One thing quite remarkable, in a perverse way, is that since we are told that Maduro has assumed power last December, no major decision has been taken by the regime, outside of a devaluation that came without any de rigueur measures to try to make the best of it. If it is clear that the regime is practicing some form of macroeconomic adjustment while trying to hide it, and thus we know little of its details, less of its scope while on any regards it is not working. The reason behind that secrecy is that the power struggle to replace Chavez is far from resolved so no one among his heirs wants to be seen as responsible from the bad news even though by not taking charge or attempting some form of coherence they are making things worse.
And thus violence seems the last option for the regime.
I suppose that the threats made by Maduro yesterday against the autonomous universities students and faculties march of tomorrow were a foretold conclusion after what was said last week end. It was a long week end because on Monday we commemorated Carabobo, our Yorktown for those who know US history. The ceremonies take place at the battle field shrine and used to be Chavez favorite. Maduro tried to look the big leader with little success; however he announced that corruption would devour the revolution and that some were trying the ridicule the fatherland concept as understood by chavismo.
The meta message was elsewhere. What the regime announced was that it was loosing patience with two groups: those inside chavismo that had other interests than those of the leadership, and the opposition who refuses to recognize Maduro, a fortuitous coincidence that is making Maduro's life quite unbearable.
The corruption salvo was to convince us that Chavez was the first president that managed scrupulously the moneys of the nation and thus any corrupt person is anti chavista. I am not going to insult the intelligence of the readers by reminding them why the chavista regime has been the most corrupt in Venezuela's history. We are not Maduro's audience. What Maduro is doing here is trying to shed away from him a corruption that cannot be hidden anymore, by either putting it on the opposition or making the corrupt faction that opposes him (Cabello et al.) as an opposition by themselves. The veracity of the charges is inconsequential here, as we were reminded again this week with yet another piped hearing for Lara's governor Falcon alleged corruption. No, the corruption charges mean that the regime faction around Maduro is prepared to play dirty to get rid of his opposition, and dirty here means illegality and violence and massive lies.
The fatherland salvo was in large part forced upon Maduro because of the idiotic and yet purposeful words the prior day of Jaua in his revenge seeking quest against Capriles for beating him in December elections. Jaua under pressure by his own chavista audience told them that it did not matter that they were out of toilet paper because now we have fatherland. That is right, besides saying that Capriles could f***k himself with a roll of missing toilet paper he told his audience that the fatherland of the revolution could not be measured against empty shelves. You can watch a video here if you doubt me (in Spanish, sorry). Certainly this P.R. disaster had to be recovered and Maduro who claimed that an opposition fascist and corrupt was ridiculing the notion of fatherland that Chavez left the country with.
In other words last week end we were told clearly that those who continue to oppose Maduro are traitors tot eh fatherland, fascists and corrupt, amen that Maduro and his people are the ones acting like fascist and corrupt by the mere way in which they proffer those accusations. The rest of the week has been a confirmation of this, from a cadena by Maduro to a pathetic scene on Globovision airwaves where a minster of Maduro attacked in an hysterical way governor Falcon insulting him of many things and fascists proffered several times. In any normal country a minister that behaves like Izarra is IMMEDIATELY fired but in Venezuela we wonder up to what point the hysterics were not planed to carry the point that the regime is about to pass on the offensive.
The escalation went as high as Maduro threatening the striking universities tomorrow if they dared march in protest. He went as far as singling out Leopoldo Lopez as the leader behind the university strike, as if he had such power. Of course an undaunted Lopez not only called all to go Saturday to protest, but went as far as telling Maduro to stop being such a coward.
It seems that the regime is starting to get really nervous. Maduro gets no respect from any quarter and we can genuinely wonder how can he rule for 5 more years when he is covered in such a pile of ridicule. Also, after what happened in Brazil the regime certainly understands that probably Venezuela is tinder that has yet to find its match. Something has to be done and in the current situation, with no dollars, with no will to announce the measures to be taken, with a protest that grows by the way around real grievances, from lack of toilet paper to the asphyxia of autonomous universities the regime must feel cornered enough to feel ready to use violence.
But Maduro has boxed himself. If he represses the protest tomorrow he will become an instant pariah world wide. If he does not repress he risks to have chavismo look for one who will get the job done. I guess we will find out soon if that renewed fascist posturing of the regime means business.
Friday, 28 June 2013
Thursday, 27 June 2013
Majoritarianism is not true democracy
A remarkable, for its simplicity and to the point article from The Economist. The core quote:
... this is a matter of rules and institutions to constrain a leader’s power and to allow the aggrieved to find redress. These should include a robust account of citizens’ basic rights, independent courts to enforce them and free media to monitor them. From a democratic perspective, these are the areas where Mr Erdogan has most seriously erred: not in introducing controversial or wrong-headed policies (that is his prerogative), but in capturing the courts, silencing media critics and attacking peaceful protesters. His talk of tinkering with the constitution to perpetuate his own rule, as both Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Russia’s Vladimir Putin did, is another warning sign.
And then you get a "zombie democracy". Venezuela was the first one and indeed when I look around waht I see are zombies.
... this is a matter of rules and institutions to constrain a leader’s power and to allow the aggrieved to find redress. These should include a robust account of citizens’ basic rights, independent courts to enforce them and free media to monitor them. From a democratic perspective, these are the areas where Mr Erdogan has most seriously erred: not in introducing controversial or wrong-headed policies (that is his prerogative), but in capturing the courts, silencing media critics and attacking peaceful protesters. His talk of tinkering with the constitution to perpetuate his own rule, as both Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Russia’s Vladimir Putin did, is another warning sign.
And then you get a "zombie democracy". Venezuela was the first one and indeed when I look around waht I see are zombies.
Wednesday, 26 June 2013
Maria Corina Machado victim of a Cuban character assassination technique (counts as XXI century fascism too)
Today the fascisto-communist regime of Venezuela (your pick!) has crossed a new line. Maria Corina Machado, noted Venezuelan National Assembly representative, former primary candidate, one of the main members of the opposition international outreach, and the one of the broken nose during her line of duty at the Nazional Assembly has had her private conversations taped, edited and passed as if it were a conspiracy phone call. Cuban G2 modus operandi.
The regime presented earlier today the "phone taping" as a proof that MCM was into some form of dark conspiracy, just another one of the fantastic ones presented daily in Venezuela, without a shred of evidence even when they claim to involve the purchase of a dozen and a half of war planes. Brouhaha for a while but the reply came back smashing tonight as MCM told us that in fact, the words in that conversation (which would have been badly wiretapped to begin with) were a illegal recording of a 2 hours conversation that she had in the library of German Carrera Damas, a noted historian.
That is right, the regime managed to bug the library of an elderly intellectual, something not too difficult to do, and took that private conversation, took words out of context and built up an alleged 2 minutes phone conversation that never occurred.
Why the regime would take such a risk today? To begin with, after such a fiasco no future "conspiracy conversation" will benefit of much credit now that we know what the regime is willing to lower itself. On this respect, outside of the idiotic chavista fringe, nobody will believe at face value any future recording. Also, the ones presenting that "conversation" not only probably discredited themselves utterly but may lose big in politics. One is harshly criticized Caracas-Libertador mayor, Jorge Rodriguez, who may have killed his reelection dreams (which I personally do not think he had as he was forced by Chavez to a job he did not want). The other is formerly appreciated journalist, Ernesto Villegas who has turned into the totally discredited information/propaganda minister from whom you may not even trust his watch for time of the day.
No, the point is elsewhere.
Now chavista officials, in the middle of a never ending succession war now that even their at home private conversations are not safe anymore (cell phone conversations are gone of the repertoire for conspiracy of any type). The more so that mayoral candidacies must be decided inside chavismo and the regime tries to avoid desperately primaries.
All the rest is inconsequential. MCM will come out the bigger person for her spirited defense and counter attack. Capriles has been enough attacked but is enough of the consensus leader that this will not scratch him (she supposedly complained about the lack of response on late April which not only she is not alone for that but that she voiced already). Guillermo Aveledo by now has a Teflon coat. And all appreciate the hard work she does in her role to blame her of a personal opinion. After all, contrary to chavismo, inside the opposition the debate is lively and primaries held when pertinent.
The home lesson is dramatic: from now on we ALL know that even our bedroom conversations are fair game for a regime that has lost any respect for individual rights.
Notes.
Jorge Rodriguez and Villegas can be sued. I hope MCM does follow through. When the regime changes she can have them fined heavily even though they are not corrupt rich.
Snowden is an idiot: bringing up Venezuela (among Ecuador, Russia and Cuba) as countries to protect him and favor his trips only shows that he is an ignorant, no matter how justified his crusade may be. To protect his right of free speech he uses countries where freedom of speech in under attack or nonexistent. thus, once again, Wikileakes et all are not about freedom, they are about finding ways to attack the US.
The regime presented earlier today the "phone taping" as a proof that MCM was into some form of dark conspiracy, just another one of the fantastic ones presented daily in Venezuela, without a shred of evidence even when they claim to involve the purchase of a dozen and a half of war planes. Brouhaha for a while but the reply came back smashing tonight as MCM told us that in fact, the words in that conversation (which would have been badly wiretapped to begin with) were a illegal recording of a 2 hours conversation that she had in the library of German Carrera Damas, a noted historian.
That is right, the regime managed to bug the library of an elderly intellectual, something not too difficult to do, and took that private conversation, took words out of context and built up an alleged 2 minutes phone conversation that never occurred.
Why the regime would take such a risk today? To begin with, after such a fiasco no future "conspiracy conversation" will benefit of much credit now that we know what the regime is willing to lower itself. On this respect, outside of the idiotic chavista fringe, nobody will believe at face value any future recording. Also, the ones presenting that "conversation" not only probably discredited themselves utterly but may lose big in politics. One is harshly criticized Caracas-Libertador mayor, Jorge Rodriguez, who may have killed his reelection dreams (which I personally do not think he had as he was forced by Chavez to a job he did not want). The other is formerly appreciated journalist, Ernesto Villegas who has turned into the totally discredited information/propaganda minister from whom you may not even trust his watch for time of the day.
No, the point is elsewhere.
Now chavista officials, in the middle of a never ending succession war now that even their at home private conversations are not safe anymore (cell phone conversations are gone of the repertoire for conspiracy of any type). The more so that mayoral candidacies must be decided inside chavismo and the regime tries to avoid desperately primaries.
All the rest is inconsequential. MCM will come out the bigger person for her spirited defense and counter attack. Capriles has been enough attacked but is enough of the consensus leader that this will not scratch him (she supposedly complained about the lack of response on late April which not only she is not alone for that but that she voiced already). Guillermo Aveledo by now has a Teflon coat. And all appreciate the hard work she does in her role to blame her of a personal opinion. After all, contrary to chavismo, inside the opposition the debate is lively and primaries held when pertinent.
The home lesson is dramatic: from now on we ALL know that even our bedroom conversations are fair game for a regime that has lost any respect for individual rights.
Notes.
Jorge Rodriguez and Villegas can be sued. I hope MCM does follow through. When the regime changes she can have them fined heavily even though they are not corrupt rich.
Snowden is an idiot: bringing up Venezuela (among Ecuador, Russia and Cuba) as countries to protect him and favor his trips only shows that he is an ignorant, no matter how justified his crusade may be. To protect his right of free speech he uses countries where freedom of speech in under attack or nonexistent. thus, once again, Wikileakes et all are not about freedom, they are about finding ways to attack the US.
El descenso de los Trabajos de Ascenso
No he escrito nada todavía sobre la crisis de la educación superior que atraviesa Venezuela estos días. Para empezar es la misma crisis que se vive desde hace una década, solo exacerbada por la inflación que padecemos todos. Ademas, los origines de la crisis pre-datan el chavismo. Las universidades autónomas no se reformaron cuando tuvieron chance de hacerlo. Ahora no importa si se reforman porque la inflación y la re-conducción automática de presupuesto han hecho fenecer los alegados privilegios de los cuales gozaban las universidades autónomas.
Ustedes tal vez no se recuerden bien pero los primeros gabinetes de Chávez fueron dominados por UCVistas. Pero pareciese que la derrota de Merentes a ser su rector decretó la muerte de la educación autónoma. No es que defienda a Merentes, para nada, él era unos de esos UCVistas en el gobierno que fueron a extender sus privilegios, no a reformarlos. Me explico con el ejemplo mas burdo de ellos, Maria Lourdes Urbaneja.
Esa mujer cuando fue ministro de sanidad de Hugo tenia entre sus tareas reconciliar el plan completo de seguro social dejado por Caldera, con la constitución de 1999. Algo que a la luz de hoy no se ha hecho, y menos se ha propuesto uno nuevo. Pues bien, en aquella época yo todavía miraba VTV y me acuerdo como si fuese ayer esa mujer decir que el plan de pensiones que iba a proponer el gobierno no se iba a aplicar a la UCV. Era sobreentendido que el plan del gobierno iba a ser mas chimbo que los planes existentes en la UCV. Hoy en día todos los pensionados están ladrando sea cual sea su antiguo sistema. El punto que quiero resaltar era la mentalidad de esos "profesores" UCVistas que no iban a renunciar a sus privilegios, por mas revolucionarios que sean. Y los no revolucionarios todavía pasaban agachaditos, felices que nada cambie con larobolución revolución.
