This summer has been nothing of the quiet vacation time, the regime pushing up its attacks while the country is supposedly anesthetized by the summer break. Well, it is always summer here, let's call it the school break. And yet for all its effort the regime is not reaching its goals. Not that the opposition is reaching theirs, mind you. What is at work here is the relentless crisis that seems to be reshuffling the deck constantly. Thus maybe it is time to do a short summary at where we stand at.
The regime
No more pussy footing here. The regime has barked the dictatorship in that it has announced its intention to demolish the opposition. For this, fake charges are being processed against the opposition leadership, media is bought out, left without printing paper, blackmailed. Assassination attempts are made up on a monthly basis. The regime will do anything it can strong-hand to diminish the adverse result coming its way in December, the last elections that will be held with a semblance of democracy in that the opposition should improve slightly its current holdings. That the opposition will improve its holdings is not of concern for the regime: enforcing of the Communes Law will neuter fast any town-hall lost. What the regime needs is to minimize the opposition gains to avoid to avoid further loss of legitimacy in public opinion, here or abroad. Nobody takes the Maduro regime seriously. All know the electoral fraud of last April and all are actually waiting for a major defeat in December to become more vocal about it. Even the allied rogues are not as supportive as one may think they should.
Inside chavismo things are far from settled. Maduro seems more in place, but not on his own merits. In fact, his personal image is getting worse as it is painfully apparent that he is there because Chavez said so, not out of any merit he may have earned, besides his talents for sycophancy. Let's make it simple: the guy is clearly woefully unprepared for his job. Neither was Chavez but at least he had a sick charisma and a clear personal goal to direct his actions. Maduro seems lost at sea, being mean not enough to give sense to an administration. The impression of him being more in charge than two months ago seems to come more from chavismo rallying around him for electoral purposes, thus postponing the final settlement for next year.
Do not be fooled: chavismo troubles are far from being settled. That the candidates for mayor were appointed rather than selected through primaries proves beyond a doubt that chavismo is afraid of internal democracy as it is afraid of external one. Thus Cabello, for the time being, rallied to Maduro to the point of figuring both in the latest fake assassination target. One may suppose that equality in ridicule is a positive value inside chavismo.
The democrats
The big help for the opposition is the economic crisis that shows no sign of abating. No matter what the regime plans, they exhausted their funds for last October to reelect Chavez and barely had enough to ensure Maduro win in April, with the help of a few dead and multiple voters. The economic mess insure that no matter how much money they throw in the streets, basic food and power shortages will not be solved by December. And may actually get worse! After all the currency keeps diving: the black market rate is 38 for a dollar today while the official is 6,3, and the SICAD is around 11 though the regime does nto give much through SICAD. Think about it for a second: in 1999 when Chavez took office the dollar was around 0.5, and now at 30+ it means a >60 fold loss!!!!! At some point it was meant to hit the regime even with an oil barrel at 100+.
There is trouble inside the democrats too, but compared to trouble inside chavismo, they are doing great. True, there has been a few money induced desertions but all in all the opposition is holding its ground and some of the dissident may still find the way back to the fold. and for those that do not find their way back, the electoral disaster awaiting them will have at least the benefit of purging the opposition of a certain number of moles and saboteurs. The real problems are elsewhere.
There still those idiot enough to preach abstention without offering anything in exchange. Truly, they would be working for chavismo they could not be more efficient. Short of marching together to burn down the CNE and Miraflores the only option is to participate actively in December AND man all the polling stations to minimize as much as possible multiple voting and the zombie vote. I do not see these voices do either one. Fortunately it seems that the movement is starting to ebb as reality hits.
Another problem is coming from a few who decided now to criticize Capriles as the leader of the opposition. As if we had chance to pull one out of the hat to direct the campaign for next December... Certainly I never supported Capriles, only rallying him as the consensus leader. His 50% in April certainly give him the right to hold the helm until at least December 9. But some people seem to want faster exits to our crisis, or more intellectually pleasing ones such as this embarrassing tone deaf entry which proves that when you live for too long outside Venezuela......
Unfortunately the true problem is the loss of Globovision, the last network where albeit its limited national coverage the opposition could still make its points known. The new campaign is now run with a total governmental air waves hegemony where only snippets of the opposition campaign may be seen occasionally. The opposition is now forced to walk the walk and reply on Facebook and Twitter and web pages. We'll see how truly connected the country is.
September is coming. Now you have the scene as it is, before possible momentous changes start. We'll see.
Tuesday, 27 August 2013
Saturday, 24 August 2013
The Venezuelan dictatorship in action
Having made the case that Venezuela is now under a novel dictatorship form of government, there is nothing left for this blog but to illustrate our hypothesis with probationary evidence. In a single day, we got three to discuss.
The homes of the fatherland
Let's not get into the detail that the regime is breaking all electoral rules by launching strong its campaign for December municipal elections. Dictatorships follow the electoral flow chart they chose and change at will. Instead let's look at the message exposed today.
#ChavezLivesTheFatherlandContinues Let's go all to register and participate en the Network for Patriotic Homes, Bolivarian and Chavista to rule together.
In short it means that if you do not go an sign up your home in this new registry, then you are a traitor.
Translation: they certainly are not going to come and knock at my door. This is a measure to strike fear in popular districts where increasingly people are daring to vote against the regime. The published electoral results may be a manipulation but the regime knows the real numbers. In addition in popular districts where there is a certain flux of inhabitants, this creates a new up to date registry of voters, listing the many ways they can be threatened if they do not vote (by belonging to any of the various Misiones, or having their relatives in one of those). The way the state TV reports it includes a video where the ghost of Chavez floats over these Patriot Homes. Interestingly Diosdado Cabello was campaigning in Anzoategui, which in theory should be a lost cause for chavismo, with a surprising inclusive message of bringing solutions for all, regardless of their party affiliation......
Not only this is dictatorship, but it is also fascism.
Amuay revisited
You may remember the Amuay disaster of one year ago. In spite of all sorts of blockades set by the regime so we do not know what caused the accident, the opposition representatives at the National Assembly did try to conduct an investigation and got some results that they tried to deliver at Amuay Plant Management. Who refused to receive them, not even accepting the bound report. While PDVSA workers were conveniently set outside to heckle the representatives.
Well, at least they got a result. The regime decided suddenly that it will "soon" reveal the evidence that Amuay was an attack from the opposition, a sabotage to ruin the reëlection campaign of Chavez. Maduro, of course, just states that he has the evidence but he is unable even to give a hint. Nor, that we know of, is anyone already under arrest or something. Just like the myriad of assassination attempts against Chavez that have yet to yield an actual picture of the would be assassin, and even less of a trial......
Now, I am not going to put it past from some oppo loonies to set Amauy on fire. After all, next door in Colombia, the FARC is tired to blow up pipelines and electric transmission towers. So the inspiration would come directly from Maduro's pals in Colombia. However it is inexcusable that if the regime had any evidence of such a sabotage we are only told now, AFTER the opposition presented a serious paper on the matter, that the regime will not as a matter of principle even try to refute. Well, they cannot, but that is another story.
This is how a dictatorship replies to criticism, by counter attack in an outrageous manner, to drown the noise from the other side. And a little fascistic in the threats implied and vocabulary used.
Movie censorship
And to finish this on a lighter note of sorts. The latest state sponsored movie is about a moment in the life of Bolivar who is played by Roque Valero, one of these artists who after 14 years decided to come out for Chavez in last year campaign. The critic has not been good, but was not bad either. At any rate, there seems to have been a snafu in the distribution of the tracks and the regime has taken it as a personal offense, as censorship of its voice. This for a regime that has just closed down Globovision and does not allow a single opposition figure to be featured on any of the state media. Note the aggressive attack of Maduro
By the way, Maduro wants his followers to jump on Facebook and Twitter to harass the opposition participants there. Maybe I should expect more harassment? Kind of a form of censorship if you ask me. Do they read English?
The homes of the fatherland
Let's not get into the detail that the regime is breaking all electoral rules by launching strong its campaign for December municipal elections. Dictatorships follow the electoral flow chart they chose and change at will. Instead let's look at the message exposed today.
#ChávezVivelaPatriaSigue Vamos tod@s a inscribirnos y participar en la Red de HogaresPatriotas,Bolivarianos yChavistas para Gobernar Junt@s.
— Nicolás Maduro (@NicolasMaduro) August 24, 2013
#ChavezLivesTheFatherlandContinues Let's go all to register and participate en the Network for Patriotic Homes, Bolivarian and Chavista to rule together.
In short it means that if you do not go an sign up your home in this new registry, then you are a traitor.
Translation: they certainly are not going to come and knock at my door. This is a measure to strike fear in popular districts where increasingly people are daring to vote against the regime. The published electoral results may be a manipulation but the regime knows the real numbers. In addition in popular districts where there is a certain flux of inhabitants, this creates a new up to date registry of voters, listing the many ways they can be threatened if they do not vote (by belonging to any of the various Misiones, or having their relatives in one of those). The way the state TV reports it includes a video where the ghost of Chavez floats over these Patriot Homes. Interestingly Diosdado Cabello was campaigning in Anzoategui, which in theory should be a lost cause for chavismo, with a surprising inclusive message of bringing solutions for all, regardless of their party affiliation......
Not only this is dictatorship, but it is also fascism.
Amuay revisited
You may remember the Amuay disaster of one year ago. In spite of all sorts of blockades set by the regime so we do not know what caused the accident, the opposition representatives at the National Assembly did try to conduct an investigation and got some results that they tried to deliver at Amuay Plant Management. Who refused to receive them, not even accepting the bound report. While PDVSA workers were conveniently set outside to heckle the representatives.
Well, at least they got a result. The regime decided suddenly that it will "soon" reveal the evidence that Amuay was an attack from the opposition, a sabotage to ruin the reëlection campaign of Chavez. Maduro, of course, just states that he has the evidence but he is unable even to give a hint. Nor, that we know of, is anyone already under arrest or something. Just like the myriad of assassination attempts against Chavez that have yet to yield an actual picture of the would be assassin, and even less of a trial......
Now, I am not going to put it past from some oppo loonies to set Amauy on fire. After all, next door in Colombia, the FARC is tired to blow up pipelines and electric transmission towers. So the inspiration would come directly from Maduro's pals in Colombia. However it is inexcusable that if the regime had any evidence of such a sabotage we are only told now, AFTER the opposition presented a serious paper on the matter, that the regime will not as a matter of principle even try to refute. Well, they cannot, but that is another story.
This is how a dictatorship replies to criticism, by counter attack in an outrageous manner, to drown the noise from the other side. And a little fascistic in the threats implied and vocabulary used.
Movie censorship
And to finish this on a lighter note of sorts. The latest state sponsored movie is about a moment in the life of Bolivar who is played by Roque Valero, one of these artists who after 14 years decided to come out for Chavez in last year campaign. The critic has not been good, but was not bad either. At any rate, there seems to have been a snafu in the distribution of the tracks and the regime has taken it as a personal offense, as censorship of its voice. This for a regime that has just closed down Globovision and does not allow a single opposition figure to be featured on any of the state media. Note the aggressive attack of Maduro
"¿De quién es Cinex? Porque se niegan a pasar la película Bolívar. Hay que abrir una investigación porque la censura es delito en el país y quien comete censura lo tiene que pagar caro."Who is the owner of Cinex [theater franchise]. Why do they refuse to pass a film on Bolivar[?]. We need to open an investigation because censorship is a crime in this country and the one who commits censorship needs to pay big for it.This said of course with a total lack of self consciousness. On the fascist side, no?
By the way, Maduro wants his followers to jump on Facebook and Twitter to harass the opposition participants there. Maybe I should expect more harassment? Kind of a form of censorship if you ask me. Do they read English?
Wednesday, 21 August 2013
Globovision-less evenings, information-less TV
I am back in San Felipe after a few days in Caracas, when we learned the end of Globovision. And thus I had to face my first evening without Leopoldo Castillo, a.k.a. El Ciudadano. It is not that I was a slave of that show, never watching it when I am away from home, but in San Felipe it was part of my routine, the essential routine considering that I got ideas for many a post by listening to the discussions of the talk show.
No, I was not sitting in front of the set for 3 hours, I had it like one has the radio on while doing something else, only actually watching when something really interesting happened. Also, with DirectTV recording box, I often started watching after 6 the show starting at 5, zapping though all that had little or not interest for me.
But in the past decade, and the more so once Cesar Miguel Rondon was booted out of Televen, El Ciudadano was the only talk show worth watching in Venezuelan TV. Never condescending, strongly opinionated but with proof in hand, it was the crude exposition of all of the regime's miserableness. You loved it or hated it, but El Ciudadano was the star of political TV.
Now Globovision is in its agony throes. After the departure of Castillo, the truly serious journalists left have decided to go also. They did not leave at first last May, trusting that they would still be able to do some significant work under the new ownership of Globovision. The ones that left at first were the entertainers (Buenas Noches, Yo Prometo....). But the near simultaneous departure of Chuo Torrelaba and Leopoldo Castillo last week have opened the flood gates. The journalists left are the ones covering the beat, the ones too afraid of going jobless, etc... The editorialists, the ones that were able to put the news in context, the only way you can understand certain type of news in this most secretive and falsely open country, will be all gone soon because in Globovision they will not be allowed to put context.
I think that the sudden and precipitous demise of Globovision comes paradoxically from the return of chavista voices to its sets. Until the change of owners Globovision talk show anchors were tired of showing the invitations sent to ministers and directors of the regime that were declined or simply ignored. Once Globovision changed hands some started to come back to a network that was not a complacent one like the state propaganda vehicle, VTV, is. There you had the feel that the journalists cleared up all questions before asking them, assuming you could call those "questions" as they were mere excuses for starting long diatribes by the public "servant" on the set.
