As I have been writing through December in any possible way that I could come up with, the confrontation between the regime and the opposition new National Assembly is inevitable. And started in all earnest today. By demanding that almost a dozen MUD representative election is to be questioned, the regime has deprived the new majority of its supernumerary majority of 2/3 which would have allowed it to change some of the worst and more repressive and manipulative laws approved under Chavez. Namely the laws that ensure the regime's near dictatorial nature such as freedom of expression and control of the judiciary by the regime (absolute, 100% control by the way as nobody remembers the last time the regime lost a case in the high court TSJ).
True, the Assembly still preserves the 3/5 super-majority that it needs to control fiscal aspects of the regime, but the ones that matter, the ones that can bring back democracy to Venezuela, are, for the time being, lost. Let's look at some details.
The regime uses two excuses to justify that up to a dozen of the newly elected representatives should not be seated. Note: such massive annulment is unprecedented in Venezuela since regular elections started in 1958, the more so that the regime controls tightly the electoral system which makes it implausible the theory that the opposition could commit fraud at election time (see OAS secretary Almagro 18 pages letter to Tibisay Lucena, head of the electoral board CNE).
The first motive is that in a few districts the amount of nil votes is larger than the margin of victory of the opposition candidate. In the eyes of the regime PSUV vehicle this mean that the real will of the people has not been expressed. In short: the regime does not recognize the possibility of the nil vote.
The first line of criticism against such a view is that if the nil vote needs to be taken into account then there should be no abstention and everyone should be obliged to vote. An obligation, by the way, that chavismo removed in the Constitution of 1999. The second immediate objection is that there is no way to say which way the nil vote would have gone if these people had been "obliged" to make a choice. At least in that part of the ruling the representatives are not unseated outright but the TSJ has opened the door to repeat the election in those district without any justifiable reason, going over the attributions of the CNE which should decide on such matters BEFORE the TSJ does. That is, if you consider that the CNE did not give you justice then you go to the high court of the country. The regime simply uses its stronghold on the judicial power to dictate the resolutions it needs to be dictated, bypassing whatever needs to be bypassed, starting with the will of the people.
The second motive is that apparently in the state of Amazonas, in the Wild South of the country, there may have been cases of vote buying. First, let's note the absolute cynicism of the regime who has made it an institutional practice to buy vote and blackmail public employees in voting for the regime, as they did in Amazonas. After the vote we have Maduro himself on record saying that since people did not vote for him he did not see any point in keeping building housing for them. We have the director of electrical service in Venezuela firing people suspected of not having voted for the regime. We have the documented distributions of goodies such as tablets, before the election. But even if we assume that there was indeed vote buying by the Amazonas governor who seats with the opposition, how do you know the people blackmailed into voting for you did so in the end? After all the vote is secret EVEN in Amazonas; and in other areas where the regime exerted huge pressure it lost the election anyway. For example in ALL of Caracas districts. Thus vote "buying" is no guarantee of vote "getting".
Let's go a little further in the vote buying supposition. Before you write a sentence to unseat an elected representative for Amazonas, which the TSJ just did, you need to have an investigation, possibly a trial, definitely real verifiable evidence. None of these things exist to this writing, we only have declarations of the PSUV direction with an illegal phone tapping which authenticity has yet to be established. I will go further, you need to prove that the elected representatives actually worked directly at vote buying. It is quite conceivable that a third party with interest in the electoral result may have bought the vote behind the scenes but that is no reason to punish FIRST the elected official, without a trial, even a fake trial.
I trust that with these very simple arguments stated above it is quite clear for the reader that what is going on is a judicial coup to deny the genuine expression of the people of Venezuela in rejecting the regime. Period.
What can the opposition do?
It started by the easiest way offered by the hurried desperation of the regime: it decided to demand that the justices in charge of that sentence be declared as unfit for conflict of interests. See, one of the judges is someone who was a PSUV representative in the outgoing Assembly and was hurriedly, and illegally, appointed judge a week ago. Clearly, such a judge, member of the PSUV until a very few days ago, cannot be fair and impartial. And more like that.
The opposition has also other choices. It can go international and has already enough evidence to require that the OAS applies the sanctions previewed in its democracy chart. That is, demand that Venezuela be not recognized anymore as a functional democracy. Just with the precedent of the 18 page letter of OAS secretary Almagro it is near impossible that the regime wins its case. A letter has already been sent to various organizations.
However international help, if it comes, is slow. Meanwhile at home the choices are not as clear. The Assembly may decide to seat the questioned deputies anyway and thus enter in a direct power confrontation. The TSJ may disband the New Assembly for contempt, etc. etc......
The fact of the matter is that the regime has decided to use any way it can to annul the MUD victory. And that is that. Recent evidence? Maduro is using the remaining two days of his enabling law to dictate more control measures to limit the scope of action of the new Assembly. He also said that he could not care less about the new "burguesa" assembly, that he was going against the "capitalismo salvaje"
In case you have any doubt of the totalitarian mentality of the regime there is that clip from yesterday when on live TV a Maduro supporter said that any deserter of chavismo should be put down with a bullet though the head, gesture included. Maduro laughed and told him that such things cannot be said on live TV, which implies that off camera chavismo has no problem using violent and foul language to discuss the fate of its opponents/deserters/traitors. You can see the complete video to truly measure the nature of these people here, if your Spanish allows (the shooting gesture is clearer in the long version).
Friends, it is going to get worse before it gets better.
Wednesday, 30 December 2015
Monday, 28 December 2015
The priorities ahead
And thus I am on December 28 in a hurry to write something as events keep going on in Venezuela. There is no time for a holiday pause. What, with the regime's shenanigans and the opposition division and only 7 days left for the new National Assembly to be sworn in!
The regime treachery has been exposed just before Christmas and they have remained quiet since. But it is just a lull, they are surely thinking about their next step. The opposition reacted fast, a surprise for chavismo used by Chavez to do illegal stuff during holiday breaks. More important, the recent quiet maybe due to divisions of chavismo as one side is getting tired of the acts of a minority only interested in saving their skins. The internal crumbling cannot be hidden anymore.
On the opposition side things have not been going well. Capriles, again, shot himself in the foot which maybe be a reflection of the delusion inside his party, Primero Justicia, at being the recognized leaders of the opposition. Apparently they seem to think that MUD label votes were pretty much PJ label votes. I am not going into the stupidities of Capriles, I am through with him. Let's just say that if his strategy helped for 6D vote, his humanity and political sense are now highly questioned.
So, in face of the current situation what should the opposition do first as of January 5?
What we need to be fully aware of is that a confrontation with the regime is unavoidable. The only things to be settled are the date and intensity of the confrontation. If all goes well we can hope that such confrontation will be an electoral one, not a violent one. And we can advance the latest date for the confrontation: December 2016 when governors's term ends. Yet four other electoral confrontation are possible depending on the degree of regime's despair.
Maduro may resign. New presidential elections need to be called to complete the six years term (1). This would be the wisest for the regime, to let the opposition burn itself dealing with the economic catastrophe next year. The problem with that option (and all others for that matter) is that it gives the opposition time to investigate the wasted oil bonanza of the last decade. In fact that option may be the worst one for the regime, as the ones discussed next give them time to prepare better some form of golden exile.
Maduro is stubborn and with the help of a portion of chavismo a recall election is called. This has to take place BEFORE summer as a later date could reach the fatal 4 year mark in the term and allow chavismo to seat an appointed vice president to complete the term (article #233 of the 1999 constitution). In short if the opposition choses or has to chose that way it should be decided by May at the latest considering the economic costs and the developing economic crisis. Note that the success of this maneuver depends on the electoral participation and the ability of the opposition to campaign actively.
Referendum/referenda for constitutional amendments. This could be a compromise between the opposition, the army and a sector of chavismo. This tool (#341) can be used in many ways, to free the judicial system of political control, to diminish the presidential power, to change electoral system, to approve reforms that the regime blocks, etc... It also has the advantage that it requires a simple majority inside the opposition so divisions are possible in case a faction decides to go to the dark side (yes, I am looking forward to see the new installment of the ninenalogy). The problem with this approach is that it depends on too many variables, one if the eventual willingness of Maduro to play the game and recognize defeat, accepting to stay in office just to preserve the "Chavez legacy", whatever that may mean. In short the regime would evolve into some form of parliamentary system where cohabitation is possible, French way.
Constitutional reform/assembly. The reform (#342) is a more extreme form of the referenda discussed above. This one would be to unseat the judicial system at large, change the electoral system and reestablish a bicameral congress as a way to create a containment wall against a fast return of chavismo, undo a persistent undue military influence and obtain the reinforcement of decentralization. The constitutional assembly (#348) is the ultimate weapon of mass destruction if the judicial power in the hands of chavismo is used in excess against any opposition initiative. The problem with a constitutional assembly is that it is a bomb that can sweep away all parties as the economy degenerates. On the other hand it can be called at any time if the opposition retains the 2/3 vote, and can be called through signature gathering process and a referendum as long as the opposition retains a working majority.
So?
The consequence of the exposed above indicates that elections are on their way and the opposition needs to get ready for it from the very start, on January 6. For this it needs to do the following actions, ALL EQUALLY IMPORTANT.
The regime treachery has been exposed just before Christmas and they have remained quiet since. But it is just a lull, they are surely thinking about their next step. The opposition reacted fast, a surprise for chavismo used by Chavez to do illegal stuff during holiday breaks. More important, the recent quiet maybe due to divisions of chavismo as one side is getting tired of the acts of a minority only interested in saving their skins. The internal crumbling cannot be hidden anymore.
On the opposition side things have not been going well. Capriles, again, shot himself in the foot which maybe be a reflection of the delusion inside his party, Primero Justicia, at being the recognized leaders of the opposition. Apparently they seem to think that MUD label votes were pretty much PJ label votes. I am not going into the stupidities of Capriles, I am through with him. Let's just say that if his strategy helped for 6D vote, his humanity and political sense are now highly questioned.
So, in face of the current situation what should the opposition do first as of January 5?
What we need to be fully aware of is that a confrontation with the regime is unavoidable. The only things to be settled are the date and intensity of the confrontation. If all goes well we can hope that such confrontation will be an electoral one, not a violent one. And we can advance the latest date for the confrontation: December 2016 when governors's term ends. Yet four other electoral confrontation are possible depending on the degree of regime's despair.
Maduro may resign. New presidential elections need to be called to complete the six years term (1). This would be the wisest for the regime, to let the opposition burn itself dealing with the economic catastrophe next year. The problem with that option (and all others for that matter) is that it gives the opposition time to investigate the wasted oil bonanza of the last decade. In fact that option may be the worst one for the regime, as the ones discussed next give them time to prepare better some form of golden exile.
Maduro is stubborn and with the help of a portion of chavismo a recall election is called. This has to take place BEFORE summer as a later date could reach the fatal 4 year mark in the term and allow chavismo to seat an appointed vice president to complete the term (article #233 of the 1999 constitution). In short if the opposition choses or has to chose that way it should be decided by May at the latest considering the economic costs and the developing economic crisis. Note that the success of this maneuver depends on the electoral participation and the ability of the opposition to campaign actively.
Referendum/referenda for constitutional amendments. This could be a compromise between the opposition, the army and a sector of chavismo. This tool (#341) can be used in many ways, to free the judicial system of political control, to diminish the presidential power, to change electoral system, to approve reforms that the regime blocks, etc... It also has the advantage that it requires a simple majority inside the opposition so divisions are possible in case a faction decides to go to the dark side (yes, I am looking forward to see the new installment of the ninenalogy). The problem with this approach is that it depends on too many variables, one if the eventual willingness of Maduro to play the game and recognize defeat, accepting to stay in office just to preserve the "Chavez legacy", whatever that may mean. In short the regime would evolve into some form of parliamentary system where cohabitation is possible, French way.
Constitutional reform/assembly. The reform (#342) is a more extreme form of the referenda discussed above. This one would be to unseat the judicial system at large, change the electoral system and reestablish a bicameral congress as a way to create a containment wall against a fast return of chavismo, undo a persistent undue military influence and obtain the reinforcement of decentralization. The constitutional assembly (#348) is the ultimate weapon of mass destruction if the judicial power in the hands of chavismo is used in excess against any opposition initiative. The problem with a constitutional assembly is that it is a bomb that can sweep away all parties as the economy degenerates. On the other hand it can be called at any time if the opposition retains the 2/3 vote, and can be called through signature gathering process and a referendum as long as the opposition retains a working majority.
So?
The consequence of the exposed above indicates that elections are on their way and the opposition needs to get ready for it from the very start, on January 6. For this it needs to do the following actions, ALL EQUALLY IMPORTANT.
Change the composition of the CNE to gain a 3 to 2 majority inside the electoral board.
If time allows modify some key sections of the electoral law and work on gerrymandering negative effects for regional elections of December 2016.
Free political prisoners as everyone is needed on board to campaign, while annulling some of the resentment appearing due, among others, Capriles foot in mouth approach to politics.
Improve access to all parties to media, which means reform the CONATEL law that gives CONATEL too much punishing control over media, return of RCTV network, change ANTV into a true form of C-span, and more. There is no need to investigate the suspicious purchase of some media as those ones have less and less rating. Just allowing for new blood will be enough to finish off this mercenaries (I am looking at you, Universal, Ultimas Noticias, Globovision, etc...)
Change the law on the comptroller office which allows this one by fiat to bar anyone to run for election if it so pleases the regime. It is enough to demand that for barring someone to run for office a fair trial with its subsequent verdict are necessary. And make it retroactive.And more but those ones are the crucial. The point is that all of these can be voted within three months and be made effective by June.
Of course, these must be made while the assembly attends other extremely urgent matters but nobody said that the work of the New Assembly would be easy and cool.
Thursday, 24 December 2015
A sweet and sour Christmas
It is time for the annual exercice to wish the readers a happy Christmas. At least to those outside of Venezuela who have nice odds at it being happy; unless you are Venezuelans with a split family between those who stayed (had to?) behind and those who emigrated to freer skies.
Here, for the first time since December 1998, I have listened to my Christmas music collection with real feeling. Chavismo has always made its duty to spoil Christmas for all of us, including its followers who were constantly summoned for the defense of the banana republic (1). This year is no exception as the Maduro/Cabello combo has managed to force through the nomination of political judges on December 23. And we know they are planning further moves of the judicial coup under way for next week. There is no rest for the wicked. Christmas eve for them cannot be much more than getting plastered with 18 year old Scotch that they are the lone ones to be able to afford these days.
But for the rest of us Christmas will be a tad better this year, even if food shortages and prices make hallacas difficult to come by and presents for kids will be very limited. The election result of December 6 has opened ajar the door towards better days. The road to complete freedom is still long and the road to enough prosperity to be able to reunite families is probably longer. But for the first time in years we can perceive a road.
Thus my best wishes for Christmas to the readers that have followed this blog for so long. As a gift of sorts, the lone ones that can be brought through Internet, two videos from what may be my favorite Venezuelan Christmas tunes, so different and unique from the packaged music that seems to have become the rule elsewhere. A guitar with "Niño Lindo" and Guanaguanare with the original folk composer.
And a version with words, not necessarily the best one but there are is none on YouTube that truly satisfies me.