Es por eso que el modelo educativo venezolano esta en crisis desde antes de Hugo y este lo agravó a niveles catastróficos, no solamente asfixiando las universidades que con todos sus problemas lograban todavía graduar profesionales valiosos, pero creando universidades bolivarianas piratas cuyos graduad@s nadie quiere contratar en el sector privado, no por la ideología, pero por la mediocridad.
No voy a enumerar los problemas del sistema venezolano ya que siendo yo producto del sistema francés y norteamericano tengo pocas simpatías por el credo de un país donde se dice que TOD@S tiene derecho a un titulo universitario, y lo mas gratis posible aunque no valga ni el papel donde se imprime el título. Amen de la titularidad del puesto casi del momento que se ingresa a la carrera.
Ningún país produce buenos profesionales donde la calidad tiene que ser diluida por la cantidad. Pero aparentemente eso no les preocupa a las familias de los graduad@s bolivarianos que nos dicen las encuestadoras no podemos razonar, y menos criticar, porque sus hijos tienen un título inútil. Es eso en parte lo que le da la fuerza al gobierno de aplicar su infame chantaje a las universidades autónomas, porque mientras mas baja el nivel de esas universidades, menos deslucen las bolivarianas. El chantaje es hecho aun mas fácil y descarado cuando muchos de los "profesores" chavistas de dichas universidades autónomas no tienen problemas en redondearse el sueldo con "consultorías" con el gobierno. Son mediocres y quieren por lo tanto que su lugar de trabajo sea mediocre para que ellos puedan mandar, ¡por fin! ¡Que se frieguen los buenos!
Si bien las universidades autónomas han cometido pecados esos son ya lejanos y los que dan la lucha hoy como la rectora Arocha no tienen que pagar por eso. Y menos los estudiantes, que no pueden ni siquiera tener acceso a librerías semi adecuadas para sus estudios, merecen el abuso del gobierno. Si eso no fuese razón suficiente para apoyar a esa gente, en visto de lo que escribo antes tenemos que entender que esta generación presionada es la que podrá hacer las reformas necesarias a la UCV una vez que derroten el pensamiento único de la mediocridad que les quiere imponer el régimen. ¿Hace falta mas argumento para salir a apoyarlos?
Lo que me induce a escribir hoy es algo que escuché de una de las profesoras en protesta. Aparentemente el gobierno quiere que los trabajos de ascenso sean presentados a los consejos comunales (¿y evaluados por?). No soy partidario del sistema de trabajos de ascenso como esta planteado en Venezuela, donde es un trabajito que hoy en día se puede hasta comprar, que garantiza un nuevo escalafón pero que no necesariamente castiga al flojo que se conforma con su escalafón. Hay mejores alternativas como vincular directamente el sueldo con la productividad académica en una revisión, digamos, trienal, que incluya baja de sueldo para los parasitos. Pero eso es otro asunto.
¿Como es posible que se le ocurra al gobierno mandar a revisar trabajos de ascenso por los consejos comunales, por mas piratas que sean los trabajos (sin mencionar la piratería de la mayoría de los consejos, puestos ahí para alcahuetear la corrupción)? Tengo dos objeciones que si suenan clasistas, me disculparán por adelantado; pero la verdad es la verdad.
Digamos que mi trabajo de ascenso sea sobre "je pense donc je suis" de Descartes. ¿Que carajo saben los consejos comunales de Yaracuy sobre Descartes? ¿Les importa? Claro que no. Lo que va a pasar es que ellos se van a rebelar y exigir trabajos de ascenso que les interese fuera de toda norma científica o intelectual. El resultado será mas mediocridad. Pronto será valido hacer un trabajo de ascenso sobre la planaridad de la tierra porque el jefe del consejo comunal al lado de la UNEY no cree que la tierra sea redonda. Los licenciados especialidad Lysenko pronto mandarán en las universidades.
Pero mas allá de la presentación de trabajos de ascenso a consejos comunales ¿por que? ¿que les da el derecho? ¿pagan impuestos? ¿financian las universidades directamente? ¿que desorden es eso? ¿porque el estado no asume su responsabilidad de educar a los consejos comunales para que por lo menos no despilfarren la plata que se les da? el gobierno tiene 14 años en ejercicio y lo que parece resultar de todo ese tiempo es una ignorancia comunal descomunal, peor que en 1998.......
Ya es tiempo que de que la MUD se dedique de frente a la defensa de la universidad autónoma, que se ponga al frente de la protesta. ¿O es que es mas importante las municipales que igual nos van a robar?
-------
Posdata.
La lectora Edith puso un comentario citando la propuesta del gobierno donde sí se lee que los consejos comunales recibirán y evaluarán los trabajos de ascenso.
En cuanto a un resumen de la situación universitaria Javier Corrales tiene uno excelente pero en inglés. Imagínense, si aquí nos cuesta entender, como les costará a los extranjeros!
Ustedes tal vez no se recuerden bien pero los primeros gabinetes de Chávez fueron dominados por UCVistas. Pero pareciese que la derrota de Merentes a ser su rector decretó la muerte de la educación autónoma. No es que defienda a Merentes, para nada, él era unos de esos UCVistas en el gobierno que fueron a extender sus privilegios, no a reformarlos. Me explico con el ejemplo mas burdo de ellos, Maria Lourdes Urbaneja.
Esa mujer cuando fue ministro de sanidad de Hugo tenia entre sus tareas reconciliar el plan completo de seguro social dejado por Caldera, con la constitución de 1999. Algo que a la luz de hoy no se ha hecho, y menos se ha propuesto uno nuevo. Pues bien, en aquella época yo todavía miraba VTV y me acuerdo como si fuese ayer esa mujer decir que el plan de pensiones que iba a proponer el gobierno no se iba a aplicar a la UCV. Era sobreentendido que el plan del gobierno iba a ser mas chimbo que los planes existentes en la UCV. Hoy en día todos los pensionados están ladrando sea cual sea su antiguo sistema. El punto que quiero resaltar era la mentalidad de esos "profesores" UCVistas que no iban a renunciar a sus privilegios, por mas revolucionarios que sean. Y los no revolucionarios todavía pasaban agachaditos, felices que nada cambie con la
Es por eso que el modelo educativo venezolano esta en crisis desde antes de Hugo y este lo agravó a niveles catastróficos, no solamente asfixiando las universidades que con todos sus problemas lograban todavía graduar profesionales valiosos, pero creando universidades bolivarianas piratas cuyos graduad@s nadie quiere contratar en el sector privado, no por la ideología, pero por la mediocridad.
No voy a enumerar los problemas del sistema venezolano ya que siendo yo producto del sistema francés y norteamericano tengo pocas simpatías por el credo de un país donde se dice que TOD@S tiene derecho a un titulo universitario, y lo mas gratis posible aunque no valga ni el papel donde se imprime el título. Amen de la titularidad del puesto casi del momento que se ingresa a la carrera.
Ningún país produce buenos profesionales donde la calidad tiene que ser diluida por la cantidad. Pero aparentemente eso no les preocupa a las familias de los graduad@s bolivarianos que nos dicen las encuestadoras no podemos razonar, y menos criticar, porque sus hijos tienen un título inútil. Es eso en parte lo que le da la fuerza al gobierno de aplicar su infame chantaje a las universidades autónomas, porque mientras mas baja el nivel de esas universidades, menos deslucen las bolivarianas. El chantaje es hecho aun mas fácil y descarado cuando muchos de los "profesores" chavistas de dichas universidades autónomas no tienen problemas en redondearse el sueldo con "consultorías" con el gobierno. Son mediocres y quieren por lo tanto que su lugar de trabajo sea mediocre para que ellos puedan mandar, ¡por fin! ¡Que se frieguen los buenos!
Si bien las universidades autónomas han cometido pecados esos son ya lejanos y los que dan la lucha hoy como la rectora Arocha no tienen que pagar por eso. Y menos los estudiantes, que no pueden ni siquiera tener acceso a librerías semi adecuadas para sus estudios, merecen el abuso del gobierno. Si eso no fuese razón suficiente para apoyar a esa gente, en visto de lo que escribo antes tenemos que entender que esta generación presionada es la que podrá hacer las reformas necesarias a la UCV una vez que derroten el pensamiento único de la mediocridad que les quiere imponer el régimen. ¿Hace falta mas argumento para salir a apoyarlos?
Lo que me induce a escribir hoy es algo que escuché de una de las profesoras en protesta. Aparentemente el gobierno quiere que los trabajos de ascenso sean presentados a los consejos comunales (¿y evaluados por?). No soy partidario del sistema de trabajos de ascenso como esta planteado en Venezuela, donde es un trabajito que hoy en día se puede hasta comprar, que garantiza un nuevo escalafón pero que no necesariamente castiga al flojo que se conforma con su escalafón. Hay mejores alternativas como vincular directamente el sueldo con la productividad académica en una revisión, digamos, trienal, que incluya baja de sueldo para los parasitos. Pero eso es otro asunto.
¿Como es posible que se le ocurra al gobierno mandar a revisar trabajos de ascenso por los consejos comunales, por mas piratas que sean los trabajos (sin mencionar la piratería de la mayoría de los consejos, puestos ahí para alcahuetear la corrupción)? Tengo dos objeciones que si suenan clasistas, me disculparán por adelantado; pero la verdad es la verdad.
Digamos que mi trabajo de ascenso sea sobre "je pense donc je suis" de Descartes. ¿Que carajo saben los consejos comunales de Yaracuy sobre Descartes? ¿Les importa? Claro que no. Lo que va a pasar es que ellos se van a rebelar y exigir trabajos de ascenso que les interese fuera de toda norma científica o intelectual. El resultado será mas mediocridad. Pronto será valido hacer un trabajo de ascenso sobre la planaridad de la tierra porque el jefe del consejo comunal al lado de la UNEY no cree que la tierra sea redonda. Los licenciados especialidad Lysenko pronto mandarán en las universidades.
Pero mas allá de la presentación de trabajos de ascenso a consejos comunales ¿por que? ¿que les da el derecho? ¿pagan impuestos? ¿financian las universidades directamente? ¿que desorden es eso? ¿porque el estado no asume su responsabilidad de educar a los consejos comunales para que por lo menos no despilfarren la plata que se les da? el gobierno tiene 14 años en ejercicio y lo que parece resultar de todo ese tiempo es una ignorancia comunal descomunal, peor que en 1998.......
Ya es tiempo que de que la MUD se dedique de frente a la defensa de la universidad autónoma, que se ponga al frente de la protesta. ¿O es que es mas importante las municipales que igual nos van a robar?
-------
Posdata.
La lectora Edith puso un comentario citando la propuesta del gobierno donde sí se lee que los consejos comunales recibirán y evaluarán los trabajos de ascenso.
En cuanto a un resumen de la situación universitaria Javier Corrales tiene uno excelente pero en inglés. Imagínense, si aquí nos cuesta entender, como les costará a los extranjeros!
DOMA doom
For my US friends! A day to rejoice, infamous DOMA has been killed by the Supreme Court. And states can now have valid marriage for all. Only about 30 something more states to go and you will catch up with France ;-)
Tuesday, 25 June 2013
Dreams of constitutional repression
That ever self serving pseudo panacea of our sub continent, calling for a constitutional assembly to solve problems that politicians have no resolve to deal with directly, is being invoked all around. After all, the brilliant example of Chavez who called for a constitutional assembly to solve Venezuelan problems is there for all: not only he did not solve any of his country problems, but he made them worse, and he certainly did solve the financial future of his relatives and friends, ending himself as a president for life.
These weeks we heard from different points a call for some form of constitutional assembly, and in all cases it comes from a group of people that are unable of unwilling to have their way and thus want to use the mechanism. Let's not be afraid of words here, what they all want really is a soft, legal repression, that will silence down those that are not allowing them to get their way.
Let's start with Brazil of Dilma Rousseff who has never being characterized by her creativity nor her own political following. She is calling for a constitutional revision process as the only way she can come up to quiet down the brewing revolt in her cities. That in ten years of PT rule through her and Lula they have not being able, or willing, to face the problems of Brazilian politics, even trying to benefit from them as the corruption "mensalao" case under Lula shows, is not something that she is very intent to apologize for. In fact, her latest deal, praised as democratic by many people who should know better, maybe be supported by a PT who finds in it a way to stop ruling as a coalition, something that, well, hindered some of the most extreme proposals that rest in their filing cabinets.
Less obvious but still along the lines is coming from the Bachelet campaign team who wants her back in office. They are trying to have people forget about the poor readiness of her administration in the earthquake that happened a few days before she left office. They think that a constitutional proposal is a good scheme. Hopefully in Chile there are a few minds that understand that even though the constitution is a legacy of Pinochet, changing it brutally is not necessarily the solution: one smart wit calls it a "lyrical coup".