After a decade of boycotting free and open media the few chavista that started showing up on Globovision demonstrated that they had lost any skill at replying to questions, at accounting for their actions or their ideas. This was seen best in Grado 33, the 8PM half hour in depth research show which started to have for the first time a few chavista voices. The format was to postulate a given item and have 2 to 5 people answer a series of questions on that theme. When Grado 33 managed to have its first chavistas in the group it became dramatically clear that these people had long ago given up on thought processes, on questioning ideas, on being coherent. It was clear that after working all these years for the regime, they had become used to follow meekly directives, regardless on how nonsensical those may have been.
I suppose that it did not take long for the new owners, really figureheads for the true political operators behind the purchase, to realize that a more neutral Globovision was actually WORSE than a partial one. The order to kill came earlier than expected.
Tonight, I have decided to erase #110 on my "favorites" Direct TV box. There is nothing to watch anymore there. It does not matter what Vladimir Villegas tries to convince us with, and he does have a valid point with the double speech that many have used against Globovision troubles, the problem is that the way Globovision new owners have proceeded has killed the credibility of that network. When the best TV journalists prefer to go jobless than hold their job, you know they do that to preserve their personal credibility. Venezuelan TV? Move along! Nothing to watch there!
Ironically the main victim of Globovion neutering is going to be the chavista lumpen who is denied access to any state network. Only Globovision would show their complaint, that insecurity was killing them, that promises were unfulfilled, that they had no jobs, no lights, no water. And yet, pledging to vote for Chavez. Now they can start working on their inner contradiction and turn protest violent if they want anyone to pay attention. Paradoxically the venting off at Globovision waves may have helped chavismo more than what it thinks. But this one has been rendered too idiotic to notice. Now we'll see.
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PS: as for the future of Globovision. When a highly specific audience channel is dismissed the audience is lost. The ones that were watching state TV will remain doing so, not seeing why they should switch, just like a previous regime attempt though Canal-i failed dismally. And the ones who were devoted can only but be disappointed in the new format, and angry. Globovision was also advertising for the upper social strata which are going to be the ones deserting the fastest and the most. Advertisers are going to go elsewhere. In other words, Globovision is going to go into irrelevance and a money losing scheme for the new owners. Then again income was not the reason for the purchase.
There have been sustained rumors that Globovision was bought by a chavista faction (Diosdado?) to prepare itself for future battles when it breaks with Maduro who as president gets to keep the state media. Whatever was true in this urban legend, the panicky way the new owners chose to sped up the demise as the national situation worsens for chavismo, excludes such a future scenario. The future of Venezuelan information is Internet and its people's journalism; and back to newspaper until the regime kills all of that too. A matter of time.
No, I was not sitting in front of the set for 3 hours, I had it like one has the radio on while doing something else, only actually watching when something really interesting happened. Also, with DirectTV recording box, I often started watching after 6 the show starting at 5, zapping though all that had little or not interest for me.
But in the past decade, and the more so once Cesar Miguel Rondon was booted out of Televen, El Ciudadano was the only talk show worth watching in Venezuelan TV. Never condescending, strongly opinionated but with proof in hand, it was the crude exposition of all of the regime's miserableness. You loved it or hated it, but El Ciudadano was the star of political TV.
Now Globovision is in its agony throes. After the departure of Castillo, the truly serious journalists left have decided to go also. They did not leave at first last May, trusting that they would still be able to do some significant work under the new ownership of Globovision. The ones that left at first were the entertainers (Buenas Noches, Yo Prometo....). But the near simultaneous departure of Chuo Torrelaba and Leopoldo Castillo last week have opened the flood gates. The journalists left are the ones covering the beat, the ones too afraid of going jobless, etc... The editorialists, the ones that were able to put the news in context, the only way you can understand certain type of news in this most secretive and falsely open country, will be all gone soon because in Globovision they will not be allowed to put context.
I think that the sudden and precipitous demise of Globovision comes paradoxically from the return of chavista voices to its sets. Until the change of owners Globovision talk show anchors were tired of showing the invitations sent to ministers and directors of the regime that were declined or simply ignored. Once Globovision changed hands some started to come back to a network that was not a complacent one like the state propaganda vehicle, VTV, is. There you had the feel that the journalists cleared up all questions before asking them, assuming you could call those "questions" as they were mere excuses for starting long diatribes by the public "servant" on the set.
After a decade of boycotting free and open media the few chavista that started showing up on Globovision demonstrated that they had lost any skill at replying to questions, at accounting for their actions or their ideas. This was seen best in Grado 33, the 8PM half hour in depth research show which started to have for the first time a few chavista voices. The format was to postulate a given item and have 2 to 5 people answer a series of questions on that theme. When Grado 33 managed to have its first chavistas in the group it became dramatically clear that these people had long ago given up on thought processes, on questioning ideas, on being coherent. It was clear that after working all these years for the regime, they had become used to follow meekly directives, regardless on how nonsensical those may have been.
I suppose that it did not take long for the new owners, really figureheads for the true political operators behind the purchase, to realize that a more neutral Globovision was actually WORSE than a partial one. The order to kill came earlier than expected.
Tonight, I have decided to erase #110 on my "favorites" Direct TV box. There is nothing to watch anymore there. It does not matter what Vladimir Villegas tries to convince us with, and he does have a valid point with the double speech that many have used against Globovision troubles, the problem is that the way Globovision new owners have proceeded has killed the credibility of that network. When the best TV journalists prefer to go jobless than hold their job, you know they do that to preserve their personal credibility. Venezuelan TV? Move along! Nothing to watch there!
Ironically the main victim of Globovion neutering is going to be the chavista lumpen who is denied access to any state network. Only Globovision would show their complaint, that insecurity was killing them, that promises were unfulfilled, that they had no jobs, no lights, no water. And yet, pledging to vote for Chavez. Now they can start working on their inner contradiction and turn protest violent if they want anyone to pay attention. Paradoxically the venting off at Globovision waves may have helped chavismo more than what it thinks. But this one has been rendered too idiotic to notice. Now we'll see.
--------------------------------------------------------
PS: as for the future of Globovision. When a highly specific audience channel is dismissed the audience is lost. The ones that were watching state TV will remain doing so, not seeing why they should switch, just like a previous regime attempt though Canal-i failed dismally. And the ones who were devoted can only but be disappointed in the new format, and angry. Globovision was also advertising for the upper social strata which are going to be the ones deserting the fastest and the most. Advertisers are going to go elsewhere. In other words, Globovision is going to go into irrelevance and a money losing scheme for the new owners. Then again income was not the reason for the purchase.
There have been sustained rumors that Globovision was bought by a chavista faction (Diosdado?) to prepare itself for future battles when it breaks with Maduro who as president gets to keep the state media. Whatever was true in this urban legend, the panicky way the new owners chose to sped up the demise as the national situation worsens for chavismo, excludes such a future scenario. The future of Venezuelan information is Internet and its people's journalism; and back to newspaper until the regime kills all of that too. A matter of time.
Monday, 19 August 2013
A XXIst century dictatorship primer
Even though for informed people the Venezuelan regime has become a symbol of utter corruption, immeasurable incompetence, sublime contempt for the rule of law and plasticity for human rights, you read here and there that we are a democracy. We cannot possibly be a dictatorship because people are happy and keep reëlecting the same folks letting hysterics dominate Twitter. What these people fail to notice is that the concept of dictatorship has evolved with the times. Now, in the earlier part of the XXI century, in an age of mass media and massive social media, the tools of dictatorship have had to evolve, even if old means are yet to be out of fashion as we see in Egypt these days.
To understand that "adaptation of dictatorship to new realities" let's start by remembering what are the core concepts of democracy and, as a consequence, what trumps a democracy and can thus represent the basic tools to sustain a dictatorship.
A democracy cannot be defined alone by elections, even if those are free and fair. In a complex, multiethnic, multicultural world, and dare I invent a word, multieconomical, we need to look beyond what were the democratic aspirations of the XIX century: right of vote for all, equal justice for all and for more forward looking societies like the US, equal opportunities for all. The aspirations of the XIX century and the birth of the welfare state have led to our current system where democracy also includes protection for minorities, guarantees that a political minority can become a political majority, rule of law though independent institutions implying stricter separation of powers. Not to enter into human rights which have expanded considerably from those of the XIX century which were basically limited to habeas corpus and freedoms of the press and beliefs.
This restructuring of democracy tenets have also implied the redefinition of power. All through the XXth century democracy has had to contend with that side of human nature that wishes to control everything. This made democracy to be seen for some as weak and incompetent creating a wish for a substantial chunk of the society that wants clear and direct answers. The enemy of democracy has thus been the will of small groups who invented crass appeal to the populace, or populism, to reach power. In their more extreme forms these people went easily over to fascism or communism, which are the negative picture of the democratic aspiration, totalitarianism.
Unfortunately at this vantage point it seems that the trend is for a victory of populism in its milder forms over sensible government though we should not give up quite yet. This has been made easier because mass media cannot resit to dabble in political influence, in all countries of the world. Exciting the masses is rather easy and a few good soundbites can influence an election more than electoral homework. But yet these media and international realities make an outright grab to power more difficult than it was. Absolute control is today nearly impossible unless it was established in the last century. Thus ambitious groups and individuals had to reshape their goals.
The only thing that, with some ease, can be more or less thoroughly controlled today is the income of the country. In an authoritarian regime this is a must because the state income is used by those in powers to play off one side of the country against the other one. Other forms of control then can follow. In a welfare state age and crass consumption sponsored by all types of media living off advertising, the power of the purse is more effective than the power of the weapons. True, the other tool of dictatorships, giving only to a few powers for abuse over their brethren still exists but runs into lots of problems in an age of human rights, no matter how many psychopaths a regime can draw. Disposable bribe money works better, violent repression is a last recourse. Although preparations for repression are made as diligently as they used to be made last century.
The trick for those craving absolute power is on how to reach absolute control over the state financial resources. The Venezuelan model is the first success story though one difficult to emulate unless you have a spigot of money like the one that exists underground in Venezuela. The model was implemented in stages so that not that many people objected to it at any given time, outside of the 2002 scare.
First, you sell the empty promise of a new constitution without describing what you will put in it. As such people project in a new Constitution any of their phantasms or needs to be fulfilled. In April 1999 only 10% voted NO to elect a constitutional assembly. Then, with the new constitution as an excuse you change the institutions of the state or at the very least exchange the people holding them for your cronies. This was strategically done in December 1999 when the transition commission between the two constitutions overextended its reach in removing all the members of the judicial system it did not like.
Once the judicial power has lost its independence it is just a matter of time in taking control of the rest of the state. This was done by 2004 when the opposition was left with a few town halls and two state houses. Then it becomes easy to manipulate financial arrangements to make sure only the regime can drain the bulk of resources and distribute them at will. Once this is achieved the regime is on its way to become an "electoral" dictatorship. It takes about half a decade to create a dependent population that is too afraid to vote against the regime least it risks to lose what is seen as its lone livelihood. This was achieved by 2006 when the charisma of the leader and the dependency on state giveaway programs ensured a solid electoral victory and the beginning of the other measures more in agreement with a traditional dictatorship, like restricting the freedom of expression, or using corruption to gain the willingness of supporters to start harassing opposition people, be them politicians or mere civilians that refuse to accept the new regime.
Today, certainly, we can access Internet, we can travel outside of the country at will but with significant difficulty, we can talk freely among friends to trash the regime, we can still get significant news in some newspapers. But that is pretty much it. For the rest we are in a dictatorship, a bona fide one even though the above hides it for the casual observer.
Let's list a few of the restrictions we suffer that do look like those of a more traditional dictatorship.
All of these items taken separately could make the case for a mere authoritarian regime. Taken together they surely indicate a dictatorship.
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All of what I wrote above is documented in hundreds of posts that have been forming this blog since 2003. The path toward dictatorship was undertaken in 2004 with the apartheid political list by representative Tascon which created a class of sub-citizens, not to say traitors. In 2007 the regime suffered a setback, the last election where the opposition was still able to carry its message with some effectiveness. In 2010 the first massive electoral fraud was perpetrated, including an obscene gerrymandering that left an opposition with a majority of the vote with barely a little bit more than a third of legislative seats. Personally it was in 2010 when I started calling the regime a dictatorship. Final confirmation came, for those who still pretend otherwise, in the legal maneuvering required to violate the 1999 constitution and ensure that Maduro would be the heir of Chavez. Maduro is an illegitimate president that got its official mandate after a fraudulent election that the regime refused to audit, of course. The paradox is that Maduro is the front dictator of the country but he is not the one truly in charge. The real dictators are elsewhere to be found. But that is another story.
-------------------------------
Note
I would be remiss if I were not to mention the Venezuelan model elsewhere. The one that comes closest to the Venezuelan model is the Russia of Putin although they certainly were able to come up with the same considerations that drove chavismo to do the deed, under Cuban direction. Though Putin has been more careful at keeping appearances, so far. But the model is the same in that the regime bases its success on the spigot of cash it controls. Just as the US has financed Chavez, Europe has financed Putin.
Of the other countries that have tried to follow a Venezuelan model, only Ecuador has a small spigot of cash. If it has not become a dictator ship it is because Correa has been a better manager of the economy and has accepted that the US dollar remains the Ecuador currency. The other imitators, Argentina, Bolivia and Nicaragua are sui generis in their own with much lesser promising options if the Venezuelan cash were to stop sustaining their political corruption system. But there are other politicians that are dreaming of an improved Venezuelan system that are in the wings, in Chile, Peru, Honduras, etc....
To understand that "adaptation of dictatorship to new realities" let's start by remembering what are the core concepts of democracy and, as a consequence, what trumps a democracy and can thus represent the basic tools to sustain a dictatorship.
