a week to go to the border and this late in the game he had to go populist and offer all sorts of goodies to calm down the natives. But it was too late, Colombian public opinion was united, and not around Santos. Even ex president Gaviria questioned the participation of Colombia to fakes like UNASUR who clearly do not wish to offend whatsoever the susceptibility of Maduro and co.  To add insult to injury Maduro kept giving fake handouts in Venezuela, declared falsely that scarcity was over thanks to his policies in Tachira, threatened to push the border blockade all along the Venezuelan border and flew to Vietnam. Cabello on his own decided to stir a little bit of trouble with the Brazil border attacking garimpeiros as if did not know they  had been creating ecological devastation since Chavez came to office!

I think that we are assisting to the undoing of Obama and Santos foreign schemes. I, for one, dearly hope that this is all part of a master plan to muzzle once and for all the rogue regimes of Havana and Caracas. But I am not holding my breath whatsoever.

Luckily for Santos and Obama, they do not have to worry about reelection anymore. Others will sort out the debris.

And it all came to that

Almost as a rule the end of revolutions and their ersatz is equally appalling. True revolutions like the French one (9 Thermidor) or the Russian one (Kulak starvation) have a moment that mark the end of ideal and the bloody start of a very long path to stability. Ersatz are lucky if they have a semi grand moment but as a rule end up in ridicule if they are lucky (Peron). But some end up in infamy, betraying any possible justification they had at their start. This is the case of this fakest of all revolutions, the bolivarian of Chavez which is slowly petering its way to infamy.

Closed border, people in check. Why?

I suppose some would make a case for April 2002 as "the grand moment". But it was not, a mere failed coup and a failed Restoration which yielded a shit faced Chavez that decided to surrender to the Castros in Cuba to get what he really wanted: life presidency. It worked, he died in office.

That first farcical but how damaging moment of April 2002 got a pricey oil enhanced stint which led to the 2007 referendum failure. For me it was the end, no revolution can survive when its idealistic and creative base deserts it, or rather turns against it as Venezuelan campus were never fervent Chavez supporters, even in his first couple of years.

Student and his bookcase?

From 2007 on it was all predictable: the pseudo revolution morphed into an autocratic regime that added insult to injury by becoming a narco state and henceforth the most corrupt and violent country in the Americas. By far.

I thought that we had seen it all, that we had accepted the fact that under Maduro we entered the outright dictatorship phase of the regime. A cross between Peron, sans Evita, with the Burma never ending military thuggery. Heck, with Leopoldo Lopez and Maria Corina Machado we are even getting a bi-cephalic version of Aung San Suu Kyi.

But no, we had to go into such infamy as creating a refugee crisis worse than the one in Europe right now, worse because even if much smaller it is absolutely unjustified, absolutely unnecessary, invented in full by dark conspiracies and likely drug war cartels fighting for turf control. These dark forces have had no qualm to use a state conflict to solve their own internal problems, harking back to imperial models of having the natives fight it ought for the honor of being directly under the toe of the colonial master. Chavismo there cannot even match the epic of Tlaxcala or the complexity of Plassey.

That is not all. There are no people drowning in the Mediterranean but poor Colombians wading in a shallow river with the lone bag they were allowed to carry. No real fences like in Hungary but a mere cattle guard here and there.

Even in infamy chavismo is so tacky, so venial, so corrupt that it cannot create a moment of epic or even true outrage. The word is taking its time in condemning the regime abuses on the Colombians it unjustly expels because they are mesmerized by the fact the regime is seriously wanting them to believe that these scared house wives wading dirty water are the cause of all of Venezuela trouble.

But one thing is not missing, fascism. In addition of all sort of promoted tweet support the regime has even produced Colombians supporting the abuse. A tropical Nazi paradise cannot be that far away.

Refugee camp and a meager army to push them away, not even
allowing them to go the next bridge...

And so it all came up to that. A revolution that claimed to unite a whole continent for the liberation of all of its people against real or imaginary empires ends up in a whimper, ostracizing, jewing up a population that cannot be distinguished at all from the one across the border or from the one they have been living among since there is historical memory.

Apartheid worse, R on houses that have been "revised" searched.
Some have a D for scheduled demolition.

Chavismo is now, like its founder, a corpse. We just need to find an undertaker.

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First video Maduro says horrors about Colombians and states that Colombians come to Venezuelan Bolivarian Paradise just like from Africa migrants go to Europe. Pathetic, the more so he is from Cucuta so we have there his subconscious betraying him in not wanting to be Colombian, like some kid in Austria, you know.



In this one the goebbelian frau Rodriguez says that all is an invention, that nothing is going on at the border, that the scenes are invented. Both videos promptly posted by the people of Maria Corina Machado apparently FROM international footage of news. Footage that is of course not shown on Venezuelan TV.

Will it hold?

It seems that creating an unjustified "state of emergency" at the border with Colombia has accelerated talk of regime "change". We have Miguel, or a nice article at the FT (subscription) by Daniel Lansberg or a dire "self-coup" from Oppenheimer at the Miami Herald. Readers of this blog should not be surprised as I have expressed often my doubts at the elections on December 6 would be actually held, or when describing how the country was collapsing steadily.

Rather than going into the macro thing covered extensively elsewhere, let me go first into the micro stuff.


The fact of the matter is that shelves of non controlled products at grocery stores are getting empty. As for the controlled stuff when it arrives, it is in insufficient quantities, immediately sold, often among some trouble and even looting outside of Caracas as the situation there is much worse.  But this you already knew, it's just that it's getting worse by the day.

But scarcity of food and medicine is just the apparent face.  The reality is much worse as it is more and more difficult to produce food and medicine. It is not that raw materials are lesser and lesser amounts, it is that working with the limited amounts available is increasingly difficult. Not only spare parts deficiency stop production lines frequently, in addition to raw material erratic deliveries, but insecurity in transport and distribution make the few still producing reluctant to ship far away or to risky areas.

And that is not all. To the above problems you must add a renewed corruption drive where public "servants" now are asking straight to your face cash to perform the duties that they are required to perform by law. Not only inspectors now are blunt about asking you for money or they will close your facility on some dumb excuse that would carry at worst a small fine, but requesting permits for whatever has become an ordeal.

I am not going to give you references for the above: this all is my personal day to day experience. We are helpless in front of it all. There is nowhere to go for redress of any abuse, of any black market activity.

As expected this is having a deleterious effect on the political climate, explaining why the regime is grasping at any excuse to blame others for its failures. It was the "economic war" then it was the irridente Esequibo, today it is Colombia unable to control its borders and promoting paramilitaries even though we ALL KNOW that the huge contraband at the border can only happen because of the connivance or actual help from the Venezuelan military. Tomorrow?  It will get worse as these political shows have a light traction, at best, for the regime's political aims. Polls this week seem to credit that if fair elections were held the opposition is above 20% the regime and up and up. Difficult to see how the regime could bridge the gap by December 6. Short of miraculously ending all food and medicine lines I do not see how the regime can reduce the spread to less than 10%, the maximum amount that it can compensate through electoral cheating.

This being said it is quite clear that the Tachira "emergency" and the abuses perpetrated  against defenseless Colombian migrants are a clear step in the strategy to falsify the election. The hope is that cheap nationalism will be enough to reverse the regime's fortunes, or otherwise justify a national "emergency" that will allow a postponement of elections in the hope of better electoral days.

This all we can take as "fact". What is more worrisome is that the regime in full economic debacle IS NOT taking ANY MEASURE. ANY. Unless arresting a few assholes with an extra 10 pounds of corn flour or a few gallons of gas on their bike to Colombia count as an economic measure in a country with maybe 30 million folks. Why? Are we that broke that we cannot even buy basic staples overseas? Is the regime so politically helpless that we cannot even increase the price of gas to a dime a gallon? Are divisions and/or incompetence so entrenched in the regime that they cannot come up with or decide on a single measure to deal with the situation? Measures exist, simple, like a devaluation from 6.3 to 100 which, believe it or not, would have more beneficial effects on inflation than negative ones.

Or is it that the regime is so convinced of its own demise that it is playing the burnt earth card?