This Guanaguanare has a deficient sound track, sorry
-----------------------------
1) The 1999 Christmas was spoiled by the natural disaster of Vargas, but that year the regime did what it take to ruin Christmas absolutely by not only refusing help for the disaster but by performing its first judicial coup in between Christmas and New Year just as the country was picking pup the death toll. From there we all knew that the welfare of the people would never be the major concern of the regime: politics and power first. Always.
Here, for the first time since December 1998, I have listened to my Christmas music collection with real feeling. Chavismo has always made its duty to spoil Christmas for all of us, including its followers who were constantly summoned for the defense of the banana republic (1). This year is no exception as the Maduro/Cabello combo has managed to force through the nomination of political judges on December 23. And we know they are planning further moves of the judicial coup under way for next week. There is no rest for the wicked. Christmas eve for them cannot be much more than getting plastered with 18 year old Scotch that they are the lone ones to be able to afford these days.
But for the rest of us Christmas will be a tad better this year, even if food shortages and prices make hallacas difficult to come by and presents for kids will be very limited. The election result of December 6 has opened ajar the door towards better days. The road to complete freedom is still long and the road to enough prosperity to be able to reunite families is probably longer. But for the first time in years we can perceive a road.
Thus my best wishes for Christmas to the readers that have followed this blog for so long. As a gift of sorts, the lone ones that can be brought through Internet, two videos from what may be my favorite Venezuelan Christmas tunes, so different and unique from the packaged music that seems to have become the rule elsewhere. A guitar with "Niño Lindo" and Guanaguanare with the original folk composer.
And a version with words, not necessarily the best one but there are is none on YouTube that truly satisfies me.
This Guanaguanare has a deficient sound track, sorry
-----------------------------
1) The 1999 Christmas was spoiled by the natural disaster of Vargas, but that year the regime did what it take to ruin Christmas absolutely by not only refusing help for the disaster but by performing its first judicial coup in between Christmas and New Year just as the country was picking pup the death toll. From there we all knew that the welfare of the people would never be the major concern of the regime: politics and power first. Always.
Tuesday, 22 December 2015
The now you see, now you don't see the constitutional coup {UPDATED URGENT}
Guys, this is it, the real thing. The regime cannot accept the electoral result of December 6 and has started this week to pull real moves to make sure that it keeps firmly in control of the country, or at least the essential, namely that its leadership does not go to jail (not even keep looting, there is not much left to loot...).
In short the regime is holding a coup d’état except that instead of having tanks rolling down the avenues it is packing the courts and removing representatives recently elected through that packed court. Il suffisait d'y penser (1)
The regime had been remiss in packing the high court, TSJ, a chance it would have got a couple of months ago even though it was illegal as it was at the cost of forced early retirement for the judges whose term ended soon and would be replaced by the new assembly where the regime was sure it would not get the 2/3 and not even the 3/5. For reasons that we do not know the regime did not proceed and now that it lost the election it is going full speed at it even though it is breaking all of the legal parameters that the regime set itself. Now conveniently the TSJ just issued a ruling saying that Diosdado Cabello, the outgoing Assembly chair, can do all the legal violations he is doing.
Yet there is a problem with that attempt at securing for half a decade a unanimous support for the regime at the TSJ: it is so blatantly illegal that the new assembly after some struggle could manage to revoke the new judges. It still would not be able to get a political majority in the TSJ but the mere thought of a dissident opinion is enough to send shivers through the regime spine. Remember: nobody in Venezuela recalls the last time the regime lost a case in court, and nobody has a notion that there could just be such a thing as dissenting court opinion.
Add to this that the recent arrests in Houston and Miami are promising yet more corruption revelations of such a magnitude that, well, time si running short for those who allowed it to happen here. And we can also add that the negotiations between Cuba and the US are at a standstill due to the complex electoral system of the US that makes the year before a presidential year a lost one where no controversial measures can be taken. It is likely that Raul has decided that power has to be retained at all cost so that he keeps getting his monthly allowance (2).
So the regime has decided to go in full coup mode. Today, even though the TSJ is on legal and formal holiday vacation, it reopened for a few minutes to allow the regime to send a writ to suspend at least 22 of the representatives of the opposition elected on December 6.
This is totally illegal for so many reasons... To begin with, the recourse must be set first with the CNE, electoral board, who has to judge on the merits before it goes to the TSJ. The regime is claiming nakedly electoral fraud even though its control over the electoral system is total and the elections unfair conditions toward the opposition have been widely discussed overseas. What the regime is doing is accusing the opposition of a electoral fraud that it simply has no means to do, even if it wanted to do so; and thus the regime gets a sentence in its favor before the parties get their day in court. Etc., etc...
What the regime wants immediately? If the new assembly finally gathers on January 5 (which is yet to be seen as the Parliament seat is actually occupied by an assembly of the appointed "poder comunal" which the regime is toying with the idea of it replacing the elected assembly) it would be incomplete. Having less than a 2/3 majority the regime could even block its working by walking out and forfeiting the minimum attendance required to vote laws. Also, the opposition worried on regaining its 22 seats will not have time to investigate the Cabellos and Rincon and Ramirez of the regime. And while all of this takes place the regime can come up with more provocations making reactions to such acts an excuse to disband outright the elected assembly.
And more, but this is long enough as it is.
I think that at this point the opposition should come out explicitly announcing that it will go to the OAS and Mercosur to denounce a constitutional violation and annulment of a legitimate power, duly elected though supervision of the enemy.
This is a coup, we must call it so, in the hope (vain?) that the regime will back down from a provocation that will descend the country into chaos and will speed up the bitter end of those who seek protection though that coup. Indictments are coming in the US (and elsewhere), so the best that Cabello and his corrupt narco cohorts can hope for is to transform Venezuela into a jail from which they cannot go out. Then again they are pranes so they may be OK with it. (3)
UPDATE
We just learned that the TSJ said it has not received any writ for cancelling the election of the 22 opposition representatives? What the f....?
Now, the curious thing is that this late the TSJ decided to reply, to say no, and to accuse the 2.0 of creating destabilizing rumors. That is, if there is no writ the TSJ could have well waited tomorrow morning, or not replied at all, or elliptically state that they were close for business until January 11 so they could not possibly have any answer. But no, they replied and took the opportunity to lance barbs at the opposition.
What happened?
The reaction may have been fast enough to the point that a few phone calls made through at Maduro's office and the order was stopped (for the time being?).
Or it is a reflection of the internecine warfare of chavismo as such a measure is bound to affect one side more than the other. The side not controlling that event put a stop to it.
Or it could be the military repeating that there is nothing to be done until January 5, that the regime needs to wait for a offense from the opposition before retaliating, and no offense can be done until January 5).
Heck, it could even be someone at the CNE with half a brain that told them that they should let the CNE rule on that first, that they will oblige gladly but that they should have the first go to make the thing look like a valid judicial trap.
Or simply it was a mere trial to test the opposition readiness for bigger things planned.
Or a distracting tactic so people talk about that instead fo the 12 justices that will be illegally replaced.
Or a combination, or something else totally.
The only thing that is certain is that the regime is looking for ways, and looking, and looking et qui cherche trouve. (4)
Note: I had to change the title of the blog entry. The first time ever!
---------------------------------
1) One just had to think of it
2) Credit to Rafael Poleo of Zeta. Then again for me the case is that these people are probably not even thinking of Cuba now, just thinking as to how to save their butt. So the fortunes of Raul and Fidel are not that pressing for me right now.
3) Pran is a leader in the Venezuelan jail system. That is, a thug/mafiosi/gangster/whatever that directs his gang from inside the jail where he actually gets more protection than if he were outside the jail. Jails in Venezuela even have discos and swimming pool. You may not be able to go out (some do) but life inside is OK and through cel phones you can keep operating your racket.
4) Who seeks shall find
In short the regime is holding a coup d’état except that instead of having tanks rolling down the avenues it is packing the courts and removing representatives recently elected through that packed court. Il suffisait d'y penser (1)
The regime had been remiss in packing the high court, TSJ, a chance it would have got a couple of months ago even though it was illegal as it was at the cost of forced early retirement for the judges whose term ended soon and would be replaced by the new assembly where the regime was sure it would not get the 2/3 and not even the 3/5. For reasons that we do not know the regime did not proceed and now that it lost the election it is going full speed at it even though it is breaking all of the legal parameters that the regime set itself. Now conveniently the TSJ just issued a ruling saying that Diosdado Cabello, the outgoing Assembly chair, can do all the legal violations he is doing.
Yet there is a problem with that attempt at securing for half a decade a unanimous support for the regime at the TSJ: it is so blatantly illegal that the new assembly after some struggle could manage to revoke the new judges. It still would not be able to get a political majority in the TSJ but the mere thought of a dissident opinion is enough to send shivers through the regime spine. Remember: nobody in Venezuela recalls the last time the regime lost a case in court, and nobody has a notion that there could just be such a thing as dissenting court opinion.
Add to this that the recent arrests in Houston and Miami are promising yet more corruption revelations of such a magnitude that, well, time si running short for those who allowed it to happen here. And we can also add that the negotiations between Cuba and the US are at a standstill due to the complex electoral system of the US that makes the year before a presidential year a lost one where no controversial measures can be taken. It is likely that Raul has decided that power has to be retained at all cost so that he keeps getting his monthly allowance (2).
So the regime has decided to go in full coup mode. Today, even though the TSJ is on legal and formal holiday vacation, it reopened for a few minutes to allow the regime to send a writ to suspend at least 22 of the representatives of the opposition elected on December 6.
This is totally illegal for so many reasons... To begin with, the recourse must be set first with the CNE, electoral board, who has to judge on the merits before it goes to the TSJ. The regime is claiming nakedly electoral fraud even though its control over the electoral system is total and the elections unfair conditions toward the opposition have been widely discussed overseas. What the regime is doing is accusing the opposition of a electoral fraud that it simply has no means to do, even if it wanted to do so; and thus the regime gets a sentence in its favor before the parties get their day in court. Etc., etc...
What the regime wants immediately? If the new assembly finally gathers on January 5 (which is yet to be seen as the Parliament seat is actually occupied by an assembly of the appointed "poder comunal" which the regime is toying with the idea of it replacing the elected assembly) it would be incomplete. Having less than a 2/3 majority the regime could even block its working by walking out and forfeiting the minimum attendance required to vote laws. Also, the opposition worried on regaining its 22 seats will not have time to investigate the Cabellos and Rincon and Ramirez of the regime. And while all of this takes place the regime can come up with more provocations making reactions to such acts an excuse to disband outright the elected assembly.
And more, but this is long enough as it is.
I think that at this point the opposition should come out explicitly announcing that it will go to the OAS and Mercosur to denounce a constitutional violation and annulment of a legitimate power, duly elected though supervision of the enemy.
This is a coup, we must call it so, in the hope (vain?) that the regime will back down from a provocation that will descend the country into chaos and will speed up the bitter end of those who seek protection though that coup. Indictments are coming in the US (and elsewhere), so the best that Cabello and his corrupt narco cohorts can hope for is to transform Venezuela into a jail from which they cannot go out. Then again they are pranes so they may be OK with it. (3)
UPDATE
We just learned that the TSJ said it has not received any writ for cancelling the election of the 22 opposition representatives? What the f....?
Now, the curious thing is that this late the TSJ decided to reply, to say no, and to accuse the 2.0 of creating destabilizing rumors. That is, if there is no writ the TSJ could have well waited tomorrow morning, or not replied at all, or elliptically state that they were close for business until January 11 so they could not possibly have any answer. But no, they replied and took the opportunity to lance barbs at the opposition.
What happened?
The reaction may have been fast enough to the point that a few phone calls made through at Maduro's office and the order was stopped (for the time being?).
Or it is a reflection of the internecine warfare of chavismo as such a measure is bound to affect one side more than the other. The side not controlling that event put a stop to it.
Or it could be the military repeating that there is nothing to be done until January 5, that the regime needs to wait for a offense from the opposition before retaliating, and no offense can be done until January 5).
Heck, it could even be someone at the CNE with half a brain that told them that they should let the CNE rule on that first, that they will oblige gladly but that they should have the first go to make the thing look like a valid judicial trap.
Or simply it was a mere trial to test the opposition readiness for bigger things planned.
Or a distracting tactic so people talk about that instead fo the 12 justices that will be illegally replaced.
Or a combination, or something else totally.
The only thing that is certain is that the regime is looking for ways, and looking, and looking et qui cherche trouve. (4)
---------------------------------
1) One just had to think of it
2) Credit to Rafael Poleo of Zeta. Then again for me the case is that these people are probably not even thinking of Cuba now, just thinking as to how to save their butt. So the fortunes of Raul and Fidel are not that pressing for me right now.
3) Pran is a leader in the Venezuelan jail system. That is, a thug/mafiosi/gangster/whatever that directs his gang from inside the jail where he actually gets more protection than if he were outside the jail. Jails in Venezuela even have discos and swimming pool. You may not be able to go out (some do) but life inside is OK and through cel phones you can keep operating your racket.
4) Who seeks shall find
Saturday, 19 December 2015
Left press review
On a slow Saturday night I decided to do what I have stopped doing long, long ago, to examine the misinforming to plain idiotic articles supporting the bolivarian farce. But two upset readers sent me these pieces and by sheer courtesy I read them and went ahead to comment below.
The first one is from CounterPunch. Since I do not read such pages I cannot evaluate how far left these people are. Nor I care for, taking the piece for itself as objectively as I could. It did not go far... All started well enough, pointing out the wish for the revolutionaries to fight back while acknowledging a major electoral setback. But then by the 4th large paragraph we were back in 2002... Really? It is OK that here, in Venezuela, they use that argument because they have no other one left, but overseas? Can't they afford to be a tad more creative in defending the revolutionary farce? Here the paragraph in full:
In April 2002, the U.S.-backed opposition in Venezuela staged a coup against then President Chavez in a desperate attempt to reassert their control over the country and extinguish the Bolivarian Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans poured into the streets of Caracas, with millions more in other parts of the country, calling for Chavez to be restored tohis rightful office, and for the coup leaders to be arrested. There was really no doubt that the U.S. was responsible for this attempt at forced regime change, with many mainstream news outlets reporting within days that high-ranking officials in the Bush administration were intimately involved in orchestrating the coup.
The US had sympathies but it was NEVER proved that the Bush administration gave a "go ahead". Apparently for the left it is absolutely impossible to conceive that actually there would be a strong popular movement against a leftist regime, a movement that does not need to be stoked on by the CIA. Sigh... The good savage theory from the North Atlantic do-gooders....
As for the hundred of thousand in Caracas and the millions across the country, pictures please. Amazing how some urban legends that started with a small crowds of looters on Friday 12 and some protest gatherings in the name of Chavez AFTER it was becoming clear that the army may be returning Chavez to office ended up becoming throngs of freedom seeking folks who did all the work. Apparently the author was in Caracas and I wasn't.
You can gather by yourself that the rest of the piece read like an open propaganda pamphlet. No need to comment further, just to point out that the piece appeared first in Telesur. 'nuf said!
The other piece graced Huff Post, where you can find about everything if you are patient enough to set through it (I do not). It is written by Dan Kovalic who presents himself as an adjunct professor. And has his twitter avatar posing next to Chavez tombstone. So there goes academic objectivity.