A democracy cannot be defined alone by elections, even if those are free and fair. In a complex, multiethnic, multicultural world, and dare I invent a word, multieconomical, we need to look beyond what were the democratic aspirations of the XIX century: right of vote for all, equal justice for all and for more forward looking societies like the US, equal opportunities for all. The aspirations of the XIX century and the birth of the welfare state have led to our current system where democracy also includes protection for minorities, guarantees that a political minority can become a political majority, rule of law though independent institutions implying stricter separation of powers. Not to enter into human rights which have expanded considerably from those of the XIX century which were basically limited to habeas corpus and freedoms of the press and beliefs.
This restructuring of democracy tenets have also implied the redefinition of power. All through the XXth century democracy has had to contend with that side of human nature that wishes to control everything. This made democracy to be seen for some as weak and incompetent creating a wish for a substantial chunk of the society that wants clear and direct answers. The enemy of democracy has thus been the will of small groups who invented crass appeal to the populace, or populism, to reach power. In their more extreme forms these people went easily over to fascism or communism, which are the negative picture of the democratic aspiration, totalitarianism.
Unfortunately at this vantage point it seems that the trend is for a victory of populism in its milder forms over sensible government though we should not give up quite yet. This has been made easier because mass media cannot resit to dabble in political influence, in all countries of the world. Exciting the masses is rather easy and a few good soundbites can influence an election more than electoral homework. But yet these media and international realities make an outright grab to power more difficult than it was. Absolute control is today nearly impossible unless it was established in the last century. Thus ambitious groups and individuals had to reshape their goals.
The only thing that, with some ease, can be more or less thoroughly controlled today is the income of the country. In an authoritarian regime this is a must because the state income is used by those in powers to play off one side of the country against the other one. Other forms of control then can follow. In a welfare state age and crass consumption sponsored by all types of media living off advertising, the power of the purse is more effective than the power of the weapons. True, the other tool of dictatorships, giving only to a few powers for abuse over their brethren still exists but runs into lots of problems in an age of human rights, no matter how many psychopaths a regime can draw. Disposable bribe money works better, violent repression is a last recourse. Although preparations for repression are made as diligently as they used to be made last century.
The trick for those craving absolute power is on how to reach absolute control over the state financial resources. The Venezuelan model is the first success story though one difficult to emulate unless you have a spigot of money like the one that exists underground in Venezuela. The model was implemented in stages so that not that many people objected to it at any given time, outside of the 2002 scare.
First, you sell the empty promise of a new constitution without describing what you will put in it. As such people project in a new Constitution any of their phantasms or needs to be fulfilled. In April 1999 only 10% voted NO to elect a constitutional assembly. Then, with the new constitution as an excuse you change the institutions of the state or at the very least exchange the people holding them for your cronies. This was strategically done in December 1999 when the transition commission between the two constitutions overextended its reach in removing all the members of the judicial system it did not like.
Once the judicial power has lost its independence it is just a matter of time in taking control of the rest of the state. This was done by 2004 when the opposition was left with a few town halls and two state houses. Then it becomes easy to manipulate financial arrangements to make sure only the regime can drain the bulk of resources and distribute them at will. Once this is achieved the regime is on its way to become an "electoral" dictatorship. It takes about half a decade to create a dependent population that is too afraid to vote against the regime least it risks to lose what is seen as its lone livelihood. This was achieved by 2006 when the charisma of the leader and the dependency on state giveaway programs ensured a solid electoral victory and the beginning of the other measures more in agreement with a traditional dictatorship, like restricting the freedom of expression, or using corruption to gain the willingness of supporters to start harassing opposition people, be them politicians or mere civilians that refuse to accept the new regime.
Today, certainly, we can access Internet, we can travel outside of the country at will but with significant difficulty, we can talk freely among friends to trash the regime, we can still get significant news in some newspapers. But that is pretty much it. For the rest we are in a dictatorship, a bona fide one even though the above hides it for the casual observer.
Let's list a few of the restrictions we suffer that do look like those of a more traditional dictatorship.
- As of this week there is basically nothing critical of the regime on TV. And on radio only in some cities. Newspapers and media in general practice a significant amount of self censorship and some news only appear in the Internet. Yes, you can still find criticism but now you must work for it, the masses that satisfy themselves on TV do not get much.
- Nobody remembers the last time the state lost a case in the High Court of Venezuela. Suing the state is a waste of time and money unless you need to do so before you can be allowed to reach for international help. Also, winning a case in court against a friend of the regime is an uphill and very expensive battle. Expensive because in the end the winner of the trial is the one that bribes the highest.
- Your property is not your property anymore. Once the state decides to expropriate you you have no recourse, your compensation is dictated by the state, not by an independent third party. And that compensation will be payed by the state whenever it pleases it.
- You cannot use your property at will. Some items now can be sold or rented only after the state consents, after deciding on the price. Your access to foreign currency is severely restricted, and only if you travel.
- You cannot manage your business as you see fit. Not only heavy regulations make it difficult to work but they stimulate extortion from abusive state inspectors. Worse, you cannot let the market decide your selling prices; and in increasing cases you cannot sell it where you want to whom you want even at fixed prices.
- For those who must deal regularly with the authorities, roughly half of the time the person that you need to reach, the one with real authority in charge, is military personnel. A large amount of governors and ministers come from the army.
- Personality cult is for all to see. Be it the one for Chavez still going on, but there is also an incipient propaganda for Maduro.
- Human and civil rights are trampled for some groups. There are political prisoners, a few but mistreated notoriously to set an example. The elected opposition representatives in Parliament are beaten up and insulted as a matter of fact.
- Corruption is eating up the country. You need to pay something for almost anything important you need to get done. Obtaining loans from state banks, any business with the state, has a a fixed percentile rate of the deal to be given to the one who signs it. In cash, no trail.
- Political segregation is the norm since the Tascon list was set in 2004. Many services now only reach followers of the regime, though badly. Obtaining a public job, a subsidized housing, a scholarship, is obtained only after pledging allegiance to the regime.
- And to close a list that can still go on, elections are neither free nor fair anymore. There is clear electoral fraud patterns that are now in the public domain. It starts with the extreme unfairness of an election where the opposition is not allowed to finance itself or communicate its program against a regime that uses all the resources of the state and the media to promote its cause and blackmail voters. And it ends with the dead voting and the end of secret voting.
All of these items taken separately could make the case for a mere authoritarian regime. Taken together they surely indicate a dictatorship.
---------------------------------------------------------------
All of what I wrote above is documented in hundreds of posts that have been forming this blog since 2003. The path toward dictatorship was undertaken in 2004 with the apartheid political list by representative Tascon which created a class of sub-citizens, not to say traitors. In 2007 the regime suffered a setback, the last election where the opposition was still able to carry its message with some effectiveness. In 2010 the first massive electoral fraud was perpetrated, including an obscene gerrymandering that left an opposition with a majority of the vote with barely a little bit more than a third of legislative seats. Personally it was in 2010 when I started calling the regime a dictatorship. Final confirmation came, for those who still pretend otherwise, in the legal maneuvering required to violate the 1999 constitution and ensure that Maduro would be the heir of Chavez. Maduro is an illegitimate president that got its official mandate after a fraudulent election that the regime refused to audit, of course. The paradox is that Maduro is the front dictator of the country but he is not the one truly in charge. The real dictators are elsewhere to be found. But that is another story.
-------------------------------
Note
I would be remiss if I were not to mention the Venezuelan model elsewhere. The one that comes closest to the Venezuelan model is the Russia of Putin although they certainly were able to come up with the same considerations that drove chavismo to do the deed, under Cuban direction. Though Putin has been more careful at keeping appearances, so far. But the model is the same in that the regime bases its success on the spigot of cash it controls. Just as the US has financed Chavez, Europe has financed Putin.
Of the other countries that have tried to follow a Venezuelan model, only Ecuador has a small spigot of cash. If it has not become a dictator ship it is because Correa has been a better manager of the economy and has accepted that the US dollar remains the Ecuador currency. The other imitators, Argentina, Bolivia and Nicaragua are sui generis in their own with much lesser promising options if the Venezuelan cash were to stop sustaining their political corruption system. But there are other politicians that are dreaming of an improved Venezuelan system that are in the wings, in Chile, Peru, Honduras, etc....
Saturday, 17 August 2013
Maduro's confession that he is a totalitarian; and yet controls shit
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PSUV flowchart? |
- Si hubiéramos ido a procesos de primarias, ¿cómo creen ustedes que estaríamos ahora? Tengo una opinión: hubiésemos quedado partidos en tres, cuatro y cinco pedazos. In short: had we held primaries we would be a fractured party today. [In this single sentence Maduro acknowledges that the PSUV is a weak party, prey to centrifugal forces, and implying he has barely control over them, if any. That he admits a reality we all knew is simply astounding, stupid, or Machiavellian as he appeals for the wish of the lumpen chavismo to be held under the sway of a great powerful leader that thinks for them. Your pick]
- [en las riamrias] la amenaza permanente de la pasión individualista de alguna gente que aspira a cargos públicos con una fuerza sospechosa. Primaries are an opportunity for unscrupulous people to reach for public office. [This is even more extraordinary. Not only Maduro admits that inside the PSUV many are wanting of a primary to attack his tenuous grasp on power, but that they have the strngth to do so. He also tries to come across as a saint, that the only way to have good public servants is to trust him. Jeeez...]
- Las primarias no volverán a celebrarse en el Polo Patriótico mientras "prevalezca la cultura burguesa de las democracias carnavalescas". Primaries will never be held inside chavismo as long as the bourgeois carnival democracy remains. [And it got worse. With that one Maduro admits that the aim of the PSUV is to become a monolithic communist party, that primaries are a fake democracy and that such a system should be eliminated and replaced in the future by another socialist system to be determined in its due time. In other words, primaries can only exist in a one party state, I suppose.]
If anyone needs to get evidence on why chavismo is not, never was a democratic movement, s/he needs not go further than yesterday's rambling of Maduro. These words were crystal clear, there is no ambiguity, the objective of the PSUV is the one party state, at best.
This is bad news, my friends.
This is bad news, my friends.
Friday, 16 August 2013
Exit Globovision
I was at a small social gathering when through twitter we learned that Leopoldo Castillo, the anchor for 12 years of Alo Ciudadano, was quitting. Thus ended the party. Thus died the last independent talk show on Venezuelan TV, and I dare say Globovision. As of tonight there is no TV network in Venezuela that has a critical view of the regime: all are either outright propaganda or neutered journalism that passes as little as possible unfavorable news for the regime. If any. Now, to get a more complete view of the news in Venezuela, the real news, the real problems, you need to read more than one newspaper, you need to scour through Internet, and if you are lucky you live in a town that has still some semi independent radio stations (independent radio stations seem to be rare these days, and only in major centers). But TV is out.
I did not like many of the Globovison features and it had been quite a while that I only watched Alo Ciudadano, as the only place in Venezuela where news were actually discussed in depth and the only TV in Venezuela where viewers could place a call and speak their mind. If many of the calls were exasperating, they did at least reflect the mood of the country opposition. Even chavistas had to call El Ciudadano because there is no place of the state media where you can call and complain.
But I never shared the rather effete and cavalier attitude of some pages that criticized Globovision as not following journalism standards of their liking. The fact was that very early under Chavez tenure Globovison was holding a war journalism. Not only its journalists had to hit the streets with helmets and gas masks, but the judicial system was sending fine after fine. Failing to understand this and making allocations for the output of the network was, for me, intellectual cowardice. (1)
Eventually the owners sensing that the regime would drive Globovison to bankruptcy decided to sell (after the RCTV closure that drew international condemnation the regime knew better than closing networks outright). I am not one to condemn the Zuloaga family for selling. First, I am sure that they did not get as much as they would have got for it if Venezuela were a more "normal" country. Second, with or without the Zuloaga family at the helm, the journalists of Globovision were doomed to lose their jobs sooner than later. I am even willing to say that the Zuloagas thought that they were getting a reprieve of at least one year for their personnel. It did not last 3 months. Any clear minded observer of Venezuela knew that the regime could not afford a critical voice anymore now that Chavez was gone and that the economy was going to the dogs. The question was not if, it was when.
The 'when' thus came in two parts.
First, it was the selling of the network to some rather new money working in insurance companies, as if that was a credential to own and direct the most famous network of Venezuela. We all suspected that the real buyers were others and that Cordero and co. were only front men. Who in Venezuela today would throw good money at a TV network who will see its share plummet once its editorial line would be changed? This could only be dirty money thrown at a network for some form of laundering operation while the regime would get rid of its best critics.
The second part came in installments. Buenas Noches was the first talk show to go. Even though it was a lousy and strident show it did not leave for its quality but for censorship reasons. Next were Yo Prometo. Soon, the tone of the news became less critical of the regime though in spite of doomsayers Globovision still did show what others would not. Early this morning Chuo Torrealba headlines round up announced that it was it was his last appearance. But the unexpected came tonight with Alo Ciudadano that even pessimists like me though would last until December. And as a staff protest about the fast speed to self censorship the nightly news was boycotted by journalists leaving Globovison with the rebroadcast of a Colombian network on its screen.
Why that sudden finishing off? Because do not be fooled, without Alo Ciudadano Globovison will become an irrelevant network. The reason why the regime decided to finish off Globovison is very simple: things are about to get so bad that they simply have to try to silence as many news outlets as possible. In the century of social networks it is a lost cause for them, but when you are desperate...... At least whomever truly bought Globovision will own the concession and can use it for the internecine chavista warfare. I, for one, could not care less to watch those.
To end this post: for those who criticized from the opposition Globovision and for those who could not be bothered in defending the last pulpit we had, now let's see what you are going to do. And for those who salivate at the potential of getting the viewers and revenue share of Globovision, wait, your turn to be closed or bought out for peanuts will come. Totalitarianism is inexorable.
