The Venezuela-Colombian border crisis should have been a fantastic opportunity to put the Venezuelan narco-regime on notice. Instead it serves as show case on how the appeasement policies of Obama and Santos are sinking fast.
The crisis was an absolutely artificial creation of the Venezuelan regime, increasingly taxed by its faults. As polls plummet for the regime when crucial elections are scheduled for December 6, this one has done all what it can to sabotage them. One offensive was to go straight ahead and jail major opposition figures, bar from running other, gerrymander further the districts, increase censorship and try to bankrupt the scant remaining free press. Elections? Sure! Just try to campaign! However it was an uphill battle to regain the favor of its electors, the only real way to win elections. Since the economy has tanked there is only one option left to rekindle the love of the chavista voter: chauvinistic nationalism, redundancy intended.
First there was a renewed anti US anti Obama drive. This one floundered when Havana and Washington started real talks and petered out at the recent OAS general assembly when Maduro got to see Obama without cameras for a brief moment, long enough for Obama to talk him down.
It seems thus that the "millions" of anti Obama signatures "freely collected" and validated without scruples by the "electoral authorities" were not enough to raise polls for a durable hold. So Maduro sought a conflict with Guyana over maritime and territorial claims. The only result of that came with a further loss of the Venezuelan case; and that the supposedly meek supporters of Venezuela in CARICOM went Guyana way without batting an eyelash. Isolation is thy name, Maduro.
Having been defeated in the imaginary northern border with the US of A and the Eastern border of Guyana there were only two borders left. The one in the South with Brazil is far and dicey although it seems the regime will try something. But the Western border with Colombia was ripe with existing excuses, or fertile grounds to plant new ones.
There are all sorts of theories on how the pretext came about. Some say that it all started from a rivalry between two narco-gangs in Venezuela, the one of the "Soles" and the one of "Guajira", both pointed out as being at least partially controlled by different wings of the army. Others say that it was a mere rivalry between gangs controlling the heavy contraband system towards Colombia, courtesy of the artificially deflated prices of Venezuelan goods. Others advance that it was a way to get rid of Tachira governor rumored to be in talks with "transition" proposals. Some even go as far as saying the whole show is just to put pressure on Santos who may extradite to the US compromising witnesses of the narco-regime in Caracas. None of these pretexts exclude the others, by the way.
Clearly, something as crazed as that, with damning images of human rights abuses as Colombians in Venezuela are rudely expelled when not leaving in a hurry motu proprio, should have been a bonus, a golden opportunity for Colombian and US diplomacy to read a writ to Venezuela. Unfortunately the errors of Santos and Obama policies toward Venezuela's regime are now paid, most likely under Cuban direction. Which have been these mistakes?
Obama's mistakes come from opening to Cuba without proper reciprocity. Thinking that making the first step toward a totalitarian regime will bring concessions is a mistake that the West should have learned once and for all in 1938 while drinking beer in Munich. Certainly I approved of Obama's initiatives since everything else tried before by the US has failed; more by lack of will than actual vices or virtues of any legislation. But one thing is to approve the initial gesture, another thing is to approve the mechanism chosen. The result is that as soon as Cuba realized that the big bucks were not coming fast the Castro's regime started increasing repression and moving its pieces elsewhere. Extortion is the natural state for these people and that Obama and Kerry thought it would be different this time around is simply bedeviling.
The second mistake was sending Shannon to discuss with Maduro and Cabello without anything in exchange. Or so it seems so far. True, it is supposed that the release of half a dozen of political prisoners would be a result of that, along the call for elections which was suspiciously delayed. But the released prisoners are under house arrest and suffer all sorts of impediments while elections can be cancelled even on election day. The real result of these "negotiations" is that thug in chief, Diosdado Cabello, pointed out by many as a drug capo, feels vindicated and now indispensable. So as any good thug would do he has increased his attacks on people who dare criticize him, has decided to bankrupt once and for all the remaining free newspapers, and more. So much for Shannon effectiveness.
Colombia's president, Santos, mistakes started 5 years ago when he "befriended Chavez". It has been downhill since. Chavez under a reprieve as Uribe's parting shot was exposing all FARC training camp inside Venezuela, played nice and stroked Santos ego in that he could indeed bring the FARC to serious negotiations after having been the Uribe's defense minister in charge of blowing them out. Which he nearly did, by the way and may have been able to complete had he wanted to. Under the excuse that Venezuela's role was crucial to the eventual success of Havana's Santos-FARC talks, the Santos administration made all sorts of concessions to the Venezuelan regime, most despicably by handing over to Caracas drug kingpins and political exiles.
Sure enough the FARC is playing Santos through and though. Its first success was to force Santos into a difficult reelection. This conservative, liberal right president has had to ally himself to the fading left of Colombia to get reelected and thus he has unnecessarily promoted its recovery. After reelection the FARC has become even more belligerent, and now it is trying to use the border crisis offering itself as the best guarantor against contraband and the alleged paramilitary infiltration inside Venezuela, as if Venezuela was not the main promoter of paramilitary groups like the colectivos, pranes .....