At least, in a way, he is more honest: you do not need to wait for the 4th paragraph, you get it right in the face from the start.
Of course, given the fact that the opposition was able to win such an election, and that President Maduro and the PSUV are going to honor that election, is a true testament to what many of us have been saying for years -- that, despite the claims of the U.S. government and its compliant media (collectively, the U.S.), Venezuela under Chavez/Maduro governance is authentically democratic. Indeed, one of the great achievements of the Chavista revolution has been democratic reforms.
So right there you have it, before Chavez there was no democracy (how did he get elected, to begin with?). And poor Mr. Kovalic: he should have waited a few days before writing on the Huff: Maduro et al. are not "honoring" the result.
For the rest Mr. Kovalic reveals his true colors: the bolivarian farce is good and worth defending no matter what because, well, it is anti US. Mr. Kovalic does in very broad strokes. Not for him to have read the 18 pages letter from OAS secretary exquisitely detailing all the electoral treachery BEFORE the first vote was cast. Nor for him either to take a calculator and verify that the minimum wage today in Venezuela is not even 20 USD a month and as such ALL social advances of Chavez, whatever those may be, are now voided, leaving people worse off than what they were in 1998. The rest of the note is thus quite predictable. As is predictable that both notes do not expand much on the reasons why people voted against the regime: years of waiting on line under the sun for food and medicine and sanitary items. Conditions that neither one would tolerate for a minute in the cozy countries where they live and from where it is so easy to decide what is best for Venezuela (even if it is OK to sacrifice it on the anti US altar).
The problem with people like these two authors is that debate with them is useless, It is not that they believe in what they write about, it is that they desperately want to believe. And against that, history, logic and facts are impotent.
May the dear readers do as they wish with this blog entry.
The first one is from CounterPunch. Since I do not read such pages I cannot evaluate how far left these people are. Nor I care for, taking the piece for itself as objectively as I could. It did not go far... All started well enough, pointing out the wish for the revolutionaries to fight back while acknowledging a major electoral setback. But then by the 4th large paragraph we were back in 2002... Really? It is OK that here, in Venezuela, they use that argument because they have no other one left, but overseas? Can't they afford to be a tad more creative in defending the revolutionary farce? Here the paragraph in full:
In April 2002, the U.S.-backed opposition in Venezuela staged a coup against then President Chavez in a desperate attempt to reassert their control over the country and extinguish the Bolivarian Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans poured into the streets of Caracas, with millions more in other parts of the country, calling for Chavez to be restored tohis rightful office, and for the coup leaders to be arrested. There was really no doubt that the U.S. was responsible for this attempt at forced regime change, with many mainstream news outlets reporting within days that high-ranking officials in the Bush administration were intimately involved in orchestrating the coup.
The US had sympathies but it was NEVER proved that the Bush administration gave a "go ahead". Apparently for the left it is absolutely impossible to conceive that actually there would be a strong popular movement against a leftist regime, a movement that does not need to be stoked on by the CIA. Sigh... The good savage theory from the North Atlantic do-gooders....
As for the hundred of thousand in Caracas and the millions across the country, pictures please. Amazing how some urban legends that started with a small crowds of looters on Friday 12 and some protest gatherings in the name of Chavez AFTER it was becoming clear that the army may be returning Chavez to office ended up becoming throngs of freedom seeking folks who did all the work. Apparently the author was in Caracas and I wasn't.
You can gather by yourself that the rest of the piece read like an open propaganda pamphlet. No need to comment further, just to point out that the piece appeared first in Telesur. 'nuf said!
The other piece graced Huff Post, where you can find about everything if you are patient enough to set through it (I do not). It is written by Dan Kovalic who presents himself as an adjunct professor. And has his twitter avatar posing next to Chavez tombstone. So there goes academic objectivity.
At least, in a way, he is more honest: you do not need to wait for the 4th paragraph, you get it right in the face from the start.
Of course, given the fact that the opposition was able to win such an election, and that President Maduro and the PSUV are going to honor that election, is a true testament to what many of us have been saying for years -- that, despite the claims of the U.S. government and its compliant media (collectively, the U.S.), Venezuela under Chavez/Maduro governance is authentically democratic. Indeed, one of the great achievements of the Chavista revolution has been democratic reforms.
So right there you have it, before Chavez there was no democracy (how did he get elected, to begin with?). And poor Mr. Kovalic: he should have waited a few days before writing on the Huff: Maduro et al. are not "honoring" the result.
For the rest Mr. Kovalic reveals his true colors: the bolivarian farce is good and worth defending no matter what because, well, it is anti US. Mr. Kovalic does in very broad strokes. Not for him to have read the 18 pages letter from OAS secretary exquisitely detailing all the electoral treachery BEFORE the first vote was cast. Nor for him either to take a calculator and verify that the minimum wage today in Venezuela is not even 20 USD a month and as such ALL social advances of Chavez, whatever those may be, are now voided, leaving people worse off than what they were in 1998. The rest of the note is thus quite predictable. As is predictable that both notes do not expand much on the reasons why people voted against the regime: years of waiting on line under the sun for food and medicine and sanitary items. Conditions that neither one would tolerate for a minute in the cozy countries where they live and from where it is so easy to decide what is best for Venezuela (even if it is OK to sacrifice it on the anti US altar).
The problem with people like these two authors is that debate with them is useless, It is not that they believe in what they write about, it is that they desperately want to believe. And against that, history, logic and facts are impotent.
May the dear readers do as they wish with this blog entry.
Thursday, 17 December 2015
Chavismo these days illustrates very well the difference between fascism and communism
The behavior of the regime since December 6 allows us to illustrate some of the differences between fascism and communism. NOTE: they are both equally evil, just different ways to reach the final goal of a small group to control a totalitarian state.
In communist systems there is, whenever possible, great care to pretend to follow legality. There is also great care to make things appear as the expression of the majority of people. An ever growing majority, of course. The leadership maybe be filthy rich with dachas and all, but they tend to be discreet about it. The leadership also, whenever possible, brags of a certain educational level, an ideological formation according to "accredited" venues. When violence is exerted it is in the name of the people, of the state, not of the party, unless necessary. This is of course a very rough approach.
In fascistic systems legality may or may not be followed. It is optional. The word of a great leader is enough. If a majority appearance is preferable, belonging to the caste is far more important. In fact, the caste is there for the benefit of the people. The leadership maybe very rich but claims it is poor even if all appearances are to the contrary. For example, Chavez claimed that he only got his paycheck and he did not even know the amount. He did not know where his fancy tailored suites came from. In short fascist leaders have nothing, just what the people gives them for their work. Education in the leadership is irrelevant: the main and almost sole criteria for promotion is loyalty to a great leader. Between two equally sycophantic characters the educational level may or may not make a difference. And when violence is exerted, it can be exerted just for the sake of it.
This week we observed some truly fascist scenes.
The press conference of two dissenting members of chavismo, both long time ministers of Chavez, was interrupted by a violent mob because they betrayed chavismo, allegedly. The guards around did not intervene to protect them from the mob. Had it been a communist action it would have been better prepared, making sure that the accusations of betrayal included not only the party and leadership. That action was, in my book, fascist.
Since the National Assembly is lost, and by an extraordinarily wide margin, the regime simply is trying to move on by creating a parallel structure, a comunal assembly which is, well, appointed by the regime. In a communist system the National Assembly would have been voided outright BEFORE the election while the outgoing assembly reviewed the legality of the new communal assembly. In fascist system, as the Venezuelan regime has become, there is no care for legality, lip service at best, and the communal assembly is installed just because Diosdado Cabello wanted it so. It is not idle to remember that one of the most fascist acts in Cabello's history was to block access to the National Assembly during debate. Thus a group of people could go inside and break the faces of a few opposition representatives. Communism is kinder; it simply would not allow them to enter the assembly from the start. Or arrest them at home. It is much preferable in a communist system that the blood shed is as discreet as possible, no matter how copious that one may be. The people are kind, you know. In the last stages it is fascism that is kinder as it lets you die.
Even in the argumentation that the regime is clumsily advancing to void the election of the new Assembly we can detect differences.
In a communist regime great care would have been met in tying all ends to avoid a victory of the opposition. Certainly the electoral board CNE tried it so. But communism is not arrogant, just deeply self righteous. Since fascism is arrogant then there was no need for the regime to go beyond what was done in previous elections to rig them. They simply disregarded polls thinking that their pressure mechanisms would work as usual. Alas, it did not work. In its response a communist regime that would have been caught by such a mesure, like it happened in Poland, would try to remain coherent in its response, even if that response was useless in the end. See, contradicting what you said before is something that communism does not like to do, there is an ideology to follow closely at all time. But fascism has no problem to call something blue today that they called yellow yesterday. And thus we have the creator of the current CNE structure treachery apparatus, Jorge Rodriguez, sounding as if he were going to sue the CNE itself!
Amen of the outright lies. A good one was that people were misled into voting against the regime by the opposition controlled media (where? which ones?). Even in their outright lies it reeks more of fascism than communism as this one tries to make its lies viable, credible, even if it is merely through application of self righteousness.
In the past I had qualified the regime of Chavez as a cross between fascism and other stuff, due mostly to its military character. But I must confess my error. Chavismo is a fascist regime, inspired by a communist regime that has turned fascist in its day to day behavior, Cuba's Castro.
Then again this fits better. Fascism is more akin to gangster, mafia operations. And since Venezuela has become a narco state, there you go.
---------------------
PS: another thing that fascism is good at is to insult people without reason. Today's France Prime Minister's office emitted a communique praising the MUD victory, signed by Manuel Valls himself.
Maduro was in a fury even accusing Valls of being a racist (interestingly the National Front critic of Valls timeline on Tweeter sound a lot, A LOT, like chavistas). I read French. I can assure you that there is NOTHING in that communique that remotely smacks of racism.
In communist systems there is, whenever possible, great care to pretend to follow legality. There is also great care to make things appear as the expression of the majority of people. An ever growing majority, of course. The leadership maybe be filthy rich with dachas and all, but they tend to be discreet about it. The leadership also, whenever possible, brags of a certain educational level, an ideological formation according to "accredited" venues. When violence is exerted it is in the name of the people, of the state, not of the party, unless necessary. This is of course a very rough approach.
In fascistic systems legality may or may not be followed. It is optional. The word of a great leader is enough. If a majority appearance is preferable, belonging to the caste is far more important. In fact, the caste is there for the benefit of the people. The leadership maybe very rich but claims it is poor even if all appearances are to the contrary. For example, Chavez claimed that he only got his paycheck and he did not even know the amount. He did not know where his fancy tailored suites came from. In short fascist leaders have nothing, just what the people gives them for their work. Education in the leadership is irrelevant: the main and almost sole criteria for promotion is loyalty to a great leader. Between two equally sycophantic characters the educational level may or may not make a difference. And when violence is exerted, it can be exerted just for the sake of it.
This week we observed some truly fascist scenes.
The press conference of two dissenting members of chavismo, both long time ministers of Chavez, was interrupted by a violent mob because they betrayed chavismo, allegedly. The guards around did not intervene to protect them from the mob. Had it been a communist action it would have been better prepared, making sure that the accusations of betrayal included not only the party and leadership. That action was, in my book, fascist.
Since the National Assembly is lost, and by an extraordinarily wide margin, the regime simply is trying to move on by creating a parallel structure, a comunal assembly which is, well, appointed by the regime. In a communist system the National Assembly would have been voided outright BEFORE the election while the outgoing assembly reviewed the legality of the new communal assembly. In fascist system, as the Venezuelan regime has become, there is no care for legality, lip service at best, and the communal assembly is installed just because Diosdado Cabello wanted it so. It is not idle to remember that one of the most fascist acts in Cabello's history was to block access to the National Assembly during debate. Thus a group of people could go inside and break the faces of a few opposition representatives. Communism is kinder; it simply would not allow them to enter the assembly from the start. Or arrest them at home. It is much preferable in a communist system that the blood shed is as discreet as possible, no matter how copious that one may be. The people are kind, you know. In the last stages it is fascism that is kinder as it lets you die.
Even in the argumentation that the regime is clumsily advancing to void the election of the new Assembly we can detect differences.
In a communist regime great care would have been met in tying all ends to avoid a victory of the opposition. Certainly the electoral board CNE tried it so. But communism is not arrogant, just deeply self righteous. Since fascism is arrogant then there was no need for the regime to go beyond what was done in previous elections to rig them. They simply disregarded polls thinking that their pressure mechanisms would work as usual. Alas, it did not work. In its response a communist regime that would have been caught by such a mesure, like it happened in Poland, would try to remain coherent in its response, even if that response was useless in the end. See, contradicting what you said before is something that communism does not like to do, there is an ideology to follow closely at all time. But fascism has no problem to call something blue today that they called yellow yesterday. And thus we have the creator of the current CNE structure treachery apparatus, Jorge Rodriguez, sounding as if he were going to sue the CNE itself!
Amen of the outright lies. A good one was that people were misled into voting against the regime by the opposition controlled media (where? which ones?). Even in their outright lies it reeks more of fascism than communism as this one tries to make its lies viable, credible, even if it is merely through application of self righteousness.
In the past I had qualified the regime of Chavez as a cross between fascism and other stuff, due mostly to its military character. But I must confess my error. Chavismo is a fascist regime, inspired by a communist regime that has turned fascist in its day to day behavior, Cuba's Castro.
Then again this fits better. Fascism is more akin to gangster, mafia operations. And since Venezuela has become a narco state, there you go.
---------------------
PS: another thing that fascism is good at is to insult people without reason. Today's France Prime Minister's office emitted a communique praising the MUD victory, signed by Manuel Valls himself.
Maduro was in a fury even accusing Valls of being a racist (interestingly the National Front critic of Valls timeline on Tweeter sound a lot, A LOT, like chavistas). I read French. I can assure you that there is NOTHING in that communique that remotely smacks of racism.
.@NicolasMaduro trato de racista a @manuelvalls ¿No saben leer francés en @DrodriguezVen ? https://t.co/ofcgdtbkxr https://t.co/DurZI9qElb— daniel duquenal (@danielduquenal) December 18, 2015#Venezuela: Félicitations à l'opposition démocratique de @unidadvenezuela. Appel à la libération de @LeopoldoLopez. pic.twitter.com/Pmkt3OTPsH
— Manuel Valls (@manuelvalls) December 17, 2015Wednesday, 16 December 2015
Somebody home?
I wonder if anyone is aware of the chasm ahead. From what I can see it would seem like no, nobody is taking notice. But then again I may be wrong. Hopefully.
Chavo-madurismo in overdrive
I write "chavo-madurismo" because including all of chavismo is not accurate at this time. There are enough voices inside chavismo that have decided to speak up and who think that genuinely and strategically it is better to acknowledge the electoral defeat and rebuild first chavismo before attempting to counter the opposition. Note: these are not democratic voices, these are people that are aware that they have lost a majority and who are simply surprised by the result and think that it is a mere historical accident and that a little bit of polish will be enough to return to full power for el pueblo.
The chavo-madurismo is as such a faction inside chavismo that has no time nor intention to change anything. Thus they are in an overdrive to conserve their power, privileges and legal immunity. The last one, legal immunity is the motor of that group (by the way, General Reverol may be officially indicted in US courts this week). Too compromised in corruption human rights violations and drug trafficking they know very well that their future will flounder fast with a mere cursory audit of their tenure in office. Thus for them it is out of question to allow that a new assembly can audit them. Period.