-------------------------
1) Yet another example of ignorance and misinterpretation on Globovision comes from the AFP release of today, in Spanish, sorry. At the end they write that the new management was allowing government officials to visit again. This is untrue, shoddy journalism. El Ciudadano in particular got tired of exhibiting the many invitations he sent to public officials that often would not even be courteously declined. The reason why they did not come is that Leopoldo Castillo would not censor the incoming phone calls. And chavista officials do not like to be held accountable.
I did not like many of the Globovison features and it had been quite a while that I only watched Alo Ciudadano, as the only place in Venezuela where news were actually discussed in depth and the only TV in Venezuela where viewers could place a call and speak their mind. If many of the calls were exasperating, they did at least reflect the mood of the country opposition. Even chavistas had to call El Ciudadano because there is no place of the state media where you can call and complain.
But I never shared the rather effete and cavalier attitude of some pages that criticized Globovision as not following journalism standards of their liking. The fact was that very early under Chavez tenure Globovison was holding a war journalism. Not only its journalists had to hit the streets with helmets and gas masks, but the judicial system was sending fine after fine. Failing to understand this and making allocations for the output of the network was, for me, intellectual cowardice. (1)
Eventually the owners sensing that the regime would drive Globovison to bankruptcy decided to sell (after the RCTV closure that drew international condemnation the regime knew better than closing networks outright). I am not one to condemn the Zuloaga family for selling. First, I am sure that they did not get as much as they would have got for it if Venezuela were a more "normal" country. Second, with or without the Zuloaga family at the helm, the journalists of Globovision were doomed to lose their jobs sooner than later. I am even willing to say that the Zuloagas thought that they were getting a reprieve of at least one year for their personnel. It did not last 3 months. Any clear minded observer of Venezuela knew that the regime could not afford a critical voice anymore now that Chavez was gone and that the economy was going to the dogs. The question was not if, it was when.
The 'when' thus came in two parts.
First, it was the selling of the network to some rather new money working in insurance companies, as if that was a credential to own and direct the most famous network of Venezuela. We all suspected that the real buyers were others and that Cordero and co. were only front men. Who in Venezuela today would throw good money at a TV network who will see its share plummet once its editorial line would be changed? This could only be dirty money thrown at a network for some form of laundering operation while the regime would get rid of its best critics.
The second part came in installments. Buenas Noches was the first talk show to go. Even though it was a lousy and strident show it did not leave for its quality but for censorship reasons. Next were Yo Prometo. Soon, the tone of the news became less critical of the regime though in spite of doomsayers Globovision still did show what others would not. Early this morning Chuo Torrealba headlines round up announced that it was it was his last appearance. But the unexpected came tonight with Alo Ciudadano that even pessimists like me though would last until December. And as a staff protest about the fast speed to self censorship the nightly news was boycotted by journalists leaving Globovison with the rebroadcast of a Colombian network on its screen.
Why that sudden finishing off? Because do not be fooled, without Alo Ciudadano Globovison will become an irrelevant network. The reason why the regime decided to finish off Globovison is very simple: things are about to get so bad that they simply have to try to silence as many news outlets as possible. In the century of social networks it is a lost cause for them, but when you are desperate...... At least whomever truly bought Globovision will own the concession and can use it for the internecine chavista warfare. I, for one, could not care less to watch those.
To end this post: for those who criticized from the opposition Globovision and for those who could not be bothered in defending the last pulpit we had, now let's see what you are going to do. And for those who salivate at the potential of getting the viewers and revenue share of Globovision, wait, your turn to be closed or bought out for peanuts will come. Totalitarianism is inexorable.
-------------------------
1) Yet another example of ignorance and misinterpretation on Globovision comes from the AFP release of today, in Spanish, sorry. At the end they write that the new management was allowing government officials to visit again. This is untrue, shoddy journalism. El Ciudadano in particular got tired of exhibiting the many invitations he sent to public officials that often would not even be courteously declined. The reason why they did not come is that Leopoldo Castillo would not censor the incoming phone calls. And chavista officials do not like to be held accountable.
Tuesday, 13 August 2013
Homophobia as a chavista weapon to destroy the opposition
Besides that I am particularly sensitive on the topic, what was most disgraceful tonight was the deliberate use of insult and homophobia to taint the opposition. Chavismo must have reached real lows that it is left with the language of the lowest life thug as political argument against its political adversaries. Let me try to summarize briefly, if I can, if my mind clears up some after the homophobic onslaught to which we were subject today, live on TV.
The thing is that the regime has decided to destroy the opposition, or at least its leadership. Polls are not good and there is no hope of improvement as the economy shows no sign of better days, nor measures can be taken by the regime to that effect. The regime is now a military one since the only way it could have survived the Chavez death and the constitutional violations that followed is because the army accepted them. Just look at who has power in the public administration and most of the time you will bump into a barracks product. Thus the current situation is forcing the regime into its final conversion to frontal military dictatorship, of a fascist nature; and homophobic as well as are all those kind of regimes in history, of course.
Besides the usual attacks against the opposition inherited from Chavez (traitor, pro US, blood thirsty capitalist, etc.) the new regime feels like it needs to push the ante. A few weeks ago started a massive propaganda blitz trying to prove that the opposition is the real culprit of corruption in Venezuela. This is not catching much because public opinion has not a jaundiced view on corruption and know very well that the regime is the most corrupt in our history, accepting the situation perhaps because, after all, many get the occasional freebie.
But the regime keeps pushing, using the corruption theme to get rid of some of the opposition leaders. Whether the charges pressed are real is irrelevant because the controlled judicial system will do what is expected from submissive judges; and, come to think of it, what is really sought is the discredit of that leadership by association no matter what a judge does in the end. After all, the same judicial system does not bother to examine sustained accusations of public notice against the regime own corruption, cases that dwarfs orders of magnitude whatever is charged to the opposition these days.
When you lean so heavily on a supposed financial corruption that does not fly in public opinion the final consequence is that you must extrapolate it to moral turpitude. The objective is to state that the accused party is more corrupt than the accusing party on so many levels that the accused cannot fight back in public opinion, the more so when the media is muzzled. To put it more simply, Diosdado Cabello may have stolen 100 million dollars by himself against, say, the 100 thousand that Mardo laundered, but Mardo is a worse criminal because he is ALSO gay, he hires whores, he smokes pot, he does not stop at red lights for old ladies. In the fascist Goebbelian tradition it does not matter how believable the charges are, the one that can repeat them the most, and the louder, will win the argument. Or so it goes because that argument is rarely won, and not for long, but at least the opposition shuts up for a while.
What happened tonight was the crossing of that line, accusing Primero Justicia to be a haven of faggots that dabble in prostitution at Miranda state house. And challenging the rest of the opposition to remain around PJ, very close to them, hugging that bunch of faggots, corrupt faggots by association.
There is no need to enter into the details, the excuses that chavismo used to cross that line: the historical mechanism that I hinted at above are always the same, even in Communist regime like Cuba who in their drift toward totalitarianism reach the same methods that fascists reach a little bit earlier. Let's just talk about the agents and what they said.
The main one, the one that crossed that line was Pedro Carreño (@pedrocarreno_e). This character has no credibility and as such has been the henchman of Cabello to start the most grotesque attacks against the opposition (like the broken nose of Maria Corinna Machado). Why do I write this? Because besides been a lout, the product of drunken barracks and whore houses according to chavista themselves, he made his reputation on announcing that Montesinos, the henchman of Peru's dictator Fujimori, was dead (he was not, just blackmailed by corrupt chavista security) and that Direct TV decoders had secret cameras to see what people did inside their home (take that! NSA). Thus for PedroCarroña Carreño there is no problem to assume the posture he did today, and assume it with relish, sort of coming out from his closet of repressed homophobia.
I can give you a short summary of Carreño performance tonight in La Verdad including a video impossible to watch for me right now to pick up details (Internet is getting worse by the day). But I had the distaste to watch it live and maybe it is a good thing that You Tube is basically out of order in Venezuela. Or you can go to Noticias 24 who carries in highlight the words he used:
Beyond the current political crisis, I need to remind readers that long ago I have pointed at the inner homophobia inside chavismo, at my bemusement on how come many gays actually supported a movement that had only contempt for them starting with Chavez himself whose silence on the issue was more deafening than an actual homophobic comment (the sexist ones, he did spread around easily). This is a government that has done nothing for gay except promising that they would do a lot for them. No civil union, no domestic partnership, no access to insurance for partners, no nothing except a vague "we do not discriminate" when in practice you have yet to have an only gay person holding any position of importance inside the regime though we know that many are closet cases.
There is a reason why homophobia is one of the tags of this blog, a tag that yet I use sparsely to avoid making it look like a personal issue. But tonight, I felt personally offended by these chavistas speakers. And even more offended because not a single one of the other chavista representatives had the courage to stand up and say that "PJ is corrupt but we should refrain on discussing their private lives". Not one of them. All guilty by association. But then again I should not be surprised, this is how fascism works.....
PS: for those who have the stomach for it, the video ofCarroña Carreño
The thing is that the regime has decided to destroy the opposition, or at least its leadership. Polls are not good and there is no hope of improvement as the economy shows no sign of better days, nor measures can be taken by the regime to that effect. The regime is now a military one since the only way it could have survived the Chavez death and the constitutional violations that followed is because the army accepted them. Just look at who has power in the public administration and most of the time you will bump into a barracks product. Thus the current situation is forcing the regime into its final conversion to frontal military dictatorship, of a fascist nature; and homophobic as well as are all those kind of regimes in history, of course.
Besides the usual attacks against the opposition inherited from Chavez (traitor, pro US, blood thirsty capitalist, etc.) the new regime feels like it needs to push the ante. A few weeks ago started a massive propaganda blitz trying to prove that the opposition is the real culprit of corruption in Venezuela. This is not catching much because public opinion has not a jaundiced view on corruption and know very well that the regime is the most corrupt in our history, accepting the situation perhaps because, after all, many get the occasional freebie.
But the regime keeps pushing, using the corruption theme to get rid of some of the opposition leaders. Whether the charges pressed are real is irrelevant because the controlled judicial system will do what is expected from submissive judges; and, come to think of it, what is really sought is the discredit of that leadership by association no matter what a judge does in the end. After all, the same judicial system does not bother to examine sustained accusations of public notice against the regime own corruption, cases that dwarfs orders of magnitude whatever is charged to the opposition these days.
When you lean so heavily on a supposed financial corruption that does not fly in public opinion the final consequence is that you must extrapolate it to moral turpitude. The objective is to state that the accused party is more corrupt than the accusing party on so many levels that the accused cannot fight back in public opinion, the more so when the media is muzzled. To put it more simply, Diosdado Cabello may have stolen 100 million dollars by himself against, say, the 100 thousand that Mardo laundered, but Mardo is a worse criminal because he is ALSO gay, he hires whores, he smokes pot, he does not stop at red lights for old ladies. In the fascist Goebbelian tradition it does not matter how believable the charges are, the one that can repeat them the most, and the louder, will win the argument. Or so it goes because that argument is rarely won, and not for long, but at least the opposition shuts up for a while.
What happened tonight was the crossing of that line, accusing Primero Justicia to be a haven of faggots that dabble in prostitution at Miranda state house. And challenging the rest of the opposition to remain around PJ, very close to them, hugging that bunch of faggots, corrupt faggots by association.
There is no need to enter into the details, the excuses that chavismo used to cross that line: the historical mechanism that I hinted at above are always the same, even in Communist regime like Cuba who in their drift toward totalitarianism reach the same methods that fascists reach a little bit earlier. Let's just talk about the agents and what they said.
The main one, the one that crossed that line was Pedro Carreño (@pedrocarreno_e). This character has no credibility and as such has been the henchman of Cabello to start the most grotesque attacks against the opposition (like the broken nose of Maria Corinna Machado). Why do I write this? Because besides been a lout, the product of drunken barracks and whore houses according to chavista themselves, he made his reputation on announcing that Montesinos, the henchman of Peru's dictator Fujimori, was dead (he was not, just blackmailed by corrupt chavista security) and that Direct TV decoders had secret cameras to see what people did inside their home (take that! NSA). Thus for Pedro
I can give you a short summary of Carreño performance tonight in La Verdad including a video impossible to watch for me right now to pick up details (Internet is getting worse by the day). But I had the distaste to watch it live and maybe it is a good thing that You Tube is basically out of order in Venezuela. Or you can go to Noticias 24 who carries in highlight the words he used:
Responde, homosexual. Acepta el reto, maricón. Reply, homosexual. Accept the challenge, faggot [actually a much worse term in that context]Then it was the turn of Disodado Cabello, sounding more moderate after the attacks of Carreño but equally as obnoxious, equally as homophobic in defending himself against homophobia. Again, yet another product of low educated barracks (@dcabellor).
Es problema de ellos (los dirigentes de Primero Justicia) lo que hagan con su culo, pero tienen que ser serios It is their problem [PJ] what they do with their ass, but they have to be serious.
Beyond the current political crisis, I need to remind readers that long ago I have pointed at the inner homophobia inside chavismo, at my bemusement on how come many gays actually supported a movement that had only contempt for them starting with Chavez himself whose silence on the issue was more deafening than an actual homophobic comment (the sexist ones, he did spread around easily). This is a government that has done nothing for gay except promising that they would do a lot for them. No civil union, no domestic partnership, no access to insurance for partners, no nothing except a vague "we do not discriminate" when in practice you have yet to have an only gay person holding any position of importance inside the regime though we know that many are closet cases.