How can Santos and his ever more idiotic looking foreign minister Holguin whose appeasing smiles and seduction to Maduro are now blowing up to her face have lost the political coup offered to them on a silver tray?
First, the delayed response. Uribe was promptly at the border with Venezuela while Holguin sought a "meeting" with the Venezuelan foreign minister, the insufferable hack sister of Caracas mayor and inventor of all electoral frauds. While Holguin was giving Rodriguez a propaganda platform to accuse Colombia in its own country, the images of Colombians wading the river Tachira with their scarce belongings made front pages.
Santos waited for a week to go to the border and this late in the game he had to go populist and offer all sorts of goodies to calm down the natives. But it was too late, Colombian public opinion was united, and not around Santos. Even ex president Gaviria questioned the participation of Colombia to fakes like UNASUR who clearly do not wish to offend whatsoever the susceptibility of Maduro and co. To add insult to injury Maduro kept giving fake handouts in Venezuela, declared falsely that scarcity was over thanks to his policies in Tachira, threatened to push the border blockade all along the Venezuelan border and flew to Vietnam. Cabello on his own decided to stir a little bit of trouble with the Brazil border attacking garimpeiros as if did not know they had been creating ecological devastation since Chavez came to office!
I think that we are assisting to the undoing of Obama and Santos foreign schemes. I, for one, dearly hope that this is all part of a master plan to muzzle once and for all the rogue regimes of Havana and Caracas. But I am not holding my breath whatsoever.
Luckily for Santos and Obama, they do not have to worry about reelection anymore. Others will sort out the debris.
Saturday, 29 August 2015
Wednesday, 26 August 2015
And it all came to that
Almost as a rule the end of revolutions and their ersatz is equally appalling. True revolutions like the French one (9 Thermidor) or the Russian one (Kulak starvation) have a moment that mark the end of ideal and the bloody start of a very long path to stability. Ersatz are lucky if they have a semi grand moment but as a rule end up in ridicule if they are lucky (Peron). But some end up in infamy, betraying any possible justification they had at their start. This is the case of this fakest of all revolutions, the bolivarian of Chavez which is slowly petering its way to infamy.
I suppose some would make a case for April 2002 as "the grand moment". But it was not, a mere failed coup and a failed Restoration which yielded a shit faced Chavez that decided to surrender to the Castros in Cuba to get what he really wanted: life presidency. It worked, he died in office.
That first farcical but how damaging moment of April 2002 got a pricey oil enhanced stint which led to the 2007 referendum failure. For me it was the end, no revolution can survive when its idealistic and creative base deserts it, or rather turns against it as Venezuelan campus were never fervent Chavez supporters, even in his first couple of years.
From 2007 on it was all predictable: the pseudo revolution morphed into an autocratic regime that added insult to injury by becoming a narco state and henceforth the most corrupt and violent country in the Americas. By far.
I thought that we had seen it all, that we had accepted the fact that under Maduro we entered the outright dictatorship phase of the regime. A cross between Peron, sans Evita, with the Burma never ending military thuggery. Heck, with Leopoldo Lopez and Maria Corina Machado we are even getting a bi-cephalic version of Aung San Suu Kyi.
But no, we had to go into such infamy as creating a refugee crisis worse than the one in Europe right now, worse because even if much smaller it is absolutely unjustified, absolutely unnecessary, invented in full by dark conspiracies and likely drug war cartels fighting for turf control. These dark forces have had no qualm to use a state conflict to solve their own internal problems, harking back to imperial models of having the natives fight it ought for the honor of being directly under the toe of the colonial master. Chavismo there cannot even match the epic of Tlaxcala or the complexity of Plassey.
That is not all. There are no people drowning in the Mediterranean but poor Colombians wading in a shallow river with the lone bag they were allowed to carry. No real fences like in Hungary but a mere cattle guard here and there.
Even in infamy chavismo is so tacky, so venial, so corrupt that it cannot create a moment of epic or even true outrage. The word is taking its time in condemning the regime abuses on the Colombians it unjustly expels because they are mesmerized by the fact the regime is seriously wanting them to believe that these scared house wives wading dirty water are the cause of all of Venezuela trouble.
But one thing is not missing, fascism. In addition of all sort of promoted tweet support the regime has even produced Colombians supporting the abuse. A tropical Nazi paradise cannot be that far away.
And so it all came up to that. A revolution that claimed to unite a whole continent for the liberation of all of its people against real or imaginary empires ends up in a whimper, ostracizing, jewing up a population that cannot be distinguished at all from the one across the border or from the one they have been living among since there is historical memory.
Chavismo is now, like its founder, a corpse. We just need to find an undertaker.
------------------------------------
First video Maduro says horrors about Colombians and states that Colombians come to Venezuelan Bolivarian Paradise just like from Africa migrants go to Europe. Pathetic, the more so he is from Cucuta so we have there his subconscious betraying him in not wanting to be Colombian, like some kid in Austria, you know.