In Colombia of course we have the other naked extreme: the FARC that uses a constitutional assembly as a way to pressure Santos to cave in their demands. This has little chance to fly because Colombia has changed her constitution not that long before Venezuela and the change has worked much better, no comparison, than the one in Venezuela. But the FARC knows that right now, as they are in a defensive position, not to call it cornered, their only chance to obtain an amnesty is by silencing those seeking redress for the crimes committed by the FARC. They thus put forward outrageous demands to have Santos cave in. They are of course pushed by Cuba and Venezuela who desperately need that second corner stone of an anti US league, next door to Panama. As such a constitutional assembly in Colombia would be nothing more than a repression of those intent on punishing the FARC for its crimes, just as the Venezuelan constitution of 1999 was a way to "forgive" the coup-mongers of 1992 who went from a life of violence to a life of obscene corruption.
Which brings us to Venezuela where election-stolen Capriles has finally admitted that going for a constitutional assembly may be the only way to get rid of the hyper corrupt regime issued of 1999. In fact, some even are suggesting that we could ask outright to a simple return to the 1961 constitution through a referendum.
Besides the many legal and electoral obstacles that such a proposal has in a Venezuela dominated by the mob, and worthy of several post of their own, this proposal of Capriles sounds like a little bit too little and too late. What he is doing, in part, is using the idea to silence (repress?) in his own camp those who demand more action from his part. Let's not forget that Diego Arria had made a new constitution his main, if only, plank for the 2012 primaries. Just as it was in 1999, a constitutional change is not going to solve the problems of the country who know include a wealthy mob that will sabotage any, ANY, regime that does not oblige them.
To all of these characters, and not wanting to sound pro US, I will remind them that the US has had the same Constitution in effect since 1789, duly amended through extensive processes that required quite a lot of discussion and compromise between the parties involved. The UK still does not have a constitution. France, for all of its apparent historical instability, had no constitution between 1870 and 1946 and the current one is effective since 1958. What is common among them (and other such countries)? That any constitution, or lack thereof, is only as good as the people who apply it.
That is why the current LatAm examples described above are simply ways for a political group to distract from the real work required in each and every country, in each and every reality. They are dreams of legal repression of the antagonistic sides (though in Venezuela at least Capriles has some valid points as he is dealing with the mob).
These weeks we heard from different points a call for some form of constitutional assembly, and in all cases it comes from a group of people that are unable of unwilling to have their way and thus want to use the mechanism. Let's not be afraid of words here, what they all want really is a soft, legal repression, that will silence down those that are not allowing them to get their way.
Let's start with Brazil of Dilma Rousseff who has never being characterized by her creativity nor her own political following. She is calling for a constitutional revision process as the only way she can come up to quiet down the brewing revolt in her cities. That in ten years of PT rule through her and Lula they have not being able, or willing, to face the problems of Brazilian politics, even trying to benefit from them as the corruption "mensalao" case under Lula shows, is not something that she is very intent to apologize for. In fact, her latest deal, praised as democratic by many people who should know better, maybe be supported by a PT who finds in it a way to stop ruling as a coalition, something that, well, hindered some of the most extreme proposals that rest in their filing cabinets.
Less obvious but still along the lines is coming from the Bachelet campaign team who wants her back in office. They are trying to have people forget about the poor readiness of her administration in the earthquake that happened a few days before she left office. They think that a constitutional proposal is a good scheme. Hopefully in Chile there are a few minds that understand that even though the constitution is a legacy of Pinochet, changing it brutally is not necessarily the solution: one smart wit calls it a "lyrical coup".
In Colombia of course we have the other naked extreme: the FARC that uses a constitutional assembly as a way to pressure Santos to cave in their demands. This has little chance to fly because Colombia has changed her constitution not that long before Venezuela and the change has worked much better, no comparison, than the one in Venezuela. But the FARC knows that right now, as they are in a defensive position, not to call it cornered, their only chance to obtain an amnesty is by silencing those seeking redress for the crimes committed by the FARC. They thus put forward outrageous demands to have Santos cave in. They are of course pushed by Cuba and Venezuela who desperately need that second corner stone of an anti US league, next door to Panama. As such a constitutional assembly in Colombia would be nothing more than a repression of those intent on punishing the FARC for its crimes, just as the Venezuelan constitution of 1999 was a way to "forgive" the coup-mongers of 1992 who went from a life of violence to a life of obscene corruption.
Which brings us to Venezuela where election-stolen Capriles has finally admitted that going for a constitutional assembly may be the only way to get rid of the hyper corrupt regime issued of 1999. In fact, some even are suggesting that we could ask outright to a simple return to the 1961 constitution through a referendum.
Besides the many legal and electoral obstacles that such a proposal has in a Venezuela dominated by the mob, and worthy of several post of their own, this proposal of Capriles sounds like a little bit too little and too late. What he is doing, in part, is using the idea to silence (repress?) in his own camp those who demand more action from his part. Let's not forget that Diego Arria had made a new constitution his main, if only, plank for the 2012 primaries. Just as it was in 1999, a constitutional change is not going to solve the problems of the country who know include a wealthy mob that will sabotage any, ANY, regime that does not oblige them.
To all of these characters, and not wanting to sound pro US, I will remind them that the US has had the same Constitution in effect since 1789, duly amended through extensive processes that required quite a lot of discussion and compromise between the parties involved. The UK still does not have a constitution. France, for all of its apparent historical instability, had no constitution between 1870 and 1946 and the current one is effective since 1958. What is common among them (and other such countries)? That any constitution, or lack thereof, is only as good as the people who apply it.
That is why the current LatAm examples described above are simply ways for a political group to distract from the real work required in each and every country, in each and every reality. They are dreams of legal repression of the antagonistic sides (though in Venezuela at least Capriles has some valid points as he is dealing with the mob).
Friday, 21 June 2013
Why there is no "latino american spring", and certainly not in Venezuela
When you watch all that had happened in Arabic countries and what happened in Turkey recently, amen of the diverse "take" groups from NewYork to Puerta del Sol, you may wonder why is it that in Latin America there is no such collective feel. After all, there is a list of candidates: Venezuela, Argentina, and Cuba at the very least. Not to mention that the tension exists such as the instability of certain countries can bear witness (Bolivia, Guatemala, and even Chile).
But the surprise has come from Brazil where suddenly Dilma Roussef finds herself in trouble proving that the direction of the country under Lula was plagued with corruption and crass materialism aiming strictly at "improving" access to goods to the downtrodden. Because that is what Lula did, bring stability at home through better material access and middle class increase while he was doing a Chavez outside, bringing in a World Cup, the Olympics and even trying for a permanent seat at the UN security council.
Certainly, it is infinitely commendable that Lula's administration raised in real terms the income of people, and sustainable levels apparently. But that was enough for him and public services in accordance to an emerging middle class and world pretensions was not a priority. Now Dilma is paying the price and Brazil could be looking right now for a Chavez like creep to fulfill promises that cannot be fulfilled but that will fool long enough the new middle class to grab power and keep it.
And yet in Venezuela nothing happens.
We have crippling inflation and serious, life threatening shortages.
The real campuses aflame while the chavista ones cow in shame, because faculty is underpaid and there is no means to ensure proper education. But chavista faculty get the same pay check while curiously having an uncanny ability to find "consulting" contracts with the regime to supplement handsomely their income. Chavista university students do not seem to be bothered by their poor quality education, all theoretical due to the lack of means, because, well, no matter what they will get a degree, as worthless and unmarketable as this one may be.
Politicians focus on December municipal elections that the CNE is sure to make fraudulent once again, at least in Caracas. We are bemused by this lack of bitching at the CNE...
And amen of insecurity, labor claims, corruption and assorted abuses that victimize us all.
There is no spring for us, we of the wretched country. We did have a spring in 2002 and 2003 but the world turned its back on us, thinking that we were just a spoiled middle class that was resistant to Chavez reforms. We all know what happened next.
Do not expect me to feel sad for Brazilians who are the main guilty party to our unraveling as a country when Lula, with the agreement of his opposition, started sending tankers of gasoline to Chavez early 2003. Whether you overthrow Dilma or suffer a massive repression, I prefer to worry about other people. After I saw how well you were doing a couple of months ago, you are way more spoiled than what we were in 2003.
And that is why we have no collective spring because we have proven ourselves to be perhaps the most selfish continent, where the glory of individual politicians seem more important than the fate of nations, from Ushuaia to Tijuana. Well, with a few rare exceptions like Costa Rica. That we enable that in our politicians goes a long way to explain that we could not care less, in all truth, about what happens next door.
But the surprise has come from Brazil where suddenly Dilma Roussef finds herself in trouble proving that the direction of the country under Lula was plagued with corruption and crass materialism aiming strictly at "improving" access to goods to the downtrodden. Because that is what Lula did, bring stability at home through better material access and middle class increase while he was doing a Chavez outside, bringing in a World Cup, the Olympics and even trying for a permanent seat at the UN security council.
Certainly, it is infinitely commendable that Lula's administration raised in real terms the income of people, and sustainable levels apparently. But that was enough for him and public services in accordance to an emerging middle class and world pretensions was not a priority. Now Dilma is paying the price and Brazil could be looking right now for a Chavez like creep to fulfill promises that cannot be fulfilled but that will fool long enough the new middle class to grab power and keep it.
And yet in Venezuela nothing happens.
We have crippling inflation and serious, life threatening shortages.
The real campuses aflame while the chavista ones cow in shame, because faculty is underpaid and there is no means to ensure proper education. But chavista faculty get the same pay check while curiously having an uncanny ability to find "consulting" contracts with the regime to supplement handsomely their income. Chavista university students do not seem to be bothered by their poor quality education, all theoretical due to the lack of means, because, well, no matter what they will get a degree, as worthless and unmarketable as this one may be.
Politicians focus on December municipal elections that the CNE is sure to make fraudulent once again, at least in Caracas. We are bemused by this lack of bitching at the CNE...
And amen of insecurity, labor claims, corruption and assorted abuses that victimize us all.
There is no spring for us, we of the wretched country. We did have a spring in 2002 and 2003 but the world turned its back on us, thinking that we were just a spoiled middle class that was resistant to Chavez reforms. We all know what happened next.
Do not expect me to feel sad for Brazilians who are the main guilty party to our unraveling as a country when Lula, with the agreement of his opposition, started sending tankers of gasoline to Chavez early 2003. Whether you overthrow Dilma or suffer a massive repression, I prefer to worry about other people. After I saw how well you were doing a couple of months ago, you are way more spoiled than what we were in 2003.
And that is why we have no collective spring because we have proven ourselves to be perhaps the most selfish continent, where the glory of individual politicians seem more important than the fate of nations, from Ushuaia to Tijuana. Well, with a few rare exceptions like Costa Rica. That we enable that in our politicians goes a long way to explain that we could not care less, in all truth, about what happens next door.
Not holding my breath over corruption
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socialist coruption |
A small business like mine has had to pay once to a SENIAT corrupt about 15K just to save a shipment unduly retained. It was paying that or losing the shipment. NOTE: the fine would have been more than the 15K, they usually ask between 50 and 80% of the fine so you feel better about yourself. The blackmail is based on abusive laws that allow the customs to punish you for a misfiled form, or even a mere typo. And yet the merchandise is there, you can always prove through CADIVI that you imported neither more nor less than what you intended to import, there is no fraud on the amounts or quality of the merchandise, just a clerical error along the way, an easy occurrence considering that you need to fill up dozens of forms. The system is stacked against you.
Thus, if you ask me, those 4 million represent at most a month of "work", and probably his share because if he had to pay off his accomplices he would not have kept the money in his home least he got robbed and then punished by the mafia. Then again it is possible he was set up and had just received the cash and was ready to distribute it to whomever it may concern. Still, it is not much money when I consider the many cases of customs abuse I have heard of.
But I digress. The real point here is that I do not believe that the regime is bound on any anti corruption crusade. There are two things at play in this story: the regime needs to throw the hoi polloi a bone, so it needs to make look that it is fighting corruption. But the regime also has a cash problem and needs to send a message that austerity also applies to the mafia and that they need to lower their percentages because they are exacerbating the asphyxia of the economy.
I could also add more cynically that there is not enough cash around and thus what we are seeing is a mere gang war to thin the ranks of those who have access to blackmail and other mafia practices.
Wednesday, 19 June 2013
Are there simple measures to stop provisionally Venezuela's slide into major recession?
I was thinking that after my post yesterday on how the regime has no clue as to what to do to boost exports, it would be fair for the readers of this blog to list what could be the bare, minimal measures that seen from ground zero could help Venezuelan producers to stay in business and perhaps increase production.
I must warn the readers that this is not a list about recovering the country: this one would be much longer and would require several years of work, and the end of the current "model". What I am listing below are simple measures that would bring back some good will, some desire to reactivate some production sectors and that would, for a couple of years, avoid further decline in the production of food stuff. In short, what I am proposing is what the regime could do to gain a couple of years until it settles its internal affairs and decide what it wants to do on the economy. Assuming of course that inside the regime there is a sector large enough that does not want to see the country turn into a Cuban style outright rationing of goods. If the internal balance of power is going the Saman way, more controls, more hard stance, ration cards are to be expected by the end of the year.