All what chavo-madurismo is trying to do to avoid its fate (rigging of high court, creating para legal structures and what not in the three weeks before January 5) will not stand legal review and will lead to an inevitable confrontation that will play in international arena. See, if the gained control at the National Assembly is voided by force, then it is enough for the new chair of the Assembly to demand to the OAS to apply its Democracy Chart. This time around, with heavy weights on board like Argentina, the Venezuela crisis will be made a world crisis. Add the humanitarian side and there you go.
Because whilecastro-chavo-madurismo fights recklessly for its survival, at all costs, this happens:
The chimio treatments imported for children ARE NOT working. Anyone home to answer for that?
The opposition seems preoccupied elsewhere
While chavo-madurismo is in overdrive the opposition does not seem in a hurry to take charge.
On one side we have a Capriles who thinks his strategy was the one that allowed the opposition to win a majority, namely that the Assembly was elected solely to solve material problems for the people. Thus he places himself squarely as the rightful spokesperson for the new majority. A strategy equally wrong since 1) the new assembly cannot be the direct actor in improving the fate of el pueblo, the gouvernement is still in charge of that no matter what as even the new laws application will depend on the good will of the regime, 2) that even if it could do so, the solutions to be written down are not of easy or fast application, 3) not all agree in the priorities that Capriles demands and 4) his demands are possibly unrealistic in the actual context where the regime is applying brute force.
The fact of the matter is that the opposition victory is born on many parameter that include the unrest of early 2014, the discredit of the regime since the 2014 repression, the economic crisis and the protest vote as a reaction, and also the offering of Capriles. But by far not alone by the non confrontational offering of Capriles, the more so that the regime is getting into open confrontation mode.
This explain why the newly elected representatives are more worried about deciding who will chair the coming assembly, and who will hold such and such commission rather than mounting an effective platform to reply to the regime recent attacks. Never mind starting to explain to the country that there is no money for anything when there are people inside chavismo that blithely state the the new assembly will refuse to vote the constant special credits that the executive demands for its social programs.
One is also allowed to wonder whether there is somebody home in charge. Some are noticing this early absence of leadership in the opposition.
And yet the opposition immediate priorities are simple. Considering that a confrontation is inevitable the opposition must from now announce that all measures current mesures taken by the regime will be voided on day first, that the CNE renewal will be conducted immediately and that the amnesty law will be the first law voted. If the regime seeks confrontation, we will give it in our terms, in an area where the opposition is unimpeachable, at least overseas.
In short, the opposition must take a grip of the only defensive tools it can get: fair elections (if needed soon), political leaders free on the streets from jail or exile, partial recuperation of freedom of information and press. Or is it that the political agenda of people like, say, Capriles is more important than the national agenda at a time where we need to find a side that will be able to negotiate the import of food and medicine that are required in 2016 for us not suffer more than necessary?
Chavo-madurismo in overdrive
I write "chavo-madurismo" because including all of chavismo is not accurate at this time. There are enough voices inside chavismo that have decided to speak up and who think that genuinely and strategically it is better to acknowledge the electoral defeat and rebuild first chavismo before attempting to counter the opposition. Note: these are not democratic voices, these are people that are aware that they have lost a majority and who are simply surprised by the result and think that it is a mere historical accident and that a little bit of polish will be enough to return to full power for el pueblo.
The chavo-madurismo is as such a faction inside chavismo that has no time nor intention to change anything. Thus they are in an overdrive to conserve their power, privileges and legal immunity. The last one, legal immunity is the motor of that group (by the way, General Reverol may be officially indicted in US courts this week). Too compromised in corruption human rights violations and drug trafficking they know very well that their future will flounder fast with a mere cursory audit of their tenure in office. Thus for them it is out of question to allow that a new assembly can audit them. Period.
All what chavo-madurismo is trying to do to avoid its fate (rigging of high court, creating para legal structures and what not in the three weeks before January 5) will not stand legal review and will lead to an inevitable confrontation that will play in international arena. See, if the gained control at the National Assembly is voided by force, then it is enough for the new chair of the Assembly to demand to the OAS to apply its Democracy Chart. This time around, with heavy weights on board like Argentina, the Venezuela crisis will be made a world crisis. Add the humanitarian side and there you go.
Because while
Tras la muerte de niños con Cancer este titular enajena: "Quimioterapias que trajo el gobierno son ineficaces" pic.twitter.com/qVZg9rIEJo— Nelson Bocaranda S. (@NelsonBocaranda) December 16, 2015The chimio treatments imported for children ARE NOT working. Anyone home to answer for that?
The opposition seems preoccupied elsewhere
While chavo-madurismo is in overdrive the opposition does not seem in a hurry to take charge.
On one side we have a Capriles who thinks his strategy was the one that allowed the opposition to win a majority, namely that the Assembly was elected solely to solve material problems for the people. Thus he places himself squarely as the rightful spokesperson for the new majority. A strategy equally wrong since 1) the new assembly cannot be the direct actor in improving the fate of el pueblo, the gouvernement is still in charge of that no matter what as even the new laws application will depend on the good will of the regime, 2) that even if it could do so, the solutions to be written down are not of easy or fast application, 3) not all agree in the priorities that Capriles demands and 4) his demands are possibly unrealistic in the actual context where the regime is applying brute force.
The fact of the matter is that the opposition victory is born on many parameter that include the unrest of early 2014, the discredit of the regime since the 2014 repression, the economic crisis and the protest vote as a reaction, and also the offering of Capriles. But by far not alone by the non confrontational offering of Capriles, the more so that the regime is getting into open confrontation mode.
This explain why the newly elected representatives are more worried about deciding who will chair the coming assembly, and who will hold such and such commission rather than mounting an effective platform to reply to the regime recent attacks. Never mind starting to explain to the country that there is no money for anything when there are people inside chavismo that blithely state the the new assembly will refuse to vote the constant special credits that the executive demands for its social programs.
One is also allowed to wonder whether there is somebody home in charge. Some are noticing this early absence of leadership in the opposition.
And yet the opposition immediate priorities are simple. Considering that a confrontation is inevitable the opposition must from now announce that all measures current mesures taken by the regime will be voided on day first, that the CNE renewal will be conducted immediately and that the amnesty law will be the first law voted. If the regime seeks confrontation, we will give it in our terms, in an area where the opposition is unimpeachable, at least overseas.
In short, the opposition must take a grip of the only defensive tools it can get: fair elections (if needed soon), political leaders free on the streets from jail or exile, partial recuperation of freedom of information and press. Or is it that the political agenda of people like, say, Capriles is more important than the national agenda at a time where we need to find a side that will be able to negotiate the import of food and medicine that are required in 2016 for us not suffer more than necessary?
Tuesday, 15 December 2015
The hysteria of Diosdado and Tarek
The stupendous defeat of the regime two Sundays ago is just starting to unleash all demons within chavismo. There are two little items that are worth noting.
Diosdado Cabello, the outgoing chair of the National Assembly has lot of reasons to worry about the incoming Assembly. Not only he will not be enjoying the privileges associated with the position but, lord have mercy on him, he risks to have his microphone cut when he starts insulting other representatives in what he qualifies as normal debate. If that was not enough he will have as a new colleague Rafael Guzman. This Rafael was 7 years ago the guy that studied all the improprieties that Cabello did during his lone tenure as Miranda governor from where he was ignominiously booted by Capriles (and forced to return to his native Monagas). The very substantial dossier could never receive any legal examination because no tribunal would pick up the thing to avoid offending Cabello or Chavez, but Cabello himself as of 2010 made sure that the National Assembly would not even be aware of the existence of such dossier.
Now, in prime time, Rafael Guzman will be able to broach on the matter, something that should be enough to unseat Cabello from the Assembly and to get him a seat in a jail, independently of what the US does on his likely indictment on drug trafficking.
Tarek El Aissami is the very unhappy governor of Aragua state. Not only he is in the hot list of likely DEA indictments, but his state went from overwhelmingly chavista to a clean sweep by the opposition. Three years of him as a governor were enough to transform Aragua electoral landscape even more than the crisis changed the rest of the country.
This was rendered the more humiliating as one of the chief organizer in Aragua anti Tarek movement was the mayor of a small area, the lone survivor for the opposition loss two years ago, Delson Guarate. Since major players in Aragua had been neutralized (think Richard Mardo, Maracay defenestrated representative) poor Delson had to bear the brunt of Tarek attacks, These included a now famous battle over refusing to give the district of Delson the machines that are needed to pick up the trash so that the district would be the worst of Aragua. Of course, people are not as stupid as Tarek and the PSUV think they are and two Sundays ago they let it know to Tarek that his days in Aragua were nearly over.
But Tarek will have none of it and he instead went to ask chavismo supporters to mass in front the National Assembly on January 5 to block access to the new representatives.... Certainly, after Cabello, our boy Tarek is in the top tier of people in serious need to be investigated for anything from racketeering to drug traffic. Probably even for setting soccer game results... Nothing would too low to stop the national assembly to take its seats.
Diosdado Cabello, the outgoing chair of the National Assembly has lot of reasons to worry about the incoming Assembly. Not only he will not be enjoying the privileges associated with the position but, lord have mercy on him, he risks to have his microphone cut when he starts insulting other representatives in what he qualifies as normal debate. If that was not enough he will have as a new colleague Rafael Guzman. This Rafael was 7 years ago the guy that studied all the improprieties that Cabello did during his lone tenure as Miranda governor from where he was ignominiously booted by Capriles (and forced to return to his native Monagas). The very substantial dossier could never receive any legal examination because no tribunal would pick up the thing to avoid offending Cabello or Chavez, but Cabello himself as of 2010 made sure that the National Assembly would not even be aware of the existence of such dossier.
Now, in prime time, Rafael Guzman will be able to broach on the matter, something that should be enough to unseat Cabello from the Assembly and to get him a seat in a jail, independently of what the US does on his likely indictment on drug trafficking.
Tarek El Aissami is the very unhappy governor of Aragua state. Not only he is in the hot list of likely DEA indictments, but his state went from overwhelmingly chavista to a clean sweep by the opposition. Three years of him as a governor were enough to transform Aragua electoral landscape even more than the crisis changed the rest of the country.
This was rendered the more humiliating as one of the chief organizer in Aragua anti Tarek movement was the mayor of a small area, the lone survivor for the opposition loss two years ago, Delson Guarate. Since major players in Aragua had been neutralized (think Richard Mardo, Maracay defenestrated representative) poor Delson had to bear the brunt of Tarek attacks, These included a now famous battle over refusing to give the district of Delson the machines that are needed to pick up the trash so that the district would be the worst of Aragua. Of course, people are not as stupid as Tarek and the PSUV think they are and two Sundays ago they let it know to Tarek that his days in Aragua were nearly over.
But Tarek will have none of it and he instead went to ask chavismo supporters to mass in front the National Assembly on January 5 to block access to the new representatives.... Certainly, after Cabello, our boy Tarek is in the top tier of people in serious need to be investigated for anything from racketeering to drug traffic. Probably even for setting soccer game results... Nothing would too low to stop the national assembly to take its seats.
Monday, 14 December 2015
The 2015 election: final review
The good thing about landslides is that detailed study of vote movement is not necessary nor possible since the anger vote is difficult to assess and predict for the future. In democratic countries this is not really an issue: Mauritius had once a 100% district parliament win fort a single party and it never stopped being a democracy. Thus after reviewing the highlights we may try to summarize the whole thing.
I reviewed the worst chavista defeats, the crown jewel falling to the opposition in full, the ill fate of the dissidents, the division in the new majority. For further details Tal Cual has a nice graph about the MUD growth in each district from 2010 to 2015. So let's summarize a few points.
Below is the update of the Caucaguita graph including Sunday 6 result.
Caucaguita went to the opposition and thus the help it supposed to be for chavismo in the gerrymandering did not work out. As reader Boludo Tejano pointed out, that gerrymandering does not work does not mean "it blew up in your face". Though in Barinas it was a clear case of such thing: the newly drawn three seats district could have gone only one or two for opposition before but went down all three. Another infamously redrawn district, Valencia South, went all three seats for the opposition.
What is interesting in the Caucaguita numbers above is that the opposition growth followed its old pattern: the vote to punish Maduro only played a role in that the opposition went above chavismo when in projection it should have been slightly below. There is the bad news for chavismo: there was an anger vote but there was also growing opposition vote. Which one is which will be revealed over the next years, but the trend was there even if in some states the MUD vote had truly circumstantial "angry voter" jumps.
The angry vote as it explained anything was the extreme polarization of the country. Third party candidates fared particularly bad. You were for Maduro or you were not. And let's not forget that a significant portion of the Maduro vote was out of fear. Had elections be free we may be talking today of a National Assembly Mauritius style. Yet, this uncertainty about how much of its gains are real should give pause to the MUD as it must find ways to retain enough of this angry vote to retain a parliamentary majority in the future. The upcoming CNE will probably eliminate the gerrymandering of the currently chavista controlled CNE and future 2/3 majorities cannot be counted upon again.
Another lesson should be taken away from these elections: the electoral fraud of chavismo may be everywhere but at vote counting time it only works if turnout is rather low. From all information we can listen to, if there are possible local vote padding, those were ineffective. True, the electoral fraud actually takes place BEFORE the vote by making it impossible for the opposition to campaign effectively. But we hope that from today on the campaign in pro of abstention will be finally silenced and redirected to fight pre-election fraud.
In the end the strategy of the opposition to do nothing and wait for the elections worked ONLY because the economy got worse than anyone expected. Thus at this point trying to figure out the effect of Leopoldo Lopez protest of 2014 and subsequent martyrdom cannot be evaluated out of the vote itself. Yet I propose that the spectacular sweep of Caracas by the opposition owes something to Leopoldo (and Maria Corina and Ledezma). His Caracas protest and the locally felt regime's overboard reactions have energized the opposition there even though people like Capriles poo-pooed it.
We thus got a 2/3 majority which contrary to the pessimist crowd I think should hold long enough to pass key decisions that will affect future electoral contests. One is the renewal of the electoral board CNE. Another one is to remove part of the censorship that affects election campaigns. With this the material advantage of the regime at election time will be lowered considerably. If we can get at least that much next year, and I trust we will, then this election would have been worth it just for that, for allowing the return of a real political debate that may avoid a civil war.
Finally, when we look at the results in some details there is no way to hide the unmitigated disaster the vote was for the regime even if it tries to disguise the disaster by, well, ignoring it. Even though the PSUV held "primaries", even though it did manage to spread a few goodies at the last minute, two years of long lines under the sun and rain have done the regime a permanent damage. And it seems that all hell is about to break lose inside chavismo. Let's not forget that when such a mass movement finds itself so degraded is when it can become more dangerous and bring more harm than ever. Or peter out fast. Let's hope for the alter.
I reviewed the worst chavista defeats, the crown jewel falling to the opposition in full, the ill fate of the dissidents, the division in the new majority. For further details Tal Cual has a nice graph about the MUD growth in each district from 2010 to 2015. So let's summarize a few points.
Below is the update of the Caucaguita graph including Sunday 6 result.