In this one the goebbelian frau Rodriguez says that all is an invention, that nothing is going on at the border, that the scenes are invented. Both videos promptly posted by the people of Maria Corina Machado apparently FROM international footage of news. Footage that is of course not shown on Venezuelan TV.
 |
| Closed border, people in check. Why? |
I suppose some would make a case for April 2002 as "the grand moment". But it was not, a mere failed coup and a failed Restoration which yielded a shit faced Chavez that decided to surrender to the Castros in Cuba to get what he really wanted: life presidency. It worked, he died in office.
That first farcical but how damaging moment of April 2002 got a pricey oil enhanced stint which led to the 2007 referendum failure. For me it was the end, no revolution can survive when its idealistic and creative base deserts it, or rather turns against it as Venezuelan campus were never fervent Chavez supporters, even in his first couple of years.
 |
| Student and his bookcase? |
From 2007 on it was all predictable: the pseudo revolution morphed into an autocratic regime that added insult to injury by becoming a narco state and henceforth the most corrupt and violent country in the Americas. By far.
I thought that we had seen it all, that we had accepted the fact that under Maduro we entered the outright dictatorship phase of the regime. A cross between Peron, sans Evita, with the Burma never ending military thuggery. Heck, with Leopoldo Lopez and Maria Corina Machado we are even getting a bi-cephalic version of Aung San Suu Kyi.
But no, we had to go into such infamy as creating a refugee crisis worse than the one in Europe right now, worse because even if much smaller it is absolutely unjustified, absolutely unnecessary, invented in full by dark conspiracies and likely drug war cartels fighting for turf control. These dark forces have had no qualm to use a state conflict to solve their own internal problems, harking back to imperial models of having the natives fight it ought for the honor of being directly under the toe of the colonial master. Chavismo there cannot even match the epic of Tlaxcala or the complexity of Plassey.
That is not all. There are no people drowning in the Mediterranean but poor Colombians wading in a shallow river with the lone bag they were allowed to carry. No real fences like in Hungary but a mere cattle guard here and there.
Even in infamy chavismo is so tacky, so venial, so corrupt that it cannot create a moment of epic or even true outrage. The word is taking its time in condemning the regime abuses on the Colombians it unjustly expels because they are mesmerized by the fact the regime is seriously wanting them to believe that these scared house wives wading dirty water are the cause of all of Venezuela trouble.
But one thing is not missing, fascism. In addition of all sort of promoted tweet support the regime has even produced Colombians supporting the abuse. A tropical Nazi paradise cannot be that far away.
 |
| Refugee camp and a meager army to push them away, not even allowing them to go the next bridge... |
 |
| Apartheid worse, R on houses that have been "revised" searched. Some have a D for scheduled demolition. |
------------------------------------
First video Maduro says horrors about Colombians and states that Colombians come to Venezuelan Bolivarian Paradise just like from Africa migrants go to Europe. Pathetic, the more so he is from Cucuta so we have there his subconscious betraying him in not wanting to be Colombian, like some kid in Austria, you know.
In this one the goebbelian frau Rodriguez says that all is an invention, that nothing is going on at the border, that the scenes are invented. Both videos promptly posted by the people of Maria Corina Machado apparently FROM international footage of news. Footage that is of course not shown on Venezuelan TV.
Monday, 24 August 2015
Will it hold?
It seems that creating an unjustified "state of emergency" at the border with Colombia has accelerated talk of regime "change". We have Miguel, or a nice article at the FT (subscription) by Daniel Lansberg or a dire "self-coup" from Oppenheimer at the Miami Herald. Readers of this blog should not be surprised as I have expressed often my doubts at the elections on December 6 would be actually held, or when describing how the country was collapsing steadily.
Rather than going into the macro thing covered extensively elsewhere, let me go first into the micro stuff.
The fact of the matter is that shelves of non controlled products at grocery stores are getting empty. As for the controlled stuff when it arrives, it is in insufficient quantities, immediately sold, often among some trouble and even looting outside of Caracas as the situation there is much worse. But this you already knew, it's just that it's getting worse by the day.
But scarcity of food and medicine is just the apparent face. The reality is much worse as it is more and more difficult to produce food and medicine. It is not that raw materials are lesser and lesser amounts, it is that working with the limited amounts available is increasingly difficult. Not only spare parts deficiency stop production lines frequently, in addition to raw material erratic deliveries, but insecurity in transport and distribution make the few still producing reluctant to ship far away or to risky areas.
And that is not all. To the above problems you must add a renewed corruption drive where public "servants" now are asking straight to your face cash to perform the duties that they are required to perform by law. Not only inspectors now are blunt about asking you for money or they will close your facility on some dumb excuse that would carry at worst a small fine, but requesting permits for whatever has become an ordeal.
I am not going to give you references for the above: this all is my personal day to day experience. We are helpless in front of it all. There is nowhere to go for redress of any abuse, of any black market activity.