The basic problem of the regime is to get dollars so that some productive sectors can purchase raw materials and supplies to increase production of whatever can be increased inside Venezuela, considering the extensive damage that has been wrought on the industrial and agricultural sectors in the last decade. We are not talking expansion here, we are talking recovering the 100% capacity of production which is currently between 30 and 80% depending on the sectors (my estimations, there is no comprehensive evaluation that I know of, even Polar is not working 100% because they do not have enough raw material). The idea would be for the "pragmatic sector" of the regime to get more bang for the buck by producing some stuff locally rather than importing the finished goods (which does not please the corrupt trafficking gang but let's assume that the pragmatic sector of the regime can rein in their appetite for a couple of years).
The first measure is thus to create a dual exchange system (Miguel speaks of a possible return to the famous "permuta" of a SICAD on fluoride). I personally think that a dual exchange is best and simplest and slightly less corruption prone than SICAD or permuta. The 6,3 current exchange rate is pushed to 8 and reserved strictly for import of raw material and supplies for food and medicine. Everything else is sent to a fixed exchange that I would put at least at 12 to start with. Preferably 15 outright. Inflation would be pushed by another ten points but at this point, with monthly rates in the 6-8%, who cares really..... The economy would crunch fast but whoever can work may start working again and in 6 month we could "grow" again.
This working devaluation needs to be compensated for the chavista masses and the regime needs money to subsidize a reduced social program that includes only Mercal and Barrio Adentro. Where to find the money for that? In addition to the dollars already needed for the devaluation described above so that its purpose can be accomplished.
Gas price hike is one way. To avoid major upheaval, it should be calculated such as to bring in, say, and extra 500 million a month by reducing gas consumption to at least stop the current gas imports bleed. The impact on inflation would be rather minor considering the current situation.
Explain to allies that they will need to tighten up their belt. That is, out of Petrocaribe and Cuba, another 300 million a month must be obtained.
Stop all weapons purchases whatsoever for at least 2 years, postpone any current contract execution for at least two years. Limit infrastructure purchases for one year strictly to what is needed to recover current communication ways (no more trains, no more highway from Portugal, no nothing, just start filling up holes in highway and fix up bridges and the like). Have Mision Vivienda, pared down, and sent to local constructors to build cheap homes, who can do it cheaper in dollars than the idiots of the sino-russian mafia involved. There is at least another 200 million there.
All in all the regime needs to find an extra billion dollar a month to import supplies for folks like me so we can produce food again. Not to become self sufficient but at least to stop the constant increase in food import. It is quite possible, it is quite feasible but it involves the will to put a stop to the mafia easy contracts.....
But that is not all: we need also real incentives for us, producers, to risk again our assets and health to produce in this hell.
There is a real need to render flexible price controls so as to adjust them to inflation fast. Inflation can only be curbed when production reaches reasonable levels again so that some competition will start. There is no other way around. Since we have inflation already anyway, might as well harvest its benefits.
The regime not only needs to declare the provisional end of expropriation for at least 2 years, but should have the guts to recognize that the expropriations that led nowhere should be returned to their original owners. That is, AgroIsleña should be returned to their old owners if the regime intends agricultural production to return. And lands that have been expropriated without results should also be returned, through some form of ad hoc commission. That commission may not do shit but at least it will reassure those who still have productive land.
I can vouch myself on at least two sectors that can recover fast: poultry and coffee.
An adequate supply to poultry producers can restore Venezuelan self sufficiency in a mere year. If the price of chicken is too high for "el pueblo" the regime needs only to buy, say, 30% of the production and resell at specific Mercal programs at a lower price. Even that 30% subsidized would be cheaper for the regime than buying frozen chicken from Brazil.
If coffee prices are freed for good, I can assure you that within three years the Venezuelan production could recover enough to satisfy the market and perhaps even consider some small exports. In the first year the illegal shipments to Colombia stop, and in three years the existing deteriorated coffee farms can be recovered through some small credits and be put to produce again. It is THAT simple. But that would mean stopping buying coffee from Nicaragua, yet another mafia sure to bitch.....
Some other sectors like dairy will take longer to recover because it takes time to rebuild the cattle population. Grain production will not be rapid because too many lands must be recovered after improper expropriations, and we may simply not have enough farmers to get the job done since those that have been chased from the countryside through expropriations may not be willing to come back. Also that recovery is also tied in large part to personal security of agriculture people as well as repairing access roads, etc... But some sectors, like the ones I mentioned, can have a significant recovery in three years or less, if the regime let's them work.
You will observe that the measures offered are not drastic, do not even question the current model as they can be presented as a transition and do not preclude the regime to intervene again in production later with a "renovated model" maybe based on more cooperation while "el pueblo" is led to think that the government calls all the shots. You will also observe that what I propose does not promote new investments, just a refurbishing of what is already in place and that any positive effect would be seen over two to four years and then nothing more. But we need to start somewhere since nobody in his right mind will invest his or her own money in Venezuela today.
Yet, I am afraid that even such a simple plan is too much for the regime at this point who prefers to buy a highway from a Portuguese company rather than accept that local builders may be able to do it for cheaper. In that regard chavismo is alive and well and keeps driving us to the ground. Note: Portugal signed even though I am sure they know we are bankrupt and that the regime may not last much longer. At least the coming government can be sued for breach of contract and Portugal will get something anyway. So we are not done paying for the hubris of Chavez and his heirs.....
I must warn the readers that this is not a list about recovering the country: this one would be much longer and would require several years of work, and the end of the current "model". What I am listing below are simple measures that would bring back some good will, some desire to reactivate some production sectors and that would, for a couple of years, avoid further decline in the production of food stuff. In short, what I am proposing is what the regime could do to gain a couple of years until it settles its internal affairs and decide what it wants to do on the economy. Assuming of course that inside the regime there is a sector large enough that does not want to see the country turn into a Cuban style outright rationing of goods. If the internal balance of power is going the Saman way, more controls, more hard stance, ration cards are to be expected by the end of the year.
The basic problem of the regime is to get dollars so that some productive sectors can purchase raw materials and supplies to increase production of whatever can be increased inside Venezuela, considering the extensive damage that has been wrought on the industrial and agricultural sectors in the last decade. We are not talking expansion here, we are talking recovering the 100% capacity of production which is currently between 30 and 80% depending on the sectors (my estimations, there is no comprehensive evaluation that I know of, even Polar is not working 100% because they do not have enough raw material). The idea would be for the "pragmatic sector" of the regime to get more bang for the buck by producing some stuff locally rather than importing the finished goods (which does not please the corrupt trafficking gang but let's assume that the pragmatic sector of the regime can rein in their appetite for a couple of years).
The first measure is thus to create a dual exchange system (Miguel speaks of a possible return to the famous "permuta" of a SICAD on fluoride). I personally think that a dual exchange is best and simplest and slightly less corruption prone than SICAD or permuta. The 6,3 current exchange rate is pushed to 8 and reserved strictly for import of raw material and supplies for food and medicine. Everything else is sent to a fixed exchange that I would put at least at 12 to start with. Preferably 15 outright. Inflation would be pushed by another ten points but at this point, with monthly rates in the 6-8%, who cares really..... The economy would crunch fast but whoever can work may start working again and in 6 month we could "grow" again.
This working devaluation needs to be compensated for the chavista masses and the regime needs money to subsidize a reduced social program that includes only Mercal and Barrio Adentro. Where to find the money for that? In addition to the dollars already needed for the devaluation described above so that its purpose can be accomplished.
Gas price hike is one way. To avoid major upheaval, it should be calculated such as to bring in, say, and extra 500 million a month by reducing gas consumption to at least stop the current gas imports bleed. The impact on inflation would be rather minor considering the current situation.
Explain to allies that they will need to tighten up their belt. That is, out of Petrocaribe and Cuba, another 300 million a month must be obtained.
Stop all weapons purchases whatsoever for at least 2 years, postpone any current contract execution for at least two years. Limit infrastructure purchases for one year strictly to what is needed to recover current communication ways (no more trains, no more highway from Portugal, no nothing, just start filling up holes in highway and fix up bridges and the like). Have Mision Vivienda, pared down, and sent to local constructors to build cheap homes, who can do it cheaper in dollars than the idiots of the sino-russian mafia involved. There is at least another 200 million there.
All in all the regime needs to find an extra billion dollar a month to import supplies for folks like me so we can produce food again. Not to become self sufficient but at least to stop the constant increase in food import. It is quite possible, it is quite feasible but it involves the will to put a stop to the mafia easy contracts.....
But that is not all: we need also real incentives for us, producers, to risk again our assets and health to produce in this hell.
There is a real need to render flexible price controls so as to adjust them to inflation fast. Inflation can only be curbed when production reaches reasonable levels again so that some competition will start. There is no other way around. Since we have inflation already anyway, might as well harvest its benefits.
The regime not only needs to declare the provisional end of expropriation for at least 2 years, but should have the guts to recognize that the expropriations that led nowhere should be returned to their original owners. That is, AgroIsleña should be returned to their old owners if the regime intends agricultural production to return. And lands that have been expropriated without results should also be returned, through some form of ad hoc commission. That commission may not do shit but at least it will reassure those who still have productive land.
I can vouch myself on at least two sectors that can recover fast: poultry and coffee.
An adequate supply to poultry producers can restore Venezuelan self sufficiency in a mere year. If the price of chicken is too high for "el pueblo" the regime needs only to buy, say, 30% of the production and resell at specific Mercal programs at a lower price. Even that 30% subsidized would be cheaper for the regime than buying frozen chicken from Brazil.
If coffee prices are freed for good, I can assure you that within three years the Venezuelan production could recover enough to satisfy the market and perhaps even consider some small exports. In the first year the illegal shipments to Colombia stop, and in three years the existing deteriorated coffee farms can be recovered through some small credits and be put to produce again. It is THAT simple. But that would mean stopping buying coffee from Nicaragua, yet another mafia sure to bitch.....
Some other sectors like dairy will take longer to recover because it takes time to rebuild the cattle population. Grain production will not be rapid because too many lands must be recovered after improper expropriations, and we may simply not have enough farmers to get the job done since those that have been chased from the countryside through expropriations may not be willing to come back. Also that recovery is also tied in large part to personal security of agriculture people as well as repairing access roads, etc... But some sectors, like the ones I mentioned, can have a significant recovery in three years or less, if the regime let's them work.
You will observe that the measures offered are not drastic, do not even question the current model as they can be presented as a transition and do not preclude the regime to intervene again in production later with a "renovated model" maybe based on more cooperation while "el pueblo" is led to think that the government calls all the shots. You will also observe that what I propose does not promote new investments, just a refurbishing of what is already in place and that any positive effect would be seen over two to four years and then nothing more. But we need to start somewhere since nobody in his right mind will invest his or her own money in Venezuela today.
Yet, I am afraid that even such a simple plan is too much for the regime at this point who prefers to buy a highway from a Portuguese company rather than accept that local builders may be able to do it for cheaper. In that regard chavismo is alive and well and keeps driving us to the ground. Note: Portugal signed even though I am sure they know we are bankrupt and that the regime may not last much longer. At least the coming government can be sued for breach of contract and Portugal will get something anyway. So we are not done paying for the hubris of Chavez and his heirs.....
Tuesday, 18 June 2013
Please! Export something! Anything!

The rest of the entry is under no real name to protect not only the participants, clients of mine, but also the participating officers who could get in trouble if some folks in the regime would hear them admitting some of the flaws of the "proceso".
The setting is in and important branch of the government that shall remain nameless (you know, at the level of ministry, the central bank or the nazional assembly). The motive is that the regime needs to foster imports. The guests (summoned to the meeting actually) are some of the guys that did export stuff at some point, under Chavez, besides oil or oil derived stuff.
The regime representatives startled the audience by saying stuff such as "the government needs foreign currency sources outside of oil". And "how come that most of you stopped exporting by 2005?" (1). Paraphrasing, of course, since I was not there.
Then they asked how they could help to increase exports. Though specifying that exports could only proceed once the local market is duly supplied, as "this is a social economy" (2).
Attendants were well behaved but could not help themselves when mere simple facts sounded almost offensive for the officials.
For example one of them who still exports on occasion (that person produces a "specialty" and thus still can send an occasional shipment). S/he said that there is a need to fulfill around 70 steps and requirements with the government until eventually they were allowed to export (3- and see -1-)
Others pointed out that to produce you needed to be able to import the raw material and tools needed to produce in Venezuela. One pointed out that the permits for importing specific spare parts for his/her machinery were repeatedly refused and thus production could not increase (4).
All attendees agreed on one thing: "we are more than willing to produce enough to be able to export, but for that we should be allowed to produce first".
Apparently the attending officers looked shocked..... Amen of their apparent inability to understand what was told to them (5).