Which bring us to the title. My own opinion is that it is a distinct possibility that the regime will not hold until December 6. Either Maduro will be gone, or the regime will have morphed into your regular explicit proto-totalitarian dictatorship. Even if measures are taken TODAY they cannot have much effect by December 6. Even if the regime brings in a whole bunch of imports they are not here yet, they would be insufficient, they will not be spread efficiently and at best could only reach the hard core chavismo.

It is just too late to save the regime in December 6, even if electoral cheating is applied bluntly irregardless of world observation. It would be worse than when Ahmadinejad was fraudulently elected against Mousavi.

Thus the possibility of regime "change", from a Maduro resignation to a coup and bloody repression is becoming quite distinct. Whichever it is one thing is certain: it will not go away peacefully.

Brief electoral report

This is not an electoral report. As I have announced weeks ago, this blog will not cover the coming elections for a variety of reasons. Still, when I read all of the nonsense or wishful thinking elsewhere, I suppose that I feel compelled from time to time to remind people that treating the parliamentary election of December as if it were a normal election is, well, close to idiotic. In other words discussing in detail the intrigues inside the MUD of PSUV is close to irrelevant. Discussing the treachery of the regime is close to redundant at this point. Speculating on the final outcome with polls and calculations is only marginally productive unless one places the comment on the consequences of the vote rather than the actual results.

Thus in no particular order a few talking points, for lack of a more descriptive title.


Electoral treachery. The regime keeps at it. In addition of banning from office for the silliest of reasons opposition leaders (interestingly no significant PSUV is banned, they do not even try to keep a vague pretense of fairness), it has now started to intervene directly into opposition parties organization on the flimsiest of excuses. Any disgruntled party member can sue its direction, win the trial courtesy DIRECTLY from the hand of the high court TSJ so there is no possible appeal whatsoever, and become the new party leader. The objective is simple: try to pry away from the MUD opposition umbrella electoral organization. Since the new "leaders" appointed by the regime are to say the least suspicious in their opposition commitment the MUD has no other choices but to expel the "renovated" parties. These in turn are expected to name their own candidates, certainly financed by the regime.

The point here is not the detail of any given electoral treachery. The point is that the regime will go in crescendo in inventing barriers to any opposition putative electoral victory and, caught in its own game, it will feel justified on December 7 not to recognize the adverse result.

Conclusion, of a sort.  All of this in the end matters little. The vote is quite clear. No matter who the candidates are, the crisis has tuned out the election into a referendum on Maduro. Any yellow or red dog will get its due votes. Any treachery form the regime has no effect on the long run of things.

Do the results matter?

They do not. It is irrelevant which side wins on December 6, the task is the same for all, there is no margin of action. The price of oil keeps going down and corruption is stronger than ever. Things are so reckless that I have been asked straight for money if I want a certain permit to be processed: they will receive the request, they cannot refuse, but the evaluation will happen only if I pay a load of cash to X (fake companies exist with fiscal registry so I can even get a bill for tax purposes).

For the regime the strategy is clear: rake as much cash as possible before December 6, either to win votes, or to have a safety net if ousted, AND leave the coffers empty if the opposition wins. This one deprived of means will be destined to failure (with a fast chavista return to office). And if chavismo wins they will find a way to wing it out, using harsh repression as needed. There cannot be any other way for the colony as long as the Cuban master needs whatever it can get from its Venezuelan overseas territory. That the viceroys of that overseas are corrupt narco military and radical low life politicos only aggravates the situation.

In short, the predictably worsening economic crisis in 2016 will lead to political failure of whomever holds office. One is actually tempted to wish for a chavismo "victory" so to be able to finish it off once and for all in the following year.

The opposition will lose the election

Not only electoral treachery will be hard to overcome, but the opposition electoral umbrella, MUD, is doing whatever it takes to demotivate its potential electors. For example sabotaging folks like Leopoldo Lopez or Maria Corina Machado makes their more fervent and dedicated electoral voters want to stay home.  Lack of a concrete program is as bad as lack of a principled program: lack of either one sets up the opposition for political failure after the election and has as such a demotivating effect. The current offering of being an kind of efficient chavismo, or efficient populism, an oxymoron of course, is simply not enough to pry away chavista voters who at best, it is hoped for, will stay home.

Because the opposition victory is not to get more seats than chavismo, the opposition needs a victory of at least 3/5 of the seats at stake. Otherwise it will have no veto power and no real control over a public administration and power structures solidly packed with chavista hacks. The reader should remember that the MUD is not a political party based on any ideology or coherent program, even if flawed. The MUD is first an electoral alliance to unify a splintered opposition, an alliance that has really no program beyond restoring some democracy to the country. This is by itself very commendable, but in the current calamitous situation it is not enough.  Thus only a 3/5 victory will steel the MUD in front of chavismo and give it a chance to take action, if anything to call for a recall election on Maduro. If the MUD gets a simple majority this one will fall apart in front of the crisis and chavismo will not be controlled and over time will be able to pry away or outright destroy whatever it needs to recover a majority.

Chavismo will not win the election

The paradox here is that I can write that the opposition will lose the election but that chavismo will not win it. The candidate "primary" fixing process of chavismo has been very interesting. First, it was all but transparent. Second, more than half of the outgoing representatives are not running for reelection (I read somewhere that 80% were out). This does not talk at all of internal democracy inside chavismo, this talks of account settling between factions, of an absolute lack of trust in the currently serving personnel for the leaders of the current factions, or vice-versa. All prefer new blood, or have been eaten up by dissent.

If opposition need 3/5 to win, chavismo needs 2/3! If it fails to do that no faction will have an internal majority to rule over the assembly and possible outright divisions may not be contained further. With less than 2/3 of the assembly chavismo will simply have to rely even more on the military to hold unto office, either through repression, or as the only power all factions can agree on, albeit reluctantly.

The grand elector

Which brings us to the only elector that truly matters in this electoral charade: the army.

The army is under great threat. Tendency is for chavismo, and the opposition, to turn the army into the scapegoat of the whole crash. Chavismo because the army may have put the brakes of radicalization of the system. Opposition because the army did not slow down the decay and instead associated itself happily with the looting of the country.

The truth is that to avoid an outright civil war (there is already a larval civil war going on, look at the numbers of people killed every day) a grand pact between opposition and chavismo is necessary. And such negotiation can only be carried through with the consent of the fire power of the country which will be in charge of keeping order while the painful measures are being taken.

It does not matter, thus, who wins in December, the army will either rule or decide who the apparent ruler will be for the unavoidable transition.

Conclusion

Covering the current election as if it were a "normal" one albeit with peculiar/extraordinary parameters is, well, intellectually dishonest. But I suppose that journalists and bloggers and think tankers need to cover their white pages with ink, digital or otherwise.

The only thing worth discussing today is not the election or the immediate exit of Maduro. The only thing worth discussing is to demand a transition government and how to get one. Elections are not necessary. They will not solve the crisis, unless of a presidential or constitutional nature. Period.

Baduelismus

A strange surprise came yesterday. General Baduel, former savior of Chavez (2002), former defense minister of Chavez, one of his personal own first political prisoners has been released from jail. Sure enough he is blocked at home, but he is out of military jail.

That he served most of his jail sentence on trumped up charges (who is not corrupt inside chavismo?) and thus was "released" to complete the rest of his sentence at home is a mere detail. What is important here is that the regime has dared to release who was a seen as one of Chavez very own political prisoners.


The reader must understand one thing about Venezuela: there are two type of political prisoners, those of the revolution and those that are Chavez personal prisoners, such as judge Afiuni, Baduel and even Lopez, though this one is a prisoner of both. The revolution political prisoners can be jailed or released at will, such are the cases of Ceballos, former mayor of San Cristobal or Simonovis of 2002 fame unjustly jailed for revolutionary political need. There are also Chavez very own political exiles, such as Rosales former Zulia governor and Chavez 2006 campaign opponent, or journalist Poleo. In short, those that Chavez has placed on his very own list in theory cannot benefit from any measure of grace. Only Afiuni did get some alleviation to her plight due to the intense international pressure, but her trial is going fast nowhere.