Caucaguita went to the opposition and thus the help it supposed to be for chavismo in the gerrymandering did not work out. As reader Boludo Tejano pointed out, that gerrymandering does not work does not mean "it blew up in your face". Though in Barinas it was a clear case of such thing: the newly drawn three seats district could have gone only one or two for opposition before but went down all three. Another infamously redrawn district, Valencia South, went all three seats for the opposition.
What is interesting in the Caucaguita numbers above is that the opposition growth followed its old pattern: the vote to punish Maduro only played a role in that the opposition went above chavismo when in projection it should have been slightly below. There is the bad news for chavismo: there was an anger vote but there was also growing opposition vote. Which one is which will be revealed over the next years, but the trend was there even if in some states the MUD vote had truly circumstantial "angry voter" jumps.
The angry vote as it explained anything was the extreme polarization of the country. Third party candidates fared particularly bad. You were for Maduro or you were not. And let's not forget that a significant portion of the Maduro vote was out of fear. Had elections be free we may be talking today of a National Assembly Mauritius style. Yet, this uncertainty about how much of its gains are real should give pause to the MUD as it must find ways to retain enough of this angry vote to retain a parliamentary majority in the future. The upcoming CNE will probably eliminate the gerrymandering of the currently chavista controlled CNE and future 2/3 majorities cannot be counted upon again.
Another lesson should be taken away from these elections: the electoral fraud of chavismo may be everywhere but at vote counting time it only works if turnout is rather low. From all information we can listen to, if there are possible local vote padding, those were ineffective. True, the electoral fraud actually takes place BEFORE the vote by making it impossible for the opposition to campaign effectively. But we hope that from today on the campaign in pro of abstention will be finally silenced and redirected to fight pre-election fraud.
In the end the strategy of the opposition to do nothing and wait for the elections worked ONLY because the economy got worse than anyone expected. Thus at this point trying to figure out the effect of Leopoldo Lopez protest of 2014 and subsequent martyrdom cannot be evaluated out of the vote itself. Yet I propose that the spectacular sweep of Caracas by the opposition owes something to Leopoldo (and Maria Corina and Ledezma). His Caracas protest and the locally felt regime's overboard reactions have energized the opposition there even though people like Capriles poo-pooed it.
We thus got a 2/3 majority which contrary to the pessimist crowd I think should hold long enough to pass key decisions that will affect future electoral contests. One is the renewal of the electoral board CNE. Another one is to remove part of the censorship that affects election campaigns. With this the material advantage of the regime at election time will be lowered considerably. If we can get at least that much next year, and I trust we will, then this election would have been worth it just for that, for allowing the return of a real political debate that may avoid a civil war.
Finally, when we look at the results in some details there is no way to hide the unmitigated disaster the vote was for the regime even if it tries to disguise the disaster by, well, ignoring it. Even though the PSUV held "primaries", even though it did manage to spread a few goodies at the last minute, two years of long lines under the sun and rain have done the regime a permanent damage. And it seems that all hell is about to break lose inside chavismo. Let's not forget that when such a mass movement finds itself so degraded is when it can become more dangerous and bring more harm than ever. Or peter out fast. Let's hope for the alter.
Sunday, 13 December 2015
The 2015 results: polarization, when thou hold us enthralled!
This entry is for the anecdotal part. There were some "independents/dissenter" candidates. What was their fate?
The polarization of the country rolled over them without pity.
The ones from the opposition side, who should have fared batter than those from PSUV were not only laminated but actually caused the loss of at the very least one seat for the MUD. Imagine it at 113! And because of two of them Maria Corina Machado has created a lot of grief for herself, when she should have been one of the heroines of the election campaign for her selfless dedication to campaigning for whomever wanted her presence at meetings.
There was one seat where I thought that MCM would have scored; the one in Lara for Palavecino where she supported Gomez Sigala. The MUD, unwisely, had decided to put one of the aides of governor Falcon, suspected of hiding in the MUD until better days were ahead for an alliance with the PSUV, together with Marquina who apparently moves a lot across Venezuela, having been representative for the states of Sucre and Miranda.
Gomez Sigala, on the liberal right of the MUD, has been a good representative in that he has been working assiduously during his 5 years tenure. The MUD tossed him out because anyone smelling of free market and private property is, well, unpalatable in a country where all, ALL political parties are some shade of populists. One of the reason by the way MCM has not managed to make her political party, VENTE, viable so far. Traditions are hard to break even if they are intellectually correct and coherent.
Unfortunately the polarization was so high, the desire of a punishing vote on Maduro so exacerbated that Gomez got only 4,160 votes to the 146,424 votes that Marquina got on top of the ticket. Note that the chavista top got only 67,576 so even a perfect split between the two opposition tickets would have still given that seat for the opposition.
But the stubbornness of Gomez and the unwise political flair of MCM only messed his career but weakened MCM position further inside the MUD. And this was made worse by her support of a dissident MUD in Tachira that this time did give an extra undeserved seat to chavismo allowing the reelection of the unsavory Sanguino. This one got 40,7% of the vote while the combined opposition vote was 59+% (and state wise was 2 to 1 for the opposition!). Note that the MUD candidate got 13% more votes than the dissident candidate, so it was not even close.
In other dissident we had in Caracas Berenice Gomez, firebrand personality of Radio Caracas and with a twitter following of 715K. She pitted herself against Ramos Allup because she thought him (justifiably) weak in front of chavismo corruption due to his family links to financial sectors of chavismo. Well, Ramos got 139.435 votes to 458 for our girl Berenice. An even split there would have given the seat to the opposition anyway as the chavista candidate only got 56.562 but such are the wonders of polarized electorate, the more so in big cities which have suffered most from the regime's policies.
Another very questionable dissent was the MAS, henceforth a weak member of the MUD as the bulk of its leftist electorate went Chavez long ago. Its score nation wide has been dismal, ruining any chance it has to rejoin the MUD. For example 758 votes out of 1.221.224 votes cast in Caracas Libertador where 9 seats were elected.
As for chavismo dissent, hidden through some diverse parties, it is not even worth discussing. Whatever chavismo dissent existed it went straight to the MUD to punish Maduro, not even staying home as the high participation of the electorate showed.
Just a little note on fake dissent. In Petare district chavismo run William Ojeda. What was notable there is that you needed to wait for election day to discover that Ojeda was also the candidate of PSUV. That is, all the campaign of Ojeda was based on a party judicially hijacked by chavismo, MIN, which run as if they were the opposition, with almost the same color of the MUD brand, and placed, surprise, next to the MUD case on the ballot. The a clear intent to confuse voters, even noted overseas. As I described all of the Petare district was plastered with Ojeda pale blue posters. You would be hard pressed to find a single PSUV poster in red supporting Ojeda. Well, it did not work. Ojeda was TRASHED with 73,840 against MUD standard banner Pizarro with 144.727. To add insult to injury through the PSUV label Ojeda got 68.205 votes while under the MIN label 1.759 votes.
In short it is quite possible that there has been more MIN posters for Ojeda than the MIN actually got in votes.
And keep in mind that more than half of the voters in Petare are from what has been termed the largest continuous barrio/favella/slum in the world. Ain't it that something!
Conclusions;
1) polarization has been worse than ever
2) the MUD victory is clearly due to a big chunk of chavismo voting against Maduro's failed policies and
3) those MUD victory votes are "borrowed". If it is true that once a first switch happens, further switches are much easier for the voters. However this switch is not very constructive. MUD strength was built slowly by chavista voter first abstaining from voting Chavez, and then finally going MUD the following election. I would venture that half of the MUD growth this time can revert easily to chavismo once Maduro is removed from office.
The polarization of the country rolled over them without pity.
The ones from the opposition side, who should have fared batter than those from PSUV were not only laminated but actually caused the loss of at the very least one seat for the MUD. Imagine it at 113! And because of two of them Maria Corina Machado has created a lot of grief for herself, when she should have been one of the heroines of the election campaign for her selfless dedication to campaigning for whomever wanted her presence at meetings.
There was one seat where I thought that MCM would have scored; the one in Lara for Palavecino where she supported Gomez Sigala. The MUD, unwisely, had decided to put one of the aides of governor Falcon, suspected of hiding in the MUD until better days were ahead for an alliance with the PSUV, together with Marquina who apparently moves a lot across Venezuela, having been representative for the states of Sucre and Miranda.
Gomez Sigala, on the liberal right of the MUD, has been a good representative in that he has been working assiduously during his 5 years tenure. The MUD tossed him out because anyone smelling of free market and private property is, well, unpalatable in a country where all, ALL political parties are some shade of populists. One of the reason by the way MCM has not managed to make her political party, VENTE, viable so far. Traditions are hard to break even if they are intellectually correct and coherent.
Unfortunately the polarization was so high, the desire of a punishing vote on Maduro so exacerbated that Gomez got only 4,160 votes to the 146,424 votes that Marquina got on top of the ticket. Note that the chavista top got only 67,576 so even a perfect split between the two opposition tickets would have still given that seat for the opposition.
But the stubbornness of Gomez and the unwise political flair of MCM only messed his career but weakened MCM position further inside the MUD. And this was made worse by her support of a dissident MUD in Tachira that this time did give an extra undeserved seat to chavismo allowing the reelection of the unsavory Sanguino. This one got 40,7% of the vote while the combined opposition vote was 59+% (and state wise was 2 to 1 for the opposition!). Note that the MUD candidate got 13% more votes than the dissident candidate, so it was not even close.
In other dissident we had in Caracas Berenice Gomez, firebrand personality of Radio Caracas and with a twitter following of 715K. She pitted herself against Ramos Allup because she thought him (justifiably) weak in front of chavismo corruption due to his family links to financial sectors of chavismo. Well, Ramos got 139.435 votes to 458 for our girl Berenice. An even split there would have given the seat to the opposition anyway as the chavista candidate only got 56.562 but such are the wonders of polarized electorate, the more so in big cities which have suffered most from the regime's policies.
Another very questionable dissent was the MAS, henceforth a weak member of the MUD as the bulk of its leftist electorate went Chavez long ago. Its score nation wide has been dismal, ruining any chance it has to rejoin the MUD. For example 758 votes out of 1.221.224 votes cast in Caracas Libertador where 9 seats were elected.
As for chavismo dissent, hidden through some diverse parties, it is not even worth discussing. Whatever chavismo dissent existed it went straight to the MUD to punish Maduro, not even staying home as the high participation of the electorate showed.
Just a little note on fake dissent. In Petare district chavismo run William Ojeda. What was notable there is that you needed to wait for election day to discover that Ojeda was also the candidate of PSUV. That is, all the campaign of Ojeda was based on a party judicially hijacked by chavismo, MIN, which run as if they were the opposition, with almost the same color of the MUD brand, and placed, surprise, next to the MUD case on the ballot. The a clear intent to confuse voters, even noted overseas. As I described all of the Petare district was plastered with Ojeda pale blue posters. You would be hard pressed to find a single PSUV poster in red supporting Ojeda. Well, it did not work. Ojeda was TRASHED with 73,840 against MUD standard banner Pizarro with 144.727. To add insult to injury through the PSUV label Ojeda got 68.205 votes while under the MIN label 1.759 votes.
In short it is quite possible that there has been more MIN posters for Ojeda than the MIN actually got in votes.
And keep in mind that more than half of the voters in Petare are from what has been termed the largest continuous barrio/favella/slum in the world. Ain't it that something!
Conclusions;
1) polarization has been worse than ever
2) the MUD victory is clearly due to a big chunk of chavismo voting against Maduro's failed policies and
3) those MUD victory votes are "borrowed". If it is true that once a first switch happens, further switches are much easier for the voters. However this switch is not very constructive. MUD strength was built slowly by chavista voter first abstaining from voting Chavez, and then finally going MUD the following election. I would venture that half of the MUD growth this time can revert easily to chavismo once Maduro is removed from office.
Starting Advent a tad late but...
This morning I dusted off my Christmas music. For the first time in over a decade I can enjoy it truly even though the feast will be meager this year. I suppose I am late to start Advent but heck, I found this in Facebook so there you go, Christmas is all about sharing!
Saturday, 12 December 2015
The last days of Maduro. Or is it of Cabello?
I will try to be short. The actions that Maduro and Cabello are taking are playing against them. One could almost call them suicidal.
Summary: after a begrudging acceptation of results in the wee hours of Monday 7, Maduro and then Cabello have started to push the ante by taking all sorts of measure to neutralize the reach of the newly elected assembly. Accompanying this, of course, we hear a fiery speech to defend the revolution and go above institutions as needed, if we can call the racketeering system that the regime has put in place "institutions". In no particular importance:
- Promotion of the judge that put Leopoldo Lopez in jail
- Swearing o 12 new high court judges without respecting the delays and rules specified in the constitution and laws (written by the regime, by the way).
- Depriving the National Assembly of its own TV network, thus maintaining the country real news black out.
- More promises of the sort such as ruling through "asambleas del pueblo" as if the pueblo had not just voted in 112 seats...
- Sending red shirted thugs to break down press conferences of dissident chavistas (and directing a full blown scale verbal attack on those inside chavismo that want to point out the high levels of the regime as the ones responsible for the defeat).
- Refusing to accept any guilt for the defeat; all is the fault of the economical warfare, of the empire, of the opposition hold on media, etc. Without bothering to present a single shred of evidence: it is my word and that is enough.
Interpretation.
First there was the shock. The regime never expected such a stunning defeat. Like this blogger, it expected that in the end, facing the voting machine, a lot of disgruntled chavista would vote conservative, that is, the 17 year old regime. Except that this blogger knew the polls were too overwhelmingly against the regime and that the vote spread would be 16%, 10% less than what polls were saying.
See, the inner workings of the fraudulent electoral system is that it is not too difficult to apply some make up to bad electoral results. The regime can pad its vote at the last minute if the results are close ("late" voters, voting tables where opposition witness have been banned and which suddenly have 100% participation, and more). But this time around the results were so dramatic that the last minute forcing out of people to go and vote may have resulted in actually more votes for the opposition...
In short the regime was prepared for a narrow victory, at worst. They truly believed it. We cannot conclude otherwise. How come they made such a crass mistake is for the books.
There were two immediate consequences when the results were announced.
The first one was that the repressed dissidence within chavismo was going to cash in, the "I told you so" campaign that the regime had all the trouble in the world to contain would not be contained anymore. And that will be a direct challenge to Maduro and Cabello.
The second one was that the new assembly would sooner or later start investigating the actions of Cabello and his allies (Maduro as the president must be removed from office first before being fully investigated). For Cabello, already under international investigation, it was a sure thing that Venezuela was his safe haven. But not anymore. For him to avoid investigation at home would be at the price of leaving the political scene and, possibly, return part of what he stole or gained illegally. That is, the opposition could only forgive him once it made sure that Cabello could not be a nuisance anymore. Maduro's own unpopularity does not make such process necessary but that his family can now be thoroughly investigated has the same effect on his future.
It is true that the opposition for the sake of political stability and because of the dire economic crisis ahead may chose not to remove Maduro or to investigate Cabello for the time being. But it will happen and there is no way for Maduro and Cabello to recover politically fast enough to block these attempts. A 15% vote defeat cannot be regained in a few month, not even through some form of referendum. By the time chavismo can regain competitiveness it would be too late for both of them.