It is to be noted that things such as price controls were not brought up since after all it is for export, but other stuff were brought up such as Venezuela being quite behind in international standards of norms and quality to be immediately competitive in foreign markets as the situation here blocked many of the industrial upgrading that other economies have experienced in the last decade.
All ended relatively well, the attendees "getting" that the regime is finally starting to be concerned, though no hint about the officials attending on their ability to obtain the changes required.
Now, my comments for thus that do not understand this post:
1- Currency control was established in January 2003 and became sort of operative a few months after. The problem with such controls is that when you export and are paid in foreign currency you are obliged to give the amount of the bill in foreign currency to the regime which gives them to you back in VEB. Since one of the aims of currency exchange control was to overvalue the VEB so that imports of food and goods would be cheaper (indirect subsidy), you can realize that within months exporters stopped making money. Besides, it became clear that importing and reselling what you used to produce was a better deal. By 2005 the exports of Venezuela experienced a sensible to dramatic drop according to the few sectors exporting, which were rather small to begin with.
What is remarkable here is that the regime in the last ten years KNOWS that fact but seems NOT TO UNDERSTAND it.
2- Social economy means nothing. After ten years of currency control and socialist talk, the public officials have been so brain washed that there are things they repeat without realizing that it is neither the audience, or that they make no sense at this level. There is not such a thing as self criticism inside chavismo, just a desperate attempt at reaching for straws so as to keep doing things as usual with a little bit of tweaking only. It is impressive to see that in their subconscious these officials bought hook, bait and sink the Chavez speech that Venezuela could be an autarky of sorts. They have a hard time to grasp that to produce ANYTHING in the world today you do require stuff from outside of the country. Amen of their own contradiction that the local market should be supplied first before exporting when they are the ones that ruined the local production by importing stuff for electoral purposes.....
3- The paperwork for importations through CADIVI requires anywhere from 20 to 40 steps BEFORE being able to place the order, and then at least a dozen more steps to pay your provider once you received the goods. So I can imagine what exports would be when in addition you need to prove that you will not deprive the country of goods, that you are indeed exporting "surplus". The bureaucracy to import or export has gotten out of hand and this week we learned that it is going to get worse. Now, business will have to declare that all of their workers are fulfilling their military recruiting duty otherwise the said business cannot obtain "solvencia laboral" a key paper for CADIVI. That means at the very least 3 more steps since 1) you need to demand certificates from your workers, 2) you need to submit those tot he army and 3) the army will have to send someone to do an "inspection" in situ before granting the paperwork.
4- In their desperate need to reduce foreign currency demands the regime does a lot of silly things. For example they are denying CADIVI dollars for spare parts. Or for test kits (one of my own problems). They only give for raw materials, food and "equipment". which they do not give really, but at least they pretend. Apparently they do not understand that certain processes require sophisticated maintenance that require specific spare parts worth mucho dollars. They are truly primitive...
5- Again, I must come back on neo totalitarian consequences on thought. The regime has been so staunch on its "principles" for so long that they are unable to understand that they need to change their system if they want production to increase. The situation is dire enough that they understand some changes are necessary but they are simply unable to realize that they need to change it all. It is worse than unwilling, they are unable, sort of brain dead. That is what fascismocommie outlook does to your neurons.
Monday, 17 June 2013
Assessing the non-assessable (word?)
I am having a hard time to return to regular blogging. One of the reasons is what to write about. Certainly themes are abundant but the big problem here is what for? Do I have at this time still to write over and over about why chavismo is bad? That ship has sailed, all know about that, they just have decided to put up with it for a variety of reasons. Thus, as some still do in other blogs, covering the day to day events in Venezuela as if we were just a quirky country is in my view a waste of time.
I suppose having come out long ago that this regime had become a dictatorship in 2010 when the will of the people was mocked at the last parliamentary elections has its advantages. First, clarity. No need to pretend, no need to make excuses for either the regime or the opposition occasional ill advised choices. That the regime veered into a neo-fascist ersatz as Chavez got sick and died is simply a logical continuation. Thus now there is really the need only to write about what illustrates the fascist nature of the regime: the rest is merely material anecdotes, far away of what truly matters, at least for me.
Having painted myself in that corner, and enjoying it in a perverse fashion, there is still the need to deal with the writing bug inside. Away from regular blogging for almost two months, starting to recover from minor ailments, it is time to go back and decide what to do from now on with the blog. I will, for example, change the format for a simpler, to the core format. So this is probably one of the last times you will see the background that has been so distinctive of this blog to the point that I was not able to change it... But times have changed, now it is a resistance against a neo fascist narco state and boxes, and colors, and stuff are not appropriate anymore to the gravity of the situation.
Thus, before entering in earnest in a new phase of this blog let's have an entry as brief as possible trying to make sense a little bit on where is the country at today.
First, the premises that existed two months ago are still there. The post Chavez regime is a difficult coalition between radicals, corrupt bureaucrats, narco trafficking military and the like, to which we learned recently that even the Russian mafia is involved more and more. Fascist regimes are always led by what are nothing more than mobsters, so there is no surprise at the turn things have taken since Chavez left the scene: at least Chavez was egotistic enough and thought himself enough of a leftist to hide his corruption under a leftist ideology. The thin varnish has peeled.
The opposition is aware of this, that in front of them they have killers. That accounts for a lot in its inability to offer a true challenge to the electoral fraud of last April. The whole country now thinks there has been a fraud. The difference is that many approve of it. A mafia never gives up power in a good way, unless there is no way it can hold to it anymore, and still, they tend to grasp until the last minute. Capriles may have gotten as much as 55% last April but that is not enough. Between those who really not care, and those who for the first time switched, there is too large a chunk of people that voted for him but are certainly not yet ready to expose their life to have him become president. The MUD and Capriles know that: there are more people willing to kill them than to defend them. The time for violence has not come yet. Not that fascist regimes are overturned through internal violence at any rate: they are either ousted from outside or they collapse. Such an eventual collapse may be what the opposition has opted for which leaves poor Capriles left out to dry.
The question becomes thus how fast the regime is collapsing. I think it is, but I am also afraid that it may take longer than what the opposition hopes, no matter what dire economic disaster is lurking for the next months. One thing is certain, it is that the succession wars are far from over and that everyday the radicals seem to score a point while the military bolibourgeois corrupted wing also scores one. Maduro, in the middle, looks more and more helpless. Such as spectacle distracts the masses from everyday concerns and helps the regime to survive longer than it should.
The radicals seem able to stop any economic change. They remain truly oblivious of the catastrophic consequences of their policies. Since last December the regime has been postponing any real economic decision, satisfying itself with a devaluation that was not enough, that was not accompanied with measure to avoid further degradation. As such inflation reached 6% last May and there is speculation that June may bring us 8%. The only response to this is to bring back one of the worst radicals in the regime, one that had been disgraced by Chavez himself. Thus Eduardo Saman is back at the agency that controls prices, proving that in front of the price debacle the only thing the regime can think of is yet more controls, putting the blame anywhere else but their obviously failed policies of the last decade. Giving a new meaning to slow learner, I suppose.
On the other hand, the more pragmatic wing, the one that wonders if the country will be able to import enough food to feed its base in a not so distant future keeps trying to engage the private sector. Many of my clients have been called to "mesas de trabajo" where supposedly they were to expose what they need to produce more and the regime would try to oblige. My clients report all the same, no matter where they attend: the regime is simply unable to understand the mess they are in, are unable to connect the dots as to why production keeps sinking and are trying desperately to find other solutions than the obvious ones: spending control, real devaluation accompanied with easier access to foreign currency through dual change if necessary, more flexibility in the labor market. In all fairness it is not that they cannot understand the reasons why productivity is so low, it is more that they are unable to make a U-turn. Deers in headlights.
And thus it all comes back to the internal power struggle where Diosdado Cabello looks more like the Schrodinger cat than anything else. His recent visit to Cuba, picture with Fidel included, something he had avoided during the Chavez tenure, is interpreted on all extremes: Fidel wants to negotiate with him, or Fidel wants to silence him personally. There is no way to know for sure whether Cabello is winning, though I tend to think he is slowly edging Maduro out, or at least forcing him to follow his lead.
It is under this struggle for power and the need to gain a desperate legitimacy that we must understand moments like the release of judge Afiuni. Or why Maduro, a Sai Baba follower and commie atheist is so keen on meeting with Pope Francis before the opposition does.
So there we are. Keep expecting irregular postings but be assured that I will be there when it is important.
I suppose having come out long ago that this regime had become a dictatorship in 2010 when the will of the people was mocked at the last parliamentary elections has its advantages. First, clarity. No need to pretend, no need to make excuses for either the regime or the opposition occasional ill advised choices. That the regime veered into a neo-fascist ersatz as Chavez got sick and died is simply a logical continuation. Thus now there is really the need only to write about what illustrates the fascist nature of the regime: the rest is merely material anecdotes, far away of what truly matters, at least for me.
Having painted myself in that corner, and enjoying it in a perverse fashion, there is still the need to deal with the writing bug inside. Away from regular blogging for almost two months, starting to recover from minor ailments, it is time to go back and decide what to do from now on with the blog. I will, for example, change the format for a simpler, to the core format. So this is probably one of the last times you will see the background that has been so distinctive of this blog to the point that I was not able to change it... But times have changed, now it is a resistance against a neo fascist narco state and boxes, and colors, and stuff are not appropriate anymore to the gravity of the situation.
Thus, before entering in earnest in a new phase of this blog let's have an entry as brief as possible trying to make sense a little bit on where is the country at today.
First, the premises that existed two months ago are still there. The post Chavez regime is a difficult coalition between radicals, corrupt bureaucrats, narco trafficking military and the like, to which we learned recently that even the Russian mafia is involved more and more. Fascist regimes are always led by what are nothing more than mobsters, so there is no surprise at the turn things have taken since Chavez left the scene: at least Chavez was egotistic enough and thought himself enough of a leftist to hide his corruption under a leftist ideology. The thin varnish has peeled.
The opposition is aware of this, that in front of them they have killers. That accounts for a lot in its inability to offer a true challenge to the electoral fraud of last April. The whole country now thinks there has been a fraud. The difference is that many approve of it. A mafia never gives up power in a good way, unless there is no way it can hold to it anymore, and still, they tend to grasp until the last minute. Capriles may have gotten as much as 55% last April but that is not enough. Between those who really not care, and those who for the first time switched, there is too large a chunk of people that voted for him but are certainly not yet ready to expose their life to have him become president. The MUD and Capriles know that: there are more people willing to kill them than to defend them. The time for violence has not come yet. Not that fascist regimes are overturned through internal violence at any rate: they are either ousted from outside or they collapse. Such an eventual collapse may be what the opposition has opted for which leaves poor Capriles left out to dry.
The question becomes thus how fast the regime is collapsing. I think it is, but I am also afraid that it may take longer than what the opposition hopes, no matter what dire economic disaster is lurking for the next months. One thing is certain, it is that the succession wars are far from over and that everyday the radicals seem to score a point while the military bolibourgeois corrupted wing also scores one. Maduro, in the middle, looks more and more helpless. Such as spectacle distracts the masses from everyday concerns and helps the regime to survive longer than it should.
The radicals seem able to stop any economic change. They remain truly oblivious of the catastrophic consequences of their policies. Since last December the regime has been postponing any real economic decision, satisfying itself with a devaluation that was not enough, that was not accompanied with measure to avoid further degradation. As such inflation reached 6% last May and there is speculation that June may bring us 8%. The only response to this is to bring back one of the worst radicals in the regime, one that had been disgraced by Chavez himself. Thus Eduardo Saman is back at the agency that controls prices, proving that in front of the price debacle the only thing the regime can think of is yet more controls, putting the blame anywhere else but their obviously failed policies of the last decade. Giving a new meaning to slow learner, I suppose.
On the other hand, the more pragmatic wing, the one that wonders if the country will be able to import enough food to feed its base in a not so distant future keeps trying to engage the private sector. Many of my clients have been called to "mesas de trabajo" where supposedly they were to expose what they need to produce more and the regime would try to oblige. My clients report all the same, no matter where they attend: the regime is simply unable to understand the mess they are in, are unable to connect the dots as to why production keeps sinking and are trying desperately to find other solutions than the obvious ones: spending control, real devaluation accompanied with easier access to foreign currency through dual change if necessary, more flexibility in the labor market. In all fairness it is not that they cannot understand the reasons why productivity is so low, it is more that they are unable to make a U-turn. Deers in headlights.
And thus it all comes back to the internal power struggle where Diosdado Cabello looks more like the Schrodinger cat than anything else. His recent visit to Cuba, picture with Fidel included, something he had avoided during the Chavez tenure, is interpreted on all extremes: Fidel wants to negotiate with him, or Fidel wants to silence him personally. There is no way to know for sure whether Cabello is winning, though I tend to think he is slowly edging Maduro out, or at least forcing him to follow his lead.
It is under this struggle for power and the need to gain a desperate legitimacy that we must understand moments like the release of judge Afiuni. Or why Maduro, a Sai Baba follower and commie atheist is so keen on meeting with Pope Francis before the opposition does.