Thus the importance of Baduel's release. For this to happen there must have been a powerful reason, a significant movement inside chavismo to face down a Chavez order. The reader should be immediately reassured: this mean nothing good for the opposition no matter what a portion of Twitterzuela tried to make of it last night.

You can speculate, offer many readings. Here is mine for those still reading.

The jailing of Baduel had created a rift inside the armed forces. For sure, these were not going to oppose Chavez for many reasons, one being that cash was flowing into their pocket. But there was a rift inside because Baduel as a former defense minister was the voice of the army for a while and as such deserved more respect, even from Chavez. Baduel's jail was a direct message to the army to behave and it was understood as such.

But the resentment remained and now that Chavez is gone the army feels the need to come together again and freeing Baduel goes a long way even if the guy now has little power in it. Thus the real question is why is the army coming back together, taking such a stand?

The situation of the country is deteriorating fast. It is clear now with the recent looting and recent polls that the regime is overstaying its welcome and is decided in leaving nothing standing in its wake. Burnt earth they also call it.  The people that will be left behind to try to hold things together, no matter what government comes, are the armed forces that will have to do all the necessary repression.

Thus, for me at least, the army comes together because it not only needs to be united to face coming harder times, but also because it needs to weigh carefully its actions so as not to be blamed for the mess left behind by Chavez. That does not mean the army is good or bad, or that a coup is around the corner. To begin with, a coup is unnecessary as this is already a military regime. What the army is probably doing at this point is getting its act together to intervene as a single voice to dictate to the civilians in the regime what to do, or to rule over a transition regime, or if needs be, to tolerate an opposition government as long as the army goes unscathed of any crime it committed during the Chavez years.

Nothing major happens inside Venezuela without the consent or action of the Army. Releasing Baduel cannot have happened without this one consent as I, for one, am absolutely sure that Maduro would not have released of his own accord a Chavez prisoner, amen of the proven cruelty of Maduro.

That is why Baduel's release is so interesting. All specuatlions maybe allowed, but what this really means is that pieces are moving inside the regime. Perhaps faster than one may surmise.

A guide to Venezuela eateries around the world

The Venezuelan diaspora(4%? population so far) has had an effect around the world: there are now dozens of Venezuelan food restaurants in most major cities of the "west" where Venezuelans do emigrate.  I got this in the mail, a comprehensive list made by Andrew Richard and Daniela Cadena. Though In Spanish it is easy to find your way around for your own city. I include the maps for Europe and the US where most readers are. But Australia and South America are well represented while Canada lists Toronto and Montreal and many Central America countries do have Venezuelan joints. 

So look to see if your place shows up and go for it. The places listed have a link.

By the way, for those who live in New York area, the Times has a complete review of the local joints.

The official 2013 VNV municipal election post

I suppose I should not break a long and on occasion distinguished electoral number crunching tradition. Even though elections have become a test of will rather than any democratic exercise it still matters that we look at the electoral considerations and perspectives. Even if diffidently.   Thus this general and as brief as possible unique electoral post about what are not necessarily the main races to watch but rather those that should confirm the trend as to the waning of chavismo. Outside, of course, the ever present crass electoral fraud.


The conditions

The municipal elections of December 8 have turned out to become a referendum on Maduro's tenure.  It should not have been like this of course, since we are supposed to vote for the guy that we think is better at fixing potholes and picking up the garbage. But in a country where a mass expects only goodies and another mass resent populism and the accompanying sectarianism you cannot expect anything else but plebiscitary polarization, the more so that the Maduro "election" of last April is now established as fraudulent by any impartial observer.

The electoral board has done its homework. The Maduro camp is amply favored, from gerrymandering of many a council district, to an absolute blind eye on power abuse, from using the resources of the state as if nothing to legally bar as many candidates as possible that could win a given district away from chavismo. In addition the flaws amply documented last April, from dead people voting to guarantees that the vote will be secret have been ignored. The CNE is more than ever the Ministry of Chavistas to be Reelected.

Yet we need to go and vote. Firstly, it is either voting or taking a gun and start a guerrilla warfare. Voting does not imply meek acceptance of adverse fraudulent results, but if you do not bother to vote you cannot complain afterwards. So we need to have the election stolen from us in order to be allowed to bitch about it. It may be unfair but this is the way things work in the real world.

Secondly the situation is not that desperate. After all, the more we vote, the more we set up systems to defend our vote, the more difficult it is for the regime to cheat. We need to force the regime to go to an outright open vote stealing to have international opinion become less complacent. Not that they will send Marines or Legionaires, but no democrat will want to be seen with a fraud. In case you have not noticed it, Maduro is only received by his pariah colleagues, real democrats limit as much as possible exposure to the post Chavez cancer.

What I am trying to say here is that the nature of the CNE fraud is to improve the chavismo numbers by somewhere close to 5%. That is, the day chavismo gets in real life less than 45% it will not be able to claim a majority and the CNE will have no option but to announce that the opposition has 50,1% or more. Which would mean that it got at least 55% . If the real numbers are never announced it will not matter, the psychological earthquake of a losing chavismo should be enough to speed up the collapse of the regime.

This is why the regime has gone on overdrive in recent weeks reaching for the organized looting and destruction of commerce in the country.  All polls pre-looting were implying that Maduro candidates were at least 10 points behind the opposition MUD, and sliding. Furthermore, contrary to Chavez good old days, Maduro does little, if any, direct candidate support: he is toxic.  If Maduro is 10 points behind it means that when cheating is factored in chavismo loses 52 to 48 in favor of the MUD.

I personally doubt that the latest antics of the regime are going to favor chavismo much. At best it will energize chavismo bases but I doubt it will be enough for Maduro to regain his "number" of April. In fact, if votes are reasonably counted, I am on record that chavismo will not reach 6.5 million votes, a net loss of 1 million at the very least since April, in elections that may have a surprisingly high turnout for local votes.

On the other hand the paradox maybe that the opposition vote will not only be re-energized, but as many store clerks are losing their jobs these coming weeks, the opposition may gain a not insignificant number of weak chavista votes directly!  I am willing to go on record that irregardless of the tally, the MUD will not get less than 400 K votes more than chavismo, cheating included. I can see easily chavismo getting no more than 6 million nationally and the MUD reaching the 6.5 million.  Note, I am not predicting anything yet, nor will I considering the extraordinary emotionalism of this vote and the plain intention of electoral fraud from the regime. I am just saying that this 6 to 6.5 result would seem "normal" for me under current conditions. With such a result we would all know that in fact the opposition has now 1 million votes more than chavismo and that this one can stay in office only through violent repression.

It is interesting to note that today November 23 series of street protests all across the country, more or less attended according to the locale (it was as the expected bust in San Felipe for example, but a big hit in Caracas), has been yet another opportunity for the regime to go a notch further in repression. First there has been a blackout on all TV networks in coverage of that protest and Capriles had to go to CNN tonight so at least somewhere we knew what was going on.  That was not all, the man in charge of organizing Capriles campaign travels across the country was arrested for a few hours by the state repressive security breaking into his home in the wee hours. Lopez was directly threatened with jail by Maduro. And other such incidents, including yet a new wave of mall "price police supervision" to try to lure shoppers to the mall instead of public protest. To no avail of course, but it betrays how far the regime will go by December 8.

The details

Considering the above it should be clear for the reader that monitoring individual races is as much wishful thinking than actual electoral science.  Thus in the table below I have only picked up a few races that should help the reader understand better the general political trend of the country in the last three years.  The table uses the rounded up vote numbers of chavismo and opposition in 2008, the last municipal vote, and April 2013. In pink chavista districts and in blue opposition ones. Note, sometimes the color does not match the numbers because I have added numbers when there was a division in 2008. For example in Cocorote the opposition wins by a thousand but loses the mayor anyway because it went divided. The "total" at the bottom include the votes listed minus those of Libertador included in the Caracas at large.  I have starred some districts which are "rural", for the sake of the discussion. I have calculated the percentile advantage for each election for chavismo which means that when the number is negative then the opposition leads. And to compare the two elections I calculated how that percentile moved in 4.5 years. Comments after the table.