Hence the sudden and desperate offensive this past week, and the ones to come until January 5. What Maduro and Cabello are doing are desperate measures. Even if they were to be met with some success the economic crisis aggravation as of now would sweep them.
In short, what they are doing right now is counterproductive for their political survival. We are witnessing the last weeks, maybe months at best for them, of Cabello and Maduro. Which is not to say that their replacement would be any better, but that is another story.
Note: since Chavez left for his last trip to Cuba, Maduro and Cabello have been fighting out for his "legacy". Their never ending battle which seemed to go Cabello for a while had a very negative collateral effect: they forgot or did not have time to think about the realities of the country. Not daring to take any of the necessary measures needed to avoid a worsening of the crisis, that had already started in the last year of Chavez, this one came back with a vengeance causing this electoral disaster. They have only themselves to blame and chavismo knows it. Hence the open dissidence of a political system that does not want to go down with Cabello and Maduro.
Summary: after a begrudging acceptation of results in the wee hours of Monday 7, Maduro and then Cabello have started to push the ante by taking all sorts of measure to neutralize the reach of the newly elected assembly. Accompanying this, of course, we hear a fiery speech to defend the revolution and go above institutions as needed, if we can call the racketeering system that the regime has put in place "institutions". In no particular importance:
- Promotion of the judge that put Leopoldo Lopez in jail
- Swearing o 12 new high court judges without respecting the delays and rules specified in the constitution and laws (written by the regime, by the way).
- Depriving the National Assembly of its own TV network, thus maintaining the country real news black out.
- More promises of the sort such as ruling through "asambleas del pueblo" as if the pueblo had not just voted in 112 seats...
- Sending red shirted thugs to break down press conferences of dissident chavistas (and directing a full blown scale verbal attack on those inside chavismo that want to point out the high levels of the regime as the ones responsible for the defeat).
- Refusing to accept any guilt for the defeat; all is the fault of the economical warfare, of the empire, of the opposition hold on media, etc. Without bothering to present a single shred of evidence: it is my word and that is enough.
Interpretation.
First there was the shock. The regime never expected such a stunning defeat. Like this blogger, it expected that in the end, facing the voting machine, a lot of disgruntled chavista would vote conservative, that is, the 17 year old regime. Except that this blogger knew the polls were too overwhelmingly against the regime and that the vote spread would be 16%, 10% less than what polls were saying.
See, the inner workings of the fraudulent electoral system is that it is not too difficult to apply some make up to bad electoral results. The regime can pad its vote at the last minute if the results are close ("late" voters, voting tables where opposition witness have been banned and which suddenly have 100% participation, and more). But this time around the results were so dramatic that the last minute forcing out of people to go and vote may have resulted in actually more votes for the opposition...
In short the regime was prepared for a narrow victory, at worst. They truly believed it. We cannot conclude otherwise. How come they made such a crass mistake is for the books.
There were two immediate consequences when the results were announced.
The first one was that the repressed dissidence within chavismo was going to cash in, the "I told you so" campaign that the regime had all the trouble in the world to contain would not be contained anymore. And that will be a direct challenge to Maduro and Cabello.
The second one was that the new assembly would sooner or later start investigating the actions of Cabello and his allies (Maduro as the president must be removed from office first before being fully investigated). For Cabello, already under international investigation, it was a sure thing that Venezuela was his safe haven. But not anymore. For him to avoid investigation at home would be at the price of leaving the political scene and, possibly, return part of what he stole or gained illegally. That is, the opposition could only forgive him once it made sure that Cabello could not be a nuisance anymore. Maduro's own unpopularity does not make such process necessary but that his family can now be thoroughly investigated has the same effect on his future.
It is true that the opposition for the sake of political stability and because of the dire economic crisis ahead may chose not to remove Maduro or to investigate Cabello for the time being. But it will happen and there is no way for Maduro and Cabello to recover politically fast enough to block these attempts. A 15% vote defeat cannot be regained in a few month, not even through some form of referendum. By the time chavismo can regain competitiveness it would be too late for both of them.
Hence the sudden and desperate offensive this past week, and the ones to come until January 5. What Maduro and Cabello are doing are desperate measures. Even if they were to be met with some success the economic crisis aggravation as of now would sweep them.
In short, what they are doing right now is counterproductive for their political survival. We are witnessing the last weeks, maybe months at best for them, of Cabello and Maduro. Which is not to say that their replacement would be any better, but that is another story.
Note: since Chavez left for his last trip to Cuba, Maduro and Cabello have been fighting out for his "legacy". Their never ending battle which seemed to go Cabello for a while had a very negative collateral effect: they forgot or did not have time to think about the realities of the country. Not daring to take any of the necessary measures needed to avoid a worsening of the crisis, that had already started in the last year of Chavez, this one came back with a vengeance causing this electoral disaster. They have only themselves to blame and chavismo knows it. Hence the open dissidence of a political system that does not want to go down with Cabello and Maduro.
Friday, 11 December 2015
The 2015 results: Caucaguita (and Caracas) sweetest moment for the MUD
No need to go in where the opposition did its best score, the 112 new 2/3 majority speaks of itself, the blog entry to cover it all would be too long. Instead let's go where the opposition victory may have been the sweetest: Caracas and greater Caracas.
The title of a recent blog entry was "As Caucaguita goes so will the election". I did not know I would be proven so right. Unbelievably the opposition took Caucaguita, going a long way to explain how the MUD took the double seat district of Guarenas and Guatire (and the rest of the country). I was expecting at best, from the graph of that entry, an even score. Well, in Caucaguita the opposition list won with 50.21% against the PSUV list at 46.95%. The closest result for the opposition in Caucaguita were 5 years ago when the opposition list got 80% of what chavismo got. This time it got 110% of the chavista vote....
But if Caucaguita remains justifiably for this blog the bellwether district, the smashing win in Caucaguita was the reflection of the smashing win across the country, none as sweet that the conquest of Caracas and almost all of the greater Caracas. If a popular, urban, low income district like Caucaguita went MUD, how could similar districts of Vargas, Libertador, Petare do otherwise?
The Caracas districts sweep across 5 town-hall, with Libertador, where seat of government resides, being about half the size. The MUD took ALL.
In Libertador the MUD beat 57 to 40 the regime! It took 23 de Enero where the mother of fake revolution martyr Robert Serra was running. In Catia "safe seats" where regime's stars Bernal and Villegas were running, the MUD candidates won by 12%. Jacqueline Faria who said that long lines were fun was trashed by 12% also, in what was supposedly another safe seat reserved for her. Jose Guerra, on foot, house by house, with no budget, took on Jesus Faria, former communist, economist degree from RDA Berlin, ex minister of Chavez, credit control comission at the NA, and beat him by 9 points. In total, 8 out of 9 seats.
In Miranda as expected the opposition took Baruta/Chacao. But the regime had gerrymandered the two districts of Baruta/Chacao/Petare in such ways that from 4 seats it only sends 2 this time around, using the trimmed and outright stolen portion to reinforce chavistas districts in the South and East of Caracas. And yet it did not work. Placing Caucaguita and similar districts with Guarenas and Guatire to improve chavismo chances did not work: Capriles state secretary list took the district. D'Elia beat by 8 points what was supposed to be a relative safe seat for Eekhout, the strident pasionaria of the regime that was a National Assembly vice president. The other greater Caracas districts went one for the MUD (San Antonio/Los Teques) while the Southern district did remain chavista. If Jaua did manage to get elected it is still a bitter defeat for him and the regime. Dispatched in 2013 to Miranda as a viceroy with a parallel budget and organization to sabotage Capriles, the state wide list of the PSUV was trashed by 20 points. TWENTY POINTS! Yet the gerrymandering was so effective that with its total 5 out of 12 seats the PSUV still gets somewhat over represented.
I have saved the best for last: Vargas. As the Northern border of Caracas Vargas is part of the greater Caracas. A state which has been incomprehensibly chavista when we consider how Chavez mistreated them, it went opposition this time, to the surprise of most observers. And not only it went MUD, but it did so clearly with 52 to 45, giving three out of its 4 seats to the MUD.
The victory for the MUD in the greater Caracas was stunning. It got all the district seats of Caracas and 5 out of 8 of the greater Caracas. It got votes all across demographics, from wealthy Hatillo districts to emblematic 23 de Enero, where Chavez used to vote, with a clown martyr of the revolution in Robert Serra, where paramilitary colectivos like infamous La Piedrita rule. When 23 de Enero votes were counted in full, the MUD had 48.64% to the 48.16% of chavismo alliance (PSUV alone 44.8 %).
Two years of long lines under the sun took a toll: bastions like Caucaguita and 23 de Enero fell in spite of all the blackmail, pressure, bribes, vote buying and even colectivo terror. End of an era for racial and class divides promoted from the regime.
The title of a recent blog entry was "As Caucaguita goes so will the election". I did not know I would be proven so right. Unbelievably the opposition took Caucaguita, going a long way to explain how the MUD took the double seat district of Guarenas and Guatire (and the rest of the country). I was expecting at best, from the graph of that entry, an even score. Well, in Caucaguita the opposition list won with 50.21% against the PSUV list at 46.95%. The closest result for the opposition in Caucaguita were 5 years ago when the opposition list got 80% of what chavismo got. This time it got 110% of the chavista vote....
But if Caucaguita remains justifiably for this blog the bellwether district, the smashing win in Caucaguita was the reflection of the smashing win across the country, none as sweet that the conquest of Caracas and almost all of the greater Caracas. If a popular, urban, low income district like Caucaguita went MUD, how could similar districts of Vargas, Libertador, Petare do otherwise?
The Caracas districts sweep across 5 town-hall, with Libertador, where seat of government resides, being about half the size. The MUD took ALL.
In Libertador the MUD beat 57 to 40 the regime! It took 23 de Enero where the mother of fake revolution martyr Robert Serra was running. In Catia "safe seats" where regime's stars Bernal and Villegas were running, the MUD candidates won by 12%. Jacqueline Faria who said that long lines were fun was trashed by 12% also, in what was supposedly another safe seat reserved for her. Jose Guerra, on foot, house by house, with no budget, took on Jesus Faria, former communist, economist degree from RDA Berlin, ex minister of Chavez, credit control comission at the NA, and beat him by 9 points. In total, 8 out of 9 seats.
In Miranda as expected the opposition took Baruta/Chacao. But the regime had gerrymandered the two districts of Baruta/Chacao/Petare in such ways that from 4 seats it only sends 2 this time around, using the trimmed and outright stolen portion to reinforce chavistas districts in the South and East of Caracas. And yet it did not work. Placing Caucaguita and similar districts with Guarenas and Guatire to improve chavismo chances did not work: Capriles state secretary list took the district. D'Elia beat by 8 points what was supposed to be a relative safe seat for Eekhout, the strident pasionaria of the regime that was a National Assembly vice president. The other greater Caracas districts went one for the MUD (San Antonio/Los Teques) while the Southern district did remain chavista. If Jaua did manage to get elected it is still a bitter defeat for him and the regime. Dispatched in 2013 to Miranda as a viceroy with a parallel budget and organization to sabotage Capriles, the state wide list of the PSUV was trashed by 20 points. TWENTY POINTS! Yet the gerrymandering was so effective that with its total 5 out of 12 seats the PSUV still gets somewhat over represented.
I have saved the best for last: Vargas. As the Northern border of Caracas Vargas is part of the greater Caracas. A state which has been incomprehensibly chavista when we consider how Chavez mistreated them, it went opposition this time, to the surprise of most observers. And not only it went MUD, but it did so clearly with 52 to 45, giving three out of its 4 seats to the MUD.
The victory for the MUD in the greater Caracas was stunning. It got all the district seats of Caracas and 5 out of 8 of the greater Caracas. It got votes all across demographics, from wealthy Hatillo districts to emblematic 23 de Enero, where Chavez used to vote, with a clown martyr of the revolution in Robert Serra, where paramilitary colectivos like infamous La Piedrita rule. When 23 de Enero votes were counted in full, the MUD had 48.64% to the 48.16% of chavismo alliance (PSUV alone 44.8 %).
Two years of long lines under the sun took a toll: bastions like Caucaguita and 23 de Enero fell in spite of all the blackmail, pressure, bribes, vote buying and even colectivo terror. End of an era for racial and class divides promoted from the regime.
Thursday, 10 December 2015
The 2015 results: stable majority, where art thou?
I am talking of course of who holds the majority inside the 112 elected representatives. This is of utmost importance because there will be the need for a common front to resist the assaults of the regime, from incarceration to plain bribery. Amen of the required speed to pass urgent laws and go above Maduro's sabotage. The stable majority is also required to agree on a more than likely constitutional reform.
The good news is that in spite of the scatter inside that new 112 majority, managing to get the 84 required to get everyday decisions should not be too difficult. Note, those "majority" numbers are from the existence of 55 PSUV that will always vote NO.
The initial weakness of this new assembly is its ability to resist PSUV/Regime pressure. That pressure at first can come from bribes or threats. But as the PSUV makes it through its necessary aggiornamento it is quite possible that some inside the opposition alliance may be tempted to explore dalliances with the PSUV. Thus the next graph where the MUD parties are ranked through what I think are their more leftist to less leftist willingness to seek agreements with the regime. The division is not a comfortable right/left division because some parties, dues to their long time unjustly jailed leader might chose not to speak to the PSUV.
From this figure we can see already that if it is not too difficult for the regime to pry away some members to void the 2/3 supernumerary majority, the one at 3/5 is quite safe for the time being (100). There is simply no way for the regime to get overtime a working bare majority.
Finally we can look at how easy it is to create a majority within that majority, namely 112/2=56 seats. That is the required "inner" majority to lead the rest.
I have put in light lavender the three parties that are more likely to work together on the big issues. And it turns out that they are also the three largest fractions. Between them, UNT, AD and PJ, they would be holding, if Tal Cual is right, 79 which is way more than 56... And to their right or to their left they can find without much trouble the missing ones to get the 84 parliament simple majority to dispatch everyday matters. I guess that the lone seats from Convergencia and ABP can also be added to the 79 so they are 81. Thus the 3 missing to reach 84 can come on their own from any of 5 other parties which have 3 or more seats.
As I can see for the time being, UNT, AD and PJ are forced to work together, which should not be too difficult at force. Any one of them that can get Voluntad Popular support on a given measure can put pressure on the other two to compromise its way. The minor parties will need to form parliamentary groups to make sure that they can have some influence.
In practical results the presidency and two vice-presidencies of the Assembly will be decided over the three biggies. The smaller players will have to be tamed through commissions chairs and vice chairs.
And chavismo already knows that. Together with the bitterness at some of their defeats (see previous post) goes a long way to explain the panic within Cabello and Maduro entourage....
 |
| Data gathered from Tal Cual who has assigned party labels to the 112 elected folks. I have roughly distributed them according to suspected ideology. Note that in Venezuela EVERYONE claims to be at the very least left of Center. VENTE (Maria Corina Machado) is the only one openly right of center. Colors assigned are inasmuch as possible, through Excel, those of the political parties. |
The good news is that in spite of the scatter inside that new 112 majority, managing to get the 84 required to get everyday decisions should not be too difficult. Note, those "majority" numbers are from the existence of 55 PSUV that will always vote NO.