There is a reason why homophobia is one of the tags of this blog, a tag that yet I use sparsely to avoid making it look like a personal issue. But tonight, I felt personally offended by these chavistas speakers. And even more offended because not a single one of the other chavista representatives had the courage to stand up and say that "PJ is corrupt but we should refrain on discussing their private lives". Not one of them. All guilty by association. But then again I should not be surprised, this is how fascism works.....
PS: for those who have the stomach for it, the video of
Friday, 9 August 2013
Now what?
Yesterday's High Court, TSJ, decision was not earth shattering, by far, but it was momentous nevertheless. Though its effect has to be sought in the psyche of the players rather than any direct consequences. For the opposition, it makes little difference except that the intention of putting Capriles behind bars is truly obvious. Strategy adjustments will have to be made accordingly. For chavismo the consequences are more complex.
Nobody really expected anything from the TSJ. Personally I thought that the TSJ would have admitted the electoral challenges but ruled over them in any convenient political way at its best convenience, anywhere from rejecting them to approving them to get rid of Maduro. Thus, the outright rejection of the challenges without examination surprised me in that it revealed that the inner fights of chavismo have been put on hold, that Maduro has improved his internal positions and that they decided to put all their efforts in avoiding a debacle next December. In a practical way they need all their militants to collaborate for the "bring in the vote" and the necessary cheating required to "win". We can thus expect lot's a loving inside the PSUV.
And yet the ruling fails badly at where it matters the most. The TSJ admitted for all practical purposes that Maduro did not win in April. For all in Venezuela it is now clear that the "victory" was achieved through significant cheating, that chavismo is not a majority anymore. I insist, even for chavistas who know it as a fact but pretend it otherwise. It is just a matter of self interest, or of idiocy for portions of the rank and file who are only too willing to believe any propaganda line. For this last group, even if Capriles had officially won they would go around saying that there was electoral fraud against Maduro. This is not new, it already happened in times of AD and COPEI. What I am trying to say here is that the TSJ non-ruling but a ruling is going to have an demotivating effect among chavismo. You can see that by the PSUV leaders addressing that issue as discretely as possible compared to the loud protests of the opposition, focusing on their candidate appointments today.
But the damage goes further. Now the opposition can harp more about the electoral fraud and make an ever better argument that people need to participate, to stay at all voting stations until every ballot is counted to diminish fraud if they want a chance to improve their lot in the long term, if anything by having a better garbage pick up. Also, overseas the regime made the case easier for the opposition. Now we will have plenty of delegations going to all parliaments and courts of justice to explain, facts in hand, why there is no justice in Venezuela and henceforth make it a more convincing case that there is no democracy since there is no independent justice. Not that this will leave Maduro et al. sleepless, as the recent reëlection of Mugabe is a shining road to follow. Still, it is annoying for the chavista leadership that craves "respectability" to see all receiving them with a slight ironic smile while waiting for the check before singing any agreement.
For the opposition, besides the added plus for international opinion, if they play it well, and the creation of a martyr to be leader a la Aung San, they get a boost for its electoral mobilization. Now, any "dissent" running as a pretend in between chavismo and the MUD will get at best the votes of realtives and the disgruntled chavista that did not receive the free gift, so to speak.... Yet there is a very dark side. The opposition leadership is now under siege and prosecution and jails are in the works for many of them. The MUD was sent a clear message that this is becoming a true dictatorship and that actions will be taken. We have to see if finally the MUD will stop fooling itself and speak clearly to the country, letting all the wimps out of its coalition and focusing on the real fight with real democrats and not hanger on or outright moles.
------------------------------------------
I am putting this separate because I do not want to make a full post about it. The international actions for the opposition are of a long term nature if they succeed. And even then, it will require that at the very least enough countries take economic sanctions, etc... Because no marine is going to land in Venezuela. They are not landing in Syria, you know....
Yet, it is worthwhile pushing international actions.
First, Mugabe may be a cheat but he is not received in any decent country which eats him inside. The same applied for Chavez and will apply for Maduro and Diosdado. These people crave "respectability, and the ability to enjoy what they stole in the in places of the world.
Second, some of the actions may have positive effects at home. For example I do not know why the opposition is not announcing as of now that it will invoke the Protocol of Ushuaia of Mercosur. With Paraguay wondering the worth of returning to Mercosur, such a petition will create enough embarrassment in the accomplices of the regime in the Mercosur that they may at least demand discretely that Capriles does not go to jail. There are campaigns coming in three countries where the right democrats would love to have additional arguments to criticize the left for its fake attachment for human rights.
Third, it will complicate the intrigues of the regime as the opposition now is in good position to state that if they get back into office they reserve the right to recognize deals made from now on. Now they do not need to worry about internal backlash because they can call a spade a spade, or rather, a corrupt, a corrupt.
Nobody really expected anything from the TSJ. Personally I thought that the TSJ would have admitted the electoral challenges but ruled over them in any convenient political way at its best convenience, anywhere from rejecting them to approving them to get rid of Maduro. Thus, the outright rejection of the challenges without examination surprised me in that it revealed that the inner fights of chavismo have been put on hold, that Maduro has improved his internal positions and that they decided to put all their efforts in avoiding a debacle next December. In a practical way they need all their militants to collaborate for the "bring in the vote" and the necessary cheating required to "win". We can thus expect lot's a loving inside the PSUV.
And yet the ruling fails badly at where it matters the most. The TSJ admitted for all practical purposes that Maduro did not win in April. For all in Venezuela it is now clear that the "victory" was achieved through significant cheating, that chavismo is not a majority anymore. I insist, even for chavistas who know it as a fact but pretend it otherwise. It is just a matter of self interest, or of idiocy for portions of the rank and file who are only too willing to believe any propaganda line. For this last group, even if Capriles had officially won they would go around saying that there was electoral fraud against Maduro. This is not new, it already happened in times of AD and COPEI. What I am trying to say here is that the TSJ non-ruling but a ruling is going to have an demotivating effect among chavismo. You can see that by the PSUV leaders addressing that issue as discretely as possible compared to the loud protests of the opposition, focusing on their candidate appointments today.
But the damage goes further. Now the opposition can harp more about the electoral fraud and make an ever better argument that people need to participate, to stay at all voting stations until every ballot is counted to diminish fraud if they want a chance to improve their lot in the long term, if anything by having a better garbage pick up. Also, overseas the regime made the case easier for the opposition. Now we will have plenty of delegations going to all parliaments and courts of justice to explain, facts in hand, why there is no justice in Venezuela and henceforth make it a more convincing case that there is no democracy since there is no independent justice. Not that this will leave Maduro et al. sleepless, as the recent reëlection of Mugabe is a shining road to follow. Still, it is annoying for the chavista leadership that craves "respectability" to see all receiving them with a slight ironic smile while waiting for the check before singing any agreement.
For the opposition, besides the added plus for international opinion, if they play it well, and the creation of a martyr to be leader a la Aung San, they get a boost for its electoral mobilization. Now, any "dissent" running as a pretend in between chavismo and the MUD will get at best the votes of realtives and the disgruntled chavista that did not receive the free gift, so to speak.... Yet there is a very dark side. The opposition leadership is now under siege and prosecution and jails are in the works for many of them. The MUD was sent a clear message that this is becoming a true dictatorship and that actions will be taken. We have to see if finally the MUD will stop fooling itself and speak clearly to the country, letting all the wimps out of its coalition and focusing on the real fight with real democrats and not hanger on or outright moles.
------------------------------------------
I am putting this separate because I do not want to make a full post about it. The international actions for the opposition are of a long term nature if they succeed. And even then, it will require that at the very least enough countries take economic sanctions, etc... Because no marine is going to land in Venezuela. They are not landing in Syria, you know....
Yet, it is worthwhile pushing international actions.
First, Mugabe may be a cheat but he is not received in any decent country which eats him inside. The same applied for Chavez and will apply for Maduro and Diosdado. These people crave "respectability, and the ability to enjoy what they stole in the in places of the world.
Second, some of the actions may have positive effects at home. For example I do not know why the opposition is not announcing as of now that it will invoke the Protocol of Ushuaia of Mercosur. With Paraguay wondering the worth of returning to Mercosur, such a petition will create enough embarrassment in the accomplices of the regime in the Mercosur that they may at least demand discretely that Capriles does not go to jail. There are campaigns coming in three countries where the right democrats would love to have additional arguments to criticize the left for its fake attachment for human rights.
Third, it will complicate the intrigues of the regime as the opposition now is in good position to state that if they get back into office they reserve the right to recognize deals made from now on. Now they do not need to worry about internal backlash because they can call a spade a spade, or rather, a corrupt, a corrupt.
Thursday, 8 August 2013
A heavy fine for El Nacional to attack freedom of expression
We have just learned that El Nacional, the most anti Chavez paper of the country, and with El Universal the most venerable, has received a breaking fine of 1% of its 2010 revenue. The reason was the front page publication of a morgue picture with the bodies piled up in an utter mess as the morgue simply could not deal with the crime rates. I have already covered these issues in 2010 and I send you back to the entries of the time: this, this one and that one with the picture. El Nacional of course carries a complete historical here. Thus there is nothing for me to say in addition, just the need to point out that the repression is going full swing in Venezuela.
Millonas de Gladys Gutiérrez
Mas allá de la noticia siempre tenemos que estar pendiente de lo que representa en verdad. Por ejemplo, la multa que el Tribunal Supremo le impuso a Henrique Capriles en si es un escándalo, un irrespeto a los derechos humanos, y hasta un error ya que es fácil de pagar y le renueva su aura de mártir, dándole por lo menos un par de punto extras en las encuestas. Entonces, ¿Por qué lo hicieron?
Es verdad que el objetivo de una dictadura, cualquiera sea su forma, es eliminar los “enemigos” políticos, los que pueden crear una amenaza al disfrute de los privilegios de los encumbrados. Pero el discurso de Gladys Gutiérrez ayer también revelo el estado anímico de un régimen enceguecido por la soberbia. Ya no se puede criticar a las decisiones del TSJ porque es lo mismo que insultar, denigrar al tal TSJ. O sea, para los que no lo entiendan claro, el TSJ se siente menospreciado, humillado, disminuido sin darse cuenta que su propio envilecimiento es la causa de ello. Imagínense, no son capaces entra la treintena conseguir aunque sea uno que se sacrifique para salvar su voto, para hacer creer que hubo un debate, una sabia discusión del tema. En países democráticos las decisiones unánimes de los altos tribunales no son la regla, sino la excepción.
Todos sabemos por supuesto que Gladys Gutiérrez fue puesta allí para firmar las decisiones que se toman en otro sitio, y que tal vez le consulten. De los 30 no hay 3 que hayan llegado al TSJ por mérito académico o profesional comprobados. El más criticado de la corte suprema de los EE.UU., el silente Clarence Thomas, sería un lujo en el TSJ.
Pero Gladys es une digna representante de la función pública de hoy. Vaya usted a hacer diligencias en la burocracia venezolana y prepárese a enfrentar muros de arrogancia. Vean por ejemplo como se trata a los trabajadores en las Inspectorías o en el INPSASEL, ese mamotreto de la seguridad laboral que obliga a los trabajadores a perder un día de su vida cada mes para nada, para firmarles un reporte que nadie nunca leerá. Y menciono estos dos porque por lo menos allí usted se encontrará cara a cara con un funcionario en algún momento: en otros sitios no, nunca. No hay ni siquiera donde reclamar el mal servicio. ¿La Defensoría del Pueblo? Bien, gracias, le manda saludos.
Después de 14 años, por lo menos 10 de ellos formados por cubanos, hemos llegado a crear una casta de funcionarios arrogantes, que no toleran la más mínima crítica, porque si fuesen a enfrentar la crítica se derrumbarían. Pocos de ellos tienen méritos para los puestos que ocupan, casi todos lo son por lealtad pretendida a un régimen que con el paso del tiempo se convierte en lealtad automática, casi animal, perruna. Esto es lo que está pasando en Venezuela, con 14 años de chavismo solo nos quedan las emociones y reflejos de la naturaleza primitiva. En el TSJ ahora gruñen como perro que está comiendo si se les acerca cualquier sombra.
Lo que exacerba y expone el problema es la deslegitimación de Maduro, y su obvia incapacidad en resolver los problemas del país. El TÚ Nicolás está poniendo a carne viva la complicidad e incompetencia de los millones y millonas que lo sirven y que se dan cuenta que corren el riesgo de hundirse con él. Por lo tanto, por reflejo de supervivencia animal, multan a Capriles pensando salvar a Maduro. Ellos necesitan un pararrayos para protegerlos de su incompetencia. Chávez fue un pararrayos extraordinario, Maduro no lo es ni lo será. Ni ninguno de ellos.
Wednesday, 7 August 2013
What happened today: the post-Chavez regime digs in and scales up repression
Certainly today's headline is the Venezuelan High Court, TSJ, emitting one of its most shameful decisions ever (and the competition is stiff). But three other events today are equally telling and all put together are true reasons to worry.
Let's start with the headline. The TSJ had to make a decision on the challenge to the election of last April. The problem it faced is that any decision that would imply an actual revision of voting conditions for last April would without a doubt open a can of worms. There were already two clearly established electoral irregularities that did not require lengthy study: people accompanied forcibly to vote, on video, and the lists of people "dead" that did vote. Those two, by themselves, were enough to erase the "vote advantage" of Maduro in April and examination of the other claims would reveal that Maduro lost. The TSJ, formed by regime's place holders who simply sign decisions written by political agents, were in an impossible situation: accepting to review the challenges was opening the door for proving the illegitimacy of Maduro; refusing to review the challenges was tantamount to recognize that fraud had taken place. They chose a variation of the second, which is that the 10 electoral challenges were ill written and groundless, thus inadmissible for examination. The 10 challenges! As if all lawyers of the opposition were equally incompetent! As if the videos and death roll did not exist! As if what international observers reported on April 14 was misguided!