MIRANDA CARACAS AND VARGAS

The Caracas Metro area has steadily been gained over by the opposition. Even in Vargas, the most pro Chavez area the opposition has progressed by 9.5%. If Libertador, downtown Caracas, is not a safe bet for the opposition (though its division seems to have been overcome) we should remember that in 2010 the opposition did win by a couple of thousands of votes.  Thus Ledezma seems almost a shoo in for reelection for Caracas at large, some polls already giving him a 10% advance on Ernesto Villegas, and advance that may also help in taking Libertador.

If all the stunts to recover Caracas at large seem to have failed for chavismo the real races are elsewhere, in Miranda where the opposition will prove its growth only if it confirms that it is now a majority in Los Teques and it it takes Guatire. Thus the measure of success for the MUD here is to gain at least 2 out of Libertador, Los Teques and Guatire. It can be done, even the three of them and a bonus district in the Valles del Tuy which would be a true humiliation for chavismo.

ARAGUA CARABOBO AND YARACUY

There the opposition situation is not as favorable. There is really no great candidate at the top of any ticket, the decline of Proyecto Venezuela is not yet compensated by other groups, and the regime has played particularly dirty this time around screwing the natural candidate for Maracay, Mardo, and about to screw the one for Valencia, Cocchiola.

In Yaracuy we pay the consequences of division in 2008 which cost us ALL districts and thus no bases to rebuild. In addition the current rather vicious governor has sponsored many development for low social income in San Felipe turning this most anti Chavez district of Yaracuy iredder, while the middle class developments went to Independencia and Cocorote making them bluer. Thus the metro area of San Felipe may go MUD while San Felipe would remain chavista.

For good measure I have added three small rural districts. Except for Urachiche where the opposition was really low, its growth is not that great though real. Bejuma always lost for divisions this time around should finally go opposition. Boraure which is in part a dormitory of San Felipe could benefit from the pauperization of San Felipe which lured away some of its settlers to go this time around MUD.

The measure of opposition success in these states is to gain the three metro districts of San Felipe and Valencia. If Valencia in spite of all of chavismo treacheries is still likely MUD, a loss in San Felipe would not be compensated by a victory in Bejuma and Boraure. And taking Maracay is of course the true measure of success in that area, as it would prove that the military in this army rich district is not a monolith behind Maduro...

LARA

Barquisimeto should go MUD and maybe even Carora, in addition to Palavecimo. With this three districts chavismo would suffer a major set back. But even if Carora does not fall, taking Barquisimeto, once the jewel in Chavez crown, is going to be major psychological blow for chavismo. Then again they have only themselves to blame for having put a lousy mayor, not allowing her to run again so that a military lout is the candidate this time. The opposition MUD candidate is Ramos, not a great one, but compared to the chavista ones, after the humiliations imposed by Chavez on governor Falcon and even Barquisimeto, chavismo should not be surprised if it loses Barquisimeto by as much as 20 points.

ZULIA

This is one painful and unaccountable governor loss last year since even cheating was not that easy there in a state where UNT supposedly has a strong electoral machinery.  Also the mayor of Maracaibo, nepotistically set in the wife of exiled ex governor Rosales, has not been that great.  Still, the MUD can redeem itself by retaining Maracaibo and adding its southern urban district of San Francisco. Gaining these two districts is crucial for the MUD to remain viable in Zulia, regardless of what happens elsewhere in the state. It is possible considering that chavismo has launched an annoying clown for Maracaibo and that Omar Prieto in San Francisco has been one of the worst thugs of chavismo in recent years and people my be getting tired of the character.

TACHIRA MERIDA AND TRUJILLO

The Andes state are in turmoil after voting for Capriles in 2012 and amazingly putting up chavista governors 2 months later... Well, not Trujillo which is one of the most chavista states today even though its main and lone city Valera may just go MUD this time around. It would be a major success.

Tachira which unaccountably went from the most anti Chavez state to elect "moderate" chavista Vielma Mora should redeem itself with a smashing MUD victory in San Cristobal its state capital.  Merida should also go MUD in its state capital and start undoing the damage of a series of unexplained lousy chavista governors by taking over the second urban district of El Vigia. Thus the measure of success in the Andes, more than how many districts the MUD gains, is to recover a solid vote plurality through Tachira and Merida and pick up Valera to dent Trujillo. Getting that is the best guarantee that the opposition has indeed a solid base for future challenges.

BARINAS PORTUGUESA AND GUARICO

The reader may have noted that I have not included Falcon and now I am skipping over Cojedes and Apure, but these three states do not weigh much today in the grand scheme of things.  In the Llanos, Chavez bastion, the only possibility is to gain Barinas, the capital of the homonym state. More than anything else, getting the state capital of the state who cursed us with baby Chavez, is the best way to demonstrate that chavismo is indeed in the defensive.

I have included for good measure Acarigua and San Juan de Los Morros just to show that if there is progress for the MUD it is rather glacial for the hot weather of this region. Besides Barinas, the lone possible gain is San Juan.

ANZOATEGUI SUCRE NUEVA ESPARTA AND MONAGAS

These states that came late into chavismo grasp have never been that solid for it, besides Sucre the poorer one and a natural candidate for co-dependency politics. Nueva Esparta was lost in December because Morel wanted to run for the nth time and not having been such a great governor, well, he got booted.  There the race to watch is Porlamar, the main district, which should go MUD but where chavismo has dispatched one of its few stars, at least compared to other lifeless polticos.  From my last visit I am still calling it a toss up.

Sucre I am afraid is not to be recovered this time around once the Voluntad Popular representative of Cumana was blackmailed rather too easily to join chavismo.  Getting Cumana is as much as we can hope for.  Carupano would be a feat for the annals.

Anzoategui is also a land of betrayal as the El Tigre Paraquiema family left chavismo and came back to it. In spite of that, or maybe becasue of that, Capriels did rather well last April.

And in Monagas which voted for Chavez even though he forced them to drink contaminated water we have no hope except for an upset in Maturin though its dependency on PDVSA does not make me very optimistic.  The measure of resistance there is to at least retain Porlamar, pick up either Barcelona or El Tigre. Success will exist only if we add either Cumana or Maturin while getting both El Tigre and Barcelona.

BOLIVAR

The election there is particularly interesting because in the latest December Governor election there seems to be very believable claims that the election was stolen. Since then social and political peace have never returned and the chavista military governor has been shown to be at the top of an impressive corruption pyramid. It is to be noted that Puerto Ordaz, the largest worker city in Venezuela went for Capriles if barely in April while the state capital Ciudad Bolivar has been steadily opposition in recent elections.  Nowhere but Puerto Ordaz could illustrate better the break between chavismo and workers as these one are getting tired of so much corruption and broken promises.  Gaining Puerto Ordaz, if opposition divisions are smoothed over, may be with Barquisimeto and Libertador the three biggest omens of chavismo debacle to come.

Concluding notes

The real meaning of December 8, if we make it there as it is clear that the regime is seeking some form of confrontation to postpone the vote or hide massive cheating is not in how many town halls the opposition wins or loses, but which ones and how many votes.

The number of votes because if the opposition manages more than 50% by the CNE it would mean clearly, at least to the military that are the true rulers of the country, that maybe 60% of the country has abandoned chavismo or at the very least Maduro. If Maduro does not get 50% cheating included his days are numbered as his own people will start actively to seek ways to get rid of him.

Of course we would not know for a while the exact voting tally since there are a few dissidents on either side and on election night what people will see are how many town-halls each side got.  From the rural districts, as this table hints at, there is not much to hope for: the acute dependency of these people on government grants ensure that no matter how much the opposition grows, a majority of these districts will remain chavista. Thus Maduro is almost 100% assured that on December 8 at midnight to be able to claim a victory by getting a "majority" of cities, the only thing he can use to try to gloss over an almost certain defeat on vote total.

This being said on December 9 around noon we will be able to measure the real strength of the opposition or weakness of Maduro. Since the objective of the opposition is to speed up the exit of Maduro, an objective which has sympathies inside chavismo, we need a score card along these lines.

Success: more votes than chavismo;  retain Maracaibo and Caracas at large; ensure San Cristobal and 90% of districts already held;  gain at least 4 out of Valencia, Maracay, Barcelona, Puerto Ordaz, Barquisimeto, Los Teques, Cumana, San Francisco; gain maybe a couple dozen of smaller ones so that at least we get one district in every state.