As expected this is having a deleterious effect on the political climate, explaining why the regime is grasping at any excuse to blame others for its failures. It was the "economic war" then it was the irridente Esequibo, today it is Colombia unable to control its borders and promoting paramilitaries even though we ALL KNOW that the huge contraband at the border can only happen because of the connivance or actual help from the Venezuelan military. Tomorrow? It will get worse as these political shows have a light traction, at best, for the regime's political aims. Polls this week seem to credit that if fair elections were held the opposition is above 20% the regime and up and up. Difficult to see how the regime could bridge the gap by December 6. Short of miraculously ending all food and medicine lines I do not see how the regime can reduce the spread to less than 10%, the maximum amount that it can compensate through electoral cheating.
This being said it is quite clear that the Tachira "emergency" and the abuses perpetrated against defenseless Colombian migrants are a clear step in the strategy to falsify the election. The hope is that cheap nationalism will be enough to reverse the regime's fortunes, or otherwise justify a national "emergency" that will allow a postponement of elections in the hope of better electoral days.
This all we can take as "fact". What is more worrisome is that the regime in full economic debacle IS NOT taking ANY MEASURE. ANY. Unless arresting a few assholes with an extra 10 pounds of corn flour or a few gallons of gas on their bike to Colombia count as an economic measure in a country with maybe 30 million folks. Why? Are we that broke that we cannot even buy basic staples overseas? Is the regime so politically helpless that we cannot even increase the price of gas to a dime a gallon? Are divisions and/or incompetence so entrenched in the regime that they cannot come up with or decide on a single measure to deal with the situation? Measures exist, simple, like a devaluation from 6.3 to 100 which, believe it or not, would have more beneficial effects on inflation than negative ones.
Or is it that the regime is so convinced of its own demise that it is playing the burnt earth card?
Which bring us to the title. My own opinion is that it is a distinct possibility that the regime will not hold until December 6. Either Maduro will be gone, or the regime will have morphed into your regular explicit proto-totalitarian dictatorship. Even if measures are taken TODAY they cannot have much effect by December 6. Even if the regime brings in a whole bunch of imports they are not here yet, they would be insufficient, they will not be spread efficiently and at best could only reach the hard core chavismo.
It is just too late to save the regime in December 6, even if electoral cheating is applied bluntly irregardless of world observation. It would be worse than when Ahmadinejad was fraudulently elected against Mousavi.
Thus the possibility of regime "change", from a Maduro resignation to a coup and bloody repression is becoming quite distinct. Whichever it is one thing is certain: it will not go away peacefully.
Rather than going into the macro thing covered extensively elsewhere, let me go first into the micro stuff.
The fact of the matter is that shelves of non controlled products at grocery stores are getting empty. As for the controlled stuff when it arrives, it is in insufficient quantities, immediately sold, often among some trouble and even looting outside of Caracas as the situation there is much worse. But this you already knew, it's just that it's getting worse by the day.
But scarcity of food and medicine is just the apparent face. The reality is much worse as it is more and more difficult to produce food and medicine. It is not that raw materials are lesser and lesser amounts, it is that working with the limited amounts available is increasingly difficult. Not only spare parts deficiency stop production lines frequently, in addition to raw material erratic deliveries, but insecurity in transport and distribution make the few still producing reluctant to ship far away or to risky areas.
And that is not all. To the above problems you must add a renewed corruption drive where public "servants" now are asking straight to your face cash to perform the duties that they are required to perform by law. Not only inspectors now are blunt about asking you for money or they will close your facility on some dumb excuse that would carry at worst a small fine, but requesting permits for whatever has become an ordeal.
I am not going to give you references for the above: this all is my personal day to day experience. We are helpless in front of it all. There is nowhere to go for redress of any abuse, of any black market activity.
As expected this is having a deleterious effect on the political climate, explaining why the regime is grasping at any excuse to blame others for its failures. It was the "economic war" then it was the irridente Esequibo, today it is Colombia unable to control its borders and promoting paramilitaries even though we ALL KNOW that the huge contraband at the border can only happen because of the connivance or actual help from the Venezuelan military. Tomorrow? It will get worse as these political shows have a light traction, at best, for the regime's political aims. Polls this week seem to credit that if fair elections were held the opposition is above 20% the regime and up and up. Difficult to see how the regime could bridge the gap by December 6. Short of miraculously ending all food and medicine lines I do not see how the regime can reduce the spread to less than 10%, the maximum amount that it can compensate through electoral cheating.
This being said it is quite clear that the Tachira "emergency" and the abuses perpetrated against defenseless Colombian migrants are a clear step in the strategy to falsify the election. The hope is that cheap nationalism will be enough to reverse the regime's fortunes, or otherwise justify a national "emergency" that will allow a postponement of elections in the hope of better electoral days.
This all we can take as "fact". What is more worrisome is that the regime in full economic debacle IS NOT taking ANY MEASURE. ANY. Unless arresting a few assholes with an extra 10 pounds of corn flour or a few gallons of gas on their bike to Colombia count as an economic measure in a country with maybe 30 million folks. Why? Are we that broke that we cannot even buy basic staples overseas? Is the regime so politically helpless that we cannot even increase the price of gas to a dime a gallon? Are divisions and/or incompetence so entrenched in the regime that they cannot come up with or decide on a single measure to deal with the situation? Measures exist, simple, like a devaluation from 6.3 to 100 which, believe it or not, would have more beneficial effects on inflation than negative ones.