So there we are. Keep expecting irregular postings but be assured that I will be there when it is important.
Monday, 10 June 2013
Erdogan, Assad and Aung San Suu Kyi in Caracas
UPDATED
The news these days offer many a temptation to draw cheap parallelisms to Venezuela situation. But those in the title of this entry are far from being a parallel though they could help explain some of the "aspects" of the Venezuelan current debacle.
Erdogan
Comparing what is happening at Taksim square these days with an Arab spring is rather ridiculous, and embarrassing for Erdogan, the questioned Turkish prime minister cum wanna-be strong man, pretending to be a model for the newly freed states. After all, Erdogan has been duly elected in elections that were at the very least freer than those in Venezuela and Turkey economy has boomed for the last decade, with a real economic boom where production increased in real numbers.
What happens today in Turkey is an actual society choice, of people genuinely tired of progressive religious encroachment, decrease in civil liberties and the like even though the leaders claim to do it all with the aim of joining the democratic European Union. They are now exposed for what they really were: your average conservative that suddenly thinks it has it made and power for ever is a possibility. Unfortunately for democracy for every Bush there is an Obama (just as for every Carter there is a Reagan). Turkey not being yet a solid democracy, with its secular implications, we end up in Taksim square.
I suppose that if chavistas were better educated they could have looked at Erdogan as a possible model. After all he won election after election, had a popular hue even if religious in nature, managed to have self censorship of the press, and was able to force slow but regular change in Turkish society without it noticing it quite, until now. But the Venezuelan "boom" of Chavez was a mere distribution of cash, not an increase in production and now the economy is capsizing. Chavez never was a model except for its methods to ensure that gangs of thugs seize and retain power while killing democracy with its own weapons. We did have a Taksim of sorts with Plaza Altamira in 2002-2003 but this is over as the reality of Venezuelan society caught up with us: we are not a fighting people, we were never democrats and never really aspired to become such, much preferring whomever promised the best "free gifts" from the state. Elections may be stolen, but in the end we do not seem to care as long as we seem to be getting our share of the loot.
Aung San Suu Kyi
The Burma heroine may well finally reach her goal to become Burma next president in 2015. There is still a need to change the constitution there, and for the military to accept that change is now unavoidable. She will have had to wait over twenty years, a nakedly stolen election triumph, who knows how many years in house arrest but in 2015 she will either be president of Burma or whoever wins will have been approved by her.
Is this the fate of Capriles? Does he have to wait 20 years until chavismo eventually let's him reach office?
The big difference here is that ASSK had always a majority of the people with her, and a combative one that on occasion was not afraid to take risks, such as a very few years ago when Buddhists monks themselves almost made it. Poor Capriles barely crossed the 50% line this time around and he cannot hope that the chavistas who for the first time switched their vote will also go down to the streets to defend his victory. This is too much to ask, too fast for them.
What is sadder is that even among the long time opposition voters, many think that tweeter is the way to go to unseat chavismo and they are certainly not ready to suffer personally for that goal. Capriles may face a few more years in the wilderness and if like ASSK he did suffer some unfair and illegal jail time, he also has more people trying to replace him at the head, amen of the "traitors" pretending to be with the opposition but only too willing to accommodate themselves with a few more years of chavismo. And if it were not for the looming economic debacle we may be looking at a decade more of chavismo at least.
Assad
Considering Assad lesson for us is a rather grim prospect. Even if we do not need to be afraid of such a crude and cruel civil war it remains that the chavistas in place are only too willing to take down the economy along their own descent. They are actually doing it, ruining the country in their last grasp at stealing whatever is left to steal. Thuggocracy has never been as observable these days than it has been in the last decade. We could also observe that not tending to the infrastructures of the country for the last decade has some portions of Venezuela look like bombed out areas of Syria.....
Syria cannot be a parallel case for a future scenario in Venezuela. What is going on in Syria is really a religious war complicated by the fact that many religions reside there. Still, the idea that a fanatic group, afraid to lose its privileges, could be a way to retain power is not something that escapes the regime's plans. We could say that the attempt at creating a Chavez cult is a way to introduce something akin to a religion so as to excuse the immobility of society, becoming the reason why the desecrated opposition should never reach power no matter what its numbers may be. What protects us from a cruel civil war like in Syria is that we are too hedonistic and materialistic a society to have enough people fight it out to the bitter end. But we may well still get some form of civil war when people finally start realizing that they have been had by a mafia unwilling to share the loot. Then it will be fanatics versus malcontents, a strange mix for a civil war.
------------------
Update
As I was typing this entry last night Erdogan decided to clear up Taksim square, and apparently he is about to do the same with Gezi park even though it was clear that the Taksim group was more political than Gezi one, more concerned with "environmental" matters.
Thus we need to remove once and for all the democratic label to Erdogan and his cronies, as he becomes a duplicitous liar, promising one day to dialogue with the Gezi occupants, only to gas them in full a few hours later. Very Chavez like, democracy to reach power, and then bye-bye to democracy.
The news these days offer many a temptation to draw cheap parallelisms to Venezuela situation. But those in the title of this entry are far from being a parallel though they could help explain some of the "aspects" of the Venezuelan current debacle.
Erdogan
Comparing what is happening at Taksim square these days with an Arab spring is rather ridiculous, and embarrassing for Erdogan, the questioned Turkish prime minister cum wanna-be strong man, pretending to be a model for the newly freed states. After all, Erdogan has been duly elected in elections that were at the very least freer than those in Venezuela and Turkey economy has boomed for the last decade, with a real economic boom where production increased in real numbers.
What happens today in Turkey is an actual society choice, of people genuinely tired of progressive religious encroachment, decrease in civil liberties and the like even though the leaders claim to do it all with the aim of joining the democratic European Union. They are now exposed for what they really were: your average conservative that suddenly thinks it has it made and power for ever is a possibility. Unfortunately for democracy for every Bush there is an Obama (just as for every Carter there is a Reagan). Turkey not being yet a solid democracy, with its secular implications, we end up in Taksim square.
I suppose that if chavistas were better educated they could have looked at Erdogan as a possible model. After all he won election after election, had a popular hue even if religious in nature, managed to have self censorship of the press, and was able to force slow but regular change in Turkish society without it noticing it quite, until now. But the Venezuelan "boom" of Chavez was a mere distribution of cash, not an increase in production and now the economy is capsizing. Chavez never was a model except for its methods to ensure that gangs of thugs seize and retain power while killing democracy with its own weapons. We did have a Taksim of sorts with Plaza Altamira in 2002-2003 but this is over as the reality of Venezuelan society caught up with us: we are not a fighting people, we were never democrats and never really aspired to become such, much preferring whomever promised the best "free gifts" from the state. Elections may be stolen, but in the end we do not seem to care as long as we seem to be getting our share of the loot.
Aung San Suu Kyi
The Burma heroine may well finally reach her goal to become Burma next president in 2015. There is still a need to change the constitution there, and for the military to accept that change is now unavoidable. She will have had to wait over twenty years, a nakedly stolen election triumph, who knows how many years in house arrest but in 2015 she will either be president of Burma or whoever wins will have been approved by her.
Is this the fate of Capriles? Does he have to wait 20 years until chavismo eventually let's him reach office?
The big difference here is that ASSK had always a majority of the people with her, and a combative one that on occasion was not afraid to take risks, such as a very few years ago when Buddhists monks themselves almost made it. Poor Capriles barely crossed the 50% line this time around and he cannot hope that the chavistas who for the first time switched their vote will also go down to the streets to defend his victory. This is too much to ask, too fast for them.
What is sadder is that even among the long time opposition voters, many think that tweeter is the way to go to unseat chavismo and they are certainly not ready to suffer personally for that goal. Capriles may face a few more years in the wilderness and if like ASSK he did suffer some unfair and illegal jail time, he also has more people trying to replace him at the head, amen of the "traitors" pretending to be with the opposition but only too willing to accommodate themselves with a few more years of chavismo. And if it were not for the looming economic debacle we may be looking at a decade more of chavismo at least.
Assad
Considering Assad lesson for us is a rather grim prospect. Even if we do not need to be afraid of such a crude and cruel civil war it remains that the chavistas in place are only too willing to take down the economy along their own descent. They are actually doing it, ruining the country in their last grasp at stealing whatever is left to steal. Thuggocracy has never been as observable these days than it has been in the last decade. We could also observe that not tending to the infrastructures of the country for the last decade has some portions of Venezuela look like bombed out areas of Syria.....
Syria cannot be a parallel case for a future scenario in Venezuela. What is going on in Syria is really a religious war complicated by the fact that many religions reside there. Still, the idea that a fanatic group, afraid to lose its privileges, could be a way to retain power is not something that escapes the regime's plans. We could say that the attempt at creating a Chavez cult is a way to introduce something akin to a religion so as to excuse the immobility of society, becoming the reason why the desecrated opposition should never reach power no matter what its numbers may be. What protects us from a cruel civil war like in Syria is that we are too hedonistic and materialistic a society to have enough people fight it out to the bitter end. But we may well still get some form of civil war when people finally start realizing that they have been had by a mafia unwilling to share the loot. Then it will be fanatics versus malcontents, a strange mix for a civil war.
------------------
Update
As I was typing this entry last night Erdogan decided to clear up Taksim square, and apparently he is about to do the same with Gezi park even though it was clear that the Taksim group was more political than Gezi one, more concerned with "environmental" matters.
Thus we need to remove once and for all the democratic label to Erdogan and his cronies, as he becomes a duplicitous liar, promising one day to dialogue with the Gezi occupants, only to gas them in full a few hours later. Very Chavez like, democracy to reach power, and then bye-bye to democracy.
18 aviones, una plasta
La ultima intervención televisiva de Jose Vicente Rangel nos dice mas sobre el poco respeto que tiene el régimen hacia sus seguidores que sobre amenaza alguna del régimen. El tipo se le ocurrió decir el domingo que la oposición compró 18 aviones para atacar a Venezuela y que esos aviones estarán listos en Colombia en noviembre. Lo único que le faltó indicar es el numero de cuenta de ahorro de la operación para que podamos depositar dinero y ayudar ese esfuerzo opositor en el presunto ataque.
Claro está que cualquier persona con un mínimo de intelecto, con un dedito de frente, va a plantear alguna de las siguientes interrogantes. ¿Con que plata compra la oposición 18 aviones? ¿Como puede Colombia esconder tamaña aéreoflota cuando la pobre FARC no puede esconder por mucho tiempo sus campamentos? ¿Si Colombia es cómplice, porque trabaja con lo que son obviamente amateurs cuando puede usar su propio y muy bien entrenado ejercito para sacarse de encima el régimen actual? ¿O será que Colombia nos quiere cagar sabiendo que tenemos semanas apretando ese culo por la falta de papel higiénico? ¡Que perversidad! ¡Que maquiavelismo el de Santos/Uribe!
De todas maneras Colombia se sacudió esta ultima senilidad de Jose Vicente mandándolo a la ONU a denunciar es asunto, que es donde se hacen esas denuncias cuando son verdaderas. Cuando son falsas se hacen desde una tribuna sin derecho a replica.
Para terminar con este patético y vergonzoso asunto que hunde nuestro país aun mas en el ridículo, si fuese posible, permítanme recordar la escasa credibilidad que tiene JVR hoy en día, cosa que me consta en lo personal. Aquí el problema verdadero es el desprecio que tiene José Vicente Rangel hacia los seguidores del chavismo pretendiendo que se crean tamaño disparate. Es por eso que poco a poco van cayendo en votos porque la gente, por mas deseducada este después de década y media de proceso, se cansa de que sus propios lideres los sigan tomando por chaburros.
Claro está que cualquier persona con un mínimo de intelecto, con un dedito de frente, va a plantear alguna de las siguientes interrogantes. ¿Con que plata compra la oposición 18 aviones? ¿Como puede Colombia esconder tamaña aéreoflota cuando la pobre FARC no puede esconder por mucho tiempo sus campamentos? ¿Si Colombia es cómplice, porque trabaja con lo que son obviamente amateurs cuando puede usar su propio y muy bien entrenado ejercito para sacarse de encima el régimen actual? ¿O será que Colombia nos quiere cagar sabiendo que tenemos semanas apretando ese culo por la falta de papel higiénico? ¡Que perversidad! ¡Que maquiavelismo el de Santos/Uribe!
De todas maneras Colombia se sacudió esta ultima senilidad de Jose Vicente mandándolo a la ONU a denunciar es asunto, que es donde se hacen esas denuncias cuando son verdaderas. Cuando son falsas se hacen desde una tribuna sin derecho a replica.
Para terminar con este patético y vergonzoso asunto que hunde nuestro país aun mas en el ridículo, si fuese posible, permítanme recordar la escasa credibilidad que tiene JVR hoy en día, cosa que me consta en lo personal. Aquí el problema verdadero es el desprecio que tiene José Vicente Rangel hacia los seguidores del chavismo pretendiendo que se crean tamaño disparate. Es por eso que poco a poco van cayendo en votos porque la gente, por mas deseducada este después de década y media de proceso, se cansa de que sus propios lideres los sigan tomando por chaburros.