Triumph: at least 52% of the votes cast with chavismo pushed down to 46%; gain 6 of the list above; gain at least 3 of Valera, Barinas, Maturin, Carora, the 3 San Felipe metro together, Libertador, Guatire.

Maduro resigning conditions: a majority of districts regardless of their size as long as  Libertador is included.

Why this scorecards? For the stakes at play. But this is for another post.

Those regrettable moments

I know that Maxima is an habituée of hard core repressive regimes, but this....

The Netherlands King visits the naked emperor of chavismo

In the series of royalty mistakes Willem Alexander should bitch back at the Dutch government for forcing him to visit Venezuela. Certainly doing a Caribbean tour and not stopping by Caracas is a dangerous initiative as The Netherlands share an important maritime border with Venezuela (4 islands!). In addition the economy of three of these islands is quite dependent on Venezuela, from the oil they refine there to the fresh vegetables they ship regularly.  But from there to go and support such a contested figure like Maduro just when he is becoming a full blooded dictator...  Pleaaaaase...  I mean, even the French have manged not to send a president or a Prime Minister!

Of course, speculation is going good. Did they came for an oil concession? Is Venezuela holding some form of blackmail over Aruba?  What is the Dutch prime Minister snorting these days?  Can Timmermans be so incompetent?  Etc.  Whatever it is the opposition is shocked, and I include myself in this, having refused to believe that such a visit could take place, that Wilhelm would come down with the flu at the last moment or something.

We already know that chavismo has no friends and that no matter who do they smile at today, tomorrow they will stab in the back as needed. If the Dutch government does not know that they will learn it soon enough. What is graver for the Dutch is that an hypothetical but not uncertain post chavista administration may not be too forgiving. There is, oh, say, this tweet of Lopez:

Mientras Maduro reprime los reyes de Holanda vienen a pedir concesiones petroleras. Que sepan los "reyes" q se les ven las consturas.
— Leopoldo López (@leopoldolopez) November 23, 2013

While Maduro represses {the people} the kings of Holland come to ask for oil concessions. We got their number.

Needless to say that this visit is quite, quite regrettable and that the Dutch are going to regret it the most.
And to think that there are full gay rights in Amsterdam, freedom of the press, civility, etc. etc.

PS: and let's talk about a commie president kissing ass to royalty.  Chavismo is actually rather discrete about this visit, just enough to try to refurbish Maduro 's image overseas. But we gotta love the ideological incoherence.

Just a day in the life of a dictatorship: Maduro starts applying the enabling law

I never cease to be impressed by the deep denial that still exists in some people as to Venezuela being a military dictatorship.  Sure enough, there are "elections", a civilian "president" is the one "ruling", you can travel if you can find an airplane ticket, you still can read this blog though more and more the regime practices blocking certain pages, there are "so few" political prisoners, the hundred of thousand people that emigrated out are simply not genuine patriots, etc.

Fortunately for those that still do not understand that dictatorships in the XXI century are of a very different species than the earlier ones, Maduro first day with his new toy should be the beginning of enlightenment.  Even among the opposition: this Saturday finally Capriles has called for protests all around the country. About time.....

There is no need to go much in the details of the two new laws signed today: they are, as expected, designed by the regime to control more the economy and punish those it wants to punish. The laws, as the ones to be published in the next months, are mere excuses that make the task easier in finding motives to crack down. As all such type of laws they will not work out, and in the end they never worked in any country. They are mere examples of laws that a dictatorship emits, nothing more, nothing less.  What is more interesting is how the regime bends backward further, if it were possible, the constitution.

One law is to promote corruption. Through this law Maduro creates a Centro Nacional de Comercio Exterior or National Center for Foreign Trade.  Maduro's reported words are rather confusing. Apparently now if you want to import anything you need to pass though that CNCE and sign a contract that proves you will use the dollars approved as intended and that you will be willing to be monitored in all your operations. We can sort of deal with that, it is just a more centralized CADIVI where those who have the power to grant the dollars, corrupt or not, will remain in similar posts.  Not only this will not stop corruption, it will only make it a little bit more circumvented and thus only increase the price of bribes that you will need to pay to get access to dollars to keep your business running.

Where Maduro loses us is with his announcement is that dollars that are approved will have to be deposited in a local account  instead of being transferred to your directly to your provider as it should be the case. How do I transfer dollars from my account to my provider if 1) I cannot have an account in dollars inside Venezuela and 2) there is a currency control exchange that forbids me such transfers? Is this a circumvented way to force providers to "invest" in Venezuela? A disguised devaluation as such transfers could be taxed? Was it just yet another idiotic misunderstanding of Maduro?

The other law, as expected, was to tie together a series of previous laws that will allow the regime to fix not only prices but also how much you are allowed to make in your business. In short, it is the law that is going to destroy large sectors of the economy that require flexibility in their earnings (seasonal character, for example) or that sell few large ticket items that need large margins to sustain business in between sales.  Maduro claims that this law decree will stabilize the economy. He may be right, it will be base line stability.

Now, if this does not reek enough of dictatorship, let me add that Maduro wants to give the price and earning control law a character of "organica" which does not mean at all wholesome and organic.  In Venezuelan legal tradition there are the so called organic laws which need to be voted by 2/3 of Parliament and can only be modified with a 2/3 vote.  The intention is to approve through such laws what the institutions of the country should be, things that are dangerous to change according to the whim of any government. In other words organic laws are in principle the laws that are used to implement the constitutional provisions as to how is the country organized, and NOT necessarily how it is run since this requires more flexibility to account for changes in economy or society.

Thus the beauty of this Maduro initiative: a president that stole his election in April, that is, 1) who does not have 50% of the electorate behind him, 2) has used a 3/5 vote of an assembly which has been obtained courtesy of gerrymandering, blackmailing representatives and firing others, 3) this 3/5 by the way representing LESS votes of the people in 2010 than the 2/5 sitting across the aisle, to 4) get a law that in the future can only be modified by a 2/3 vote even if it was in practice voted in with a spurious 3/5.  And he will get his wish because he only needs the high court, TSJ, to validate the new law as such. Of course, a high court that has violated the constitution so that Maduro can become president is certain to grant him his wish.

Now, if with this you still think that Maduro is not a dictator then please, do not read this blog anymore. Though, of course, you may be able to read it for only a few days more, until the regime blocks my page or something.

Errores de la MUD: algunos se pueden corregir, otros no

Siempre trato de evitar escribir en español sobre política interna de la MUD. Solo lo hago en inglés, para la gente a quien le cuesta entender sus procesos bizantinos. El asunto es que en español no importa lo que escriba sobre tal o cual partido, siempre voy a ofender a alguien. No es objetivo de este blog apoyar o acusar a nadie en la MUD ya que estoy en perfecto conocimiento que la única arma que tenemos frente al totalitarismo cubano-chavista es la unidad. No a cualquier costo, pero unidad al fin y al cabo aunque nos deje de vez en cuando algo de amargura.  Pero ayer he visto dos fracasos gravísimos sobre las candidaturas a alcaldías que me obligan a escribir sobre el asunto.

Baruta

El alcalde saliente Gerardo Blyde perdió las primarias por un puñado de votos en febrero de 2012. Tal vez no haya sido el mejor de los alcaldes pero malo no ha sido. Es mas, aprecio en el virtudes como la discreción en cuanto a publicitar los logros de su gestión. Gigantografías de él no las vi, pero si de otros aspirantes a esa alcaldía. Pero el pueblo habló y aunque no me guste el resultado ganó el candidato de Primero Justicia, David Uzcátegui, hombre también de virtudes ciertas, pero con mas tiempo libre para hacer campaña que el alcalde que tenia que ocuparse también de la alcaldía. Note que yo no voto en Baruta sino en Yaracuy pero mis muy frecuentes extendidas estadías en ese municipio me me permiten escribir sobre el asunto. 