Or is it that the regime is so convinced of its own demise that it is playing the burnt earth card?
Which bring us to the title. My own opinion is that it is a distinct possibility that the regime will not hold until December 6. Either Maduro will be gone, or the regime will have morphed into your regular explicit proto-totalitarian dictatorship. Even if measures are taken TODAY they cannot have much effect by December 6. Even if the regime brings in a whole bunch of imports they are not here yet, they would be insufficient, they will not be spread efficiently and at best could only reach the hard core chavismo.
It is just too late to save the regime in December 6, even if electoral cheating is applied bluntly irregardless of world observation. It would be worse than when Ahmadinejad was fraudulently elected against Mousavi.
Thus the possibility of regime "change", from a Maduro resignation to a coup and bloody repression is becoming quite distinct. Whichever it is one thing is certain: it will not go away peacefully.
Friday, 21 August 2015
Brief electoral report
This is not an electoral report. As I have announced weeks ago, this blog will not cover the coming elections for a variety of reasons. Still, when I read all of the nonsense or wishful thinking elsewhere, I suppose that I feel compelled from time to time to remind people that treating the parliamentary election of December as if it were a normal election is, well, close to idiotic. In other words discussing in detail the intrigues inside the MUD of PSUV is close to irrelevant. Discussing the treachery of the regime is close to redundant at this point. Speculating on the final outcome with polls and calculations is only marginally productive unless one places the comment on the consequences of the vote rather than the actual results.
Thus in no particular order a few talking points, for lack of a more descriptive title.
Electoral treachery. The regime keeps at it. In addition of banning from office for the silliest of reasons opposition leaders (interestingly no significant PSUV is banned, they do not even try to keep a vague pretense of fairness), it has now started to intervene directly into opposition parties organization on the flimsiest of excuses. Any disgruntled party member can sue its direction, win the trial courtesy DIRECTLY from the hand of the high court TSJ so there is no possible appeal whatsoever, and become the new party leader. The objective is simple: try to pry away from the MUD opposition umbrella electoral organization. Since the new "leaders" appointed by the regime are to say the least suspicious in their opposition commitment the MUD has no other choices but to expel the "renovated" parties. These in turn are expected to name their own candidates, certainly financed by the regime.
The point here is not the detail of any given electoral treachery. The point is that the regime will go in crescendo in inventing barriers to any opposition putative electoral victory and, caught in its own game, it will feel justified on December 7 not to recognize the adverse result.
Conclusion, of a sort. All of this in the end matters little. The vote is quite clear. No matter who the candidates are, the crisis has tuned out the election into a referendum on Maduro. Any yellow or red dog will get its due votes. Any treachery form the regime has no effect on the long run of things.
Do the results matter?
They do not. It is irrelevant which side wins on December 6, the task is the same for all, there is no margin of action. The price of oil keeps going down and corruption is stronger than ever. Things are so reckless that I have been asked straight for money if I want a certain permit to be processed: they will receive the request, they cannot refuse, but the evaluation will happen only if I pay a load of cash to X (fake companies exist with fiscal registry so I can even get a bill for tax purposes).
For the regime the strategy is clear: rake as much cash as possible before December 6, either to win votes, or to have a safety net if ousted, AND leave the coffers empty if the opposition wins. This one deprived of means will be destined to failure (with a fast chavista return to office). And if chavismo wins they will find a way to wing it out, using harsh repression as needed. There cannot be any other way for the colony as long as the Cuban master needs whatever it can get from its Venezuelan overseas territory. That the viceroys of that overseas are corrupt narco military and radical low life politicos only aggravates the situation.
In short, the predictably worsening economic crisis in 2016 will lead to political failure of whomever holds office. One is actually tempted to wish for a chavismo "victory" so to be able to finish it off once and for all in the following year.
The opposition will lose the election
Not only electoral treachery will be hard to overcome, but the opposition electoral umbrella, MUD, is doing whatever it takes to demotivate its potential electors. For example sabotaging folks like Leopoldo Lopez or Maria Corina Machado makes their more fervent and dedicated electoral voters want to stay home. Lack of a concrete program is as bad as lack of a principled program: lack of either one sets up the opposition for political failure after the election and has as such a demotivating effect. The current offering of being an kind of efficient chavismo, or efficient populism, an oxymoron of course, is simply not enough to pry away chavista voters who at best, it is hoped for, will stay home.
Because the opposition victory is not to get more seats than chavismo, the opposition needs a victory of at least 3/5 of the seats at stake. Otherwise it will have no veto power and no real control over a public administration and power structures solidly packed with chavista hacks. The reader should remember that the MUD is not a political party based on any ideology or coherent program, even if flawed. The MUD is first an electoral alliance to unify a splintered opposition, an alliance that has really no program beyond restoring some democracy to the country. This is by itself very commendable, but in the current calamitous situation it is not enough. Thus only a 3/5 victory will steel the MUD in front of chavismo and give it a chance to take action, if anything to call for a recall election on Maduro. If the MUD gets a simple majority this one will fall apart in front of the crisis and chavismo will not be controlled and over time will be able to pry away or outright destroy whatever it needs to recover a majority.