Saturday, 8 June 2013
NATO nattering nags Brazil
I could have never wished for a post to be validated so fast, a week later. Last Saturday I was wondering about what part of the Capriles visit in Bogota may have been linked to Colombia sending a message to UNASUR, and Brazil its puppeteer. This week Colombia added more, much more, by its renewed desire to associate itself with the North Atlantic defense organization, NATO. This of course sent the Venezuelan regime in an uproar and its associate in Bolivia to call for a UNASUR meeting against the danger of NATO invading our subcontinent I presume. When in fact all of this is further proof of a very deficient Brazilian foreign policy.
But let's start with the thuggish incoherence and down silliness of the Venezuelan regime on this respect. Of course it should be afraid. When it says that the NATO invades countries it forgets to mention that it does not invade democratic ones. So implicitly we have a subconscious admission of the regime that it is not a democracy and that at some point it may have to pay for it. Look no further than foreign minister Jaua stupidly grinning at Secretary of State John Kerry for granting him a few minutes of his time. And yet, a few breaths away Jaua who wants respect from all, including the US and the OAS wants again the Inter American Court for Human Rights to be downgraded because, well, Venezuela is denounced as a regime on the way of pariah status.
But the true aim of Bogota is not to reveal the nature of Caracas regime, we all know that even if some of us look elsewhere. Bogota is also, among other things, implying that South American institutions lack seriousness and thus it prefers to look elsewhere for countries that may not love Colombia but at least will deal with Colombia on a serious basis. If you ask me, being a mere associate of the NATO group is definitely more reassuring than being a member of UNASUR where the only thing that matters is what Brazil says. The US of A may be the driving force of the NATO but it has been quite clear that in the last decade and a half its country members participate or not at will in NATO actions though the general aim is respected: democracy and freedom from tyranny. That the means may not be the best for the aims is another discussion.
Thus we are watching ALBA countries twist in horror at any NATO link with Colombia but Brazil rather silent. Interesting, no? Dilma Rousseff got the message and even if she formally will at some point make an opposing comment, she knows that Colombia has sent her an ultimatum: deal with Mercosur and UNASUR seriously or watch us say good bye.
But let's start with the thuggish incoherence and down silliness of the Venezuelan regime on this respect. Of course it should be afraid. When it says that the NATO invades countries it forgets to mention that it does not invade democratic ones. So implicitly we have a subconscious admission of the regime that it is not a democracy and that at some point it may have to pay for it. Look no further than foreign minister Jaua stupidly grinning at Secretary of State John Kerry for granting him a few minutes of his time. And yet, a few breaths away Jaua who wants respect from all, including the US and the OAS wants again the Inter American Court for Human Rights to be downgraded because, well, Venezuela is denounced as a regime on the way of pariah status.
But the true aim of Bogota is not to reveal the nature of Caracas regime, we all know that even if some of us look elsewhere. Bogota is also, among other things, implying that South American institutions lack seriousness and thus it prefers to look elsewhere for countries that may not love Colombia but at least will deal with Colombia on a serious basis. If you ask me, being a mere associate of the NATO group is definitely more reassuring than being a member of UNASUR where the only thing that matters is what Brazil says. The US of A may be the driving force of the NATO but it has been quite clear that in the last decade and a half its country members participate or not at will in NATO actions though the general aim is respected: democracy and freedom from tyranny. That the means may not be the best for the aims is another discussion.
Thus we are watching ALBA countries twist in horror at any NATO link with Colombia but Brazil rather silent. Interesting, no? Dilma Rousseff got the message and even if she formally will at some point make an opposing comment, she knows that Colombia has sent her an ultimatum: deal with Mercosur and UNASUR seriously or watch us say good bye.
Thursday, 6 June 2013
Do you want to know how XXI century fascism work? Listen to Diego Arria on Bayly
What is most interesting about the interview of Diego Aria at the Jaime Bayly talk show off Miami is not what he says: we all know these things. What is fascinating is that he says it and he can return tomorrow to Caracas and walk free (well, growing out a third eye in the back). That is, until the regime thinks it otherwise and any excuse will suffice to put him in jail.
That is how XXI century fascism works: you control all of the judicial system, all of the state income and then you do not need to care much about what people say about you. It does not matter what they accuse you of, they have no recourse, they cannot sue you, but you can put them in jail whenever the buzz gets annoying. The trick here, for the holders of power, is not to go so far that other countries do not feel compelled to call you a dictatorship outright. Fortunately for us, Chavez knew how to sort of not cross in full that line but the guys in charge now are doing it. We'll see what the international consequences will be.
This being said, if you understand Spanish I hope you appreciate the courage of Diego Arria, as well as his political skill.
That is how XXI century fascism works: you control all of the judicial system, all of the state income and then you do not need to care much about what people say about you. It does not matter what they accuse you of, they have no recourse, they cannot sue you, but you can put them in jail whenever the buzz gets annoying. The trick here, for the holders of power, is not to go so far that other countries do not feel compelled to call you a dictatorship outright. Fortunately for us, Chavez knew how to sort of not cross in full that line but the guys in charge now are doing it. We'll see what the international consequences will be.
This being said, if you understand Spanish I hope you appreciate the courage of Diego Arria, as well as his political skill.
Can the Venezuelan parliamentary opposition resist fascism pressure?
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Heliodoro in his credibility salad days |
Since I did not comment in detail the tapes from the Mario Silvagate, I certainly will not get into this one. Who knows, maybe Alma Guillermoprieto will do us the favor. As usual what we heard was a mafia like talk about how to corrupt opposition politician. But there was a twist in it: besides a state security agent and one of chavismo more prominent bolibourgeois, William Ruperti, there was an opposition representative! Heliodoro Quintero in the lists of Un Nuevo Tiempo, Zulia's state local party, was the participating in inciting Ruperti to give money to Caldera (which does not excuse him, by the way, since Ruperti money is toxic under any circumstances).
Quintero was promptly dismissed from UNT but that is really not the solution of the problem. The problem is that the opposition is going to have to get new methods to pick the people it picks for its lists.
How can the opposition politicians resist the onslaught of blackmail, violence, money applied against them to have them desert and betray outright their colleagues? This is a regime that has absolutely no democratic bone in it and for them buying a parliamentary majority and destroying the parliamentary opposition is simply a matter of fact.
Their scope goes from buying outright representatives like Ojeda, to blackmail into submission other deputies like Nuñez, or do a character assassination like they are trying to do with Nardo. There is also the option to demolish, literally, representatives like Machado or Borges.... And now with Heliodoro we have recruitment and active collaboration which is, I suppose yet another from of representative purchase. All of this is mere fascism methodology: communist were more direct, limiting themselves to awful blackmail and simple physical elimination.
Truly, the opposition MUD will need to screen better its candidates. Who knows how much information Heliodoro was privy that went straight to the desk of Diosdado Cabello.
--------------------
PS: the transcript here, if you have stomach for it.
Wednesday, 5 June 2013
Mario Silva viewed by Alma Guillermoprieto
You know that a Venezuelan "miscellaneous" has made it big when Alma Guillermoprieto has taken the time to listen and dissect it.
The big inflation mystery: 6% or worse?
So, we are on June 5th and May inflation numbers are not out. It is not idle to remind the reader that when Chavez was alive sometimes, when convenient, the Central Bank was able to post inflation numbers for the month BEFORE that month was over....
Thus we need to read foreign outlets to know what is really going on. El Clarin reports on a Barclay's study that says that May inflation is 6%, the annual rate becoming thus 35,1% while the economic contraction may reach 9,7%.
Why? Because the regime through Mision Vivienda to reelect Chavez spent all its income and borrowed heavily and now it is out of dollars for production and the economy is collapsing. That simple. The massive expenditures for a spectacular, and spectacularly inefficient, housing program has all but bankrupted the country and now we cannot even wipe our asses.
And you know what is really scary? The regime seems not to understand. Since they had to call for municipal elections in December, there are already signs of increasing spending for electoral purposes... You may start speculating on next year inflation.....
Thus we need to read foreign outlets to know what is really going on. El Clarin reports on a Barclay's study that says that May inflation is 6%, the annual rate becoming thus 35,1% while the economic contraction may reach 9,7%.
Why? Because the regime through Mision Vivienda to reelect Chavez spent all its income and borrowed heavily and now it is out of dollars for production and the economy is collapsing. That simple. The massive expenditures for a spectacular, and spectacularly inefficient, housing program has all but bankrupted the country and now we cannot even wipe our asses.
And you know what is really scary? The regime seems not to understand. Since they had to call for municipal elections in December, there are already signs of increasing spending for electoral purposes... You may start speculating on next year inflation.....
Monday, 3 June 2013
Media shopping and its future use
We are in an economic crisis of increasing dramatic proportions and yet "groups of investors" are buying media groups....
A few weeks ago it was Globovision, and this week it is the Cadena Capriles, holder of Ultimas Noticias, the newspaper most read by the middle to lower sectors of the population (income and/or education, not that this means Ultimas Noticias is a lousy paper, it is not in its context). The neutralization of Globovision has already started but Ultimas Noticias does not really need to be neutralized. So why? To sneak in more propaganda? That would not work as "el pueblo" has largely ignored the attempts of the regime at pro Chavez rags (Ciudad Caracas, Correo del Orinoco, Vea, all with dismal sales). If Ultimas Noticias were to start resembling regime propaganda its sales would go down fast.
My hypothesis is that bolibourgeois groups are used as fronts by chavista political tendencies for future political needs. If the regime exits soon, they will be the new private "opposition media". If chavismo stays and if the internal warfare of chavismo continues, these newly sold media could be used by one faction against the other. The only victim for sure is freedom of information for all.....
A few weeks ago it was Globovision, and this week it is the Cadena Capriles, holder of Ultimas Noticias, the newspaper most read by the middle to lower sectors of the population (income and/or education, not that this means Ultimas Noticias is a lousy paper, it is not in its context). The neutralization of Globovision has already started but Ultimas Noticias does not really need to be neutralized. So why? To sneak in more propaganda? That would not work as "el pueblo" has largely ignored the attempts of the regime at pro Chavez rags (Ciudad Caracas, Correo del Orinoco, Vea, all with dismal sales). If Ultimas Noticias were to start resembling regime propaganda its sales would go down fast.
My hypothesis is that bolibourgeois groups are used as fronts by chavista political tendencies for future political needs. If the regime exits soon, they will be the new private "opposition media". If chavismo stays and if the internal warfare of chavismo continues, these newly sold media could be used by one faction against the other. The only victim for sure is freedom of information for all.....
Food card rationing, XXI century style

The government of Zulia state has announced that a new system to control purchases will be set in place sometime in June. Although full details are not available yet, we must assume that through an electronic ID system the state will know who buys what and where out of a list of 20 "monitored" items. That is, maybe through some form of finger printing as for the voting system, or though presentation of your ID card to the cashier, you will be allowed to buy, say, 2 sticks of margarine and a tube of toothpaste, every so often, no matter what store you go. That is right, you will need an ID to shop. No ration cards, Windows 7 or Linux will take care of the rest once your ID is shown. Forget leaving home in a rush to the corner store for a last minute purchase of a pound of corn flour: no shoes, no shirts, no ID, no service.
Now, the terrifying thing in this is that once the system is set, it opens itself to include all forms of electronic discrimination, which will have the advantage of not being as easily traceable as if they were printed on a ration card. The picture attached will give you the idea.
And of course forget about the contraband it is supposed to stop as subsidized food items leave Venezuela for resale in Colombia. Those that do and control that traffic are in the army and you can bet anything that the electronic system will fail to detect them....
Back home and it got worse
The strangest thing upon my return home is that things visibly deteriorated in a mere 3 weeks. I am not talking about the physical degradation of the country, I am talking about the general mood, the political exchanges, the perspectives of a somber future. Maybe it is the lack of toilet paper, of basic food items, or the impression that the regime is doing nothing to solve our problems, but I am surprised at how noticeable the general degradation has been. Clearly, we are entering into the real crisis as people realized that the last election solved nothing. In fact since 2006 no election has settled any issue and maybe this is what is driving the negativity that we can almost touch.
Sunday, 2 June 2013
Sweet and Sour France
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A chapel for fishermen (click to enlarge) |
The stay is in a fancy resort area of France where relatives happened to live way before it became a famous resort area. Living is cool, for the rich, the casual visitor or the native still hanging there. They all go to the same market two days a week, carrying all their grocery bag as there is no more the "paper or plastic" dreadful question in France: you bring your bags now, almost everywhere. All mix, whether they come from the fancy villa hidden in the pine forest or the fisherman shack. There is something about relentless sand and pines and rain that brings up a notch humility in all.