Pues bien, no tengo problema en que Uzcátegui sea el candidato: creo que el será, o debo escribir ahora, seria, un alcalde tan bueno como lo fue Blyde. Pero el deseo exacerbado de PJ de "recuperar" una alcaldía que ellos asumen les pertenece les han puesto a forzar la candidatura en las primarias de Uzcategui a pesar del interdicto del cual lo amenazan desde la contraloría y el TSJ. Los va y vienes que vimos en estos últimos dos años hubiesen debido obligar a mas prudencia tanto a PJ como a la Mesa de la Unidad. Pero no, PJ puso la torta y ayer Uzcátegui a pocos días de la elección, cuando ya no se puede cambiar el diseño de la boleta fue inhabilitado y no podrá ser candidato.

La estrategia del chavismo no es conquistar con trampa a Baruta, eso es imposible por mas Winstones que le tiren al municipio. La estrategia es fomentar la abstención de los electores de PJ en Baruta para que Ernesto Villegas la tenga mas fácil en la gran Caracas.  Yo creo que no va a resultar el truquito, la gente de Baruta es mucho menos pendeja que los electores del PSUV.......  Pero no podemos negar que el empecinamiento de PJ nos ha hecho perder tiempo y recursos.  Por lo menos, ante la hora tan menguada que vivimos, la MUD ya hoy pidió a Blyde ser el sustituto de Uzacategui y parece que este va a ser su jefe de campaña. En pocos días nos habremos olvidado del asunto y Winston, y también esperamos Ernesto, recibirán la bofetada política que se merecen por ser grandísimos sinvergüenzas.

Valencia

Desafortunadamente el entuerto de Valencia no se podrá arreglar tan fácil como el de Baruta y lo que era una alcaldía segura esta hoy en gran riesgo de quedarse en manos del chavismo corrupto que la manejo estos últimos 5 años.  Allí tenemos otra vez la prueba de que la MUD no hizo bien su trabajo al seleccionar candidatos y ponerles condiciones. Como fue el caso de Mardo, aunque este lo hizo peor, el señor Cocchiola quiere ser a juro alcalde de Valencia (y quien sabe que mas mas tarde) y por lo tanto consideró su presencia en la Asamblea Nacional desde 2010 como un tramite.

Seguramente es respetable la ambición política de Cocchiola y de Mardo y de otros, pero esa debería de someterse a las urgencias de una país. No estamos en una democracia normal donde ambiciones internas no amenazan el bien colectivo. Hacer política en Venezuela es hoy en día un riesgo personal ademas del riesgo colectivo.

Por eso no entiendo que carajo fue a hacer Cocchiola a EE.UU justo cuando se iniciaba la campaña oficial para la alcaldía a la cual el aspira.  ¡Ni siquiera era el primer nieto que le iba a nacer!  Ahora todos piensan que se fugó, que se cagó porque tiene miedo que lo pongan preso por los precios de IMECA, etc.  ¿Y acaso no disfruta de su inmunidad parlamentaria por mas usurero que haya sido en IMECA (cosa que dudo mucho, sea dicho, ya que es muy respetable como hombre de negocios)? Y peor ¿un detalle familiar es mas importante para el que todo el pueblo de Valencia? Si se le hubiese muerto o enfermado de gravedad alguien uno podría entender que se tome un par de días para arreglar el asunto, pero cuando uno aspira a una alcaldía tan importante como es la de Valencia, la vida privada tiene que ser de suma discreción. Si el señor Cocchiola no entiende esto entonces todos tenemos derecho de preocuparnos por su idoneidad por el cargo de alcalde. 

Lo que este señor ha hecho este fin de semana es un error político garrafal que el chavismo supo aprovecharse muy bien.  Esperemos que logre regresar pronto y asumir su barranco porque si no lo hace entonces Valencia está casi perdida ya que va a ser muy difícil hacer un cambio en condiciones favorables como el que se hace en Baruta hoy. Pero pase lo que pase, estoy dispuesto a apostar que esa aventura de Cocchiola con el nieto le va a costar por lo menos un concejal, si es que gana la alcaldía. Por lo menos tenemos la suerte que el candidato para Valencia del PSUV es Miguel Flores, una joyita del entrono corrupto de Ameliach. Después del desastre de Parra le va a ser muy difícil llevarse a Valencia por delante. A menos que Cocchiola siga ayudándolo.

En fin, me disculpo por estas quejas, pero a veces me exaspera ver que en las pocas condiciones favorables que tenemos, logramos meter la pata.  La MUD tiene que tener mejor seguimiento y consejería para sus candidatos....... Y los agalludos calmarse un poco porque por mas agalludos que sean, por mas alcaldías que logren quitarle al régimen, poco harán mientras la cuerda de forajidos con Maduro de parapeto siga en Miraflores. Aclaren sus prioridades, por favor.

The next few months for Venezuela

Let's go beyond what qualifies as the "mundane" for the regime. Let's not focus on the organized looting, or the spontaneous one.  Let's not delve on the idiocies of the regime which claims that looting and forcing to sell at a loss will encourage production and lower unemployment. Let's just say that what started with the Daka looting over ten days ago is a mere politico-electoral ploy from the regime, that they never quite meant it the way it turned out.

Yet there will be consequences. Which ones?


I am not going to write as a pontificating economist. Firstly, I am not one. Secondly, you do not need to be a graduate from Ivy League School of Business to guess that the odds for Venezuela to enter a deep recession next year are in the 99%+.  The Maduro regime has made a massive blunder by destroying the commercial sector which is what holds together the financial and productive sectors.  Without commerce to distribute the goods around the country there is diminished receipts for the manufacturing sector, and there are no commercial benefits that go to the banks so they cannot invest in production ventures. If you do not understand this generality, if you do not agree with this, then do not waste your time reading further.


Venezuela is a very difficult country to work in.  The inherent flexibility of any commercial sector has made the Venezuelan one able to cope more or less with the situation making sure it all did not fall apart earlier, as it is about to happen.  Logistics are tremendously complicated in a country where the inefficient regime makes harbors unworkable, does not maintain properly highways and infrastructure in general, create rules after rules that inhibit commerce, etc. Furthermore, commerce is particularly understanding with the difficulties of many producers in ways that the banking system cannot or will not. I will refer you to the glaring example of AgroIsleña which nationalization 3 years ago has created havoc in Venezuelan agricultural output.

And in case the difficulties alluded to in the preceding paragraph were not enough, commerce must deal with an inflation above 50% that is joined to the corruption of the currency control that includes nice features such as retroactive devaluations where the regime forces you to pay old debts at new larger prices, wiping out any earnings you may have managed.  Thus the calculation of restocking costs has become a true dark science in Venezuela where you need to calculate selling prices by balancing what you think the market may pay for the goods you want to offer against your wild bet as to what you will need to fork in order to replenish your shelves. Any error may make you look like Shylock or may send you into bankruptcy.

The regime has used the rules it made to control the economy as a paltry excuse to punish the economic actors for the mistakes of the regime. And this is where it all centers: who will want to keep playing a trumped game knowing now for sure that there is no way you can protect yourself from the main abuses, and even less hope of winning your case.

If we assume that the regime "never meant it that way", which I think it did but that is my opinion, then what can the regime do to restore some equilibrium? Nothing. The regime does not have enough money available to refurbish the depleted shelves, if anything because corruption would take too much of a bite out of whatever the regime would be willing to settle with. Can the regime replace the commercial sector? No. We have for that the glaring failures of AgroIsleña now a derelict AgroPatria; we have the failures of the Bicentenariao chain holding courtesy of left over French management, and the Mercal who only offer goods on occasion, according to arrival, numbering people's arm for their turn in line when necessary. The state distribution system as it is is on the verge of instituting ration cards.  If the regime wants also to pick up malls and electronics it will only add more strain to what it is doing today, and further corruption and black market.

Considering all of this, what can we expect, not even for next year, for next month already?

First, people are going to empty their meager savings to shop for whatever they can shop. I went myself to a Locatel (refusing to shop in any taken over shop refusing to profit from the misery of others) and spent several K bolivares on stuff that I do not need yet but that I know I shall consume in the next 6 months, from soap to acetaminophen.  I did not buy electronics because I have all that I need and I am not going to buy a refrigerator just because the one I have is sixteen going on seventeen.