Chavismo will not win the election
The paradox here is that I can write that the opposition will lose the election but that chavismo will not win it. The candidate "primary" fixing process of chavismo has been very interesting. First, it was all but transparent. Second, more than half of the outgoing representatives are not running for reelection (I read somewhere that 80% were out). This does not talk at all of internal democracy inside chavismo, this talks of account settling between factions, of an absolute lack of trust in the currently serving personnel for the leaders of the current factions, or vice-versa. All prefer new blood, or have been eaten up by dissent.
If opposition need 3/5 to win, chavismo needs 2/3! If it fails to do that no faction will have an internal majority to rule over the assembly and possible outright divisions may not be contained further. With less than 2/3 of the assembly chavismo will simply have to rely even more on the military to hold unto office, either through repression, or as the only power all factions can agree on, albeit reluctantly.
The grand elector
Which brings us to the only elector that truly matters in this electoral charade: the army.
The army is under great threat. Tendency is for chavismo, and the opposition, to turn the army into the scapegoat of the whole crash. Chavismo because the army may have put the brakes of radicalization of the system. Opposition because the army did not slow down the decay and instead associated itself happily with the looting of the country.
The truth is that to avoid an outright civil war (there is already a larval civil war going on, look at the numbers of people killed every day) a grand pact between opposition and chavismo is necessary. And such negotiation can only be carried through with the consent of the fire power of the country which will be in charge of keeping order while the painful measures are being taken.
It does not matter, thus, who wins in December, the army will either rule or decide who the apparent ruler will be for the unavoidable transition.
Conclusion
Covering the current election as if it were a "normal" one albeit with peculiar/extraordinary parameters is, well, intellectually dishonest. But I suppose that journalists and bloggers and think tankers need to cover their white pages with ink, digital or otherwise.
The only thing worth discussing today is not the election or the immediate exit of Maduro. The only thing worth discussing is to demand a transition government and how to get one. Elections are not necessary. They will not solve the crisis, unless of a presidential or constitutional nature. Period.
Thus in no particular order a few talking points, for lack of a more descriptive title.
Electoral treachery. The regime keeps at it. In addition of banning from office for the silliest of reasons opposition leaders (interestingly no significant PSUV is banned, they do not even try to keep a vague pretense of fairness), it has now started to intervene directly into opposition parties organization on the flimsiest of excuses. Any disgruntled party member can sue its direction, win the trial courtesy DIRECTLY from the hand of the high court TSJ so there is no possible appeal whatsoever, and become the new party leader. The objective is simple: try to pry away from the MUD opposition umbrella electoral organization. Since the new "leaders" appointed by the regime are to say the least suspicious in their opposition commitment the MUD has no other choices but to expel the "renovated" parties. These in turn are expected to name their own candidates, certainly financed by the regime.
The point here is not the detail of any given electoral treachery. The point is that the regime will go in crescendo in inventing barriers to any opposition putative electoral victory and, caught in its own game, it will feel justified on December 7 not to recognize the adverse result.
Conclusion, of a sort. All of this in the end matters little. The vote is quite clear. No matter who the candidates are, the crisis has tuned out the election into a referendum on Maduro. Any yellow or red dog will get its due votes. Any treachery form the regime has no effect on the long run of things.
Do the results matter?
They do not. It is irrelevant which side wins on December 6, the task is the same for all, there is no margin of action. The price of oil keeps going down and corruption is stronger than ever. Things are so reckless that I have been asked straight for money if I want a certain permit to be processed: they will receive the request, they cannot refuse, but the evaluation will happen only if I pay a load of cash to X (fake companies exist with fiscal registry so I can even get a bill for tax purposes).
For the regime the strategy is clear: rake as much cash as possible before December 6, either to win votes, or to have a safety net if ousted, AND leave the coffers empty if the opposition wins. This one deprived of means will be destined to failure (with a fast chavista return to office). And if chavismo wins they will find a way to wing it out, using harsh repression as needed. There cannot be any other way for the colony as long as the Cuban master needs whatever it can get from its Venezuelan overseas territory. That the viceroys of that overseas are corrupt narco military and radical low life politicos only aggravates the situation.
In short, the predictably worsening economic crisis in 2016 will lead to political failure of whomever holds office. One is actually tempted to wish for a chavismo "victory" so to be able to finish it off once and for all in the following year.
The opposition will lose the election
Not only electoral treachery will be hard to overcome, but the opposition electoral umbrella, MUD, is doing whatever it takes to demotivate its potential electors. For example sabotaging folks like Leopoldo Lopez or Maria Corina Machado makes their more fervent and dedicated electoral voters want to stay home. Lack of a concrete program is as bad as lack of a principled program: lack of either one sets up the opposition for political failure after the election and has as such a demotivating effect. The current offering of being an kind of efficient chavismo, or efficient populism, an oxymoron of course, is simply not enough to pry away chavista voters who at best, it is hoped for, will stay home.