But that was not all with the TSJ. It decided to fine Capriles for slandering the TSJ and sent the challenge dossier to the prosecutors office to investigate further and see if other criminal charges could be advanced against Capriles. Now, this is exceedingly serious because it is not only a direct attempt at freedom of expression but it offers the regime a precedent for a new repression tool. What Capriles is accused and condemned before trial (he is already fined!) is to have criticized the TSJ decisions of January and March that gave an unfair advantage to Maduro. If Capriles is fined then this blogger also should be, and thousands of journalists, lawyers, OpEd columnists, etc, etc... who have stated the obvious, that the TSJ decision of proclaim Maduro sitting president for the electoral campaign was a violation of the constitution as only an "elected" sitting president can enjoy that benefit. This is extremely grave because now any critic of any institution of the state can be attacked by that one as defamation, terrorism and what not.
If this was not enough there are two more items to note. This morning one of the right hand of Capriles apartment was searched at 6 AM. Oscar Perez is accused on nebulous connections with Mardo, because they exchanged e-mails or something.... At this time I still cannot find a good account of the why of the case, besides him being one of the key guys of Capriles for Miranda. The timing is certainly interesting: Capriles and his people have been served notice, they are going to be hounded. And the rest of us if we support him, I presume.
But the signal of intensified repression and the reinforcing of the thugs group in power come from inside chavismo itself. Not only there will be no primary nor discussion over the mayor candidates inside chavismo but we learned that ALREADY 33 outgoing mayors will not be allowed to go for reëlection and are demanded to support their appointed wanna-be successors. Stalinist purge stand trial light version for our times.
And it is not over as all the candidates have yet to be announced. If there are flash in the pans in the new nominees to districts that are more than likely to be lost by chavismo, it also happens that mayors of safe districts are also given the boot (1). For example in Vargas mayor, the current holder, which I have reliable witness of his particularly corrupt administration, has been booted. Alexis Toledo will be replaced by General Carlos Alcala Cordones. Who is this general, for those of you new to this game? He is the brother of Cliver Alcala Cordones. This one has already been featured unfavorably in this blog, but what is the most damning is that he is in the DEA/US lists of Venezuelan involved in international drug traffic. Imagine that this just retiring general, but excessively connected with the thuggiest part of the regime, will be controlling the district with the main port and airport of Venezuela, and surely will decide what military is named to control these installations, an officer that will report in all likelihood only to Cliver, or whomever Cliver reports to in Cuba or at Cabello's office.....
I guess that by now the reader will have guessed what is the conclusion of this entry: the regime has decided to intensify its repression. Again, its inability to deal with the economic crisis and its decreasing polls are pushing it to abandon any pretense and serve notice to the opposition, external or internal, that the days of "dissent" are over and that we are moving toward a more classical form of dictatorship.
------------------------------------------
1) It is necessary to remind the reader that in a XXI century dictatorship what really matters is the control of money and justice. Thus the regime may allow the opposition to control though elections a few districts that are going to be neutered anyway. What matters for the regime is the control of key districts like those with airport and harbors, military bases, etc...
------------------------
Added later. William Neuman of the NYT just out with his piece. I am not impressed, and I merely cite it so you know you need to read blogs to know the whole story....ut I truly think
Added later 2. I realize some will complain I did not write about "what next?". But we need to be serious and think this one carefully through. Let me sleep it over.
Errata. When writing this entry I got misled by one of the links I read into confusing Cliver with Carlos Alcala Cordones. They are brothers together in the army but Carlos is not on the DEA list, it is Cliver. Even though it is Cliver who is the unmasked thug it is hard to think that his brother is not somewhat involved in the "business", or at least with the thugs of the regime on non drug related activities. So I have not changed much the paragraph on them, just corrected for names and explained the relationship. It is up to Carlos, if he is elected mayor, to prove me wrong.
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Gladys Gutierrez, the new chavismo head bitch, dye job and all... |
Let's start with the headline. The TSJ had to make a decision on the challenge to the election of last April. The problem it faced is that any decision that would imply an actual revision of voting conditions for last April would without a doubt open a can of worms. There were already two clearly established electoral irregularities that did not require lengthy study: people accompanied forcibly to vote, on video, and the lists of people "dead" that did vote. Those two, by themselves, were enough to erase the "vote advantage" of Maduro in April and examination of the other claims would reveal that Maduro lost. The TSJ, formed by regime's place holders who simply sign decisions written by political agents, were in an impossible situation: accepting to review the challenges was opening the door for proving the illegitimacy of Maduro; refusing to review the challenges was tantamount to recognize that fraud had taken place. They chose a variation of the second, which is that the 10 electoral challenges were ill written and groundless, thus inadmissible for examination. The 10 challenges! As if all lawyers of the opposition were equally incompetent! As if the videos and death roll did not exist! As if what international observers reported on April 14 was misguided!
But that was not all with the TSJ. It decided to fine Capriles for slandering the TSJ and sent the challenge dossier to the prosecutors office to investigate further and see if other criminal charges could be advanced against Capriles. Now, this is exceedingly serious because it is not only a direct attempt at freedom of expression but it offers the regime a precedent for a new repression tool. What Capriles is accused and condemned before trial (he is already fined!) is to have criticized the TSJ decisions of January and March that gave an unfair advantage to Maduro. If Capriles is fined then this blogger also should be, and thousands of journalists, lawyers, OpEd columnists, etc, etc... who have stated the obvious, that the TSJ decision of proclaim Maduro sitting president for the electoral campaign was a violation of the constitution as only an "elected" sitting president can enjoy that benefit. This is extremely grave because now any critic of any institution of the state can be attacked by that one as defamation, terrorism and what not.
If this was not enough there are two more items to note. This morning one of the right hand of Capriles apartment was searched at 6 AM. Oscar Perez is accused on nebulous connections with Mardo, because they exchanged e-mails or something.... At this time I still cannot find a good account of the why of the case, besides him being one of the key guys of Capriles for Miranda. The timing is certainly interesting: Capriles and his people have been served notice, they are going to be hounded. And the rest of us if we support him, I presume.
But the signal of intensified repression and the reinforcing of the thugs group in power come from inside chavismo itself. Not only there will be no primary nor discussion over the mayor candidates inside chavismo but we learned that ALREADY 33 outgoing mayors will not be allowed to go for reëlection and are demanded to support their appointed wanna-be successors. Stalinist purge stand trial light version for our times.
![]() |
Future narco mayor's brother? |
I guess that by now the reader will have guessed what is the conclusion of this entry: the regime has decided to intensify its repression. Again, its inability to deal with the economic crisis and its decreasing polls are pushing it to abandon any pretense and serve notice to the opposition, external or internal, that the days of "dissent" are over and that we are moving toward a more classical form of dictatorship.
------------------------------------------
1) It is necessary to remind the reader that in a XXI century dictatorship what really matters is the control of money and justice. Thus the regime may allow the opposition to control though elections a few districts that are going to be neutered anyway. What matters for the regime is the control of key districts like those with airport and harbors, military bases, etc...
------------------------
Added later. William Neuman of the NYT just out with his piece. I am not impressed, and I merely cite it so you know you need to read blogs to know the whole story....ut I truly think
Added later 2. I realize some will complain I did not write about "what next?". But we need to be serious and think this one carefully through. Let me sleep it over.
Errata. When writing this entry I got misled by one of the links I read into confusing Cliver with Carlos Alcala Cordones. They are brothers together in the army but Carlos is not on the DEA list, it is Cliver. Even though it is Cliver who is the unmasked thug it is hard to think that his brother is not somewhat involved in the "business", or at least with the thugs of the regime on non drug related activities. So I have not changed much the paragraph on them, just corrected for names and explained the relationship. It is up to Carlos, if he is elected mayor, to prove me wrong.
Guía indispensable para discutir cualquier cosa con un chavista
Con la nueva burrada que hizo el TSJ hoy se hace imprescindible ayudar a los lectores con una guía a presentar a cualquier chavista que quiera discutir con nosotros que ellos tienen la razón y nosotros estamos errados.
Saqué esta guía de Facebook, ¡Imagínense! Pero me gustó y la traduje para que sirva a cualquier persona que la necesite. Sobre todo en Twitter donde hay cualquier cantidad de chavista necio que nos atacan, y también fanáticos de la oposición que son como la misma gota de agua. El original en inglés tal como lo saque de Facebook está aquí. No tengo como acreditarlo pero si alguien lo sabe, por favor díganmelo y lo agrego aquí.
PS: Ejemplo de reglas rotas por los chavistas "es que el la 4ta..." "es que porque mi comandante dijo....". Ejemplo de reglas rotas por la oposición "es que criticar a Capriles es atacarlo....." "Es que en la calle todos están contra Chavez...."
Saqué esta guía de Facebook, ¡Imagínense! Pero me gustó y la traduje para que sirva a cualquier persona que la necesite. Sobre todo en Twitter donde hay cualquier cantidad de chavista necio que nos atacan, y también fanáticos de la oposición que son como la misma gota de agua. El original en inglés tal como lo saque de Facebook está aquí. No tengo como acreditarlo pero si alguien lo sabe, por favor díganmelo y lo agrego aquí.
PS: Ejemplo de reglas rotas por los chavistas "es que el la 4ta..." "es que porque mi comandante dijo....". Ejemplo de reglas rotas por la oposición "es que criticar a Capriles es atacarlo....." "Es que en la calle todos están contra Chavez...."
As expected, the Venezuelan high court, TSJ, confirms that Venezuela is officially a dictatorship
UPDATED. We just learned that the high court of Venezuela, TSJ, has decided UNANIMOUSLY that the electoral challenges that the opposition sent are not receivable.
There is no surprise there, though I would have expected that at least one justice would have dissented, you know, to save appearances. But the regime is now in full dictatorship mode and the time for such subtleties is past. Long past if you ask me. Also the reasons for the TSJ to discard the arguments are of no interest. It is proven already that people who were dead voted and that that many had to vote under supervision. This is public knowledge, does not require any court verdict besides the one annulling the vote in, at the very least, those centers where such fraud took place. What the TSJ will write are mere manipulations of the law, which they have been doing at a hectic pace since Chavez got sick to ensure that the regime retains power.
As a side comment, the timing is mildly interesting. Capriles announced yesterday that the opposition was tired of waiting for the TSJ and was going to go international courts with the case. Either he had been tipped about the soon to come expected adverse result, or the TSJ decided a preventive move to cow the opposition down, or at least downgrade the charge of denial of justice. A decision may be fair or not, but a decision at least proves that the judicial system took action......
As far as I am concerned it does not change anything. I am tired of repeating that Venezuela is a dictatorship, officially, since late 2010. Maybe now more will see my point where it matters.
PS: I will write more on this, of course. But where is the rush? We did not scream our lungs out in April, why rush now.
-----------------
UPDATE
As expected the TSJ dismissal is lame. They claim that 1) that the details were not precise (and the videos? and the lists of dead people voting?) and 2) the challenge had for objective to discredit the institutions more than challenging the results. Duh! Besides that the institutions are already quite discredited by themselves, it reinforces the natural tendency of a dictatorship: paranoia.
What to do now? Maybe I should buy a PowerBall ticket and bail out of Dodge...
There is no surprise there, though I would have expected that at least one justice would have dissented, you know, to save appearances. But the regime is now in full dictatorship mode and the time for such subtleties is past. Long past if you ask me. Also the reasons for the TSJ to discard the arguments are of no interest. It is proven already that people who were dead voted and that that many had to vote under supervision. This is public knowledge, does not require any court verdict besides the one annulling the vote in, at the very least, those centers where such fraud took place. What the TSJ will write are mere manipulations of the law, which they have been doing at a hectic pace since Chavez got sick to ensure that the regime retains power.
As a side comment, the timing is mildly interesting. Capriles announced yesterday that the opposition was tired of waiting for the TSJ and was going to go international courts with the case. Either he had been tipped about the soon to come expected adverse result, or the TSJ decided a preventive move to cow the opposition down, or at least downgrade the charge of denial of justice. A decision may be fair or not, but a decision at least proves that the judicial system took action......
As far as I am concerned it does not change anything. I am tired of repeating that Venezuela is a dictatorship, officially, since late 2010. Maybe now more will see my point where it matters.
PS: I will write more on this, of course. But where is the rush? We did not scream our lungs out in April, why rush now.
-----------------
UPDATE
As expected the TSJ dismissal is lame. They claim that 1) that the details were not precise (and the videos? and the lists of dead people voting?) and 2) the challenge had for objective to discredit the institutions more than challenging the results. Duh! Besides that the institutions are already quite discredited by themselves, it reinforces the natural tendency of a dictatorship: paranoia.
What to do now? Maybe I should buy a PowerBall ticket and bail out of Dodge...
Tuesday, 6 August 2013
Can we already draw a preliminary score card for December vote?
It seems so, when you consider who is running and who is not.
The announcement of Antonio Ecarri who barely lost his primary election for Caracas-Libertador that he will run anyway insures that Jorge Rodriguez will win reelection. Chavista news have wasted not time in making profit out of Ecarri announcement, trashing along way claims of the opposition on other matters. In Caracas Libertador it is inconceivable that Rodriguez polls less than 40%. It will not happen because too many vested interests in chavismo perpetuation reside in Libertador (public employees, Mision recipients, etc...). Garcia was certainly not a good candidate but Ecarri is not much better. Maybe younger, a new face, but a grating, school teacher presence. If a solution is not found I predict that Rodriguez will sail through an undeserved reelection with 45%, while Ecarri will beat Garcia by a couple of percent points, maybe 35% at best; because a few chavistas, sure that Rodriguez is going to be reelected, will vote for Ecarri to punish the 2007 betrayal of Garcia. If there was one district in Venezuela where a single candidature was the key to win, it was Libertador-Caracas.