The initial weakness of this new assembly is its ability to resist PSUV/Regime pressure. That pressure at first can come from bribes or threats. But as the PSUV makes it through its necessary aggiornamento it is quite possible that some inside the opposition alliance may be tempted to explore dalliances with the PSUV. Thus the next graph where the MUD parties are ranked through what I think are their more leftist to less leftist willingness to seek agreements with the regime. The division is not a comfortable right/left division because some parties, dues to their long time unjustly jailed leader might chose not to speak to the PSUV.
From this figure we can see already that if it is not too difficult for the regime to pry away some members to void the 2/3 supernumerary majority, the one at 3/5 is quite safe for the time being (100). There is simply no way for the regime to get overtime a working bare majority.
Finally we can look at how easy it is to create a majority within that majority, namely 112/2=56 seats. That is the required "inner" majority to lead the rest.
I have put in light lavender the three parties that are more likely to work together on the big issues. And it turns out that they are also the three largest fractions. Between them, UNT, AD and PJ, they would be holding, if Tal Cual is right, 79 which is way more than 56... And to their right or to their left they can find without much trouble the missing ones to get the 84 parliament simple majority to dispatch everyday matters. I guess that the lone seats from Convergencia and ABP can also be added to the 79 so they are 81. Thus the 3 missing to reach 84 can come on their own from any of 5 other parties which have 3 or more seats.
As I can see for the time being, UNT, AD and PJ are forced to work together, which should not be too difficult at force. Any one of them that can get Voluntad Popular support on a given measure can put pressure on the other two to compromise its way. The minor parties will need to form parliamentary groups to make sure that they can have some influence.
In practical results the presidency and two vice-presidencies of the Assembly will be decided over the three biggies. The smaller players will have to be tamed through commissions chairs and vice chairs.
And chavismo already knows that. Together with the bitterness at some of their defeats (see previous post) goes a long way to explain the panic within Cabello and Maduro entourage....
The 2015 results: chavismo worst losses
Considering how upset chavismo is and how discombobulated Maduro and Cabello are I thought that I would start the result analysis by selecting some of chavimso worst results, losses that are truly troubling for the future of chavismo as a national movement. Namely Omar Prieto in Zulia, the Aragua case and Parequeima in Anzoategui.
Omar Prieto, the Zulia future power that went back to save his town-hall
Omar Prieto was, in my opinion, one of the worst creatures that chavismo has begotten. He managed somehow to get hold of the Southern area of Maracaibo, San Francisco, which normally would go opposition, albeit by narrow margins. From there he managed sabotage campaigns against former governor Perez, and was even promoted against current governor Arias by the more radical wings of chavismo. In short until last Sunday he was the potential future owner of Zulia, in the mold of Cabello like roughness. It also appealed that his tall, mestizo, forceful demeanor was in tune with the racist chavista new man. Thus Prieto was the top ticket of chavismo for Zulia.
Well, all of this changed Sunday, to the point that Prieto decided to give up his freshly gained National Assembly seat to remain San Francisco mayor.
The numbers are without possible appeal.
I would like to point out that there were 12% more voters participating this time around, which makes the result in actual votes above much worse than what they look for our boy Omar. Thus what cynically Prieto is doing is staying at San Francisco where he is the top cacique rather than being an obscure to irrelevant politico at the new National Assembly... But we also must admit to the political necessity to preserve Zulia's second biggest town-hall in the hands of chavismo because his departure would provoke a new mayoral election that chavismo would surely lose. (Note: his state wide list got ONLY 36.3% !!!; and thus his governor run next year is right now doubtful).
Aragua, "the birth state of the revolution" is a landslide for the opposition
This one gotta hurt a lot.
Aragua has been perhaps the most consistent supporter of chavismo. This time around chavismo only managed one spot in the Aragua state wide list. All the other seats, even the gerrymandered ones, went opposition, sometimes with surprising margins. 8 out 9 seats for the MUD.
From this we can see that the collapse of chavista vote is due in equal parts to abstention and crossing over, amplifying a movement that has been going on haphazardly since 2012 (Capriles was already only 80K behind Maduro in 2013).
Many explanations here. Maneuvers to destroy popular opposition leaders like Richard Mardo backfired. The imposition of Chavez last interior minister, Tarek el-Aissami turned out to be a poor choice for governor as he not only never managed to pass for an aragueño, but was also internationally associated as a drug cartel head. Never mind the abuses he comitted on anyone opposing him, be it oppo or chavo. No matter what monuments to the revolution our boy Tarek kept dotting the Aragua landscape, in the end it was the impossibility of Polar plants in Aragua to supply the locals that carried the day for the MUD.
The end of a cacique power
In Southern Anzoategui state there is a "traditional" family power shared from father to son. The name is even cacique sounding, Paraquiema. But they are equally lambucios, waiting for the best deal, no loyalty whatsoever.
They joined chavismo early but when they did not get what they wanted they went opposition in 2010 and got elected under the MUD/PODEMOS label. If I remember well there was even an assault to a town hall or something of major street trouble in El Tigre. Unfortunately the opposition did not give the governor candidacy nod to his son so Paraquiema went back to chavismo and helped it vote damaging laws even though he was elected by an opposition majority. A perverse double agent if ever.
Paraqueima got defeated this time but he did not do as bad as the cases above. Then again he is the type of local power that is followed by a group of people no matter what. Cacique style. Let's hope that this time around the primitiveness of certain portions of the electorate will be done with. At least Paraqueima dynasty has been given a real blow, if not necessarily lethal. One thing it shows chavismo is that sometimes its strength is subjected to not very loyal whims, which in the end hut more than help.
Conclusion
These three examples will convey, I hope, why chavismo is so nervous these days. The results are not just a matter of discontent with the long lines dues to food scarcity. There is also discontent with the leadership imposed from Caracas, or self imposed through rough means. The damage done in these three districts is real and it goes beyond just a mere clientele provisional disaffection. Long term, in other words.
No matter some in chavismo would like to be done with the electoral system altogether....
Omar Prieto, the Zulia future power that went back to save his town-hall
Omar Prieto was, in my opinion, one of the worst creatures that chavismo has begotten. He managed somehow to get hold of the Southern area of Maracaibo, San Francisco, which normally would go opposition, albeit by narrow margins. From there he managed sabotage campaigns against former governor Perez, and was even promoted against current governor Arias by the more radical wings of chavismo. In short until last Sunday he was the potential future owner of Zulia, in the mold of Cabello like roughness. It also appealed that his tall, mestizo, forceful demeanor was in tune with the racist chavista new man. Thus Prieto was the top ticket of chavismo for Zulia.Well, all of this changed Sunday, to the point that Prieto decided to give up his freshly gained National Assembly seat to remain San Francisco mayor.
The numbers are without possible appeal.
I would like to point out that there were 12% more voters participating this time around, which makes the result in actual votes above much worse than what they look for our boy Omar. Thus what cynically Prieto is doing is staying at San Francisco where he is the top cacique rather than being an obscure to irrelevant politico at the new National Assembly... But we also must admit to the political necessity to preserve Zulia's second biggest town-hall in the hands of chavismo because his departure would provoke a new mayoral election that chavismo would surely lose. (Note: his state wide list got ONLY 36.3% !!!; and thus his governor run next year is right now doubtful).
Aragua, "the birth state of the revolution" is a landslide for the opposition
This one gotta hurt a lot.
Aragua has been perhaps the most consistent supporter of chavismo. This time around chavismo only managed one spot in the Aragua state wide list. All the other seats, even the gerrymandered ones, went opposition, sometimes with surprising margins. 8 out 9 seats for the MUD.
From this we can see that the collapse of chavista vote is due in equal parts to abstention and crossing over, amplifying a movement that has been going on haphazardly since 2012 (Capriles was already only 80K behind Maduro in 2013).
Many explanations here. Maneuvers to destroy popular opposition leaders like Richard Mardo backfired. The imposition of Chavez last interior minister, Tarek el-Aissami turned out to be a poor choice for governor as he not only never managed to pass for an aragueño, but was also internationally associated as a drug cartel head. Never mind the abuses he comitted on anyone opposing him, be it oppo or chavo. No matter what monuments to the revolution our boy Tarek kept dotting the Aragua landscape, in the end it was the impossibility of Polar plants in Aragua to supply the locals that carried the day for the MUD.
The end of a cacique power
In Southern Anzoategui state there is a "traditional" family power shared from father to son. The name is even cacique sounding, Paraquiema. But they are equally lambucios, waiting for the best deal, no loyalty whatsoever.
They joined chavismo early but when they did not get what they wanted they went opposition in 2010 and got elected under the MUD/PODEMOS label. If I remember well there was even an assault to a town hall or something of major street trouble in El Tigre. Unfortunately the opposition did not give the governor candidacy nod to his son so Paraquiema went back to chavismo and helped it vote damaging laws even though he was elected by an opposition majority. A perverse double agent if ever.
Paraqueima got defeated this time but he did not do as bad as the cases above. Then again he is the type of local power that is followed by a group of people no matter what. Cacique style. Let's hope that this time around the primitiveness of certain portions of the electorate will be done with. At least Paraqueima dynasty has been given a real blow, if not necessarily lethal. One thing it shows chavismo is that sometimes its strength is subjected to not very loyal whims, which in the end hut more than help.
Conclusion
These three examples will convey, I hope, why chavismo is so nervous these days. The results are not just a matter of discontent with the long lines dues to food scarcity. There is also discontent with the leadership imposed from Caracas, or self imposed through rough means. The damage done in these three districts is real and it goes beyond just a mere clientele provisional disaffection. Long term, in other words.
No matter some in chavismo would like to be done with the electoral system altogether....
Wednesday, 9 December 2015
100 days of MUD
I suppose that the tradition of the cabalistic "first hundred days/measures/laws" comes from the first famous 100 days, the ones of Napoleon return to Elba which ended in Waterloo. The regime may want to ponder about that history tidbit, the more so that Waterloo bicentennial was celebrated earlier this year.
Last night we had the distinct feeling that Maduro and Cabello were operating as if they had decided for a speedy return from Elba, ignoring the trashing they got 2 days earlier. Napoleon at least spent enough tine in Elba to mark it for history. And while they plan a crash return/hold to power the rest of the world will take 100 days to find a definite way to get rid of the bolivarian monstrosity. Indeed, what Napoleon achieved in 100 days was the lost of any French recovery at the Vienna meeting, where Talleyrand was surprisingly achieving better terms than expected. After Waterloo not even Talleyrand could do a thing.
What can the opposition do? It all depends whether the outburst of Maduro and Cabello are a representation of chavismo or their desperate cry as they sense chavismo maybe willing to sacrifice them. For the following discussion let's assume that they represent chavismo (the other case is easier, these anti Maduro factions will quickly come to the forefront and we'll deal with them as constructively as possible).
The 100 days (or 30 or 50, does not really matter) started ticking yesterday December 8 and thus the resolution of the conflict is for, at the latest, early March. By then the economic and humanitarian crisis will have swept all parties anyway.
My suggestion for the opposition is very simple, find ways to explain to the country that the economy is a matter for the government to resolve and that the new Assembly will kindly oblige by reviewing speedily any proposal sent to them. Period. (1)
For that communication offensive the new Assembly can do the following: the chair can call for cadenas (mandatory broadcasts), there are precedents; the CONATEL law that regulates communications can be modified on the first days of the tenure so that the remaining subjugated but still alive media can unshackle their transmissions from self censorship as the regulatory agency will not be able to fine them anymore for thought "crimes". Plus other measures like recovering ANTV that will take more time.
Along leaving the dead economy at the regime door step the new Assembly should be sworn in with already a few law projects to recover intuitions and civil rights, forgetting about revenge or control. This can come only later, once the pulse between the executive and legislative power reaches an equilibrium of sorts. In no particular order since that one must be decided as events unfold, the Assembly should be sworn in with the following measures ready to go: amnesty law; call for nominations for a new CNE; revision of law that assigns a mandatory part of the nation's income to the provinces; suspend for a year any bill for weapon procurement; suspend punitive laws like SUNDEE that will have by itself already positive effects on the economy.
The regime will of course oppose every single one but it will be difficult for it to defend such opposition on public opinion as it will point to its unfairness, corruption, abuse and incompetence, reasons why people voted massively against the regime. And if the regime opposition becomes too vehement then there will be the excuse for the Assembly to call for a recall election or a constituent assembly. The 100 days will end there, in a food crisis and a collapse of the regime.
I suspect that there will be enough folks inside chavismo that will not want to sink with Maduro and Cabello and that before the 100 days are over they will have either started negotiations or asked Maduro to resign.
------
1) regular readers will remember that I wrote over the week end a decalogue which is still valid, what I am writing above being more of a question of pace as the regime is acting foolishly.
Last night we had the distinct feeling that Maduro and Cabello were operating as if they had decided for a speedy return from Elba, ignoring the trashing they got 2 days earlier. Napoleon at least spent enough tine in Elba to mark it for history. And while they plan a crash return/hold to power the rest of the world will take 100 days to find a definite way to get rid of the bolivarian monstrosity. Indeed, what Napoleon achieved in 100 days was the lost of any French recovery at the Vienna meeting, where Talleyrand was surprisingly achieving better terms than expected. After Waterloo not even Talleyrand could do a thing.
What can the opposition do? It all depends whether the outburst of Maduro and Cabello are a representation of chavismo or their desperate cry as they sense chavismo maybe willing to sacrifice them. For the following discussion let's assume that they represent chavismo (the other case is easier, these anti Maduro factions will quickly come to the forefront and we'll deal with them as constructively as possible).
The 100 days (or 30 or 50, does not really matter) started ticking yesterday December 8 and thus the resolution of the conflict is for, at the latest, early March. By then the economic and humanitarian crisis will have swept all parties anyway.
My suggestion for the opposition is very simple, find ways to explain to the country that the economy is a matter for the government to resolve and that the new Assembly will kindly oblige by reviewing speedily any proposal sent to them. Period. (1)
For that communication offensive the new Assembly can do the following: the chair can call for cadenas (mandatory broadcasts), there are precedents; the CONATEL law that regulates communications can be modified on the first days of the tenure so that the remaining subjugated but still alive media can unshackle their transmissions from self censorship as the regulatory agency will not be able to fine them anymore for thought "crimes". Plus other measures like recovering ANTV that will take more time.
Along leaving the dead economy at the regime door step the new Assembly should be sworn in with already a few law projects to recover intuitions and civil rights, forgetting about revenge or control. This can come only later, once the pulse between the executive and legislative power reaches an equilibrium of sorts. In no particular order since that one must be decided as events unfold, the Assembly should be sworn in with the following measures ready to go: amnesty law; call for nominations for a new CNE; revision of law that assigns a mandatory part of the nation's income to the provinces; suspend for a year any bill for weapon procurement; suspend punitive laws like SUNDEE that will have by itself already positive effects on the economy.
The regime will of course oppose every single one but it will be difficult for it to defend such opposition on public opinion as it will point to its unfairness, corruption, abuse and incompetence, reasons why people voted massively against the regime. And if the regime opposition becomes too vehement then there will be the excuse for the Assembly to call for a recall election or a constituent assembly. The 100 days will end there, in a food crisis and a collapse of the regime.
I suspect that there will be enough folks inside chavismo that will not want to sink with Maduro and Cabello and that before the 100 days are over they will have either started negotiations or asked Maduro to resign.