Because the opposition victory is not to get more seats than chavismo, the opposition needs a victory of at least 3/5 of the seats at stake. Otherwise it will have no veto power and no real control over a public administration and power structures solidly packed with chavista hacks. The reader should remember that the MUD is not a political party based on any ideology or coherent program, even if flawed. The MUD is first an electoral alliance to unify a splintered opposition, an alliance that has really no program beyond restoring some democracy to the country. This is by itself very commendable, but in the current calamitous situation it is not enough. Thus only a 3/5 victory will steel the MUD in front of chavismo and give it a chance to take action, if anything to call for a recall election on Maduro. If the MUD gets a simple majority this one will fall apart in front of the crisis and chavismo will not be controlled and over time will be able to pry away or outright destroy whatever it needs to recover a majority.
Chavismo will not win the election
The paradox here is that I can write that the opposition will lose the election but that chavismo will not win it. The candidate "primary" fixing process of chavismo has been very interesting. First, it was all but transparent. Second, more than half of the outgoing representatives are not running for reelection (I read somewhere that 80% were out). This does not talk at all of internal democracy inside chavismo, this talks of account settling between factions, of an absolute lack of trust in the currently serving personnel for the leaders of the current factions, or vice-versa. All prefer new blood, or have been eaten up by dissent.
If opposition need 3/5 to win, chavismo needs 2/3! If it fails to do that no faction will have an internal majority to rule over the assembly and possible outright divisions may not be contained further. With less than 2/3 of the assembly chavismo will simply have to rely even more on the military to hold unto office, either through repression, or as the only power all factions can agree on, albeit reluctantly.
The grand elector
Which brings us to the only elector that truly matters in this electoral charade: the army.
The army is under great threat. Tendency is for chavismo, and the opposition, to turn the army into the scapegoat of the whole crash. Chavismo because the army may have put the brakes of radicalization of the system. Opposition because the army did not slow down the decay and instead associated itself happily with the looting of the country.
The truth is that to avoid an outright civil war (there is already a larval civil war going on, look at the numbers of people killed every day) a grand pact between opposition and chavismo is necessary. And such negotiation can only be carried through with the consent of the fire power of the country which will be in charge of keeping order while the painful measures are being taken.
It does not matter, thus, who wins in December, the army will either rule or decide who the apparent ruler will be for the unavoidable transition.
Conclusion
Covering the current election as if it were a "normal" one albeit with peculiar/extraordinary parameters is, well, intellectually dishonest. But I suppose that journalists and bloggers and think tankers need to cover their white pages with ink, digital or otherwise.
The only thing worth discussing today is not the election or the immediate exit of Maduro. The only thing worth discussing is to demand a transition government and how to get one. Elections are not necessary. They will not solve the crisis, unless of a presidential or constitutional nature. Period.
Thursday, 13 August 2015
Baduelismus
A strange surprise came yesterday. General Baduel, former savior of Chavez (2002), former defense minister of Chavez, one of his personal own first political prisoners has been released from jail. Sure enough he is blocked at home, but he is out of military jail.
That he served most of his jail sentence on trumped up charges (who is not corrupt inside chavismo?) and thus was "released" to complete the rest of his sentence at home is a mere detail. What is important here is that the regime has dared to release who was a seen as one of Chavez very own political prisoners.
The reader must understand one thing about Venezuela: there are two type of political prisoners, those of the revolution and those that are Chavez personal prisoners, such as judge Afiuni, Baduel and even Lopez, though this one is a prisoner of both. The revolution political prisoners can be jailed or released at will, such are the cases of Ceballos, former mayor of San Cristobal or Simonovis of 2002 fame unjustly jailed for revolutionary political need. There are also Chavez very own political exiles, such as Rosales former Zulia governor and Chavez 2006 campaign opponent, or journalist Poleo. In short, those that Chavez has placed on his very own list in theory cannot benefit from any measure of grace. Only Afiuni did get some alleviation to her plight due to the intense international pressure, but her trial is going fast nowhere.
Thus the importance of Baduel's release. For this to happen there must have been a powerful reason, a significant movement inside chavismo to face down a Chavez order. The reader should be immediately reassured: this mean nothing good for the opposition no matter what a portion of Twitterzuela tried to make of it last night.
You can speculate, offer many readings. Here is mine for those still reading.
The jailing of Baduel had created a rift inside the armed forces. For sure, these were not going to oppose Chavez for many reasons, one being that cash was flowing into their pocket. But there was a rift inside because Baduel as a former defense minister was the voice of the army for a while and as such deserved more respect, even from Chavez. Baduel's jail was a direct message to the army to behave and it was understood as such.
But the resentment remained and now that Chavez is gone the army feels the need to come together again and freeing Baduel goes a long way even if the guy now has little power in it. Thus the real question is why is the army coming back together, taking such a stand?