Second, surviving commerce is not going to be able to replenish shelves or will do so in part, and ONLY after the regime guarantees them access to a stable currency rate.  The consequences are immediate, beyond the empty shelves: a whole bunch of people are going to go jobless in the next very few months.

Third, our quality of life is going to go down south. Commerce also provides spares parts and once a store is on its knees it will, if it does, only buy a minimum of spare parts, those that it is sure can fly away from the shelves really fast before any inspector shows up.  Now, when my refrigerator breaks down, I may not be able to get a new compressor, nor a new refrigerator.

Fourth, production will be affected faster than what you know. Because in addition of needing to import raw materials that the regime intends to control more than ever, by purchasing it all themselves before they sell it back to you, we also need a lot of supplies that will not be readily available anymore (and many already missing before last week crisis).  For example at work I need car spare parts, electrical supplies, safety implements for workers, etc. If I cannot find these within reasonable delays I may have to shut down, first a day here or there, then a week here or there and then close down once and for all.

Let me illustrate you the perversity of the system. For example safety equipment for workers are already difficult to get. If I cannot get them anymore what should I do? Endanger my workers? Risk a punitive fine by INPSASEL that could bankrupt me as they cannot care less whether I can find the supplies?  I better close shop.

Fifth, as the regime relies on sales taxes and income tax and fines to pay for its public workers (the rest is paid by oil, rounding up numbers if you allow me), it will lose significant income with all the consequences you can imagine.  Will the regime ensure purchasing power of the public sector? Yeah, right...Some of my clients depend in part of contract from the regime to supply Mercal. If the regime stops paying, how long can they hold?

Sixth, seventh, eighth.....  you get the cascade picture.

The regime has put itself in a corner. It has either to back down badly and badly fast, or it has to go all the way with its open dictatorship plan that I doubt it has much capacity to implement in the long run as it needs to start by internal purges.  Whatever the regime decides we can expect next year a major degradation in living conditions forcing
massive repression which will not be able to stop violence, a violence that I must say will start mostly from the henceforth supporters of the regime.

The regime has no capacity to raise fast oil production to get the money it needs to import all the country needs and no capacity to spread it in case it could miraculously increase oil production and revenue; or at least tell Cuba and China to fuck off on their indentured share of oil.

Thus 2014 is a sure crisis waiting for us.

Carta abierta a Nicolás Maburro Maduro

¿Y ahora que Nicolás?

Bosch tiene tu ficha

Te escribo esta carta tuteándote porque quiero apostar a que si algún día la leas, la entiendas. Me parece que en tus años de canciller no has entendido el uso correcto del 'Usted', y menos el respeto que se le debe a la gente. Por ahí decían que tu eras de trato amable y dialogante pero yo nunca me lo creí. Siempre fuiste un flojo y como se sabe la flojera es la madre de todos los vicios. Tus meses en Miraflores nos han confirmado esto, la ira, la soberbia, la envidia, la avaricia, la gula y hasta la lujuria.

Claro está que no creo que este texto llegue a tus manos. No importa, yo escribo para que quede constancia, para que sea una argumento mas en contra de los que pagarán el desastre que estas dejando, que no puedan usar la excusa del "Yo no sabia. Yo solo cumplía ordenes". Por lo menos alguno que otro chaburro chavista lo leerá y me mentará, demostrando que en algún clavo le dí.

Lo que has hecho la semana pasada no tiene nombre. No es que hayas echado a todo el comercio de Venezuela al basurero. Total, siempre fue el plan de Giordani y Jaua y otros locos de erradicar el capitalismo de los otros, no necesariamente el de ellos. Es que has arruinado al país.  Nicolás, yo se que no tienes la capacidad de entenderlo, pero sin comercio no funciona ni la producción, ni la finanza. Y sin los tres tampoco hay salud, educación, cultura, deporte, vida..... No existe experiencia histórica donde el estado haya asumido el comercio y haya sido un éxito. Simplemente no existe. Claro, con tu educación defectiva no lo vas a saber. El problema es que tu soberbia no te ha permitido buscar la gente que si sabe de eso. Los únicos que dejas que se te acerquen traen la envidia y juntos nos dejan la ira.

Todo empezó, claro, cuando diste un golpe en enero para agarrarte la presidencia de un Chávez ya muerto, jodiendo a Cabello.  Eso es problema de el y no se me pasaría por la cabeza defenderlo. Una vez que pusiste el dedo en el engranaje del mal, no podíamos sorprendernos cuando hiciste trampa y te robaste la elección de abril.  La sorpresa ese día no fue que te robes la elección: es que ya eras tan malo, habías perdido tantos votos, que tuviste que hacerlo. Y eso que en aquellos días todavía medio escuchabas a gente como Merentes que por mas sinvergüenza que sea por lo menos tenía una media noción de como se bate el cobre en una economía.

Tuviste tu chance de empezar a liquidar el nefasto legado económico de Chávez y no lo hiciste. A el no le tembló la mano nunca para robarse lo que sea necesario para comprar una elección.  Pero el tuvo siempre el instinto de dejar algo en pie, para la próxima elección. Claro, sabiendo que estaba condenado no se preocupo de la vorágine de corrupción y desorganización que creó con la Misión Vivienda.  La diferencia es que Chávez siempre le robó mas a las arcas publicas que al privado y tu no entiendes eso, saqueando a todos parejo. Es el famoso cuento de la gallina de los huevos de oro. Ahora se murió el pobre animal. El año que viene puedes olvidarte del impuesto sobre la renta y del IVA. Ya vas a ver que haces.

Pero eso si, desde el pasado abril se te ve la gula y la avaricia en la cara, hasta la lujuria por el poder se te nota, mucho mas que cualquier lujuria por cualquier primera combatiente. Hiciste un cerco con los mas atrasados comunistas que crees te darán todo el poder que ni Chávez tuvo. Giordani volvió de superhombre al ruedo, con Ramirez que ha sido el pirata saqueador mas grande de nuestra historia, por lo alto que es y por lo que dejó que saquearan de PDVSA. Ahora estás en la lona, sin entender que esa chusma, ideológicamente fracasada y cuyo único superpoder es el resentimiento, te ha traicionado, a sabiendas o no, ya no importa.

Al fin y al cabo todo esto no te preocupa: estás cumpliendo con el mandato de los cubiches que controlan el país y que te controlan ya hace décadas, parece.  Los cubiches saben usar a los flojos, siempre lo han hecho, son maestros en chulearse a la gente y reclutar la ayuda necesaria.  El problema tuyo Nicolás es que has cruzado una linea de la cual no hay retorno. No lo digo por Venezuela, al fin y al cabo el muro de Berlín que era una cosa mucho mas seria y terrible que el chavismo cayó.  Todo cae por su propio peso algún día y la revolución de mentira ahora que se ha vuelto basura va a caer mas rápidamente de lo que tu crees.

El problema que tienes Nicolás es que cuando mandaste a saquear a Daka metiste otro dedo en un engranaje aun mas fatal que el primero. No solo no tienes legitimidad pero ni a legalidad puedes pretender ahora. Presides un sistema donde un grupo se coge lo que quiere, cuando quiere, sin explicaciones. Es la mafia, mas nada. Y todos esos malandros, Nicolás, para que lo sepas, te van a culpar a ti de todas la fechorías que cometieron y tu lo pagarás. No te preocupes que ni yo ni la oposición te lo vamos a cobrar. ¿Como haríamos? Los que te lo van a cobrar son tus seguidores cuando los anaqueles no se vuelvan a llenar, los militares corruptos a quien le tumbaste el negocio, los boliburgueses que dejaste embarcados. Y hasta tus mismos radicales cuando ya no queden ni casas para saquear. Puede ser que venga el día que ni en Cuba te reciban.

Ya no importa si ganas o no en diciembre, y que conste que yo creo que ni con trampa vas a ganar porque presiento que mas votos pierdes con el saqueo que los que crees ganar.  Aunque todavía no sea obvio para todos ya es muy tarde para ti: la semana pasada pasaste a la historia de la infamia y de eso ya nadie te puede rescatar. Es mas, hasta las culpas de Chávez te las van a endosar. Vas a ser mas que el hijo de Chávez, vas a heredar todas sus deudas y desaciertos, ademas de pagar lo tuyos. Prepárate.