But chavismo has trouble of its own and seems to have conceded already two crucial districts.
In Guaicaipuro (Los Teques) the sitting mayor did not get the nod for reelection. Surprising since 5 years ago Chavez had enthroned him as the real leader of Miranda through which he would fight Capriles, just elected for his first term. Indeed, Alirio Mendoza did like to make street shows against Capriles but his administration must have been either particularly flawed and/or corrupt that the regime preferred to give him the boot and named lackluster former minister Garces. The point is that chavismo has no figure in Miranda now that two of its heavyweights have bitten the dust against Capriles. So why not try with a political unknown that may do a decent job (by chavista standards) in Los Teques and look like a home grown challenger in three years from now. I give you the enthusiastic propaganda link....
Barquisimeto is another one that chavismo seems to have crossed of its lists. Held by Falcon before he became governor, this one pushed (or was forced to push?) Amalia Saez to succeed her. And indeed she went out of her way to sabotage the work of her former sponsor. But along the way it became clear that her interest for the well being of Barquisimetanos was tangential. So she was given the boot and the chavista candidate is, guess what, a military. Bohorquez was the local Nazional Guard head so there is little expectation son that character. But of course this does not faze propaganda who like for Los Teques fail to mention the name of the outgoing mayor. Just as if all was starting anew. We should also not forget as it is almost always the case in chavismo "switches" that nomination are the result of factions slugging it out. The Reyes camp, defeated last December again, having lost its main backer in Chavez, might be receding further.
Whatever the case, the opposition will need badly to win both in Los Teques and Barquisimeto to partially compensate for what is going to be a sore loss in Caracas. Well played, Ecarri! Though if you ask me, if I have to chose I prefer to lose Libertador and gain the other two, in the grand design of things. But certainly if we could pick up the three.... What bothers me is how many other Ecarri are about to pop up.
The announcement of Antonio Ecarri who barely lost his primary election for Caracas-Libertador that he will run anyway insures that Jorge Rodriguez will win reelection. Chavista news have wasted not time in making profit out of Ecarri announcement, trashing along way claims of the opposition on other matters. In Caracas Libertador it is inconceivable that Rodriguez polls less than 40%. It will not happen because too many vested interests in chavismo perpetuation reside in Libertador (public employees, Mision recipients, etc...). Garcia was certainly not a good candidate but Ecarri is not much better. Maybe younger, a new face, but a grating, school teacher presence. If a solution is not found I predict that Rodriguez will sail through an undeserved reelection with 45%, while Ecarri will beat Garcia by a couple of percent points, maybe 35% at best; because a few chavistas, sure that Rodriguez is going to be reelected, will vote for Ecarri to punish the 2007 betrayal of Garcia. If there was one district in Venezuela where a single candidature was the key to win, it was Libertador-Caracas.
But chavismo has trouble of its own and seems to have conceded already two crucial districts.
In Guaicaipuro (Los Teques) the sitting mayor did not get the nod for reelection. Surprising since 5 years ago Chavez had enthroned him as the real leader of Miranda through which he would fight Capriles, just elected for his first term. Indeed, Alirio Mendoza did like to make street shows against Capriles but his administration must have been either particularly flawed and/or corrupt that the regime preferred to give him the boot and named lackluster former minister Garces. The point is that chavismo has no figure in Miranda now that two of its heavyweights have bitten the dust against Capriles. So why not try with a political unknown that may do a decent job (by chavista standards) in Los Teques and look like a home grown challenger in three years from now. I give you the enthusiastic propaganda link....
Barquisimeto is another one that chavismo seems to have crossed of its lists. Held by Falcon before he became governor, this one pushed (or was forced to push?) Amalia Saez to succeed her. And indeed she went out of her way to sabotage the work of her former sponsor. But along the way it became clear that her interest for the well being of Barquisimetanos was tangential. So she was given the boot and the chavista candidate is, guess what, a military. Bohorquez was the local Nazional Guard head so there is little expectation son that character. But of course this does not faze propaganda who like for Los Teques fail to mention the name of the outgoing mayor. Just as if all was starting anew. We should also not forget as it is almost always the case in chavismo "switches" that nomination are the result of factions slugging it out. The Reyes camp, defeated last December again, having lost its main backer in Chavez, might be receding further.
Whatever the case, the opposition will need badly to win both in Los Teques and Barquisimeto to partially compensate for what is going to be a sore loss in Caracas. Well played, Ecarri! Though if you ask me, if I have to chose I prefer to lose Libertador and gain the other two, in the grand design of things. But certainly if we could pick up the three.... What bothers me is how many other Ecarri are about to pop up.
Why it is impossible to discuss with a chavista
Monday, 5 August 2013
Chavismo surprises us all with its mayoral candidates
UPDATED, already... I know, I know, I was going to cover as little as possible the upcoming election but the announcement of some of chavismo candidates cannot be ignored. It is at the same time a major blunder and yet a sleek political move. How so?
For his last reelection campaign Chavez did manage to attract some "stars" of Venezuela to entertain his crowds. Supposedly one of his daughters was into the move, using her daddy's fame, and money I suppose, to associate herself with some artists. Very socialist, indeed. It is of course well known that many artists are quite narcissistic and they simply cannot resist the allure of power, knowing a showman when they see one. But I digress (I am digressing a lot these days, by the way).
At any rate, there is no way to measure the impact that attracting these artists had on Chavez reelection, but one thing is certain, their career has not being doing well since. Let's take the case of Winston Vallenilla, pumped up beef cake with the according cliche brain. After a career in RCTV and his crying like a baby over its closing in 2007, he wiped his tears and decided that money was in politics. But until he made the full switch, he was making a decent living promoting all sorts of products. Since last October I have stopped seeing his face in advertisements unless of a political nature.
The thing that these people do not understand is that the crowd that can be influenced into parting with good money is, well, opposition voter, middle class. Going over to chavismo can only land you ad revenue if you market cheap laundry detergent, which Vallenilla also did. Still, this did not stop chavismo to send Vallenilla for the mayor position of Caracas-Baruta, the opposition bastion of Venezuela. I do not discard that Vallenilla may scratch a few votes here and there, but the crassness of the move may actually cost him more than what it gains. I will go on record that even if Vallenilla makes a super media campaign he will not pass 25% of the vote. And I am willing to bet less than 20%.
For Caracas-Sucre, which was supposed to be a chavismo bastion now lost for several elections in a row, the regime launches a former baseball player turned reggaeton artist. Of course, reggaeton is a favorite inside chavismo for its macho sexual context, and violence and vulgarity. Thus "El Potro Alvarez" has a chance to make some inroads against the successful work of outgoing mayor Ocariz, in spite of all the sabotage he suffered. But I doubt he will prevail and as is the case of Vallenilla it may be counter productive when people realize that El Potro is doing the race for the fun of it, not knowing shit about what it takes to run the possibly most difficult district to run in the whole of Venezuela. The days of your vote for a song may be over when you stand in line for food. Still, for the interested reader Panorama has an "artistic profile" of Antonio Alvarez, "El Potro".
But chavismo has more than entertainers to tap on. There are also journalists that act as entertainers and as such can be thrown to run for mayor. Let's start by the surprising choice for Maracaibo, Perez Pirela, or Pispireto Pirela as I used to call him. The guy presents himself as a "philosopher" I kid you not! But watch his evening show in VTV to know that he is from the school of those philosophers that saw nothing wrong with Hitler or Stalin. He came to fame in the pages of this blog through a particularly hallucinatory conspiracy where supposedly cover agents inside Venezuela were receiving their cues from the cross words of Ultimas Noticias.
A couple of days ago we were on the expectation that Perez Pirela would be named information minister, allowing us to get finally a true Goebbels in that position. This because its current holder and former journalist, Ernesto Villegas, was launched for Caracas at large mayor. Instead, nepotism being rampant, it is the sister of Caracas mayor that got the job. His handicap there is different, besides his absolute lack of charisma: he is running for a job that chavismo has spent 5 years downgrading. Zero credibility in his run.....
So, you may think, why is chavismo sending a whole set of folks that are going to crash (amen of those that will not be allowed to stand for reelection as the mayor of Barquisimeto who is been exchanged for yet another military lout)? Isn't that counterproductive? And that is where the sleekness of the move comes.
Indeed, all of the above have very little chance to win their seat even in the best of times. BUT! they will make people talk a lot during the campaign and they can be used to hide a whole bunch of other things. In particular what the regime has in mind is to hide the fact that no primary elections were held for its mayoral candidates, contrary to the opposition. Sending a few stars to the scaffold is, in my book, the best way to hide the apparatchiks that chavismo is going to try to place elsewhere more discretely, in positions that may actually be won. A "gatopardian" image for "change" when in fact nothing much will. Though the list of no run is impressive in its own right, when besides Amalia given the boot in Barquisimeto, we have Di Martino, Ojeda, and others like Mendoza in Guaicaipuro that are going to be no shows. This is also hidden by the Vallenilla combo hoopla.
UPDATE: El Nacional comes up with more confirmation of the mickeymouseness of these "appointments": at least three of the candidates do not vote in the district they pretend to represent. And for Perez Pirela it is worse since he votes in Chacao-Caracas.... one hour airplane from Maracaibo.
For his last reelection campaign Chavez did manage to attract some "stars" of Venezuela to entertain his crowds. Supposedly one of his daughters was into the move, using her daddy's fame, and money I suppose, to associate herself with some artists. Very socialist, indeed. It is of course well known that many artists are quite narcissistic and they simply cannot resist the allure of power, knowing a showman when they see one. But I digress (I am digressing a lot these days, by the way).
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That was then, Mr. Venezuela 1996 |
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This is now, still in fluff |
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Trucutú? |
For Caracas-Sucre, which was supposed to be a chavismo bastion now lost for several elections in a row, the regime launches a former baseball player turned reggaeton artist. Of course, reggaeton is a favorite inside chavismo for its macho sexual context, and violence and vulgarity. Thus "El Potro Alvarez" has a chance to make some inroads against the successful work of outgoing mayor Ocariz, in spite of all the sabotage he suffered. But I doubt he will prevail and as is the case of Vallenilla it may be counter productive when people realize that El Potro is doing the race for the fun of it, not knowing shit about what it takes to run the possibly most difficult district to run in the whole of Venezuela. The days of your vote for a song may be over when you stand in line for food. Still, for the interested reader Panorama has an "artistic profile" of Antonio Alvarez, "El Potro".
![]() |
Ready for Maracaibo A.C. freeze |
A couple of days ago we were on the expectation that Perez Pirela would be named information minister, allowing us to get finally a true Goebbels in that position. This because its current holder and former journalist, Ernesto Villegas, was launched for Caracas at large mayor. Instead, nepotism being rampant, it is the sister of Caracas mayor that got the job. His handicap there is different, besides his absolute lack of charisma: he is running for a job that chavismo has spent 5 years downgrading. Zero credibility in his run.....
So, you may think, why is chavismo sending a whole set of folks that are going to crash (amen of those that will not be allowed to stand for reelection as the mayor of Barquisimeto who is been exchanged for yet another military lout)? Isn't that counterproductive? And that is where the sleekness of the move comes.
Indeed, all of the above have very little chance to win their seat even in the best of times. BUT! they will make people talk a lot during the campaign and they can be used to hide a whole bunch of other things. In particular what the regime has in mind is to hide the fact that no primary elections were held for its mayoral candidates, contrary to the opposition. Sending a few stars to the scaffold is, in my book, the best way to hide the apparatchiks that chavismo is going to try to place elsewhere more discretely, in positions that may actually be won. A "gatopardian" image for "change" when in fact nothing much will. Though the list of no run is impressive in its own right, when besides Amalia given the boot in Barquisimeto, we have Di Martino, Ojeda, and others like Mendoza in Guaicaipuro that are going to be no shows. This is also hidden by the Vallenilla combo hoopla.
UPDATE: El Nacional comes up with more confirmation of the mickeymouseness of these "appointments": at least three of the candidates do not vote in the district they pretend to represent. And for Perez Pirela it is worse since he votes in Chacao-Caracas.... one hour airplane from Maracaibo.
Sunday, 4 August 2013
The pragmatic option, forced on us
After writing yesterday about what seems to be the strategy of the opposition for the next few months I read tweets from Pedro Burelli that made me think and write this follow up to last post, if you will.
Pedro wrote the following (and not directed to me, by the way)
Shit! Legal challenges to the [April] elections forgotten. December elections a formality Now @hcapriles comes up with a Constituent assembly in 2014. Lost at sea.
The translation is mine as this tweet is for local consumption. Thus I limit myself to convey the gist.
Basically I am in agreement with Pedro in that the strategy since April 14 has been deficient. But where I am coming from and that I tried to put to words yesterday is to be pragmatic, to make lemonade with MUD lemons.
The thing is that as far as I am concerned the regime is simply not going to decide on the validity of the election UNLESS the anti Maduro camp wins the inner battle and decide to get rid of him. Or he has enough of the whole thing and wants to retire in Cuba. The lackluster or rather incomplete response of the opposition to April 14 fraud has basically made the issue moot. We see that in the apathy of the opposition electorate or the unwillingness of foreign leaders to receive Capriles coming a little bit too late to complain. Even the Colombian foreign minster Friday said that Capriles would not be received anymore by Santos. The legal challenges will keep gathering dust.
I suppose that the MUD had its reasons for how they handled things since April 14. And the definitely deficient foreign communication team of the Capriles/MUD camp is only matched by his rather deficient foreign policy. Only the parliamentary initiatives of folks like Maria Corina Machado, more or less coordinated with the MUD I suppose, have managed to save the day.