------
1) regular readers will remember that I wrote over the week end a decalogue which is still valid, what I am writing above being more of a question of pace as the regime is acting foolishly.
The 2015 results: general
Now that the CNE has finally announced the final result we can start more detailed analysis. They will be interesting and I will have a few posts on that through the next couple of weeks. Stay tuned. But first an evaluation of my own predictions.
The CNE does not publish vote count as too embarrassing for the regime, You could be sure that had the PSUV won the election, the vote count would be posted. Never mind, there are people that do so and there is a tweet on this matter:
My predictions were as follow:
"So I am going to go with 96 seats and 16% more votes for MUD than for PSUV. Why not? As crazy as any other prediction to be found around. My optimist outcome is 18% ahead with 101 and my pessimist is 13% with 92."
I got the seats wrong but I got the spread right: 56.2-40,8 = 15,4.
I did not get the seats right because against my own instincts I had a general shift in voting pattern across the country when in fact that pattern was less than even. A stupid mistake for more opposition leaning areas even though I did give them less shift than elsewhere, but not enough. Thus the bonus seats for the opposition. An error that delights me, by the way.
At any rate, predicting the MUD-PSUV difference that close makes me quite happy. My reasons not to buy into the optimism of most pollsters was right, my knowledge of the electoral map remained sound even if weaker than for previous election due to lack of time for proper study and update. {end of back patting}
A good basis for guessing atr the next presidential election, sooner than what you may expect.... and governor due December 2016.
The CNE does not publish vote count as too embarrassing for the regime, You could be sure that had the PSUV won the election, the vote count would be posted. Never mind, there are people that do so and there is a tweet on this matter:
MUD 7.707.422 votos (56,2%) y 112 dip (67%) / Psuv 5.599.025 (40,8%) votos y 55 dip (32,93%) El sistema chavista de 2010 benefició a la MUD— Eugenio G. Martínez (@puzkas) December 8, 2015That is self explanatory. The comment means that the gerrymandering in the end benefited the MUD, a normal occurrence as gerrymandering is designed to protect low votes but when the votes become too important in the other side then it backfires.My predictions were as follow:
"So I am going to go with 96 seats and 16% more votes for MUD than for PSUV. Why not? As crazy as any other prediction to be found around. My optimist outcome is 18% ahead with 101 and my pessimist is 13% with 92."
I got the seats wrong but I got the spread right: 56.2-40,8 = 15,4.
I did not get the seats right because against my own instincts I had a general shift in voting pattern across the country when in fact that pattern was less than even. A stupid mistake for more opposition leaning areas even though I did give them less shift than elsewhere, but not enough. Thus the bonus seats for the opposition. An error that delights me, by the way.
At any rate, predicting the MUD-PSUV difference that close makes me quite happy. My reasons not to buy into the optimism of most pollsters was right, my knowledge of the electoral map remained sound even if weaker than for previous election due to lack of time for proper study and update. {end of back patting}
A good basis for guessing atr the next presidential election, sooner than what you may expect.... and governor due December 2016.
Tuesday, 8 December 2015
When consoling the troops makes you certifiable political ass
It is always necessary for the leader of a political party to try to comfort a little bit the troops by promises of keeping up the good fight. If this cannot be done by the harshness of the score or the temperament of the leader then there is always resigning your position. What Maduro did tonight was resigning his subordinates and through Cabello announce open season on the new Assembly.
For those who were hoping for a dialogue between thugs and democrats, there you are.
It all started with a TV show where a bitter Maduro let it be known clearly that he felt betrayed by those who did not vote for him. He went, like a brat, to say that his social plans were now in doubt and that he was hurt that after all his gifts during the campaign (apartment, tablets, taxis,...) he did not get the support he deserved. He did not realize of course that he was also admitting to a crime, of buying votes. But I digress.
Then at some point Cabello joined him (I did not watch, I am just summarizing Twitter, the only open media of Venezuela). It was for Cabello to announce the new battle plans against the incoming Assembly. They include a series of new laws and appointments to be made before normal sessions end on December 15. Yes, the assembly can call a lame duck session and sit as far as January 4 I guess, but already some of the decisions announced would be illegal if they were to be approved in that delay. For example, laws need a certain numbers of discussion sessions. Naming new High Court (TSJ) judges must include a nomination process that requires weeks.
Thus even if the defeated chavista representatives went along, whose motivation remains to be seen as they are less threatened than Cabello by the courts, most of Cabello's legislative program would be illegal and I, for one, doubt that the TSJ would dare to annul an Assembly vote to revoke those lame duck decisions. Were the TSJ do so the new National Assembly would have no other choice but to call for a constituent assembly to remove ALL judges from their job.
Of course all of this bravado is the result of a bitter deception, the more so that in spite of all maneuvering the CNE finally recognized today that the National Assembly will have a 2/3 majority. To add insult to injury, that majority is due to the 3 elected representatives of the indigenous people. When Chavez wrote his 1999 constitution he included a provision that 3 representatives should be included just for indigenous people. That never worked out because if the candidates had to be named by the natives, too many non natives could affect the election. But that was not the point. The point was that in eternal gratitude for what came to be an empty gesture chavismo would have a lock on those three seats. Guess what? The natives are as fed up with scarcity than the invaders.
The bravado nature is confirmed with the latest on ANTV (our dim C-Span). Now Cabello has decided that it would go to its workers and thus the new leadership of the Assembly will not be able to direct its own TV Channel. This is of course idiotic because the new Assembly would now be forced to revoke the CONATEL law to control media and return TVes to its old owners Radio Caracas TV (and I also doubt that no matter how packed the TSJ is it would annul such decisions).
I, for one, think that Maduro and Cabello tonight are digging fast their own hole. Alone.
Note: Maduro asked for the resignation of his cabinet when he is the one who should resign. Some already suggest that it is to remove from office those that are the more compromised by shady finances and to thus delay their eventual exam by New Assembly. The real question though is who will dare to accpet the new jobs at a collapsing presidency.
For those who were hoping for a dialogue between thugs and democrats, there you are.
It all started with a TV show where a bitter Maduro let it be known clearly that he felt betrayed by those who did not vote for him. He went, like a brat, to say that his social plans were now in doubt and that he was hurt that after all his gifts during the campaign (apartment, tablets, taxis,...) he did not get the support he deserved. He did not realize of course that he was also admitting to a crime, of buying votes. But I digress.
Then at some point Cabello joined him (I did not watch, I am just summarizing Twitter, the only open media of Venezuela). It was for Cabello to announce the new battle plans against the incoming Assembly. They include a series of new laws and appointments to be made before normal sessions end on December 15. Yes, the assembly can call a lame duck session and sit as far as January 4 I guess, but already some of the decisions announced would be illegal if they were to be approved in that delay. For example, laws need a certain numbers of discussion sessions. Naming new High Court (TSJ) judges must include a nomination process that requires weeks.
Thus even if the defeated chavista representatives went along, whose motivation remains to be seen as they are less threatened than Cabello by the courts, most of Cabello's legislative program would be illegal and I, for one, doubt that the TSJ would dare to annul an Assembly vote to revoke those lame duck decisions. Were the TSJ do so the new National Assembly would have no other choice but to call for a constituent assembly to remove ALL judges from their job.
Of course all of this bravado is the result of a bitter deception, the more so that in spite of all maneuvering the CNE finally recognized today that the National Assembly will have a 2/3 majority. To add insult to injury, that majority is due to the 3 elected representatives of the indigenous people. When Chavez wrote his 1999 constitution he included a provision that 3 representatives should be included just for indigenous people. That never worked out because if the candidates had to be named by the natives, too many non natives could affect the election. But that was not the point. The point was that in eternal gratitude for what came to be an empty gesture chavismo would have a lock on those three seats. Guess what? The natives are as fed up with scarcity than the invaders.
The bravado nature is confirmed with the latest on ANTV (our dim C-Span). Now Cabello has decided that it would go to its workers and thus the new leadership of the Assembly will not be able to direct its own TV Channel. This is of course idiotic because the new Assembly would now be forced to revoke the CONATEL law to control media and return TVes to its old owners Radio Caracas TV (and I also doubt that no matter how packed the TSJ is it would annul such decisions).
I, for one, think that Maduro and Cabello tonight are digging fast their own hole. Alone.
Note: Maduro asked for the resignation of his cabinet when he is the one who should resign. Some already suggest that it is to remove from office those that are the more compromised by shady finances and to thus delay their eventual exam by New Assembly. The real question though is who will dare to accpet the new jobs at a collapsing presidency.
Musings on the 0,6666666666.... An Irrational or Transcendental number?
As I type, the opposition claims it got 2/3 of the Assembly and the CNE still tries to find ways to deny that number. But in a way it does not matter much, the psychological effect is there, and what matters more is that the vote against the current regime is 2 million+ votes. That is right, the MUD got more than 2 million votes that the PSUV alliance (GPP). The other candidates, I think , did not go much more than 1%, making this election the most polarized in our history (Chavez presidential victories aside but they were of a different nature, outright plebiscites on a charismatic leader).
By any measure the electoral result is surprising and transcendental. The Maduro's regime has been irremediably trashed, but not ousted. And that is were the key importance of the 2 million vote resides. That the regime conceded, that it was forced to by the army to do so is not democracy. With 2 million votes ahead the armed forces were not going to support a fraud because they would have had the task to kill what was needed to kill to save the regime. In the XXI century such crimes do not prescribe and General Padrino merely voiced the concerns of the bulk of the Army: "this disaster is of the politician's own making and there is no reason why we should take the hit for that". That the army benefited immensely from the regime is, in its eyes, circumstantial: the laws and lack of supervision that allowed such corruption were of the making of the politicians.
To be or not to be sanguine about a 2/3 Assembly majority? Well, for starters, the gerrymandering operated in reverse once a threshold had been reached. Also, that 2 million surprise did not follow what had been taking place slowly. The opposition share of the vote has been growing slowly from disgruntled chavistas that abstain an election or two until their conscience finally brings them to the other side. This time around too many chavistas jumped across the line outright. Too many I write because such shifts can be go back as fast as they came in. Thus the first consideration on sanguinity: that 2/3 is an ephemeral, irrational result that we should not build much on it. Speaking of constitution change right now, in the face of an economic blow out is, well, maybe unwise.
The second factor on sanguinity is the reaction of the regime. All that has been written before, at least on this blog, is still valid. They are a bunch of thugs focused on personal power and wealth. That they retreated Sunday is due to the only language thugs understand: force. 2 million + vote and the refusal of the army to go along with a fraud that could not be covered up in thick make up is a language they understand. The democratic language that people got tired of them and demand at the very least an aggiornamento of their objectives is a message that so far does not seem to have reached the guilt cortex area of Maduro, Cabello, Rodriguez and most heavy weights of the regime.
I allow myself to think that a 2/3 majority will scare the beejeezuzz of these thugs in charge and push them away of any possible transition. For the opposition to defend and assume the 0,666666... means that it has to be ready to face conflict much sooner than expected. Not that a 3/5 majority would be pleasing to the regime, but it would make negotiations easier to come along.
Let's not forget one thing: there is an economy blow up coming. What we have seen in 2015 is nothing. If we do not want to starve in 2016 or die of fever because we do not even aspirin we are going to have to go hat in hand for money. The only one left that can bail us out is the IMF and there is a need to convince the executive power in the hands of chavismo to accept that reality. Imposing it just because we have a 2/3 majority is not going to do.
To close this, a personal anecdote. The cleaning lady at home came back today from having gone to vote in her village. She has been always anti Chavez even though her village has voted 80% for Chavez (it went down to 62% Sunday...). She was happy. She hopes that the new National Assembly is going to arrange things quickly because she is sick and tired of the long lines. Talking to her I realized, to my great horror, that she has no clue as to what a National Assembly job is. For her, the N.A. is kind of a guardian put in place to replace Maduro at the helm, or something like that. I did not dare go in depth. Yet I explained in simple terms and images what a N.A. is for. It was like a revelation to her. She admitted that she had not been able to find anyone to clear that confusion for her. And she was disappointed to learn that the darn N.A. will not be able to fix up things fast. As in next week.
2/3 you said?
By any measure the electoral result is surprising and transcendental. The Maduro's regime has been irremediably trashed, but not ousted. And that is were the key importance of the 2 million vote resides. That the regime conceded, that it was forced to by the army to do so is not democracy. With 2 million votes ahead the armed forces were not going to support a fraud because they would have had the task to kill what was needed to kill to save the regime. In the XXI century such crimes do not prescribe and General Padrino merely voiced the concerns of the bulk of the Army: "this disaster is of the politician's own making and there is no reason why we should take the hit for that". That the army benefited immensely from the regime is, in its eyes, circumstantial: the laws and lack of supervision that allowed such corruption were of the making of the politicians.
To be or not to be sanguine about a 2/3 Assembly majority? Well, for starters, the gerrymandering operated in reverse once a threshold had been reached. Also, that 2 million surprise did not follow what had been taking place slowly. The opposition share of the vote has been growing slowly from disgruntled chavistas that abstain an election or two until their conscience finally brings them to the other side. This time around too many chavistas jumped across the line outright. Too many I write because such shifts can be go back as fast as they came in. Thus the first consideration on sanguinity: that 2/3 is an ephemeral, irrational result that we should not build much on it. Speaking of constitution change right now, in the face of an economic blow out is, well, maybe unwise.
The second factor on sanguinity is the reaction of the regime. All that has been written before, at least on this blog, is still valid. They are a bunch of thugs focused on personal power and wealth. That they retreated Sunday is due to the only language thugs understand: force. 2 million + vote and the refusal of the army to go along with a fraud that could not be covered up in thick make up is a language they understand. The democratic language that people got tired of them and demand at the very least an aggiornamento of their objectives is a message that so far does not seem to have reached the guilt cortex area of Maduro, Cabello, Rodriguez and most heavy weights of the regime.
I allow myself to think that a 2/3 majority will scare the beejeezuzz of these thugs in charge and push them away of any possible transition. For the opposition to defend and assume the 0,666666... means that it has to be ready to face conflict much sooner than expected. Not that a 3/5 majority would be pleasing to the regime, but it would make negotiations easier to come along.
Let's not forget one thing: there is an economy blow up coming. What we have seen in 2015 is nothing. If we do not want to starve in 2016 or die of fever because we do not even aspirin we are going to have to go hat in hand for money. The only one left that can bail us out is the IMF and there is a need to convince the executive power in the hands of chavismo to accept that reality. Imposing it just because we have a 2/3 majority is not going to do.
To close this, a personal anecdote. The cleaning lady at home came back today from having gone to vote in her village. She has been always anti Chavez even though her village has voted 80% for Chavez (it went down to 62% Sunday...). She was happy. She hopes that the new National Assembly is going to arrange things quickly because she is sick and tired of the long lines. Talking to her I realized, to my great horror, that she has no clue as to what a National Assembly job is. For her, the N.A. is kind of a guardian put in place to replace Maduro at the helm, or something like that. I did not dare go in depth. Yet I explained in simple terms and images what a N.A. is for. It was like a revelation to her. She admitted that she had not been able to find anyone to clear that confusion for her. And she was disappointed to learn that the darn N.A. will not be able to fix up things fast. As in next week.
2/3 you said?
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