The situation of the country is deteriorating fast. It is clear now with the recent looting and recent polls that the regime is overstaying its welcome and is decided in leaving nothing standing in its wake. Burnt earth they also call it. The people that will be left behind to try to hold things together, no matter what government comes, are the armed forces that will have to do all the necessary repression.
Thus, for me at least, the army comes together because it not only needs to be united to face coming harder times, but also because it needs to weigh carefully its actions so as not to be blamed for the mess left behind by Chavez. That does not mean the army is good or bad, or that a coup is around the corner. To begin with, a coup is unnecessary as this is already a military regime. What the army is probably doing at this point is getting its act together to intervene as a single voice to dictate to the civilians in the regime what to do, or to rule over a transition regime, or if needs be, to tolerate an opposition government as long as the army goes unscathed of any crime it committed during the Chavez years.
Nothing major happens inside Venezuela without the consent or action of the Army. Releasing Baduel cannot have happened without this one consent as I, for one, am absolutely sure that Maduro would not have released of his own accord a Chavez prisoner, amen of the proven cruelty of Maduro.
That is why Baduel's release is so interesting. All specuatlions maybe allowed, but what this really means is that pieces are moving inside the regime. Perhaps faster than one may surmise.
That he served most of his jail sentence on trumped up charges (who is not corrupt inside chavismo?) and thus was "released" to complete the rest of his sentence at home is a mere detail. What is important here is that the regime has dared to release who was a seen as one of Chavez very own political prisoners.
The reader must understand one thing about Venezuela: there are two type of political prisoners, those of the revolution and those that are Chavez personal prisoners, such as judge Afiuni, Baduel and even Lopez, though this one is a prisoner of both. The revolution political prisoners can be jailed or released at will, such are the cases of Ceballos, former mayor of San Cristobal or Simonovis of 2002 fame unjustly jailed for revolutionary political need. There are also Chavez very own political exiles, such as Rosales former Zulia governor and Chavez 2006 campaign opponent, or journalist Poleo. In short, those that Chavez has placed on his very own list in theory cannot benefit from any measure of grace. Only Afiuni did get some alleviation to her plight due to the intense international pressure, but her trial is going fast nowhere.
Thus the importance of Baduel's release. For this to happen there must have been a powerful reason, a significant movement inside chavismo to face down a Chavez order. The reader should be immediately reassured: this mean nothing good for the opposition no matter what a portion of Twitterzuela tried to make of it last night.
You can speculate, offer many readings. Here is mine for those still reading.
The jailing of Baduel had created a rift inside the armed forces. For sure, these were not going to oppose Chavez for many reasons, one being that cash was flowing into their pocket. But there was a rift inside because Baduel as a former defense minister was the voice of the army for a while and as such deserved more respect, even from Chavez. Baduel's jail was a direct message to the army to behave and it was understood as such.
But the resentment remained and now that Chavez is gone the army feels the need to come together again and freeing Baduel goes a long way even if the guy now has little power in it. Thus the real question is why is the army coming back together, taking such a stand?
The situation of the country is deteriorating fast. It is clear now with the recent looting and recent polls that the regime is overstaying its welcome and is decided in leaving nothing standing in its wake. Burnt earth they also call it. The people that will be left behind to try to hold things together, no matter what government comes, are the armed forces that will have to do all the necessary repression.
Thus, for me at least, the army comes together because it not only needs to be united to face coming harder times, but also because it needs to weigh carefully its actions so as not to be blamed for the mess left behind by Chavez. That does not mean the army is good or bad, or that a coup is around the corner. To begin with, a coup is unnecessary as this is already a military regime. What the army is probably doing at this point is getting its act together to intervene as a single voice to dictate to the civilians in the regime what to do, or to rule over a transition regime, or if needs be, to tolerate an opposition government as long as the army goes unscathed of any crime it committed during the Chavez years.
Nothing major happens inside Venezuela without the consent or action of the Army. Releasing Baduel cannot have happened without this one consent as I, for one, am absolutely sure that Maduro would not have released of his own accord a Chavez prisoner, amen of the proven cruelty of Maduro.
That is why Baduel's release is so interesting. All specuatlions maybe allowed, but what this really means is that pieces are moving inside the regime. Perhaps faster than one may surmise.
Monday, 10 August 2015
A guide to Venezuela eateries around the world
The Venezuelan diaspora(4%? population so far) has had an effect around the world: there are now dozens of Venezuelan food restaurants in most major cities of the "west" where Venezuelans do emigrate. I got this in the mail, a comprehensive list made by Andrew Richard and Daniela Cadena. Though In Spanish it is easy to find your way around for your own city. I include the maps for Europe and the US where most readers are. But Australia and South America are well represented while Canada lists Toronto and Montreal and many Central America countries do have Venezuelan joints.
So look to see if your place shows up and go for it. The places listed have a link.
So look to see if your place shows up and go for it. The places listed have a link.
By the way, for those who live in New York area, the Times has a complete review of the local joints.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)