Civility in France is a welcome relief from the unbending vulgarity here, one that this time around I appreciated more than ever. In Paris we saw Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet walk in front of us while we had diner at a brasserie. What is noteworthy here is that the woman is the top challenger for Paris mayor election next year and she was walking alone in a busy street, no one stopping here, no body guards accompanying her, and yet recognized. This is simply inconceivable in Venezuela where one year ago I saw Ismael Garcia attend the same pedicure as I do, accompanied with two body guards in a closed mall....
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The view from the altar |
It is to be noted that the law was officially promulgated a few days after my arrival. And promulgation meant that the Constitutional Council had validated it. What was the point in holding the Paris rally against a law that is now the law of the land and that cannot be reversed? Will they annul all the weddings that will take place between now and the hypothetical arrival to power of these people that want to overturn it?
The thing is that the parliamentary right, UMP, had decided to use the latent anti gay, homophobic sentiment of France to bolster its energy against the government of Francois Hollande. Duly supported by the Catholic Church of course. This tragic error has allowed the apparition and revival of a series of groupuscule that now do violent gay bashing and the like. I was listening to one of these characters explaining that he was protesting because he felt he was not consulted about the marriage for all reform, while being absolutely opposed to it. Does he realize his contradiction? Why should he be consulted since he is clear in his position? Was he planning to bring useful amendments? That sent me a shiver in my spine: the guy was a mere chavista. They are everywhere, from the Argentinean "piquetero" to the fundamentalist tea partier. And I did not know that there were that many of them in France still, in spite of the sweet living I enjoyed these days.
As for myself, when I see the lack of real condemnation from the UMP, the shameful attempt at gaining extremist vote at the expense of gay rights I must say that this swing voter is no more: I cannot see myself voting for the French democratic (?) right gain, and not only that, expect me campaigning against them. I predict that the cost for the UMP will be high even if today the crisis hides it in the current bad numbers of Hollande.
Saturday, 1 June 2013
Capriles in Bogota, or yet more evidence of a failed Brazilian imperialist policy
There is no need to expand on the diplomatic fiasco that Maduro's "new" team has suffered from Bogota this week. What is more interesting to note is that were Brazilian foreign policy a success, it probably would have never happened. True, there is always some small room left to suspect that the whole thing was a Machiavellian manipulation of Itamaraty to have Santos do the deed, but how unlikely an explanation....
For some reason Capriles was received by Colombia's president Santos this week. Capriles and the Venezuelan opposition keep their impressive campaign to educate the continent about the electoral fraud that allowed Maduro to retain Venezuela's presidency. A double fraud if you remember that Maduro promised a real electoral audit at UNASUR Lima's meeting to ensure their attending at his swearing in. As soon as he was sworn, the regime simply performed instead an absolutely useless audit and started a ferocious campaign to silence the opposition and place the world in front of the fait accompli of his fraudulent election.
In short, the Pacific Alliance is an open trading block, of the maritime kind, the most effective; whereas Mercosur looks everyday more like a protectionist block centered around Brazil.
It is in this context that we are more likely to understand why Santos faced a more than likely crisis with Venezuela by receiving Capriles a few days ago. Sure enough, it started with the vile outbreak of Diosdado Cabello declaring BEFORE Maduro or his foreign minster and singlehandedly turning an incident into a crisis. If there was a surprise it was not that the Venezuelan regime would be upset but by the virulence of the crisis at a time when, simply put, Venezuela has no means to put pressure on Colombia. That is, in the middle of a food crisis, where we do not even have toilet paper to wipe ourselves, the regime antagonizes the lone country that could help us the fastest. In fact a Colombian minister was prompt to add that Colombia would only help Venezuela if it offered guarantees as to paying its new bills towards Colombia, driving the point. Needless to say that this week end the regime is backpedaling already, understanding that they are not Chavez to weather such self inflicted storm, and that they were done in by Santos.
The point of this text is not to go into the motivations of Santos into running deliberately into a crisis (at the very least he certainly scored a point against Uribe while proving how toothless Venezuela has become). Nor is the point to discuss why the regime allowed National Assembly chair Cabello to play lone ranger. The point here is that Capriles highlighted clearly the limits of UNASUR by reviving the electoral fraud question of Venezuela that Brazil clearly hoped was put behind. And a possible visit of Capriles to Peru could make things worse for Brazil who undercut Peru's president Humala efforts last April when he called for that conciliation meeting that was in the end flouted by Maduro (and Brazil by extension). This eventually led to the resignation of Humala's foreign minister.....
Brazil is bound to lose a lot if it does not correct quickly its wrong headed all out support for Maduro. If Humala also receives Capriles it would be only a matter of days for the whole Pacific Alliance to side with the Venezuelan opposition in appearance, if not formally. The North South cleavage of the subcontinent would then be growing fast while to Colombia, Chile and Peru would be added soon Costa Rica, Panama and maybe even Canada, amen of Mexico already in and sympathetic to the Venezuelan opposition cause. Uruguay even is interested in that Pacific Alliance which hints at the coming irrelevance of Mercosur if things keep going the way they are.
But Brazil can lose even more. Let's remind the reader still reading that Capriles espoused the Brazilian model of Lula for the 2012 election. Little good did it do to him. In addition of the siding of Roussef with Maduro, it did not stop a shameful interference of Brazil in April's election when Lula bluntly endorsed Maduro. As the regime collapses does anyone still think that a Capriles administration will be pro Brazil?
And it is not all. Brazil in recent years had a campaign to gain a permanent seat in the security council of the United Nations. All the efforts have been lost, I dare say with the recent fiascoes. How can a country aspire to such a rank when it is unable to protect democracy in its area of influence, and furthermore generates deep divisions as it may happen soon between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance? Clearly Itamaraty hopes of world leadership are seriously compromised as its actors are revealed to be mere grocery shop managers, more worried about Venezuela paying its bills to them than the long term perspective. Or mere amoral operatives if you prefer. Let's say it: Brazil is not ready for the major leagues, Colombia is.
For some reason Capriles was received by Colombia's president Santos this week. Capriles and the Venezuelan opposition keep their impressive campaign to educate the continent about the electoral fraud that allowed Maduro to retain Venezuela's presidency. A double fraud if you remember that Maduro promised a real electoral audit at UNASUR Lima's meeting to ensure their attending at his swearing in. As soon as he was sworn, the regime simply performed instead an absolutely useless audit and started a ferocious campaign to silence the opposition and place the world in front of the fait accompli of his fraudulent election.
At first it seemed that Maduro would succeed when in his own international campaign he was received by Dilma Roussef, president of Brazil and faithful follower of Lula policy to forgive any abuse of chavismo, though if truth be told she is less enthusiastic than Lula on this regard. She offered Maduro help for the food crisis of Venezuela and listened patiently to his explanation of Capriles being a less than nothing, thus implying that Brazil was willing to accept the fraudulent electoral outcome in exchange for the preservation of its 5 billion plus dollar trade surplus. That also means a further dependency of Venezuela from MERCOSUR increasingly lorded over by Brazil as its sphere of interest, or private backyard if you will.
The implication of all of this in Brazilian minds is that no matter what UNASUR decides at its meetings, the last word is the Brazil one (in this case forgetting about the promised electoral audit agreed at Lima). UNASUR, allow me to remind the reader, includes strictly South American countries in an association that supposedly ensures the solution of internal conflicts and an alliance of sorts against outside interventions. Chavez always dreaming that he would lead UNASUR when in fact he was the pawn of Lula in that scheme, an extension of Brazilian ancestral imperialist pulsions to control all of South America.
When UNASUR was proposed it was at the height of Chavez petrodiplomacy (meaning, using Venezuelan money for his dreams of grandeur). It was also at the height of Lula, when he ruined the proposed free exchange of the Americas proposed by the US, unable to support it as it should as the US was too involved in Iraq and the like. Thus, with Brazil pushing along Venezuela and Mercosur all countries had to join UNASUR, which did not mean for a second that they all liked the idea.
Times have changed. Dilma in Brazil has failed to live to her promises of more attention to human rights (except for the distancing with Iran, the least she could do). Instead Brazil seems embarked in some form of protectionist adventure where its economical elite seems more interested in securing a safe zone/perimeter rather than confront globalization. As such the indecent hurry to exclude Paraguay from Mercosur last year on silly pretexts, removing the last block to include Venezuela in Mercosur. Venezuela, by the way, who routinely does more constitutional violations than Paraguay politicians ever did. And there is also Chavez death, just about when the petro check book also died.
Some country observed these sequence of events that proved to them once and again that not only Brazil had no good or serious intentions, but that Mercosur was not a really good club to join in. So they did the only thing that they could do, join their more market and trade oriented economy to the Pacific rim ones. And Mexico as the lone possible counterweight to Brazil economy. Thus after many preliminary summits the Pacific Alliance was formally installed in June 2012, sending Itamaraty in a panic and probably accounting a lot for the messed up Paraguay crisis. It is worth quoting the Wikipedia entry on this regard, to prove to you that anyone can notice this gigantic chess game that Brazil seems to be losing so far (my emphasis):
The Pacific Alliance (Spanish: Alianza del Pacífico) is a Latin American bloc formally launched on 6 June 2012 in Chile's Paranal Observatory at the organization's fourth summit. It groups Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The four nations of the Pacific Alliance represent about 36% of Latin America GDP, and if counted as a single country they would be the ninth largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of more than $2 trillion USD, surpassing India. According to information from the World Trade Organization (WTO), the countries of the Pacific Alliance together exported about U.S.$ 445 billion in 2010, almost 60% more than Mercosur (the main economic bloc in Latin America) exported in the same year.
In short, the Pacific Alliance is an open trading block, of the maritime kind, the most effective; whereas Mercosur looks everyday more like a protectionist block centered around Brazil.
It is in this context that we are more likely to understand why Santos faced a more than likely crisis with Venezuela by receiving Capriles a few days ago. Sure enough, it started with the vile outbreak of Diosdado Cabello declaring BEFORE Maduro or his foreign minster and singlehandedly turning an incident into a crisis. If there was a surprise it was not that the Venezuelan regime would be upset but by the virulence of the crisis at a time when, simply put, Venezuela has no means to put pressure on Colombia. That is, in the middle of a food crisis, where we do not even have toilet paper to wipe ourselves, the regime antagonizes the lone country that could help us the fastest. In fact a Colombian minister was prompt to add that Colombia would only help Venezuela if it offered guarantees as to paying its new bills towards Colombia, driving the point. Needless to say that this week end the regime is backpedaling already, understanding that they are not Chavez to weather such self inflicted storm, and that they were done in by Santos.
The point of this text is not to go into the motivations of Santos into running deliberately into a crisis (at the very least he certainly scored a point against Uribe while proving how toothless Venezuela has become). Nor is the point to discuss why the regime allowed National Assembly chair Cabello to play lone ranger. The point here is that Capriles highlighted clearly the limits of UNASUR by reviving the electoral fraud question of Venezuela that Brazil clearly hoped was put behind. And a possible visit of Capriles to Peru could make things worse for Brazil who undercut Peru's president Humala efforts last April when he called for that conciliation meeting that was in the end flouted by Maduro (and Brazil by extension). This eventually led to the resignation of Humala's foreign minister.....
Brazil is bound to lose a lot if it does not correct quickly its wrong headed all out support for Maduro. If Humala also receives Capriles it would be only a matter of days for the whole Pacific Alliance to side with the Venezuelan opposition in appearance, if not formally. The North South cleavage of the subcontinent would then be growing fast while to Colombia, Chile and Peru would be added soon Costa Rica, Panama and maybe even Canada, amen of Mexico already in and sympathetic to the Venezuelan opposition cause. Uruguay even is interested in that Pacific Alliance which hints at the coming irrelevance of Mercosur if things keep going the way they are.
But Brazil can lose even more. Let's remind the reader still reading that Capriles espoused the Brazilian model of Lula for the 2012 election. Little good did it do to him. In addition of the siding of Roussef with Maduro, it did not stop a shameful interference of Brazil in April's election when Lula bluntly endorsed Maduro. As the regime collapses does anyone still think that a Capriles administration will be pro Brazil?
And it is not all. Brazil in recent years had a campaign to gain a permanent seat in the security council of the United Nations. All the efforts have been lost, I dare say with the recent fiascoes. How can a country aspire to such a rank when it is unable to protect democracy in its area of influence, and furthermore generates deep divisions as it may happen soon between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance? Clearly Itamaraty hopes of world leadership are seriously compromised as its actors are revealed to be mere grocery shop managers, more worried about Venezuela paying its bills to them than the long term perspective. Or mere amoral operatives if you prefer. Let's say it: Brazil is not ready for the major leagues, Colombia is.
----------------
PS: let's also remark that Brazil does not understand that Colombia is not amused by its diffidence on chavismo: when things will get bad, it is Colombia which will suffer the most from a repressive Venezuelan regime. That Itamaraty is not aware of that speaks volumes about the ideological view it has adopted under Lula.
PS: let's also remark that Brazil does not understand that Colombia is not amused by its diffidence on chavismo: when things will get bad, it is Colombia which will suffer the most from a repressive Venezuelan regime. That Itamaraty is not aware of that speaks volumes about the ideological view it has adopted under Lula.
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