But those are only details when compared to a much deeper problem at home where questioning is on the rise. And what I wrote yesterday was about the MUD finally coming to grips with its problems. I suppose I am very pragmatic on the subject and decided that proposing a constitutional movement in 2014 only if the opposition wins in December was the only thing left to do. The case sorts of go this way:
- The TSJ is not going to decide anything according to law and even less according to the opposition wishes. Thus, after three months, unless the MUD organizes a series of public demonstrations against the TSJ we may as well forget the issue.
- For better or for worse Capriles is the leader of the opposition. Not because he is that great but simply because none other is emerging and there is no time to create a new one by December. Lopez is still saddled with his endorsement of Capriles. Machado has failed to create a movement. Perez has disappeared and the other ones, well, they do not count except for Falcon but he has enough problems of his own in Lara. thus it is Capriles, warts and all.
- We cannot overthrow the regime because not only the weaponry from the army and the criminals are on its side for the time being, but also because fraud and all chavismo is still 40% of faithful supporters whereas the recent growth of the opposition is too recent to count on them to support massive protests. If there was a chance to go that way it was in April. Now it is too late. We need to wait for a new fuse.
- Thus the only option we have right now is an electoral one. Even with the CNE that did the fraud of last April. We do have an advantage this time is that we may get better coverage of polling stations because the multiple candidates for mayor and council will have plenty of friends and relatives willing to man the stations. It is true that at least in those districts where the opposition already reaches 45% it is going to be more difficult for the CNE to pull its treachery than it was for the presidential election.
- The big problem is the possible abstention due in large part to the MUD and Capriles mistakes since last April. But it is done and we need to find something to excite the voters. Even if Pedro is right at seeing a constitutional initiative as a cope out, it is unfortunately the only recourse the the MUD has to silence its radical critics.
And thus why I support the strategy announced this weekend. It is useless to argue whether it is good, it is the only one unless somebody has a better idea for the current circumstances. Of course, that does not exempt the MUD and Capriles to correct the errors they did inasmuch as possible, such as their communications with foreign press who are going to have a hard time to understand this. But still, a victory in December as the only way to have the means to change things in 2014 is the only pragmatic option at this time.
Note: a constitutional change is not the lone option that depends on winning more than 100 districts in December. A recall election of the chavista representatives can only succeed if we can claim back the city halls of Valencia and win at least the ones of Barquisimeto and Puerto Ordaz as the only way to reverse the current chavista fraudulent majority..
Pedro wrote the following (and not directed to me, by the way)
Que vaina. Las impugnaciones al olvido. Las elecciones 8D un trámite. Ahora @hcapriles se le ocurre Constituyente en el 2014. Sin brújula.
— Pedro M. Burelli (@pburelli) August 4, 2013
Shit! Legal challenges to the [April] elections forgotten. December elections a formality Now @hcapriles comes up with a Constituent assembly in 2014. Lost at sea.
The translation is mine as this tweet is for local consumption. Thus I limit myself to convey the gist.
Basically I am in agreement with Pedro in that the strategy since April 14 has been deficient. But where I am coming from and that I tried to put to words yesterday is to be pragmatic, to make lemonade with MUD lemons.
The thing is that as far as I am concerned the regime is simply not going to decide on the validity of the election UNLESS the anti Maduro camp wins the inner battle and decide to get rid of him. Or he has enough of the whole thing and wants to retire in Cuba. The lackluster or rather incomplete response of the opposition to April 14 fraud has basically made the issue moot. We see that in the apathy of the opposition electorate or the unwillingness of foreign leaders to receive Capriles coming a little bit too late to complain. Even the Colombian foreign minster Friday said that Capriles would not be received anymore by Santos. The legal challenges will keep gathering dust.
I suppose that the MUD had its reasons for how they handled things since April 14. And the definitely deficient foreign communication team of the Capriles/MUD camp is only matched by his rather deficient foreign policy. Only the parliamentary initiatives of folks like Maria Corina Machado, more or less coordinated with the MUD I suppose, have managed to save the day.
But those are only details when compared to a much deeper problem at home where questioning is on the rise. And what I wrote yesterday was about the MUD finally coming to grips with its problems. I suppose I am very pragmatic on the subject and decided that proposing a constitutional movement in 2014 only if the opposition wins in December was the only thing left to do. The case sorts of go this way:
- The TSJ is not going to decide anything according to law and even less according to the opposition wishes. Thus, after three months, unless the MUD organizes a series of public demonstrations against the TSJ we may as well forget the issue.
- For better or for worse Capriles is the leader of the opposition. Not because he is that great but simply because none other is emerging and there is no time to create a new one by December. Lopez is still saddled with his endorsement of Capriles. Machado has failed to create a movement. Perez has disappeared and the other ones, well, they do not count except for Falcon but he has enough problems of his own in Lara. thus it is Capriles, warts and all.
- We cannot overthrow the regime because not only the weaponry from the army and the criminals are on its side for the time being, but also because fraud and all chavismo is still 40% of faithful supporters whereas the recent growth of the opposition is too recent to count on them to support massive protests. If there was a chance to go that way it was in April. Now it is too late. We need to wait for a new fuse.
- Thus the only option we have right now is an electoral one. Even with the CNE that did the fraud of last April. We do have an advantage this time is that we may get better coverage of polling stations because the multiple candidates for mayor and council will have plenty of friends and relatives willing to man the stations. It is true that at least in those districts where the opposition already reaches 45% it is going to be more difficult for the CNE to pull its treachery than it was for the presidential election.
- The big problem is the possible abstention due in large part to the MUD and Capriles mistakes since last April. But it is done and we need to find something to excite the voters. Even if Pedro is right at seeing a constitutional initiative as a cope out, it is unfortunately the only recourse the the MUD has to silence its radical critics.
And thus why I support the strategy announced this weekend. It is useless to argue whether it is good, it is the only one unless somebody has a better idea for the current circumstances. Of course, that does not exempt the MUD and Capriles to correct the errors they did inasmuch as possible, such as their communications with foreign press who are going to have a hard time to understand this. But still, a victory in December as the only way to have the means to change things in 2014 is the only pragmatic option at this time.
Note: a constitutional change is not the lone option that depends on winning more than 100 districts in December. A recall election of the chavista representatives can only succeed if we can claim back the city halls of Valencia and win at least the ones of Barquisimeto and Puerto Ordaz as the only way to reverse the current chavista fraudulent majority..
Saturday, 3 August 2013
Is Venezuelan opposition dragged into a coherent strategy?
The end result of this week may be unexpected. Both sides accumulated failure after failure and yet, the opposition may have come on top significantly with the real tool it needs most: a strategy.
The regime accumulated failure after failure, clearly. The undeserved prosecution of representative Mardo was perceived by most in the country as a at best a distraction move from dire reality and at worse an unspeakable abuse of power from people that had no moral grounds for that. Then, as a knee jerk reaction, the most corrupt regime in Venezuela's history called for a rally against corruption. This rally this morning was by all accounts a failure, as seen on TV. And to complete the day it was announced at the post march rally that the communication minister, a charismaticless journalist, has been named the candidate for Greater Caracas Mayor without consultation and even less of a primary; with the added contradiction that the regime has wanted to destroy that position for the last 4 years and that suddenly it wants it. The accumulation is synergistic and we may have a major political mistake from the regime, a mistake that may be of major consequences.
The opposition errors come more for their erratic organization and centrifugal forces. Mardo may have seen as a victim but he did not raise by himself major sympathy. After all, no politician that keeps bouncing from any elected office to another one rarely garner respect except perhaps from his constituents that know him better. The national attention he garnered was from what was done to him more than any martyrdom essence. A normal opposition would have been divided on that matter but the aggressiveness of the regime had the opposite effect: it showed quite a united front this week. Yet, once Mardo was done in by the Assembly the opposition hurriedly and unwisely called for a few actions across the country.
I can verify that in San Felipe the local rally never reached 100 people. It was ill planned, in an unsuitable spot, at a terrible time for the habits of the town that has Saturday morning as THE shopping time of the week. Mardo counts of little when your chance to get scarce goods coincides with the rally. That small group was so out of place and out of touch with the concerns of San Felipeños that it probably was counterproductive. The Caracas event was not even a march, but as a gathering it got a respectable attendance. Though not worth writing home about. What saved the day was that it visibly had a bigger draw than the one from the regime, who, by the way, did nothing worth noting outside of Caracas. The opposition carried the day because it failed less. Much less in fact.
The result of all this, of the clear intention of the regime to erase the opposition as needed, is that finally this one is getting is ideas in place. Today Capriles officially put himself behind a constitutional change call but with the cleverness of putting a condition: the opposition needs to win the mayor elections in December if it wants to have a chance to effect those constitutional changes. Thus the strategy is set: bring in the radical vote by telling them that unless they rally first for December their proposals will be put moot after. That way the hope is to minimize opposition abstention while the individual teams for mayor and councilmen candidates should be more efficient to limit the regime's fraud. Then, obviously for all, with a 100+ mayor it will become much easier to raise the signatures needed for constitutional reform and get the votes after.
I personally think that it is the lone way to avoid a new disaster in December. As long as the concerns of the more radical groups inside the opposition, or the mere disgust of people like me are not taken into account there is no chance to perform decently in December no matter what the polls say today. It even works to attract some chavista that are disgruntled enough to vote for the opposition in December just to force the regime to sit down and negotiate an agreement with the opposition to avoid a constitutional conflagration. And the beauty of it is that there is enough time to make this strategy prosper until December.
Let's not be blind to the reality: the hysterical power show of the regime this week, the crass attempt at creating a good corruption versus a bad corruption cannot hide the inherent weakness of this one. The regime suffers already of two strikes against: no leader able to replace Chavez and a terrible economic inheritance that the lack of leadership makes it impossible to tackle. To this the regime adds a major error: no primary to decide mayor candidates, and worse, to decide councilmen candidates where many want in. All will be appointed from Caracas. In current political language in Venezuela this means a probable fatal abstention for the regime in December as this one comes along as self serving, as defending the privileges of those already in office, not making room for new ones, not sharing the now scarce benefits. And this just at a time when the opposition may have found a way to minimize its own losses.
Even though on a foul mood through the week, tonight I find myself surprisingly optimistic.
The regime accumulated failure after failure, clearly. The undeserved prosecution of representative Mardo was perceived by most in the country as a at best a distraction move from dire reality and at worse an unspeakable abuse of power from people that had no moral grounds for that. Then, as a knee jerk reaction, the most corrupt regime in Venezuela's history called for a rally against corruption. This rally this morning was by all accounts a failure, as seen on TV. And to complete the day it was announced at the post march rally that the communication minister, a charismaticless journalist, has been named the candidate for Greater Caracas Mayor without consultation and even less of a primary; with the added contradiction that the regime has wanted to destroy that position for the last 4 years and that suddenly it wants it. The accumulation is synergistic and we may have a major political mistake from the regime, a mistake that may be of major consequences.
The opposition errors come more for their erratic organization and centrifugal forces. Mardo may have seen as a victim but he did not raise by himself major sympathy. After all, no politician that keeps bouncing from any elected office to another one rarely garner respect except perhaps from his constituents that know him better. The national attention he garnered was from what was done to him more than any martyrdom essence. A normal opposition would have been divided on that matter but the aggressiveness of the regime had the opposite effect: it showed quite a united front this week. Yet, once Mardo was done in by the Assembly the opposition hurriedly and unwisely called for a few actions across the country.
I can verify that in San Felipe the local rally never reached 100 people. It was ill planned, in an unsuitable spot, at a terrible time for the habits of the town that has Saturday morning as THE shopping time of the week. Mardo counts of little when your chance to get scarce goods coincides with the rally. That small group was so out of place and out of touch with the concerns of San Felipeños that it probably was counterproductive. The Caracas event was not even a march, but as a gathering it got a respectable attendance. Though not worth writing home about. What saved the day was that it visibly had a bigger draw than the one from the regime, who, by the way, did nothing worth noting outside of Caracas. The opposition carried the day because it failed less. Much less in fact.
The result of all this, of the clear intention of the regime to erase the opposition as needed, is that finally this one is getting is ideas in place. Today Capriles officially put himself behind a constitutional change call but with the cleverness of putting a condition: the opposition needs to win the mayor elections in December if it wants to have a chance to effect those constitutional changes. Thus the strategy is set: bring in the radical vote by telling them that unless they rally first for December their proposals will be put moot after. That way the hope is to minimize opposition abstention while the individual teams for mayor and councilmen candidates should be more efficient to limit the regime's fraud. Then, obviously for all, with a 100+ mayor it will become much easier to raise the signatures needed for constitutional reform and get the votes after.
I personally think that it is the lone way to avoid a new disaster in December. As long as the concerns of the more radical groups inside the opposition, or the mere disgust of people like me are not taken into account there is no chance to perform decently in December no matter what the polls say today. It even works to attract some chavista that are disgruntled enough to vote for the opposition in December just to force the regime to sit down and negotiate an agreement with the opposition to avoid a constitutional conflagration. And the beauty of it is that there is enough time to make this strategy prosper until December.
Let's not be blind to the reality: the hysterical power show of the regime this week, the crass attempt at creating a good corruption versus a bad corruption cannot hide the inherent weakness of this one. The regime suffers already of two strikes against: no leader able to replace Chavez and a terrible economic inheritance that the lack of leadership makes it impossible to tackle. To this the regime adds a major error: no primary to decide mayor candidates, and worse, to decide councilmen candidates where many want in. All will be appointed from Caracas. In current political language in Venezuela this means a probable fatal abstention for the regime in December as this one comes along as self serving, as defending the privileges of those already in office, not making room for new ones, not sharing the now scarce benefits. And this just at a time when the opposition may have found a way to minimize its own losses.
Even though on a foul mood through the week, tonight I find myself surprisingly optimistic.
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