Why I am not covering the "enabling law"

Yesterday the regime managed to boot out enough opposition representatives or blackmail/buy enough to its side that it got the magical 99 number to vote the enabling law.  Such a momentous moment (redundancy intended) should be covered duly. But I'll pass for a few reasons:

First, I have covered already the essential, the truly fascist nature of that law voted yesterday in first reading and certain now to pass the second vote next week.

Second, we have been, as far as I am concerned, into a bona fide dictatorship since 2010, at the very least. This law changes nothing, it just simplifies the legal aspects of the regime, in a "retroactive way" on all the abuses committed in recent months.

Third, derived from second, Maduro and the regime are already doing all what they want about the economy. Redundantly again, the law is a mere "legal" stamp and maybe an additional excuse to settle scores inside chavismo.

Fourth, a regime that knows it has the right on his side, that feels confident and supported, that holds already a decisive majority in the parliament does not need such a show.  That enabling crap is a mark of weakness that pushes us over the brink. Why bother about the details?

What is more important to cover is how a huge chunk, a majority chunk of the Venezuelan population, not all of them, by far, chavistas, are only too happy to let private enterprise sink, without defending it, without being aware of the consequences. And the opposition MUD is at least in part responsible because for meager electoral calculations they are too afraid to confront the regime as it should be confronted even if it were to cost them a few town-halls next December. Apparently they actually think that the regime will "respect" whatever victories they will get.  After the video below you KNOW that the only way out is through some from of violence. We cannot escape it because those in charge today are seeking a violent confrontation.



This video is remarkable on many aspects that most commentators that are P.C. will not dare to tell you.

You do not need to understand the words at all.

The anguish of the store owner who prefers to be outright looted instead of sealing his death by the slow process of being forced to sell at a loss everything.

The anguish of the store clerks that know that the owners have worked very hard for their store and that she and other clerks are going to be jobless tomorrow.

The "public servants" there trying to calm them down and take them away from the cameras of the local TV or whomever is filming this.  Their faces betray that they are not happy with what they are forced to do. Yet, they are too far gone to take a stand on ethics.

And the non P.C. part I promised. the owners are of middle eastern origins. They are still sort of fresh from the boat (10 years?). They have probably supported Chavez for his love to anything Muslim against anything US and/or Jewish. And now they are paid in kind.  Though admittedly they may be from the Christian minorities. But it does not make any difference: the regime is ready to throw to the wolves whoever it takes.

A regime that has allowed dozens of such scenes this week and that has decided to let them keep recurrent for the next few weeks, until election time at least, is a regime that has lost all humanity, that has fully assumed its position of a gang of thieves that leads the servile and morally corrupt majority portion of the country. Why should I bother covering the enabling law?  The only thing worth discussing is ways out of this nightmare.

To conclude I would like you to come back to a post I wrote a little bit over a year ago "When mediocrity and resentimiento will all over".  And then you will understand why I suffer from a Cassandra complex.....

From rabipelao courts to public lynching: a day of contradictions in the regime

A regime on overdrive to survive has no qualms exploring interesting ways to reach results and contradict itself as it goes, as often as needed.  If you needed evidence that Maduro is grasping for straws, you get them in the last couple of days.

Let's start with the title.  This morning I was writing that Maduro was proposing/ordering kangaroo courts to send the owners of stores he does not like faster to jail.  But tonight I have to write that he wants now "el pueblo" to take the initiative and seize looters.   There are many problems with this. First Maduro recognizes that the looting problem is big enough to deserve a stronger response when 24 hours ago it was mere isolated incidents.  Second, if rabipelao courts are good enough for Daka's owners why not send looters to the same courts? The answer to these contradictions is that Capriles went on record saying what we already all knew from pictures in twitter: the looters are directed by PSUV operatives. And I add since there is no way to prove it at this point, that this is the way chosen by the regime to pay these operatives in view of the dirty work required from them until mid December.

Todos los focos de saqueos,anarquía,caos,son dirigidos por el psuv para después decir que somos nosotros,alertas!
— Henrique Capriles R. (@hcapriles) November 12, 2013

All flash points of looting, anarchy chaos are directed by the PSUV and then they will blame it on us. Be alert!

Another fascinating contradiction is that after having started the worst wave of looting in Venezuela since 1989, and by far, Maduro today asked people to come and invest in the country.  In a day, by the way, where Venezuelans bond dropped as the international trust in the country is about junk bond status.  Can we assume that Maduro is stupid enough to contradict himself so blatantly so fast?  Well, maybe, but there must be something else too.

As he was saying that, today we also learned that car battery manufacturers were intervened, that stores such as shoe stores were threatened, that looting started to reach small store owners, of the neighborhood quality. What gives? Possibly he wants to convey overseas that the only ones to worry are the Venezuelan businesses who are unreliable and should be replaced by foreign ones.  But even this generous hypothesis from my part rings hollow because Maduro had the chutzpah to ask Venezuelan business people to bring back home the dollars they have stashed overseas, on the week where he mad private business lose millions of dollars that cannot be recovered ever. No, what Maduro was truly announcing was his economic vision, believe it or not: no more private business in Venezuela besides the big ones in association with the regime. I will note that someone commented to me today that the regime is going to have to nationalize now Daka and related because the owners are not going to refurbish the stores or the inventory; that this was a logical step because after having ruined agriculture and manufacturing the last stand of private business was commerce and banking. And banking he does not need to move against because the regime is the main driver of cash through the system and thus banks will not rise against the regime.

And yet there is another major contradiction but of a more subtle nature to understand. Today finally the Nazional Assembly managed to get rid of one of the opposition representatives which through the viciousness of Venezuelan politics will be replaced by a safe pro Maduro vote (though rumor has that he has been extorted though his properties in Monagas to make sure his future votes are the ones wished for; such as the two other opposition votes brought to chavismo though due extortion).  This beyond undemocratic maneuver is to get Maduro the wished for enabling law to deal with corruption and economics.  But does he need it? And this is where the contradiction lays because this week with the looting and the announcement of the kangaroo courts, and that he will limit what a business can make in earnings, Maduro is doing already what he would do with the enabling law. Clearly he does not need it. Or does he?

Let's read two of Leopoldo Lopez tweets today:

El conflicto interno del gobierno no solo es politico. Hay un enfrentamiento entre mafias de poder, narcos con chapa de altos funcionarios.
— Leopoldo López (@leopoldolopez) November 13, 2013

The internal conflict inside the regime is not only political. There is a confrontation between mafias fo power and drug traffickers with high public servant badges.

Quienes son los cadiveros? Publica la lista Maduro. Quienes son los directores d esas empresas? A quien responden en el gobierno?
— Leopoldo López (@leopoldolopez) November 13, 2013

Who are those that who benefited greatly from CADIVI [currency control]? Publish the list Maduro. Who are the directors of these businesses? To whom where they linked inside the regime?

Leopoldo says on twitter what no air-wave media will allow him to say because such is the extent of censorship that the regime has gone out to ask that the word "looting" is not pronounced. And with that he puts his finger on the true pressing concerns of Maduro, concerns that he can only solve with an enabling law that gives him powers to deal with his internal enemies, not the democratic opposition that he is already screwing fine without any extra law, thank you!

To get rid of any opposition muscle it is enough to apply Marxist theories of end to private property. Now the private sector has been so weakened that a reaction like 2002 is not only impossible but the victims of governmental abuse remain silent, will not even publish a bland press communique least the regime damages more than their properties: their families and their lives.  But to get rid of tribal factions inside chavismo.........

These contradictions and actions of some of the regime spokespeople (Cabello is strangely subdued in an occasion where he should be giving a declaration a minute) mean something else: Maduro has allied with the radical wing of chavismo and he is trying to make a legalistic coup against the other factions of chavimso. The coup is not against democracy and the opposition, that one was done in 2010. The coup in progress is one against a chavista group which will imply by force that Venezuela will become a Marxist country where oil revenue makes life somewhat mess miserable than in other Marxist countries like Cuba or North Korea.

Then again the coup may be coming from Maduro's own entourage who is pushing him to make such idiotic decisions so as to get rid of him sooner than later.